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POLICY-MAKING AND SECRETARIAT INFLUENCE IN THE U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY: THE CASE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

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During the annual sessions of the General ssembly of the United Nations the policy and udget of the Office of Public Information (OPI) f the organization have been the perennial enter of a complex debate. Instructions first iven the Secretariat in 1946[1] provide some lements of this debate, while others depend on he professional expertise of the international ivil service and on its influence and support in General Assembly divided several ways. As a hole, the outcome demonstrates once more oth the durable force of an attractive idea and he truth of the maxim that secretariats have reat weight in the policy processes of interational, as of other, organizations. For despite epeated debate and attack OPI has proved nduring and resilient.

During the last 15 years the many-faceted rogram of the agency[2] has shrunk somewhat, o be sure, under the economizer's knife. In articular, it was under unusually severe critiism in 1957, when the General Assembly esablished an expert committee to investigate N public information activities, and also in 958, when the results of the inquiry were disussed. This committee, appointed with the nenthusiastic concurrence of the Secretary-General,[3] and made up of six governmental nominees not all of whom had experience with public information, directly challenged some of the working assumptions of OPI and called attention to difficulties with others. Their report struck a blow, too, at the internal balance of OPI, accused it of substantive failures and urged it to design new programs. OPI's first reaction was defensive; its second, embodied in a paper the Secretary-General placed before the General Assembly, disclosed some organizational changes made in concession to the experts' report.[4] These responses notwithstanding, the General Assembly probably has not eliminated fundamental contradictions in the UN concept which have troubled OPI since 1946, nor has it overcome the advantages which enable OPI to maintain its organizational identity and stability. The outcome instead illuminates both the problems and the strength of an administrative agency charged with conflicting goals, but shielded by strong leadership at the top and benefited by divisions among its critics.

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[1] UN General Assembly Resolution 13 (I).

[2] For a comment on the development of the proram, see Robert H. Cory, Jr., "Forging a Public nformation Policy for the United Nations," *nternational Organization*, Vol. VII, No. 2 (May 953), pp. 229–242. Each of the *Annual Reports f the Secretary-General*, published as Supplement o. 1 to the *Official Records* of each session of he General Assembly, includes a descriptive and nalytical section on public information and pubc opinion.

[3] *United Nations, Official Records, General Assembly: Twelfth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 41*, p. 34 (hereafter cited as *GA: 12th sess.*, etc.). The committee was established under General Assembly Resolution 1177 (XII). Its report, dated Sept. 20, 1958, is UN Document A/3928, "Report of the Expert Committee on United Nations Public Information." The committee members were: Robert A. O. Bevan, a British advertising man; Ahmed M. El-Messiri, an Egyptian lawyer and representative at UN meetings since 1948; Enrique Rodriguez-Fabregat, head of the Uruguayan mission to the UN since 1947; P. N. Haksar, director of the External Publicity Division of the Indian foreign office and a lawyer; Louis P. Lochner, veteran American foreign correspondent; and Alexey F. Sokirkin, a Soviet diplomat. UN Press Release ORG/364, March 13, 1958.

[4] UN Document A/4122.

My purpose here is to show the influence of OPI on the policy-making process of the United Nations and how its policies and organization are maintained uninjured despite repeated onslaughts in the General Assembly. I shall argue that its acknowledged status as an expert body and a program strongly supported by one group of states in a divided General Assembly produced decisions which prevent radical changes in OPI.

I. CONTRADICTORY INSTRUCTIONS

The work of OPI has echoed a contradiction written into the UN Charter, the contradiction inherent in confederations. The Charter begins strikingly with a preamble recounting the determination of the *peoples* of the United Nations to seek a peaceful world. It then drops these admirable sentiments in favor of a set of legal obligations and limitations on *states* whose governments may or may not be responsive to these postulated wishes of their peoples.

OPI has always aimed its program at the peoples of the world, not just at their governments. In its first declaration of principles for public information, the General Assembly told the Secretariat that "the United Nations cannot achieve the purposes for which it has been created unless the peoples of the world are fully informed of its aims and activities."[5] On this premise the information department was instructed to "... promote to the greatest possible extent an informed understanding of th work and purposes of the United Nation among the peoples of the world." The premis is only as good as the success of the effort calle for in the instruction. Less than fully informe peoples of the world must logically lead to failure of the United Nations.

But after crediting the peoples of the worl with holding the life of the United Nations i their hands, the General Assembly delivered further instruction. OPI was primarily to assis and rely "... upon the co-operation of the established government and non-governmenta agencies of information to provide the publi with information. . . . " Thus, the Secretaria had to depend on organizations outside of it control to pass along communications. Nevertheless, OPI could "... on its own initiative engage in positive information activities tha will supplement the services of existing agencies . . . to the extent that these are insufficien to realize the purpose set forth. . . . " Here OP again faced a contradiction, for it was clearl to have a marginal role in informing the people of the world. But if necessary, it might act o its own initiative. Because it is unlikely tha the peoples of any part of the world approac the "fully informed" state on UN affairs, th functions of OPI soon might become as comprehensive as the world was ill-informed.

This was only the beginning of contradiction OPI also was told not to engage in "propaganda." Distinguishing between public information and propaganda is at best difficult an frequently quite impossible, if propaganda b understood to consist of information fed to public with the intention of having it adop given views. The department enjoined fron putting out propaganda had already been instructed to promote an informed understanding of the United Nations, whose members ha authorized writing into the Charter a determination to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights . . . in the equal rights of men an women and of the nations large and small. . . . Could it then introduce this statement into th Union of South Africa, the State of Mississipp and Soviet Uzbekistan, under the heading o public information? But if not, how could th Charter be understood; and without an understanding of the Charter, how could the UN b understood? Similar questions could be aske about many of the most publicized UN activities, ranging from studies of full employmen (controversial in the United States), to self-determination (presumably of high interest i Hungary) and human rights (not uninterestin in the Dominican Republic); from the despairng reiteration by the General Assembly of the need for disarmament (a matter under negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union) to its condemnation of all propaganda against the peace (an idea with as many meanings as there are definers). If the Secretariat attempted to promote understanding of such activities *without* careful selection of material and location, it would surely be accused by some governments of engaging in "propaganda." If publicity subjects were drawn from among other resolutions of the General Assembly, or *were* carefully adapted to particular areas or audiences, other governments would surely hold that the Secretariat had failed to maintain objectivity.

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[5] These and subsequent quotations of public information principles are from General Assembly Resolution 13 (I). The resolution itself is brief, containing only the cited material and the remark that the recommendations of the Technical Advisory Committee on Information, which reported to the Preparatory Commission, constitute a sound foundation for the UN public information program. These recommendations were attached to Resolution 13 (I) as an annex and thus adopted by the General Assembly. Establishment of the Technical Advisory Committee had been favored by the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission. It was established and its report was adopted by the Preparatory Commission and submitted textually to the General Assembly. Thus, information policy was a concern of the United Nations from its early days. See *Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations* (London, 1945), pp. 89, 102–103.

An attempt by the General Assembly to redefine its injunction against propaganda resulted in renewed insistence on vagueness, for an expert committee declared that the prohibition was not intended to limit OPI in promoting public understanding of the UN. Rather the Office was to avoid ". . . a bias in contradistinction to a policy of strict impartiality and objectivity in the presentation of news and information."[6]

Other instructions vested the main responsibility for formulating information policy in the Secretary-General and the head of OPI, where it has remained. Establishment of branch offices was to be considered. The functions of OPI, it was decided, fell into media categories—press, publications, radio, films, graphics and exhibitions, public liaison and reference. Services to the press were to be provided and pamphlets and other publications prepared. The work of other media was to be encouraged and material provided them when necessary. Also to be considered was the use of an advisory committee.

In carrying out these instructions, OPI strives to put an attractive face on UN activities but usually does not spend much effort in deliberately obscuring disagreeable aspects. The substance of the information disseminated appears to fall into two overlapping categories. In the first are reports and announcements of decisions by United Nations organs and the processes by which decisions are taken. For example, OPI spreads information on meetings of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The second category includes the explanation and application of policies determined by the various organs. This covers the work of the Secretariat and other field organizations and the compliance of governments with the policies of the organization. For example, OPI publicizes the character and work of the United Nations Emergency Force and, at the same time, indicates how governments contributing to it have responded to the recommendations of the General Assembly.

OPI employs both facilitative and direct means to spread its message. The "hot" news media benefit mainly from the facilitative part of the program. Working space, documents, television and radio booths, press releases, press conferences and other conveniences, furnished by OPI, help them get the story of United Nations work. Press relations and radio officers guide them through the procedural maze, arrange interviews and offer briefings. Members of the general public, too, receive direct services on visits to major UN establishments. Scholars and "opinion makers" may also receive certain services. Thus, the facilitative functions have a largely indirect effect on the peoples of the world. Only part of the material channeled through the facilitative operations of OPI originates with it; most of it represents the actual work of the United Nations. And, in addition, members of national delegations frequently feed into these channels copies of their speeches, supporting information, other materials and personal appearances. For them, and especially for the smaller delegations, these OPI operations offer important, easily available access to the public.

Direct means by which OPI reaches the public include pamphlets and other publications, prepared radio broadcasts and television shows, pictures and posters and cinema. Much of this material originates in OPI and, while based on UN activities, is produced mainly by permanent officials. The direct means used by OPI represent the major part of its effort to supplement existing means of communication.

The UN Information Centers, manned by OPI personnel in more than 25 locations on every continent, mirror the headquarters activities on a local scale. Their production resembles that of headquarters but in local languages and adaptations; they also distribute quantities of materials from New York. Because they have restricted geographical scope and personnel presumed expert in local practices, they respond more quickly and flexibly to local needs but within instructions received from headquarters. They report to New York on local problems and observations.

II. CRITICISM IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Fixing OPI in a field between opposed instructions was both the cause and the result of difficulty in the General Assembly. Contradictory instructions provide no rational basis for judging the work of the office. No one could estimate with any accuracy how closely the peoples of the world approach full information on the United Nations, how much supplementary effort would be needed, what was propaganda and where or in what situations more rather than less effort might be needed—and above all how much money should be devoted to such efforts. The OPI nevertheless had to prepare a program and a budget. The General Assembly had to examine it. Without a clear standard, the examination inevitably fell into confusion.

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[6] *GA: 6th sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 41*, p. 53.

From the beginning, discussion in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, where detailed readings of the budget presented by the Secretary-General take place, tended both to develop general support for the OPI program and also to arouse opposition on the ground that OPI required an excessive proportion of the planned expenditure. By 1948, an enduring pattern of debate had formed. Those governments which stood primarily for economy joined others, which objected to the content of the OPI program, to demand lower information appropriations. They were opposed by a majority, including all the Latin American states and many underdeveloped countries, which supported both the substance of the information program and the budget. Generally, the economy bloc was led by the United Kingdom, which was anxious to preserve its dollar reserves, and had heavy Commonwealth support. The Soviet Union and its allies promptly joined in criticizing the costs and sometimes added specific denunciations of the program. The United States opposed inefficiency and waste but supported OPI. Because OPI had the positive approval of a large number of members, it suffered only slight budgetary cuts.

What reductions were made followed suggestions by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.[7] This body, elected by the General Assembly, at first viewed the OPI proposals with only mild scepticism, pointing out that it was difficult to rationalize the budget of a growing organization. But it soon complained of ". . . the difficulties of proceeding into this field without specific guidance from the General Assembly concerning the limits of the activities undertaken . . . and the proportion of expenditure for public information to the total budget for the United Nations."[8] The Committee also made clear in 1949 its regret that a serious effort by the economy group to set the maximum expenditure on public information at 10 per cent of the total UN outlay had been defeated. Therefore the Advisory Committee, again declaring that ". . . the proportion of public information expenditures remains too high . . . ," reviewed and shaved individual budget items.[1] OPI lost a post here and a voyage there, a pamphlet here and an edition there, but on the whole succeeded in preserving its original program.

The constant effort to limit the growth of OPI and to shape its form nevertheless bore fruit during 1950, when the Fifth Committee asked the Advisory Committee to look for economies. OPI responded with the declaration that ". . . no further reductions can be made in its expenditures without impairing the efficiency of its services." This meant that the Advisory Committee would have to take responsibility for suppressing or contracting existing services, a move sure to be unpopular with many governments. To an Advisory Committee request for a list of activities together with their priorities, OPI failed, in the opinion of the Committee, to reply in accordance with the spirit and purpose of the Assembly resolution. Although the Advisory Committee insisted that a priority scheme was essential, it nevertheless suggested specific budget reductions but admitted that it had less than the full factual picture. This it had been unable to obtain from OPI.[11]

OPI shrank from any attempt to lay out formal priorities, a fact which was noticed in the Fifth Committee. A number of representatives endorsed the view of Pun Changprasoet of Thailand that ". . . it was not possible on the one hand arbitrarily to fix the amount of the appropriations . . . and on the other to apply the fundamental principles which had guided the Department during the previous five years."[12] The delegations attacking OPI then joined in establishing a new committee to review OPI activities. The new examining body was an 11-member subcommittee of the Fifth Committee, proposed by Syria to review the guiding principles of OPI and make recommendations to guide the Secretary-General in working out the 1953 budget.[13] Its membership included such critics of OPI as Australia, Czechoslovakia and Syria and such proponents as Chile, Pakistan and the Philippines. Its work during a busy Assembly session resulted in a shorter and clearer statement of principles, which nevertheless contained little of new substance and only two important changes.[14]

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[7] For a comment on this body, see J. David Singer, "The United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions," *Public Administration*, Vol. XXXV (Winter 1957), pp. 395–410.

[8] *GA: 4th sess., Suppl. No. 7, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, Second Report of 1949 to the GA*, p. 22.

[9] See *GA: 3d sess., Part I, Fifth Committee, Summary Records*, pp. 300 ff.

[10] *Loc. cit.*, note 8 above, p. 22.

[11] *GA: 6th sess., Suppl. No. 7, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, Second Report of 1951 to the GA*, pp. 28–37.

[12] *GA: 6th sess., Fifth Committee, Summary Records*, p. 86.

The first of these added to the old idea of the need for an informed understanding among the peoples of the world the qualification that OPI must operate "within its budgetary limitations" to promote understanding to the greatest possible extent. On this point, the Pakistani and Philippine representatives entered the logical reservation that such a limitation was superfluous since any UN department must work within its appropriation.

The second change instructed OPI to give special attention to places where information media were less fully developed. Thus, the underdeveloped countries had written into the principles the idea that they should be favored. But the injunction to give greater importance to the very areas where information media were least developed or active implied a greater assignment for OPI. The supplementary role given OPI would inevitably have to be enlarged to fill great *lacunae* in existing information media, and new programs of different varieties in new languages would have to be designed to meet new needs.

As for priorities, the subcommittee received from the head of OPI a three-paragraph statement which in effect rejected the request. It argued that since there was not enough money to go around, and many demands on it, the OPI had to look for the "greatest possible results . . . in the light of prevailing regional and language requirements", and that all factors set forth in the general principles were taken into account. "These budget estimates," the OPI said, "represent the sum-total of hundreds of individual priority judgments both within and between the various sections of the budget." This was the voice of the expert, speaking to the layman.

The subcommittee rather weakly retorted that it should not be "unduly difficult" for OPI to appraise the main categories of services in the light of needs and effectiveness. But it did not demand a table of priorities in the guiding principles nor did it insist that such a document was a prerequisite for any budgetary decisions.

The new principles quickly won acceptance in the Fifth Committee. Only the Soviet bloc—Czechoslovakia, a member of the subcommittee, had objected to the principles on the ground that OPI remained unrestricted—opposed the report, which was adopted by 35 favorable votes with five against and eight abstentions. This action, later approved by the General Assembly, had a double significance. In the first place, the economy bloc had won no victory; it had not been able during six years to limit absolutely or relatively the amount which OPI might propose to spend. Second, it had not forced OPI to work up a list of priorities. Above all, the revision of the OPI principles had resulted in no fundamental changes and had not eliminated contradictions. The chairman of the Fifth Committee remarked that a world information program raised problems which seemed to defy all definition and possibility of solution.[15]

III. TOWARD A BUDGETARY CEILING

Despite the failure of the OPI critics to win a firm decision on priorities, the view that it would not be unduly difficult to work out a table of needs and an assessment of effectiveness gave them the basis of a renewed attack in 1955. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions then complained that it had been assured that priorities would be brought into effect but that ". . . the 1956 budget estimates do not visibly reflect any system of priorities. The Committee has, however, received a preliminary and tentative indication of the major areas of activity that are expected to claim special attention during 1956. These include the peaceful uses of atomic energy, disarmament problems, and economic development with special reference to technical assistance."[16] These subjects represented the main themes selected by OPI in accordance with suggestions made by an advisory group it had meanwhile appointed. This body recommended reorganizing the work of OPI around a thematic approach,[17] a phrase to be heard later in discussions of the information program. Urging flexibility and imaginative planning (thus implying that these were absent), the Advisory Committee announced that "... the appropriate level of expenditure is largely a matter of judgement." It then judged that more than $5,117,000, planned for expenditure in 1956, was "... definitely on the high side, when viewed in relation to the aggregate cost of other activities." It thought that $4 million would be more appropriate and suggested this as a target to be attained during the next three years.[18]

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[13] Subcommittee 8 of the Fifth Committee was established under a resolution contained in United Nations Document A/C.5/L.117, Rev. 1.

[14] *GA: 6th sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 41*, pp. 52–56. This *Annex* reprints United Nations Document A/C.5/L.172 and includes the complete text of the revised "Basic Principles Underlying the Public Information Activities of the United Nations." Subsequent discussion of Subcommittee 8 in this article is based on it.

[15] *GA: 6th sess., Fifth Committee, Summary Records*, p. 330.

[16] *GA: 10th sess., Suppl. No. 7, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, First Report to the Tenth Session of the GA*, p. 21.

The Fifth Committee, which rejected a move by the Soviet Union to reduce the budget to the target immediately, then accepted another Soviet resolution to adopt the Advisory Committee's report. The vote was 35 to three with one abstention.[19] This action indicated that the economy group had renewed strength, but the low vote also reflected the absence of many representatives of smaller states, which usually would oppose such a move. It also meant that for the first time a standing limit on expenditures faced OPI. Thus, priorities and an absolute limit on expenditure had been combined by the Advisory Committee as a means of reducing the scope of OPI's work. OPI could no longer look to the principles adopted four years earlier as a perfect means of protection. Moreover, the supporters of OPI would have to make up lost ground if the suggested limit was not to become a permanent ceiling.

While the General Assembly moved toward a fixed OPI budget, it also foresaw an increase in services as the result of the increase in UN membership. During 1954, the Secretary-General had put a survey group to work on the headquarters information establishment. Its report, made known to the General Assembly,[20] set off a demand for a similar survey outside of headquarters. Such a survey was undertaken, reported to the Fifth Committee, commented upon by the Advisory Committee, and discussed during the 1955 Assembly session.[21] The report, which urged reapportioning expenses between the field and headquarters, called attention to the frequent demand for more information centers and increased services to individual countries.

The general approval of the Advisory Committee's approach became specific the following year. The Advisory Committee firmly recommended a $4.5 million ceiling on OPI activities.[22] This proposal and the information program as a whole underwent a rather full discussion during which the Soviet Union proposed immediate adoption of the ceiling. But a British amendment postponed its application until 1959, the intervening years to be used for readjusting activities. This resolution was adopted by 27 votes to 15 with 19 abstentions. At the same time, the Fifth Committee unanimously commended the Secretary-General for proposing to extend the network of Information Centers and recommended that preferential attention be given the new Member States, especially the underdeveloped ones. The funds were to come from savings elsewhere in the OPI. The interest in the Information Centers also impelled the Fifth Committee to request the Advisory Committee to study field activities, but consideration of its report was deferred until the next session of the General Assembly.[23]

The great number of abstentions on the resolution establishing a $4.5 million ceiling indicated less than enthusiastic support. Yet the abstainers were unwilling to bear responsibility for a higher level of expenditure. At the same time, the Secretary-General clearly believed that such a ceiling was unrealistic because of the needs of new members, the general demands for information, probable price increases and the normal increase in salaries as the staff gained seniority.[24] The final complicating element was the resolution on Information Centers which found the Fifth Committee ready to sponsor what appeared to be a popular move.

IV. AN EXPERT COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED

Considering the Secretary-General's views and the instructions given him to cut costs in order to take on more activities, his reply to the General Assembly in 1957 followed logicaly. In effect, he said that he could not help surpassing the $4.5 million target and would even find it difficult to avoid exceeding the previous year's budget—unless, of course, activities were reduced. To meet the request for more Information Centers, he proposed curtailing some activities in order to provide personnel and services for the new offices in Beirut, Madrid, Rangoon, Rome, and Tokyo. Radio operations would be reduced and the *United Nations Review* would appear quarterly instead of monthly.[25]

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[17] *Ibid;* and *GA: 10th sess., Suppl. No. 1, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, p. 115.

[18] *Loc. cit.*, note 16 above, p. 21.

[19] *GA: 10th sess., Fifth Committee, Summary Records*, p. 147.

[20] *GA: 9th sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 53*, pp. 1–3, 16, 28.

[21] *GA: 10th sess., Annexes, Agenda Items 38 and 47*, p. 7.

[22] *GA: 11th sess., Suppl. No. 7, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, Second Report to the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly*, p. 24.

[23] A fuller account of these incidents may be found in *GA: 11th sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 43*, pp. 89–92.

[24] *GA: 11th sess., Fifth Committee, Summary Records*, p. 117.

The real significance of this position lay not in its technical features but in its general political implications. If accepted, it would continue the standoff in the General Assembly which had permitted OPI to come through years of criticism without important damage. OPI supporters, pointing to the estimates of OPI experts, could again claim that lowering the information budget would reduce activity. This would affect many states, which then could be called upon to defeat the economy forces. The principles on which OPI was expected to operate need never be invoked. Rather the garnering of a majority would depend on simple horse-trading and even a cohesive economy bloc could be defeated, as on a rivers-and-harbors bill in Congress. In effect, the Secretariat proposal harked back to the situation before the Advisory Committee suggestion that the budget for information be limited by an absolute ceiling.

The Advisory Committee offered stiff resistance and new suggestions which eventually led during 1958 to a searching but controversial examination and a severe crisis for OPI. The Advisory Committee insisted that every effort be made to determine the appropriate level of public information expenditures and noted that the Secretary-General had not alluded to an overall reduction of activities. Calling attention to the ". . . fact that the details of the work programmes and priorities in the public information field are left to the discretion of the Secretary-General, subject only to the broad policy directives of the General Assembly and to the limitations of the budget provision," it proposed a thorough investigation of the responsibilities and work of OPI. An earlier suggestion by the Advisory Committee that the Information Centers be surveyed was to be revived and the scope of the study expanded ". . . to include the entire range of the public information activities of the Organization." Meanwhile, reductions in the proposed program were suggested in order to approach a $4.5 million ceiling. But the Advisory Committee doubted the wisdom of turning the *United Nations Review* into a quarterly.[26]

These recommendations by the Advisory Committee put the entire question of public information with new clarity. To reject the Secretary-General's position decisively and to go behind his claims and programs would make possible a telling attempt at economy and give the Fifth Committtee its own technical lever to use against the commanding prestige of the expert which OPI had hitherto had.

Because the heart of the proposal was an investigation of OPI, it was to it that Dag Hammarskjöld addressed himself. He fell back on his position as chief administrative officer to protect his prerogatives in the public information field and then made known that he had no objection to the idea of a small committee. He even suggested that the Advisory Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and a similar body advising on the United Nations Emergency Force might serve as examples and welcomed the advice and observations of member states. He asked for a larger membership than three, for better geographical distribution, and also suggested that governments, rather than the General Assembly, appoint experts as members of the committee.[27] Chairman Aghnides of the Advisory Committee stuck by his original proposal and then reiterated the real point of the inquiry: ". . . we should bear in mind the fact that the Department of Public Information does not directly derive specific programme directives from any legislative organs."[28]

The economy bloc in the Fifth Committee promptly supported the proposal for an inquiring committee and now that the Secretary-General had accepted it in principle, the OPI backers had little choice but to go along. Max Aitken, the British delegate and floor leader of the economy proponents, added some bait for underdeveloped countries. He remarked that Information Centers in such places as London, Paris and Washington perhaps duplicated governmental activities but that they would be useful in many other locales, especially in new Member States. Thus, he implied that if the underdeveloped countries, new members and Latin American states would support the inquiry, they could get more Information Centers. The bait was snapped up by Ecuador, India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Haiti and Cambodia. Only the Egyptian delegate, El-Messiri, who was later to serve as a member of the committee of enquiry, opposed this idea, arguing that the Centers ensured impartial information in case of disputes.[29]

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[25] *GA: 12th sess., Suppl. No. 7, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, Fifth Report to the General Assembly,* p. 5.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6, 24.

[27] *GA: 12th sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 41,* p. 34.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

The Soviet Union and its satellites attacked the budget because it exceeded the recommended ceiling and supported the enquiry as a means to further economy. Such support, if nothing else, guaranteed representation for the Soviet bloc on the committee. Other representatives repeated earlier arguments that the proportion spent on public information remained too high and that a study would develop reductions. The United States cautiously supported the study but warned that it was difficult to determine an optimum level of expenditure. Perhaps the two strongest speeches in support of a virtually unchanged information program were made by the representatives of Iraq and Italy, both of whom pointed to the importance of such activities as a source of impartial information where it was needed.

The discussion developed two important points. The first was that the scope of the inquiry would, in Aitken's words, "be of a technical nature; a reappraisal of the underlying principles and policy was perhaps overdue, but it would first be necessary to inquire into the efficiency of the information services within the existing terms of reference."[30] Thus, it was not principles but practices which were to be examined: efficiency was the watchword. The second point grew out of the nature of the expert committee. Its size became the object of discussion and then compromise, which set it at six. The compromise was necessary because of the desire of several delegations to include all geographical regions in the body. In other words, they attempted to protect their own interests from possible damage. With the question of size resolved, largely because of American insistence, a resolution to establish the Expert Committee was sponsored by 13 powers, most of them identified with the economy proponents, and passed the Fifth Committee by a unanimous 66 votes with one abstention.[31]

V. THE REPORT OF THE EXPERTS

The Expert Committee labored some five months to turn out a detailed report based on 44 interviews at New York and visits to and interviews in 16 field offices. Whatever else may be said of the report, it touched off an impassioned debate and again called attention to the great difficulty of designing a public information program that would satisfy the Secretariat and the various groups in the General Assembly The very existence of the Expert Committee as well as its seriousness, challenged the stance adopted by OPI, which thought itself at least as expert as its examiners.

From the beginning, the Expert Committee went beyond a purely technical examination It assumed that it had to look into the basic principles under which OPI operated and to make recommendations for their reform.[32] In doing so, it followed a rather ambiguous lead in a memorandum that Under-Secretary Ahmed Bokhari had presented at the outset of its work.[33] But the experts did not in fact try to revise the principles. Rather they suggested reinterpretations and implied that a reappraisal of the nature and scope of UN responsibilities in public information might lead to further economies.[34] Once again, therefore, the principles which had permitted the formation of a stable Secretariat unit to deal with public information escaped fundamental examination.

Nevertheless, the Expert Committee touched many sensitive places in OPI. It rejected what it claimed was the Secretariat's interpretation of the principles to the effect that OPI had to operate in all media. It pointed out that budgetary limitations as such had little meaning and that by failing to define its targets OPI had worsened a tendency in the General Assembly to make *ad hoc* reductions. The lack of definition of targets was a third major difficulty. Thereupon, the experts suggested a target consisting of four classes of peoples and organizations. These were governmental agencies and public institutions which influence opinion; people working in mass communications; people and organizations demonstrating a real interest in the United Nations and willing to commit themselves; and persons and institutions concerned with education. These target groups, said the Committee, would fit into the principle enjoining the OPI to rely primarily on existing agencies.[35] The experts argued that much more could be done by OPI to use existing channels and stated

> that no other target is possible or directly attainable. The best way, in the opinion of the Com-

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[29] This and the subsequent account is based on *GA: 12th sess.*, *Fifth Committee*, *Summary Records*, pp. 31–65, 69–72.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[32] United Nations Document A/3928, p. 18.

[33] *Ibid.*, Annex I, *passim*.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 82–83.

> mittee, for reaching the peoples of the world at this time is that of working through the Governments of Member States and through a select group of individuals and organizations. As for the OPI's work becoming stultified, the Committee has already shown the ineffectiveness of the present approach and the weaknesses which underlie it. The acceptance of the Committee's definition of the target will make it possible to impart a new sense of direction and purpose to the information activities of the United Nations.[36]

A main source of expense and difficulty had been a mass approach through mass communications. This was ineffective and should be replaced, the committee urged, with "the selective approach of public relations" in the best sense, with a person-to-person approach to *influential people, groups and institutions.* When OPI embarked on programs of its own, it should use selected themes but still should rely primarily on existing information channels.[37]

At the same time, services to redisseminators at New York were not to be fundamentally altered. Rather, duplication and some of the perhaps over-elaborate services, such as running summaries of meetings, might be eliminated. Basic facilities for correspondents would be available. While OPI products must be objective and impartial,

> particular care should be taken to present the information in a manner and form which leads to identification of people with the United Nations and not estrangement. The importance of the United Nations as a machinery for promoting international co-operation and peacefully resolving international disputes should be emphasized.[38]

Special importance was given Information Centers and their personnel, who should be rotated from headquarters, study their areas, cultivate personal contacts and pay special attention to the discovery of new persons and institutions willing to make commitments leading to the dissemination of information.[39]

The Expert Committee proposed reorganizing OPI in order to strengthen coordination and planning at headquarters, especially with regard to the Information Centers. A new Bureau of Planning and Coordination, with a superior status, would accomplish this job, while a Press and Publications Division and a Radio and Visual Services Division would provide materials and services. The existing Public Liaison Division was to disappear. For the Press and Publications Divison, a specific reorganization plan was drawn up. The *United Nations Review* was to be replaced by a quarterly and its contents altered sharply. Many leaflets and posters would disappear in favor of local production of information materials. The radio service would abandon many of its broadcasts and make available during the General Assembly a 15-minute news show only when there was a firm demand from a member state and when it would be rebroadcast at a satisfactory listening hour. This daily program would become weekly when the Assembly was adjourned. Where "adequate information use" of broadcasts was not made, they would be abandoned. A projected television studio should be deferred and production of feature programs for television abandoned because they had so few outlets. Film strips and exhibition photos should be produced locally with OPI supplying negatives, except in the case of underdeveloped areas where visual materials have special importance. A matrice service should be jettisoned. As for motion pictures the emphasis should be on a film library, with films produced outside the organization. As a means of helping the General Assembly formulate policy, the Expert Committee suggested that the Secretary-General submit an annual assessment of the public information program and a statement of coming operations. In addition, the experts thought that the Secretary-General might refer plans to an advisory group appointed by him from a list of nominees drawn up by the General Assembly. The advisory group would consider in some detail the plans projected by OPI.[40]

The adoption of the target suggested by the experts was intended sharply to reduce important features of the programs of the Press and Publications Bureau and the Radio and Visual Services Division, although all parts of the office would have been affected. The significance of the target, however, was not merely technical. Rather, it meant that for the first time OPI faced a concrete suggestion of budget reductions expressed in expert terms. Earlier suggestions had been turned aside with the comment that valuable work would suffer. Now, by proposing a target, the experts had tried to define what was valuable and what was superfluous.

Furthermore, the specific reorganizations would upset the relative balance between press and radio services that had been maintained since 1946. Reduction of the number of posts would hit especially hard in the Radio and Visual Services Division. The elimination of an existing division would destroy one factor in making the OPI budget. Moreover, the establishment of a new Bureau of Planning and Coordination would downgrade the existing divisions and install hitherto unknown supervision over them and over the Information Centers. Indeed, the new bureau apparently would be at least as large as either the press or radio services. Its coordinating task and its influence over the use of personnel would soon give it controlling strength in determining the programs of the two service divisions. And because it would direct public information work toward the new targets, it would carry out the virtual amputation of services to the undifferentiated general public. Finally, an advisory committee nominated by the General Assembly would put OPI under continuing outside scrutiny and might well add another independent critical voice to that of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Given OPI's relatively immune position, such a suggestion might well have seemed revolutionary, although the Secretary-General himself had indicated that he might find an advisory body of governmental representatives useful.[41]

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[36] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 92–105.

While some in OPI viewed the experts' report as a long step toward a needed reorganization, almost all of its higher officials shared the opinion that their organization was under direct and dangerous attack. The press corps at United Nations Headquarters got possession of parts of the report and blistering stories of a conspiracy to deprive the peoples of the world of objective information began to appear. *The Times*[42] of London spoke of the experts' report as advocating "militant proselytizing" and containing connotations amounting almost to brainwashing. It reported a wave of resentment among correspondents who knew themselves what was important. *The New York Times*[43] stated that the recommendation would "emasculate U.N.'s messages to the world." The United Nations Correspondents Association denounced the report and urged delegations to dissociate themselves from it; their resolution was circulated as an official document at the request of Cuba,[44] a veteran supporter of OPI.

In this controversial atmosphere, the Secretariat sharply retorted to the report with the argument that the Expert Committee had acted *ultra vires* in dealing with policy rather than operations. In a paper prepared by the OPI, the Secretary-General asserted that the new approach urged by the experts would turn national governments and organizations into "filters and transformers between the OPI and the peoples of the world."[45] This would destroy OPI's international character and minimize its important role as an initiator of information. Regarding unrelayed broadcasts, little money could be saved, but Russian, Chinese, Hungarian and Arabic shows would be suspended. As for the content of publications, OPI argued that the experts' dislike of feature treatment seemed unrelated to their advice to project ideas. It defended the *United Nations Review* and claimed to have served the press at headquarters well. In effect, the suggestions on Information Centers already were operative. As for reorganization, the Secretary-General agreed to three divisions but insisted that his directors, not a bureau of planning, be responsible for policy. The new division would consolidate other functions and strengthen relations with Information Centers. The suggestion of periodic reports to the General Assembly and of an advisory committee was rejected with the comment that the Secretary-General would seek advice when it would be useful, and that reports would be superfluous. In addition, he argued that little further savings could be made by carrying out the details of the report. Finally, his comment pointed up the Expert Committee's remark that it had a high opinion of the devotion to duty and professional skill of the personnel of OPI. In his oral presentation of this sharp report,[46] Hammarskjöld somewhat softened his language and accepted general recommendations but added the important thought that the General Assembly should remain satisfied with the principles guiding the department, leaving it to practice to work out details.

VI. ACTION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Although some representatives in the Fifth Committee complained of the press campaign and presumed public reaction, and one charged it had been artificially created,[47] the publicity, together with the broader implications of the Secretary-General's remarks on unrelayed broadcasts, gave a strongly political flavor to the question of public information. Recommendations by the Expert Committee that OPI shift to a public relations approach and a defined target provided a controversial focus for the debate. Supporters of the report argued that only a shift in emphasis was required both to safeguard conformity to the principles and to produce greater efficiency. Opponents insisted that public information was different from public relations, that working through governments and institutions could never ensure objectivity, and that a "thematic approach" led to propaganda. Other opponents agreed with the Secretariat's contention that the experts had exceeded their mandate. General accord greeted the idea of strengthening Information Centers.[48] Strenuous efforts by United Arab Republic representative El-Messiri, a member of the Expert Committee, to explain what he thought were the moderate suggestions of the report, were lost amidst professions of faith in free information and the need to inform the peoples of the world. The economy group, led by the United Kingdom, backed the report strongly but now found themselves in the position of urging reduced information to such countries as Hungary and the Soviet Union. And the latter's representatives added more confusion by attacking the Press and Publications Division as led and dominated by Americans,[49] thus casting discredit on the international civil service and violating the usual practice of commenting only on the work of responsible officials.

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[41] See above, note 27.

[42] Oct. 17, 1958.

[43] Oct. 20, 1958.

[44] UN Document A/C.5/757.

[45] This account is based on UN Document A/3945.

[46] UN Document A/C.5/764.

[47] Japan, Sweden and the Netherlands. *GA: 13th sess., Fifth Committee, Summary Records*, pp. 183, 188, 193. There is no reason to think that some OPI officials might not have encouraged corre-

The supporters of OPI again were armed. With the political weapon, they could discredit the experts' report generally. The Secretary-General's statement gave them ammunition of a technical sort to reply to the arguments of the experts. One of the latter, Professor Rodriguez-Fabregat of Uruguay, aided the Latin American supporters of OPI by weakening the unanimity of the Expert Committee. He made much of his reservation on the recommendation to give up unrelayed broadcasts. Following Hammarskjöld's lead, several delegates reaffirmed their faith in the existing principles on public information. As Raul Quijano of Argentina said, the principles need not be modified, for they were approved by all members and it was universally recognized that the information provided should be objective and given world-wide distribution.

The United States threw its prestige behind the supporters of OPI. In doing so, it repudiated the work of Louis Lochner, the veteran correspondent it had placed on the Expert Committee. The American view, as explained by Senator Hickenlooper, who introduced a United States draft resolution, supported the principles adopted for OPI and wanted to avoid too rigid a definition of targets and close restrictions on the Secretary-General. Hickenlooper opposed spoon-feeding of information and refused to accept the veto of any government on transmission of objective broadcast information to its people. In short, the United States backed the Secretary-General and its resolution in fact would have given him a free hand to apply such parts of the report as he saw fit.[50]

Besides the American resolution, additional drafts were introduced by the United Kingdom, France, and Guatemala, while Bulgaria and Rumania submitted amendments.[51] As the discussion narrowed differences and opened up opportunities for compromise, the main points at issue were the $4.5 million budget ceiling on OPI and the general recommendations made by the Expert Committee. These included injunctions to avoid propaganda, seek identification of peoples with the United Nations, serve correspondents and develop the Information Centers and other field distribution points. The principal differences between the British and American drafts were compromised. Their sponsors rejected the Soviet bloc's demands for an explicit statement of the $4.5 million limit and not even an implicit reference to it appeared. An effort by Honduras to give OPI the fullest possible backing by cutting out any reference to maximum effectiveness at lowest possible cost also was lost. The Fifth Committee finally adopted the compromise draft submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom, by 57 votes to none with 11 abstentions.[52] Most of the abstainers belonged to the Soviet bloc.

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spondents to see a threat to services and facilities in the suggestions made by the experts.

[48] For a fuller summary of the debate, see UN Document A/4062, pp. 9–14.

[49] *Loc. cit.* above, note 47, p. 195.

[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 177–178, and UN Document A/C.5/L.527.

[51] UN Documents A/C.5/L.529; A/C.5/L.530; A/C.5/L.533; A/C.5/L.540; and A/C.5/L.541.

[52] UN Document A/AC.5/L.539; *GA: 13th sess., Fifth Committee, Summary Records*, pp. 328–329.

This resolution incorporated some recommendations of the Expert Committee. It considered that the Secretary-General should give priority to use of media which ensure maximum effectiveness at the lowest possible cost, that more cooperation should be enlisted from governments and other institutions and influential persons, and that more emphasis should be put on the Information Centers. The Secretary-General was requested to give what effect was practical to the Expert Committee recommendations, to consult the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and to report back on his progress.

In effect, this resolution asked the Secretary-General to do what he said he would do, leaving it up to him to decide how to do so. This meant the OPI still had command of its own policy and had weathered serious criticism without much damage. It also appeared to signal momentary defeat for economy proponents. The technical considerations developed by the Expert Committee had failed to penetrate the OPI position, because they were turned into political questions linked to the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union on such matters as Hungary and the Middle East, and because the bloc supporting OPI had members enough to balance the economy group. Further, the Soviet Union made a tactical error in attacking the Press and Publications Bureau; the attack boomeranged and strengthened arguments of OPI supporters who saw in the Expert Committee's recommendations on radio broadcasting and on targets a possible advantage to the Soviet bloc. As for such technical recommendations as the replacement of the *United Nations Review* by a quarterly or deferment of a new television studio, these were successfully challenged by OPI and by national representatives.

By the time the discussion in the Fifth Committee was ending, the issues were precisely what they had been before the Expert Committee did its work. They involved budgetary limitation and the further development of Information Centers, all without destroying existing services. The resolution drafted by the Fifth Committee did not resolve these issues. In essence, the discussion was superficial, because it never really posed the underlying questions of the purpose of OPI and the appropriate level of its activity. Its superficiality was finally demonstrated with the reaffirmation of the contradictory principles governing UN public information activities. The principles were not discussed as such in the Fifth Committee and the lead given by the Expert Committee in opening them for review never was followed. Instead, delegates attempted to prove that the recommendations of the Expert Committee conformed or did not conform with the principles.

That the work of OPI would remain much as it had been, with some shifts in emphasis, was disclosed by the Secretary-General's report on public information for the General Assembly in 1958.[53] The steps already taken by OPI were viewed as part of a long term effort. A reorganization created a division to exercise tighter control of Information Centers; and new field offices were to open. But the effectiveness of the program was to be judged in terms of reaching the widest possible audience, and the report noted the absence of a measure for determining the level of activity. Staff and operational funds were to be stabilized. The Secretary-General intended to hold to a line of stabilization unless a marked change dictated a departure from that policy.

Over a period of several years, the development and strengthening of Information Centers and the new facilities for supervising them might well produce a marked shift in content and location of activities. But the rapid and radical change sought by the economy bloc and the Advisory Committee was not in sight. What limits had been set upon OPI expansion were not made formal and were not direct products of General Assembly supervision and control. Rather they were adopted as Secretariat policy but with reservations. Whether the General Assembly will soon reopen its discussion of the principles guiding public information is doubtful in view of the outcome of the 1958 consideration and the Secretary-General's rather conciliatory report. But even if it does, the result once more would probably be less than satisfactory for the reformers.[54]

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[53] UN Document A/4122.

[54] Since this article was written, the General Assembly has again wrestled with the subject. As anticipated here, its debates did not deal with the principles of public information but rather took up details of the Secretary-General's proposals and his effort to apply as much as possible of the report of the Expert Committee. Views virtually identical with those of the past appeared again. The General Assembly this time, however, adopted a resolution [A/RES/1405 (XIV)] on public information by 79 favorable votes and no dissent. The size of the majority indicates that no radical changes were attempted. The resolution does contain three new features. One of them, based on an offer by the Secretary-General to

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The durability of the principles on public information corresponds to the essential stability which OPI has achieved. Repeated attacks have left OPI almost unaltered, either in form or function. The Secretary-General continues to state the test of effectiveness in terms of people reached, rather than, say, influence over elites or penetration to the depths of large but significant groups. OPI continues to balance its right to go directly to the peoples of the world against its instruction to concentrate on existing institutions. Its personnel and budget have remained virtually fixed, whether viewed as a proportion of UN expenditure or as an absolute number.[55]

Whenever OPI has been challenged in the General Assembly, it relied on its expertise to support its program. That program is so complex and varied that it is difficult to grasp as a whole. The result is that OPI's expertise must be used by the Fifth Committee before it can make any apparently reasonable criticisms of the public information work.

When outside agencies have been called in, they failed to get at the fundamental policy questions either because of their bias toward administration rather than general policy, or because they lacked sufficient expertness. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions falls into the first of these categories. Primarily interested in economy and tight administration, the Advisory Committee constantly complained of the lack of standards to apply to public information. But it could not or did not develop its own. The second category includes the Expert Committee, which asserted that it would touch on the principles guiding the public information department but failed to make good its claim in its report and provided grounds for the charge that it had acted *ultra vires*. Such a charge implies that the very body which established and instructed the Expert Committee may not have been perfectly clear—or more realistically, was divided—as to the results it anticipated or on the rules for developing a report. Earlier, Subcommittee 8 of the Fifth Committee, which revised the principles in 1951, was made up of governmental representatives who were hurried in their work and not sufficiently qualified as experts to challenge OPI positions. Their work, therefore, resulted simply in a restatement of principles, not a thorough examination of them.

Very early in its history, OPI began to benefit from a body of supporters in the General

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try to stabilize the expenditure for OPI, requests him to plan a budget of about $5 million for 1960; thus, the General Assembly placed no ceiling on future expenditure, despite the usual move to do so. The second asks him to appoint a consultative panel of experts from the main cultures and geographical areas of the world; he had accepted a similar idea at the outset of the 1957 discussion and such panels had been employed on the initiative of the Secretariat before then. The third asks him to submit an outline of the policy and programs of OPI in a report to the General Assembly; in effect, OPI has always provided some information of this nature but not in such a formal manner. For the rest, the resolution echoes the wishes of both the underdeveloped countries and the economy bloc by urging him to continue with efforts to apply the ideas of the Expert Committee, to consider the importance of "adequate regional representation" in policy-making and field posts, and to establish new Information Centers, preferably by decentralizing headquarters staff.

[55] My calculations, based on actual expenditures as computed from the annual General Assembly resolution which includes supplementary appropriations, indicate that OPI from 1949 through 1957 never spent less than approximately six percent nor more than approximately eight percent of the total UN appropriation. The budgets, but not the actual amounts spent, indicated that in 1957 and 1958, OPI would spend about nine percent of the total, but unforeseen items elsewhere have lowered this proportion in the past. Delegates frequently have spoken of a 10 percent portion of the UN budget going to public information. This is true only of the estimate: the actual proportion has always been less. See General Assembly Resolutions 252 (III); 356 (IV); 471 (V); 583 (VI); 674 (VII); 786 (VIII); 890 (IX); 979 (X); 1083 (XI); and Documents A/3600, p. 83, and A/3825, p. 83. Personnel statistics are somewhat more difficult to obtain and compare. But relying on the annual budget submitted by the Secretary-General (always published as Supplement No. 5 to the *Official Records* of the General Assembly), a reasonably accurate comparison can be made for the years 1948 to 1956. Taking the Radio and Press and Publications Divisions, the structures of which remained fairly stable, as an index and adding to their personnel numbers those of the Information Centers, the following appears: in 1948, the two divisions and the centers employed 254 persons; in 1956, they included 226 persons.

Assembly. The core of this bloc was made up of representatives from Latin America, perhaps because the personality and popularity of Benjamin A. Cohen, the Chilean diplomat who headed OPI, knitted it together. Underdeveloped countries from other parts of the world tended to join the Latin American states in backing OPI budgets. Plans for expansion received equal favor from this group.

The principal area of expansion was the network of Information Centers. After 1951, OPI was instructed to open new centers in less developed parts of the world. The existing centers gave most of the receiving states a definite interest in backing the OPI program. The new centers added more clients to this group. The fact that even during the 1958 debate nine states asked that new centers be located in their territory or regions[56] lends credence to the idea that the information offices in the field not only disseminated information but also tended to build support for OPI. Furthermore, at headquarters, the very existence of an information section brought Secretariat services to the favorable attention of delegations, for important speeches and statements could easily be publicized through the good offices of OPI. When the Information Centers also were brought into play, national delegations had a rather formidable distribution service at their disposal.

If the functions of OPI, whatever its intentions, tended to create a client group among UN members, they did the same thing among the media representatives. This was clearly indicated by the speed and forcefulness with which the United Nations Correspondents Association denounced the report of the Expert Committee. Moreover, some press accounts of the report implied that OPI had secured a strong commitment from correspondents working at Headquarters. Pressure from this source entered directly into the debate on the Expert Committee's report when the resolution of the Correspondents Association was circulated as an official document.

Generally speaking, the Secretary-General cannot be distinguished from OPI in public information matters. The head of OPI usually represented the Secretary-General before the Fifth Committee and OPI usually recommended and drafted Secretariat papers on matters affecting itself. In the 1958 debate, however, the Secretary-General personally spoke before the Fifth Committee. When he did so, his own prestige added strength to the OPI position. So when he opposed the heart of the report of the Expert Committee, double pressure was put on the Fifth Committee. His prestige supported his own experts and in turn he received the backing of their friends. Moreover, he also indicated what sort of recommendation he would welcome, and with this lead encouraged his supporters to attempt to gain from the General Assembly approval for a stated Secretariat policy.

Secretary-General, OPI, a bloc of national representatives and client groups made a formidable combination to oppose the economy bloc. To have gained the day, the economy bloc would have had to put together a consensus which has so far eluded it. Its great hope for victory lay in a technical discussion of the OPI program, based on the experts' report. But the OPI bloc, developing points made by the Secretary-General, quickly put the discussion onto a political path and once again the questions to which answers had never before been found were under examination. Thus, the real substance of the experts' report—the proposed target and the beginning of reinterpretation of the principles guiding public information—was lost.

In a more general way, it can be said that distinct groups have formed around the alternatives presented to the General Assembly for public information policy. The strongest of these groups include, on the one hand, the economizers and, on the other, the convinced partisans of OPI. An ideological group, led by the Soviet Union, unwaveringly joins the economizers. Least cohesive and most wavering are the states which have taken no firm advance position on public information; among this group one usually finds the United States.

None of these groups has quite the strength to carry the day by itself and a balance among them is reflected in the principles governing public information, for these can be variously interpreted to support almost any view. The Secretary-General makes the effective proposals on public information and around these, OPI supporters, plus some of the not-yet-committed, form a majority. Thus, the General Assembly has so far left the OPI program and organization basically unchanged. At the same time, the Secretariat has kept its grip on public information policy.

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[56] The territories or regions: North Africa, Central Africa, Central America, Afghanistan, Austria, Burma, Ceylon. Offices in them were urged by Afghanistan, Austria, Burma, El Salvador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq and Tunisia. *GA: 13th sess., Fifth Committee, Summary Records*, pp. 175 ff.

The ability of the Secretariat to return from the General Assembly time after time with a renewed mandate to carry out its own public information program reflects real influence. The views of the Secretariat act as a catalyst which encourages formation of alliances among the loosely related states in the General Assembly to form a majority. Through the Information Centers and headquarters services to assist governments, OPI cannot but nurture a constituency which is enlarged and deepened by another constituency in the press lobby. And using its expert knowledge and the ability to carry out a program that must be justified by reasoning deductively from contradictory precepts, OPI offers much that is desired by a broad spectrum of UN members. Its ability to do so does not necessarily answer criticism of the contents of its public information program, but it does demonstrate how effective a secretariat can be in forming policy in the divided assembly of an international organization.

BRITISH M.P.S AND THEIR LOCAL PARTIES: THE SUEZ CASES*

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Most students of British parties have accepted the view that the mass organizations are decidedly subordinate to parliamentary leadership. Mainly this has meant rejection of the idea that policy is imposed by a party conference, or its delegated executive, in the Labour party–as in the Conservative party. But it may also lead one to ignore or depreciate the role of the constituency units which compose the national organizations.[1] That it is a mistake to do so is now suggested by the activities of local party associations during the Suez crisis of 1956–57. Research material derived from this experience provides the bases for altering the common model of the constituency party as a unit in the mass service organizations sustaining the parliamentary leadership.[2] True enough, the association of dues-paying partisans is primarily service rather than policy-making. However, the Suez experience indicates that this service includes a partly self-generating function in relation to the maintenance of parliamentary party cohesion, going beyond the well-known earlier instances of local Labour units simply following national orders to drop candidates who were suspected Communists.

I. INTRODUCTION

The power of constituency associations to take action against their M.P.s derives from their power to select candidates in the first place. Within very broad limits set by the national party, whose advice is often so much resented that it is withheld, the local dues-paying membership, and in practice its most active leaders, does the choosing. In approximately two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, safe for one party or another, such local party selection practically means election of the M.P. But the logical inference that this power to select carries with it the power, at a subsequent election, to reject the M.P. came to be disregarded, on the ground that it was a power the associations on their own rarely used, and then for personal rather than ideological causes.[3] Thus the use of this power by several associations over the Suez issue, admittedly a most emotional phase of British political history, may seem exceptional. And it has to be granted that what happened then is hardly typical of the everyday working of the political system; parliamentary cohesion, for instance, is ordinarily maintained without reference to the associations. Yet this admission does not materially reduce the significance of the Suez experience. The way in which political institutions work in a crisis has an obvious importance of its own. It is then that ultimate sources of power may be revealed, to participants as well as to observers, so as to have an impact on future behavior.

Studying M.P.-constituency association relations requires an intrusion into business which, as one M.P. wrote in response to my inquiry, is "private, personal and confidential." Candidate selection, for example, is a closed affair at all its important stages, and the ob-

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* I am grateful for the Rockefeller Foundation's financial support of my research on this and related subjects in Great Britain during 1958–59.

[1] As I have probably done in "Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (June 1956), pp. 360–77.

[2] R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (London: Heinemann, 1955), p. 588. In this useful work there are good descriptions of local party structures. Briefly, the usual Conservative pattern is for authority to be exercised by a 40- to 70-member executive council consisting of officers elected by the association at its annual meeting and of representatives elected by various ward and branch units. A smaller finance and general purposes committee, containing most of the important local leaders, often expresses general policy. The divisional Labour party, technically not bearing the name of "association," has no annual meeting open to the entire membership, but it has a general management committee comparable in size, in elected representativeness and in practical authority with the Conservative executive council. In the Labour case, the general management committee also elects a small and influential local executive committee.

[3] Of course, this was not Ostrogorski's view. In his famous alarmist study of the rise of the Liberal party "caucus," it was precisely the power of the local units of the new national party organizations that he deplored. *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, Vol. I, chaps. 4–5 (London: Macmillan, 1902). *Cf.* McKenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

server has much less chance to learn the political forces at work than he has even at an American nominating convention, not to mention the direct primary. The press, as well as political scientists, usually get no more than bare announcements of resolutions and actions taken. The procedure was really no different during the Suez crisis, but then there was enough public controversy to draw attention to the constituency relations of M.P.s who deviated from their parliamentary party's position. In these cases, it has been possible to secure fairly full information from newspaper accounts, particularly local ones, and from interviews with M.P.s and other informed persons. A detailed presentation cannot be attempted in a journal article, and therefore the case material is summarized briefly in the next section, after a description of the political setting in 1956–57. General hypotheses and evaluation are reserved for later sections.

II. SUEZ POLITICS AND THE DEVIANT CASES

1. Political background

By late October 1956, the Conservative party had been in office for five years, having been returned with a majority increased to 60 in the general election of May 1955. That election, held just after Eden succeeded Churchill as prime minister, marked a high point in Eden's fortunes. In the next year, before the Suez crisis, the Conservative government's popularity slumped, Eden was denounced as a "ditherer" even in his own party, and rank-and-file Conservatives were frustrated by their government's unwillingness to liquidate "socialism" more rapidly and to reverse the postwar policy of "scuttling the Empire." Eden himself had been suspect since it was he, as foreign secretary in 1954, who had committed Britain to the evacuation in early 1956 of the Suez Canal military base. Nasser's sudden announcement in July 1956 of his nationalization of the canal was the last straw for rank-and-file Conservatives, who desperately wanted the Conservative government to stand up for Britain's "rights." Therefore, they welcomed Eden's strong reactions to Nasser in the summer of 1956; and the party's annual conference, in early October, enthusiastically resolved to support a tough line against Nasser.[4]

On the Labour side, Attlee had retired in late 1955 to the House of Lords and he was succeeded as leader by the much younger Hugh Gaitskell. When the Suez crisis came, Gaitskell was still in the process of consolidating his position, particularly by assimilating Aneurin Bevan, his former rival, to the leadership group. Bevan was elected party treasurer at Labour's conference in the early fall, and subsequently, during the Suez crisis, he returned to the shadow cabinet, eventually to become its foreign affairs spokesman. Gaitskell, like Eden, had been suspected of a weak moderation by his more extreme followers, and his original apparent agreement with the Conservatives, in denouncing Nasser's seizure of the canal in mid-summer 1956, had not diminished those suspicions.[5] However, in the subsequent months, notably in the October-November crisis, Gaitskell became as vigorous an opponent of the Conservative government's use of force in Egypt as the most zealous, pacifist-inclined, anti-imperialist socialist could have wanted.

One other political matter should be mentioned because of its proximity to the Suez crisis. The most controversial and most widely debated issue of the preceding parliamentary session had been capital punishment. The proposal to abolish hanging had been introduced as a private member's bill by a left-wing socialist, and the Conservative government allowed the House a free vote on the measure in February 1956. Enough Conservative M.P.s, 47 to be exact, joined a virtually solid Labour party to pass the bill in the Commons.[6] Both before and after this vote, rank-and-file Conservative party members displayed, in many constituencies, sharp dislike for the anti-hanging stand taken by some of their M.P.s, and there is no doubt that Conservative M.P.s were subject to considerable constituency association pressure despite the fact that loyalty to parliamentary leadership was not involved on a free vote. In the end, incidentally, after the House of Lords refused to agree to abolition, the government later in 1956 presented a compromise, retaining hanging for a few special murder offenses, and on a party division rather than a free vote secured its enactment.[7] The issue left many Conservative party activists with a pre-Suez grievance against particular M.P.s for what was regarded as a weak, liberal and Labour-oriented reluctance to employ the full force of the state against criminals.

The actual circumstances of Britain's attempt, with France, to reoccupy the Suez Canal must be briefly told. Military preparations had been made during the unsatisfactory negotiations from July to October, but the occasion for action followed Israel's invasion of Egypt. Britain and France announced that they wanted to separate the Israeli-Egyptian forces and so safeguard the canal. On October 31, after Egypt's rejection of a one-day ultimatum, the Anglo-French attack was launched, first by air bombardment and later by landings at the northern end of the canal. The military action lasted only through November 6, at which point the British and French agreed, under immense pressure from the United States, the United Nations and some Commonwealth member nations, to halt their action, well short of its goal, and accept a United Nations force in the canal zone. Britain did not actually withdraw all of its troops until December, and the government continued to advise British shipowners to avoid using the canal until May 1957. Thus the controversy was prolonged in British politics through the period of Prime Minister Eden's illness—involving a month in Jamaica and ultimately his resignation early in January—and into the early months of the administration of the new prime minister, Harold Macmillan.

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[4] *76th Annual Report* of the Conservative Conference (1956), pp. 28–37.

[5] 557 *H. C. Deb.* 1609–17 (2 Aug. 1956).

[6] 548 *H. C. Deb.* 2645–56 (16 Feb. 1956).

[7] 560 *H. C. Deb.* 1144-1259 (15 Nov. 1956).

During this period of intense parliamentary argument, several important divisions strained the loyalties of M.P.s, particularly in the Conservative party. The first was a sudden parliamentary division on October 30, when Eden announced the Anglo-French ultimatum and the strength of both parties was low because there had not been the usual notice of the whips for an important vote. The second was a set of divisions on November 1, when the Labour opposition attacked the government during the actual military action. The third was a crucial vote on November 8, when after the cease-fire the Labour party made its most serious effort to defeat the government. Fourth, on December 6 came a division on the government's announcement that it was finally going to withdraw its troops from the canal. And fifth, there was another vote, along similar lines, in May 1957, when Prime Minister Macmillan announced, in effect, that British ships would use the canal now firmly in Egypt's hands.[8]

Of these five occasions, the first three, in the October-November period, involved support of the Eden government's military action; this is true even of the vote of November 8, after the action stopped, because the question was essentially whether the government's policy of the previous week should be upheld. But the divisions in December and the following May involved approval of the liquidation of Eden's Suez intervention, first by his own government during his absence in Jamaica and then, in May, by the government of Macmillan, who had himself been publicly (and privately, too, it was thought) a strong original supporter of the military action.

Accordingly there were two very different lines of Conservative deviation, one stemming from doubt about the military action and the other from doubt about the withdrawal. Neither deviation, it should be stressed, turned out to be so large as to destroy the essentially inter-party form which the Suez issue assumed in British politics.[9]

2. Anti-Suez Conservatives

The most important line of deviation, actually and potentially, was by members of the Conservative majority against their government's action in October-November 1956. If numerous and willing enough, they could have helped the Labour opposition to destroy the Eden government, or less drastically, by threats to abstain or to vote with the opposition, could have pressured the government to change its policy. Logically, then, signs of such deviation were regarded most seriously by the loyal Conservatives of the constituency associations.

Exactly how many Conservative M.P.s were against their government's Suez action is hard to specify. Varying degrees of such opposition ranged from widespread misgivings to thoroughgoing antagonism. Estimates of the number sufficiently concerned to meet together to organize means to stop the Suez action range from 25 to 50, and it is widely believed that this group, largely by informal personal communication to parliamentary leaders, did add its pressure to the international forces seeking to bring Eden's Egyptian intervention to a halt. Certainly 25 to 50 Conservative M.P.s could have constituted a vital pressure, but most of them never became publicly identified with the opposition cause. In fact there was not even a partial group demonstration until the division of November 8, by which time military action had been halted anyway. In that division, there were eight known Conservative abstentions. In addition, two other anti-Suez Conservatives have been identified because their views became publicly known, although they always voted in the government lobby. In these ten cases, then, it is possible to observe the reactions of Conservative constituency associations to their M.P.s' deviations against the Eden government's Suez action.

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[8] Records of the five sets of parliamentary divisions are at 558 *H. C Deb.* 1377–82 (30 Oct. 1956), 558 *H. C. Deb.* 1729–44 (1 Nov. 1956), 560 *H. C. Deb.* 403–08 (8 Nov. 1956), 561 *H. C. Deb.* 1577–86 (6 Dec. 1956), and 570 *H. C. Deb.* 697–704 (16 May 1957).

[9] This was true to a large extent outside of parliament as well. British Institute of Public Opinion polls (made available through the courtesy of the Gallup organization) showed that during the first two days of November 76 per cent of Conservative voters agreed with Eden's policy and 72 per cent of Labour voters disagreed. About a week later, Conservative support had strengthened to the remarkable point of 89 per cent agreement with Eden, while Labour disagreement had dropped to 63 per cent.

Nicolson. The leading case is that of Nigel Nicolson, who abstained on November 8 after attacking Eden's action the night before in a speech to a distinctly non-Conservative UN Association meeting. His was a very safe constituency, Bournemouth East and Christchurch, a growing south-coast resort community populated by many retired middle-class citizens (including former military officers). Nicolson's troubles were the most publicized, partly because they were drawn out over two years and partly because Nicolson himself had both the opportunity and the ability to dramatize his cause. He wrote a book covering all but the final climactic events of his experience,[10] and he received the support of most of the national press and of the intellectual community generally. To this community, he himself belonged both by inheritance—as the son of the distinguished Sir Harold Nicolson—and by his own work as an author and publisher. Moreover, Nicolson was a "liberal" intellectual who, as Bournemouth's M.P. since 1952, had previously offended his old-guard supporters by a moderate view of Aneurin Bevan and by opposition to the death penalty.

Nicolson's acute trouble with his association, which began promptly after his opposition to Suez became known, led his 55-member executive committee, by mid-November, to adopt a resolution charging that he had chosen to act so as to "a) cause embarrassment to the Prime Minister and Government; b) misrepresent the views of the vast majority of his supporters in the constituency; and c) encourage and delight the Opposition."[11] Then in early December a general meeting of the association voted, 298 to 92, its lack of confidence in Nicolson and its instruction to the executive to begin the process of selecting a new prospective parliamentary candidate for the next general election.[12] By February 1957, this new candidate had been selected, although Nicolson and a minority in the association continued to try to reverse the verdict.[13]

Nicolson's effort to fight back, despite the national publicity it secured, would have been entirely futile were it not for the fact that the new Conservative candidate was shown, in early 1959, to have foolishly and covertly collaborated with an extreme right-wing organization, the League of Empire Loyalists, whose campaign to save the Empire included attacks on Prime Minister Macmillan as a "traitor." With the expedient resignation of this prospective candidate, subsequent to his exposure,[14] it was possible for Nicolson to revive his cause in circumstances which made his enemies in the association leadership seem very poor judges of candidates.[15] Under pressure from the Conservative national office, by now so embarrassed by the adverse Bournemouth publicity as to overcome its previous and customary reluctance to intervene in a constituency matter, a postal ballot of all members of the Bournemouth association was held on the question of re-adopting Nicolson. This ballot Nicolson lost by the very close vote of 3,762 to 3,671.[16] He ended up deprived of his safe seat for the next general election, just as his association first intended and would normally have been able to accomplish with much less time and trouble. Nicolson's second opportunity, in the 1959 mail ballot, was fortuitous.

Medlicott. The results of Sir Frank Medlicott's abstention on November 8, and of a critical letter he wrote to Eden, are the same as the consequences of Nicolson's defection; Medlicott also ceased to be his association's candidate for the next general election. However, the history is different. Medlicott had represented his largely rural, fairly safe Norfolk constituency since 1939. He did so technically as a National Liberal, under a curious arrangement made in the 1930's by the Conservatives to accommodate their allies among right-wing Liberals. Medlicott did have some views derived from his own non-conformist Liberal origins, such as opposition to hanging, blood sports and the horse-killing Grand

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[10] Nigel Nicolson, *People and Parliament* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1958).

[11] *Bournemouth Daily Echo,* 15 Nov. 1956, p. 1.

[12] *Ibid.*, 6 Dec. 1956, pp. 1, 20.

[13] *Ibid.*, 12 Feb. 1957, pp. 1, 16.

[14] *Times* (London), 15 Jan. 1959, p. 8.

[15] *Daily Telegraph* (London), 26 Jan. 1959, p. 15.

[16] *Times* (London), 27 Feb. 1959, p. 9.

National, on which he disagreed with his Tory landowning constituents. Nevertheless, as a Conservative-voting member of the Commons, he had maintained amiable relations with his almost entirely Conservative association.

This amiability ceased abruptly after Medlicott's Suez defection. In mid-November the local Conservative executive council passed a resolution dissociating itself from Medlicott's view,[17] and in subsequent months the association effectively froze its M.P. out of his normal constituency relations. Medlicott received no Christmas-recess invitations to address meetings of the several units of his association; five of the six principal local party officers made speeches against him; and he was subject to much personal unpleasantness. Although the association neither demanded Medlicott's resignation nor actually decided to start the procedure to select a new candidate, despite some hints that it might, Medlicott chose to withdraw, in May 1957, from consideration for subsequent re-selection.[18] He might well have survived, not by defending his Suez views but by swallowing his pride and trying to gloss over the affair with some assurances about the future. Even so he would not have been sure of winning, and many M.P.s, even if less sensitive than Sir Frank, would have responded similarly when they were suddenly frozen out by their constituency associations.

Nutting. Resembling Medlicott's case in the apparently voluntary withdrawal of the M.P. was the affair of Anthony Nutting. Since 1945, he had represented a comfortably Conservative constituency in rural Leicestershire, which was his family's home. Nutting was a protege of Eden's and had risen to be Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. It was from this position that he resigned in a widely publicized letter to the prime minister during the Suez crisis; furthermore Nutting was absent, and deliberately so, from the Commons during crucial parliamentary divisions. He had informed his constituency association officers of what he was doing, asking the local leaders to refrain from taking any public stand until he could appear to explain why he opposed the Suez action. This request the finance and general purposes committee of the association refused to observe, and it sent a telegram during the crisis to the prime minister pledging its support.[19] Then, on November 14, without taking the opportunity to explain his stand to the association, Nutting announced that he was resigning his seat (immediately, that is, not just withdrawing as had Medlicott from consideration as a candidate for the next election).[20] Nutting claimed that for him to have tried to stay on, once his association's leaders were committed against his Suez stand, would have caused a split in the association. Or, put differently, Nutting would have had a Bournemouth-type fight on his hands. He was not in the most ideal personal circumstances for such a fight. Between his resignation from the government and his resignation of his parliamentary seat, Nutting's separation from his wife and his friendship with a prominent American woman had been sensationally displayed by a popular pro-Suez Sunday newspaper.[21] Whether this did in fact play a part in Nutting's decision is not certain. What is clear is that he did not want to fight the leaders of his constituency association. And, as a resigned Foreign Office minister, he could not and would not treat his views on Suez as something which could be compromised by agreement with his association.

Boyle. As the only other rebel to have resigned a governmental position, as well as to have abstained from parliamentary voting, Sir Edward Boyle demands special notice, and not least because he survived his deviation. Representing since 1950 a mixed middle-class and working-class Birmingham constituency, whose election majorities look securely Conservative despite a shifting urban population pattern, Boyle was very much a brilliant young junior minister (Economic Secretary to the Treasury) at the time of the Suez crisis. His constituency relations had been excellent, and especially so personally with his local party agent and chairman. Although known to be against hanging, Boyle had had no great local difficulty. But during the Suez crisis when he resigned his governmental post and abstained in the division of November 8, trouble began. As in the other cases, virtually all of the association's leaders intensely disliked the M.P.'s anti-Suez position, and there was a faction which wished to use this disagreement to try to get rid of Boyle. However, when the local executive met with Boyle on November 16, it adopted a moderate resolution (subsequently endorsed by the association's general meeting) expressing disagreement with the M.P.'s views but acknowledging his right to "act in accordance with his sincere convictions."[22] There is no question that this resolution was a triumph attributable to the unusually high personal regard which leading officers had for Boyle, even though disagreeing on this issue, and to the accidental fact that the very competent and popular local agent happened himself to sympathize with Boyle's views. Consequently, Boyle remained as M.P. and, despite prolonged ill feeling still expressed two years afterwards, he was re-adopted as parliamentary candidate. Furthermore there was also a national seal of forgiveness in that Macmillan, when forming his government in January 1957 and trying to conciliate all Conservative factions, took Boyle back as a junior minister. Still, no matter how definite Boyle's survival of this deviation, it is assumed in the constituency that he would not be forgiven a second major break with party orthodoxy.

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[17] *Eastern Daily Press* (Norfolk), 17 Nov. 1956, p. 1.

[18] *Ibid.*, 2 May 1957, pp. 1, 4.

[19] *Melton Mowbray Times*, 9 Nov. 1956, p. 1.

[20] *Ibid.*, 16 Nov. 1956, p. 1.

[21] *Sunday Express* (London), 11 Nov. 1956, p. 5.

[22] *Birmingham Post*, 17 Nov. 1956, p. 7.

Astor. Here the complication is that the M.P., John Jacob Astor of *the* Astor family, had announced before Suez that he would not stand for parliament again. Since 1951 he had represented the distinctly marginal Plymouth seat which had first been his father's and then for many years his famous mother's. However, Labour had won the seat in 1945 and 1950. The constituency reflected the west country's traditional non-conformist liberalism, and Astor's anti-hanging position had not seriously disturbed his good local relations. On Suez, joining his family's onslaught on Eden—notably by one brother's Sunday newspaper, the *Observer*, and by another brother's stand in the Lords—Astor on November 8 spoke against the government in the Commons and abstained from voting. His association's 80-member executive, after hearing Astor's exposition of his views on November 23, re-affirmed its confidence in Eden, and said nothing officially one way or the other about Astor. Only the chairman said ominously of Astor after the meeting: "We hope he will remain loyal."[23] Nevertheless, despite the sharp disagreement over Suez, Astor not only stayed to serve out his term as M.P. but suffered no "freeze-out" from association affairs. There was really no point in retaliating against an M.P. who was to retire anyway, unless of course his resignation was to have been forced almost immediately. But only the Labour party wanted a by-election in this marginal seat over the Suez issue; and anyway, Astor would not have resigned even if asked.

Boothby. Representing the same heavily Conservative Scottish constituency since 1924, having been a robust and popular champion of its local herring industry, and having achieved national fame as an independent-minded backbencher, broadcaster and journalist, Sir Robert Boothby was in a particularly good position to ride out any constituency association storm. Moreover, Boothby's personal relations with his association had been satisfactorily maintained despite his liberal views on many subjects, including hanging. But his abstention on November 8 caused him trouble, eventually patched up. Boothby explained his abstention to his executive on November 23, after which the executive, unconvinced on the merits, issued the following statement: "The executive committee accepted his explanation and, while confirming his right to hold and to express his own views on matters of public policy, was of the opinion that his abstention on this occasion was an error of judgment. Sir Robert accepted this opinion."[24] Cryptic as is the last sentence, especially since Boothby did not make clear in other contexts that he regarded his abstention as a mistake, the outcome looks like no more than a mild rebuke. Not only could it be survived, with only slight loss of pride, but a well-entrenched personality like Boothby might even have survived another such occasion. However, his status was by 1956 nearly unique among M.P.s, and in 1958 he left the Commons for one of the new life peerages. Not long after entering the Lords he gave up his party ties altogether.

Yates. In the case of William Yates, since 1955 a young representative for a very marginal urban-rural Shropshire constituency, the deviant M.P. (although also anti-hanging) is not clearly identified with the liberal intellectual gentility characteristic of the anti-Suez rebels already discussed. Yates deviated for his own reasons and in his own way. Based on his earlier experience as a British government official in the Middle East and on subsequent discussion with Nasser himself, Yates opposed Eden's use of force against Egypt in the belief, once widely fashionable among Conservatives, that Britain should work with Arab nationalism. He was bold enough to say as much in early October in a Cairo press conference and at the Conservative party conference, where he was howled down.[25] Then during the Suez intervention itself and before the other Conservative rebels revealed themselves, Yates indicated in the Commons his belief that the government was involved in a conspiracy.[26] His abstention on November 8 was thus anti-climactic, and he had his open constituency association difficulties earlier, before the crisis period itself. On that occasion, while there was a stormy executive committee meeting with Yates and general disagreement with his Middle East position, an uneasy toleration of Yates's deviation was announced and evidently adhered to through the crisis itself.[27] Subsequently Yates remained the candidate for the next general election. Yates would not have resigned if asked, and any attempt to displace him would have been politically dangerous for the Conservative cause. Yates, a vigorous campaigner, had won the seat by only 478 votes in 1955, after Labour had held it in the previous three elections.

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[23] *Western Evening Herald* (Plymouth), 24 Nov. 1956, p. 5; *Times* (London), 24 Nov. 1956, p. 5.

[24] *Buchan Observer* (Peterhead), 27 Nov. 1956, p. 4.

[25] *76th Annual Report* of the Conservative Conference (1956), pp. 33–34.

Banks. The case of Cyril Banks, a middle-aged business man representing since 1950 a fairly safe Conservative seat in a small Yorkshire borough, stands apart from the other cases both because of its simplicity and because Banks, even more than Yates, was separated from the liberal intellectual opposition to Eden's action. Banks was a personal friend of Nasser's, whom he frequently visited as an economic adviser, and he believed that Britain could and should come to terms with Egypt, despite Nasser's seizure of the canal. Banks abstained as early as September from supporting the Eden government's strong line; at that time his association executive indicated its disagreement with Banks and also, but in a close vote, its toleration of Banks's deviation.[28] That Banks's subsequent abstention during the crisis itself would thus have been tolerated seems unlikely. At any rate, Banks did not wait to have this question squarely decided. Immediately after abstaining on November 8, he resigned the Conservative whip and became an Independent M.P. Treating this as its opportunity to secure a new prospective candidate, even though this is not often done when Conservatives simply renounce the whip, Banks's association started the selection procedure in mid-November and at the same time re-affirmed its support of the government.[29] As occurred elsewhere in the replacement of anti-Suez rebels, the association chose an outspoken and unmistakeably pro-Suez man as its new candidate.[30] It happened that this candidate as well as his successor had subsequently to withdraw for personal reasons, but Banks, although he resumed the Conservative whip while serving out his term, was not reconsidered as a candidate.

Spearman. In this case and the next, the M.P.s definitely belonged to the main body of anti-Suez Conservatives. But unlike those first discussed, all of whom at least abstained on November 8, these two voted with the government in all crucial divisions. Sir Alexander Spearman, to take his case first, did make an anti-Suez parliamentary speech November 8,[31] and this was enough to raise the wrath of his association, in a heavily Conservative resort and rural constituency of Yorkshire which Spearman had represented since 1941. In mid-November the association's executive committee heard Spearman's explanation, and accepted particularly, in his defense, that he had always voted with the government. In this circumstance, the executive took no formal action against him, but asked its chairman to address a private letter to the M.P. containing their views.[32] It is fair to say that Spearman was let off with this and other personal unpleasantness, stretching over time. The impression was left that the association had warned, at least by implication, of what was expected in the future: certainly no abstentions on important issues.

Kirk. Here the M.P., Peter Kirk, did not even make a critical parliamentary speech. The fact that he was anti-Suez reached his association through a letter to a Labour constituent, which was made public, through his personal conversation in the constituency, and probably also through the party's national leadership. The consequent pressure was sufficient to dissuade Kirk from making an early statement of his anti-Suez views; for it he substituted an equivocal criticism after the immediate crisis.[33] Nor did Kirk abstain on November 8, as once he had intended to do. Thus his experience provides an instance of association pressure anticipating, and playing some part in preventing, an M.P.'s open deviation. Even his more or less private deviation caused Kirk to have trouble conciliating his association's leaders. To some, especially older Conservative party activists, Kirk was suspect anyway as a young liberal intellectual, and particularly as one who had led the Conservative anti-hanging bloc. But, in another way, Kirk's constituency position was strong. He was a liberal Conservative in a distinctly marginal seat, Gravesend (near London), and he had first won the seat from Labour in 1955 partly due to the presence of the ex-Labour M.P. as an Independent candidate in addition to the official Labour candidate.

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[26] 558 *H. C. Deb.* 1716–17 (1 Nov. 1956).

[27] *Wellington Journal & Shrewsbury News*, 27 Oct. 1956, p. 18.

[28] *Pudsey & Stanningley News*, 27 Sept. 1956, p. 7.

[29] *Ibid.*, 22 Nov. 1956, p. 7.

[30] *Ibid.*, 14 March 1956, p. 6.

[31] 560 *H. C. Deb.* 369–70 (8 Nov. 1956).

[32] *Scarborough Evening News*, 19 Nov. 1956, p. 5.

[33] *Gravesend & Dartford Register*, 24 Nov. 1956, pp. 1, 6.

3. *Pro-Suez Conservative extremists*

As members of the old 40-man Suez rebel group of 1954, which had opposed Britain's original withdrawal from its Suez base,[34] the "pro-Suez Conservative extremists" had welcomed Eden's action of 1956 as a belated and happy conversion to their cause. The basis for their subsequent deviation arose in December 1956 and May 1957 when they were asked to vote in support of their government's successive surrenders of its strong anti-Nasser line. Then their deviations, though varying in manner and degree, were always in content farther from the Labour party's position than from that of their own party leadership. Moreover, they were deviating in accord with the expressed convictions of the Conservative rank-and-file activists, most of whom also thought that the principal trouble with Eden's Suez intervention was that it had stopped. The pro-Suez extremist M.P.s could claim to be more Conservative than their parliamentary leadership. And they could expect considerable tolerance of their position particularly after January 1957 when their own favorite Harold Macmillan became prime minister and took a leading pro-Suez extremist and December abstainer, his son-in-law Julian Amery, into the government. More than that, they could well have suspected that Macmillan would find it convenient, in dealing with other countries, to claim that he could not go too fast in withdrawing from Suez because of his pro-Suez rebel group.

Nevertheless the pro-Suez M.P.s did break with parliamentary discipline in significant ways, and their subsequent treatment by constituency associations provides a useful comparison with that of the anti-Suez deviants. There were 15 deliberate abstentions by Conservatives on December 6, 1956, on the vote on the government's withdrawal of troops from the canal zone; and on May 16, 1957, there were 14 abstentions (including nine repeaters from the first 15) on the vote over the government's decision to advise British shipowners to use the canal on Nasser's terms. Of the 14, in the latter instance, eight went farther than abstaining and resigned the party whip in order to sit as Independent Conservatives. Altogether 20 individual M.P.s were involved: the nine repeaters plus six in December only and five in May only.[35]

The vital point about this whole pro-Suez group is that no one lost his seat because of abstention, single or repeated. And in only one doubtful case can it be suspected that even going so far as to resign the whip contributed to an M.P.'s loss of his seat. This is especially remarkable since of the eight who formed the Independent Conservative "cave," to oppose Britain's "weak foreign policy," five remained without the whip until June 1958. Despite their support for the government on other issues, these lingering Independent Conservatives sorely tried their party's patience, as a general election was thought to be near and there was a desire to have candidates in technically good standing. No doubt there was pressure on the Independents from the constituencies, and in at least one case this pressure did have something to do with an M.P.'s resumption of the whip.[36] Continued irregularity, even in a cause cherished by the rank-and-file, exposed an M.P. to attacks from local opponents, who occasionally wanted the seat for another candidate. However, to be pressured to rejoin one's parliamentary party is less significant than the fact that the local parties refrained from any more serious action during the whole year that Independent status was maintained.

The one doubtful case is that of Lawrence Turner, M.P. for Oxford city, who counted himself an Independent Conservative until June 1958 after having abstained in both the December and May divisions. In May 1958, just before resuming the whip, Turner announced his withdrawal from consideration as a candidate for the next general election, and one might guess that this withdrawal was not entirely voluntary from the fact that his Oxford constituency association had almost simultaneously informed Turner that it was to start the process of considering candidates.[37] However, Turner's announced reason for withdrawal, namely medical advice, had a basis in fact. Furthermore, it was evidently Turner's own uncertainty about standing again, plus his continued delay in resuming the whip, which finally caused his association, over a year after the M.P.'s deviation, to consider other candidates. There were other reasons, too, for the association to reconsider Turner's situation. Over the years, since becoming Oxford's M.P. in 1950, he had deviated from his parliamentary leadership on certain economic issues, in a right-wing direction, as well as on foreign policy. These positions, plus a certain blunt businessman's outlook, tended to alienate the university element among Conservative voters. This could have been consequential even though Oxford was a reasonably safe Tory seat. However, it is probable that Turner's pro-Suez extremism, while unpopular with a Conservative minority (mainly outside active party circles), would not in itself have cost him his seat. In fact, his association executive voted Turner its full support after he addressed its meeting, in June 1957, to explain why he had abstained and joined the cave.[38]

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[34] 531 *H. C. Deb.* 495–504 (28 July 1954); 724–822 (29 July 1954).

[35] The fifteen abstainers in December were Biggs-Davison, Fell, Hinchingbrooke, P. F. Maitland, Maude, Turner, P. G. Williams, Hyde, McLean, Amery, T. H. Clarke, Horobin, Nabarro, Teeling, and Waterhouse. The first nine of these also abstained in May, and they were joined by Raikes, J. Eden, G. Howard, Lambton and N. Pannell. The first seven plus Raikes constituted the group resigning the whip in May. *Times* (London), 7 Dec. 1956, p. 10; 14 May 1957, p. 10; 17 May 1957, p. 12.

[36] *Daily Telegraph* (London), 25 June 1958, pp. 1, 15. The five hold-outs were Biggs-Davison, Turner, Hinchingbrooke, Fell and Williams. One of the Independent Conservatives, Maitland, resumed the whip late in 1957, and two others, Maude and Raikes, had left Parliament.

One other pro-Suez rebel was subsequently deprived of his seat, but much more clearly than in Turner's case it was for reasons unconnected with his Suez stand. The M.P. was Montgomery Hyde, a prolific author with wide intellectual interests who represented a very safe Belfast constituency, as a Conservative-affiliated Ulster Unionist, since 1950. Without joining the cave, Hyde had abstained both in December 1956 and May 1957. But this evidence of pro-Suez extremism did Hyde no more harm than it did other M.P.s of the same group. The move against Hyde's readoption did not take place until 1959, and the list of grievances against him consisted entirely of deviations in very different directions. Specifically, Hyde was disliked in his association because he was against hanging, for a liberal approach to homosexual offenses and for the return of a legally disputed set of pictures from a London to a Dublin gallery.[39] Besides he was said to have too many outside interests to be a good Northern Ireland M.P. After a prolonged fight, almost rivalling Bournemouth's in interest, Hyde's association went ahead to choose another candidate.[40]

Putting aside Turner and Hyde, 18 other pro-Suez cases remain. Three of these M.P.s voluntarily retired from parliament in the years following Suez, two of them, Waterhouse and Raikes, appropriately to business in Britain's African dependencies, and Angus Maude to the editorship of an Australian paper. All three may have been disgusted with Conservative politics, but in none of the three cases was there any evidence that their associations were disgusted with them. In fact, Maude, who stayed on in parliament the longest, until mid-1958, and was a member of the cave, was treated as a hero by the local Conservatives in his safe London suburban constituency.[41] Similar if less enthusiastic support was publicly accorded at least six other pro-Suez extremists. These included, besides Maude, five of the other eight Independent Conservatives, namely Fell, Paul Williams, Patrick Maitland, Lord Hinchingbrooke and Biggs-Davison (despite a notable restiveness in the latter's new and marginal constituency).[42] These cases, counting Maude's, of announced official local confidence account, along with Turner and Raikes (apparently supported too, if not publicly) for all of the 8-member cave. Theirs was really the only form of pro-Suez deviation usually taken seriously enough for the question of local confidence to be raised, although at least one simple abstainer of May 1957, John Eden, also received his association's public vote of confidence.[43] Ordinarily pro-Suez abstention, unlike anti-Suez abstention, was locally not even controversial.

Perhaps the most convincing way to show the tolerance of a constituency association for the pro-Suez extremist is to cite the case of Lord Hinchingbrooke. This highly individualistic, almost eccentric, son of the Earl of Sandwich functioned as leader of the Independent Conservative cave, and he abstained both in

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[37] *Times* (London), 22 May 1958, p. 4.

[38] *Oxford Mail*, 12 June 1957, p. 1.

[39] *Belfast Telegraph*, 9 Jan. 1959, p. 2; 13 Jan. 1959, p. 2.

[40] *Times* (London), 4 April 1959, p. 4.

[41] *Middlesex County Times & West Middlesex Gazette*, 8 Dec. 1956, p. 2; 1 June 1957, p. 1; 8 June 1957, p. 12; and 7 Dec. 1957, p. 1.

[42] On each of the five M.P.s, see, in order, *Eastern Daily Press* (Norfolk), 14 May 1957, p. 1; *Sunderland Echo*, 22 May 1957, p. 8; *Glasgow Herald*, 14 May 1957, p. 8; *Dorset Daily Echo*, 18 May 1957, pp. 1, 7; and *Chigwell Times & West Essex Star*, 6 Sept. 1957, p. 1.

[43] *Times* (London), 25 May 1957, p. 4.

December 1956 and May 1957. The reaction of his association, after 500 local members heard Hinchingbrooke's explanation in May, was a vote of confidence, with only six dissenting votes, the singing of "For He's a Jolly Good Fellow," and the hope that" the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government will enable him again to accept the Whip in the near future."[44] This overwhelmingly favorable outcome looks all the more significant by comparison with the other occasion, in 1952, when Hinchingbrooke, in the same fairly safe, largely rural Dorset constituency, had faced the consequences of a parliamentary deviation. Then, after Hinchingbrooke had spoken against and abstained from supporting the Conservative government's approval of German rearmament, his local executive adopted a resolution of no-confidence in its M.P. Only with much effort did Hinchingbrooke get a majority of the association, at a general meeting, to reverse this executive decision.[45] One may fairly speculate that the difference in treatment between 1952 and 1957 can be attributed not only to improved personal relations with a new executive, but also to the fact that Hinchingbrooke's later deviation was an essentially Conservative one close to the imperialist nerve-center of party activists, instead of one which, like his opposition to German rearmament, happened to place him in the same camp with left-wing socialists.

4. Labour M.P.s

The Conservative party's two-way deviations over Suez had no parallel in the parliamentary Labour party. In fact, there was no group break, in any direction, from Labour's thoroughgoing opposition to the Eden government's military intervention. Suez provided common ground for Labour's right-wing leadership, mainly liberal internationalist in outlook, and its left-wing socialists, erstwhile Bevanites. Perhaps, as was widely believed, there were doubts among trade-union M.P.s, reflecting the views of a considerable share of working-class voters, but they remained loyal in the crucial divisions. So did all of the 17 Jewish M.P.s in the Labour party,[46] although some maintained such close ethnic, religious or social ties with the Jewish community that they were certainly cross-pressured to abstain from their party's all-out attack on Britain's intervention which, despite Eden's denials, appeared to be on Israel's side.[47] Yet all 17 voted in the Labour lobby on November 1, and except in the unwhipped division on October 30 there were no deliberate abstentions among the Jewish M.P.s. The closest any of the 17 came to public deviation was in remarks by two M.P.s.[48] Accordingly, the single clear-cut Labour deviation, that of Stanley Evans, was an individual affair. Evans, a self-made business man representing a working-class constituency in the black country of the midlands, simply had his own views of Suez. His constituency experience is well worth examination.

Evans. M.P. for Wednesbury since 1945, Stanley Evans had already followed an individualist course in some respects before Suez. He had achieved a kind of fame in 1950 when, almost immediately after his appointment by the Attlee government as parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Food, Evans referred to the government's farm subsidies as "featherbedding."[49] This refreshingly frank but foolish remark cost him his junior ministerial status. Subsequently, as a back-bench M.P., he continued to make statements at odds with his party's policy, particularly on foreign and colonial issues. Some of these statements were made in the Commons and some in his constituency, often to business groups with whom Evans appeared to enjoy an increasing rapport as compared with the active leaders of his constituency party. Before Suez, however, Evans was tolerated by the Wednesbury party, for despite a general feeling of neglect and some antagonism from particular individuals there was no issue so sharply drawn as to cause the trade unionists, who dominated the local organization, to break from the normal loyalty to their M.P. After all, Evans's offenses had chiefly been those of outspokenness on issues of little direct concern to non-intellectuals, and his parliamentary record had remained sound enough on economic matters of interest to urban workers.

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[44] *Dorset Daily Echo, loc. cit.*

[45] *Times* (London), 6 Oct. 1952, p. 2; 10 Oct. 1952, p. 3; and 31 Oct. 1952, p. 6.

[46] The 17 names are from the list in the *Jewish Chronicle* (London), 9 Nov. 1956, p. 8. The same story names two Jews among Conservative M.P.s. Only a few of the M.P.s represented heavily Jewish constituencies.

[47] Zionist pressures are reported in the *Jewish Chronicle*, 9 Nov. 1956, pp. 5, 16, 23, in the form of sharp criticism of the Jewish M.P.s for voting with the Labour party. Consider particularly the case of Barnett Janner, M.P. for a non-Jewish constituency but the president of both the Zionist Federation and the Board of Jewish Deputies. To the latter, Janner had to justify his support of Labour's Suez stand before receiving a vote of confidence. *Ibid.*, 23 Nov. 1956, p. 1. Of course, it was possible to disapprove of Britain's action, on principle, and yet defend Israel.

[48] Harold Lever, who had not voted on October 30, defended Israel's action but still ambiguously refused to support Britain's action. 558 *H. C. Deb.* 1481–97 (31 Oct. 1957). Emanuel Shinwell, also a non-voter on October 30, went a little farther by issuing pro-Eden statements during his subsequent Far Eastern tour. In consequence, despite Shinwell's status as a former minister, a Labour activist of 53 years and an M.P. almost continuously from the 1920's, he had to explain his statements to his constituency executive. *Times* (London), 12 Jan. 1957, p. 6. But, like Lever, Shinwell could correctly claim that he had voted with his party when it really mattered.

[49] *Times* (London), 17 April 1950, p. 4.

Evans's Suez deviation was especially sharp and open. On October 30, when Labour attacked Eden's ultimatum, Evans spoke against his party leadership's decision to divide the House and then he subsequently abstained from voting.[60] Also on November 1 Evans made a parliamentary speech distinguishing his position from Labour's, and then again abstained from voting on Labour's censure motion despite the three-line whip.[61] Although Evans returned to the fold in the party divisions of November 8, he had deliberately and surely made himself a conspicuous rebel. Some party reaction could be expected. Significantly, however, it did not come from the parliamentary leadership, which could well afford to tolerate but one rebel and so reap favorable national publicity for relative broad-mindedness. A willingness to forgive, if not forget, which did in fact characterize the attitude of both the parliamentary party and Labour's national executive committee, was not to be found in the Wednesbury divisional Labour party. On November 17, after Evans had explained his views to a special meeting of the general management committee (the 48-member body of delegates representing the whole local membership), this committee found a "deep conflict of basic principles" and voted unanimously to ask for Evans's resignation as an M.P.[52] This extreme reaction is partly explained by the strong feeling that Evans had been disloyal to an important party cause and partly by the fact that in September, when the Suez crisis was brewing, Evans had already been told that the management committee's views were different from his.

The local party's request for Evans's resignation, unlike a decision simply to look for another candidate for the next general election, was technically unenforceable. Constitutionally, meaning customarily, most M.P.s could and did resist any such demand. Moreover there was every sign that Labour's national leadership preferred Evans to resist since his ouster involved unwelcome publicity (but no danger from a by-election to the party's hold on the safe Wednesbury seat). At any rate, before any effective national intervention could have taken place, Evans complied with his local party's request by announcing his resignation from the House of Commons although he remained a member of the Labour party. In leaving his seat immediately, Evans no doubt correctly anticipated his subsequent removal as a general election candidate. As he said in explaining why he chose not to stay on through his term: "A general without an army, and what is worse living on borrowed time, seldom wields much influence and lacks all dignity."[53]

III. TENTATIVE GENERALIZATIONS

From the fairly numerous experiences of Suez deviants, certain general hypotheses about M.P.-constituency relations can be attempted—though always with the proviso that what is being generalized about is behavior during a political crisis.

1. Effectiveness of constituency association pressure

That the constituency association is able and willing to use its power against an M.P. deviating from its political opinions is evident enough from the cases of the anti-Suez Conservatives and of Stanley Evans. This power is basically the refusal to readopt, rather than the unenforceable and often politically inexpedient demand for immediate resignation. But the threat of not readopting, combined with personal and political unpleasantness, can produce an M.P.'s withdrawal (subsequently as for Medlicott, if not immediately as for Nutting and Evans). Deprived of his association's support as of its confidence, an M.P. finds himself in the untenable position, as Evans said, of "a general without an army," or as Ostrogorski wrote years ago, of "an excommunicated sovereign in the Middle Ages, whose subjects, so devoted to him the day before, are released from their loyalty to him."[54] The fact that an

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[60] 558 *H. C. Deb.* 1287 (30 Oct. 1956).

[61] 558 *H. C Deb.* 1681–86 (1 Nov. 1956).

[52] *Midland Advertiser & Wednesbury Borough News*, 24 Nov. 1956, p. 1.

[53] *Ibid.*, 24 Nov. 1956, p. 5.

[54] *Op. cit.*, p. 449.

M.P. cannot fight back effectively from outside the party association makes him dependent on its continued good-will. Therefore, any policy dispute, even one that is eventually patched up, may appear menacing to an M.P., who understandably fears that he cannot afford another such dispute.[55] Or, for that matter, an M.P. may well think that he cannot afford even one such dispute, and consequently curb an intended deviation.

One qualification has to be made about the effectiveness of constituency association pressure. The Suez evidence indicates only that such pressure is effective when local party opinion is in line with that of the national party leadership, as it certainly was during October and November 1956. It is doubtful that an association could punish an M.P. for voting contrary to local party views if, in so doing, he was following the national party leadership. Indeed when a few local Labour parties had reacted against their M.P.s for supporting German rearmament, the national Labour leadership intervened to protect the M.P.s.[56] Of course, such a circumstance is unlikely even to arise, especially in Conservative ranks, given the association's role as the custodian of national party orthodoxy.

2. Ideological extremism

Pressure from constituency associations, insofar as it is self-generating, tends to be that of relatively extreme partisans. The voluntary and amateur nature of these associations ensures that they attract zealots in the party cause, and particularly so at the local leadership level where there are many routine political chores which only the devoted are likely to perform. Principles, not professional careers, are what matter here. It is no wonder, then, that Conservative activists showed a tolerance for the pro-Suez deviants that was denied the anti-Suez M.P.s. The basis for tolerance was the same as that which had prevailed a few years earlier in local Labour parties for the Bevanite M.P.s who had deviated from their national leadership and, like the pro-Suez rebels, in a direction away from the opposition party's line. The very fact that extremists are attacked by the other party, instead of being praised as the anti-Suez Conservatives were by Labour, convinces local supporters of their essential soundness on party doctrine.

Clearly it is the M.P. whose deviation from national leadership is toward the center, away from traditional party orthodoxy, who encounters trouble in his constituency association, and primarily from the 40 to 100 most active leaders of the association who, in the nature of party organizations everywhere, tend to manage affairs. It is these activists who are truly "more royal than the king," as was demonstrated by the fact that their zeal to punish Suez deviants like Nicolson and Evans appeared to outrun what national leaders regarded as the limits of prudence. Indeed their zeal may well have gone beyond that of the rank-and-file dues-paying membership which the local leaders are elected to represent. So it appeared at Bournemouth, where Nicolson's near 50 per cent of the 1959 mail ballot of party members contrasts sharply with the absence of any support at all on the 55-member executive body of his association. Similarly in the Stanley Evans case, but without the statistical verification, there were rank-and-file Labour supporters of Evans against his ouster by the unanimous action of the local party executive.[57] Also in accord with the same expectation, the pro-Suez Conservative deviant found his local *opponents* outside the association executive.[58]

3. Reinforcement of parliamentary party leadership

As amply illustrated, the tendency of constituency association pressure is to reinforce the leadership of each parliamentary party. Even without being stirred to action by the respective whips or central offices, as on occasion they are suspected of being, the associations are capable on their own of reacting sharply against an M.P.'s deviation. And the significance of this reaction is not lessened by the fact that the reaction is only against M.P.s who deviate toward the center. That, after all, is the deviation important to the parliamentary leadership. Joined to the opposition, it can seriously embarrass or even bring down a government. Deviation toward the extremes, if only occasional, is annoying but not potentially fatal, for in the end the deviants have nowhere to go but back or out.

Unquestionably national party leaders are aware of and grateful for the service performed by local units in maintaining parliamentary cohesion. This is so even though they may regard the methods, especially at Bournemouth, as too drastic and uncivilized, as well as too unattractive a party image to put before marginal voters on a national scale. There was little effort by national leaders to interfere with the self-generating course of constituency politics. The only apparent intervention came at Bournemouth and then in a most unusual situation which occurred after more than two years of a constituency dispute. This chariness to intervene owes something to a general reluctance to dictate to voluntary local workers, but something also to a particular reluctance to try to keep an association from enforcing the line which was that of the national leaders themselves. The local zealots might not be genteel enough, but they help to maintain the parliamentary discipline on which the fortunes of the leaders rest.

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[55] The impact of a local party's vote of no-confidence in its M.P. is vividly portrayed in the novel *No Love for Johnnie* (London: Hutchinson, 1959), written by the late Wilfred Fienburgh, himself a Labour M.P.

[56] Peter G. Richards, *Honourable Members* (London: Faber & Faber, 1959), p. 21.

[57] *Midland Advertiser and Wednesbury Borough News*, 24 Nov. 1956, p. 1.

[58] *Chigwell Times & West Essex News*, 6 Sept. 1957, p. 1.

In an important way, the constituency associations do view their role as that of supporting their national leaders. The M.P. is chosen to support the party in the House of Commons, and aside from personal services for constituents it is not clear that the association expects him to have any other important functions. Surely the ordinary M.P. is not expected to pit his own judgment against that of the leaders whom the association is organized to support. On Suez, local Conservative activists, most plainly, thought it important to support Eden and not their deviating M.P.s.[59] Not only did this reflect a greater confidence in Eden's knowledge than, say, in Nigel Nicolson's. It also reflected a quite realistic appreciation of the British political system: what does count is the maintenance of parliamentary cohesion.

4. *The attitude of the individual M.P.*

Granted that greater experience and status may insulate certain M.P.s more than others from constituency pressures, it still appears generally true that a backbencher finds it dangerous to exercise in the division lobbies his individual judgment contrary to his national leaders *and* his local party. By so doing, to the extent of abstaining on a critical question, the M.P. may find himself without effective political support, and with only the sympathy of the liberal national press and of his fellow M.P.s. The attitude of the latter group is symptomatic of the state of affairs. Most M.P.s, at least backbenchers, do sympathize with each other's constituency association problems. At Bournemouth, for example, Nicolson secured the help of both pro-Suez and anti-Suez Conservative M.P.s, while the association executive could not, at the end, get any M.P. to speak on its platform. The local officers even complained of a "trade-union" of M.P.s.[60] Undoubtedly M.P.s individually and collectively resent their associations' efforts to keep them in line, more so than they resent the more gentlemanly persuasion of the parliamentary whips. The whips are members of the same club, and so more understanding of a deviation than are the more rigid and less "political" local activists. Furthermore, an M.P.'s resentment of his local party's reaction may be sharpened by a contempt for the opinions of party activists. This contempt is at least as evident in the attitudes of upper-class Conservative M.P.s toward their middle-class supporters, often housewives and widows, as it is in the views of intellectual Labour M.P.s toward their working-class activists. In conversation, one Conservative M.P. referred to constituency associations as "dreadful things," and another, with all the bite of an English public school background, called his local chairman "a small man."

5. *Conservative and Labour party differences*

The one clear Labour deviant during the Suez crisis was so promptly disposed of that even the larger number of Conservative cases cannot lead toward any conclusion about greater effectiveness of local pressure in one party than the other. However, there now seems little basis for the older belief that Conservative M.P.s enjoy much more freedom from their associations than do Labour M.P.s. Not only did the Suez period record the pressure of several Conservative associations, but there is also a growing awareness that local Conservative parties are usually more highly developed organizationally than are local Labour parties. This is especially true of associations in safe seats. Labour's seats are mainly in working-class areas where, with occasional exceptions, local parties have few active individual members but consist heavily of less interested trade-union affiliated memberships. Conservative seats, on the other hand, are concentrated in constituencies where there is a large middle-class citizenry from which political activists are always drawn. In these circumstances, Conservative associations are not just larger. They are also likely to consist of members with sufficient economic status and education to feel self-confident in dealing with their M.P. To them he is not clearly an educated "better," but perhaps as Nicolson seemed to his association executive, a man whose intellectual refinements are merely superior enough to be disliked by middlebrows.

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[59] In the words of a local women's Conservative leader addressing a Plymouth party meeting: ". . . the leader knows best because he has proved himself able to speak to the world on behalf of the nation." *Western Evening Herald* (Plymouth), 14 Nov. 1956, p. 3. Incidentally every account of local Conservative reactions indicates that women, especially important in Conservative association work, had the strongest and most bitter feelings against their anti-Suez M.P.s, and the greatest loyalty to Eden—long a "Prince Charming" figure for the loyal ladies.

[60] *Bournemouth Evening Echo*, 12 Feb. 1959, p. 15.

A little less speculative is the question of whether association pressures have been increasing. In the Conservative party, at any rate, there is a widespread belief that this is the case. Furthermore it is attributable to the large postwar development of a new mass Conservative organization, and in particular to the reform which severely limited the amount of money which an M.P. or a candidate could contribute to his local association. Before this reform, instituted by the Maxwell-Fyfe committee,[61] many Tory M.P.s virtually bought their seats through the payment of a large part of the local association's campaign expenses, thereby rendering a large dues-paying organization unnecessary. Obviously the M.P.s of means, as were most Conservatives, then stood in a stronger position with respect to their associations than now when they no longer pay the bills.[62]

6. *Internal constituency association factors*

Within both major parties, there is a good deal of variation in the size and character of local units. In the Suez cases it was generally the large and vigorous associations which reacted against deviant M.P.s, but this does not necessarily exclude the possibility that small and otherwise uninterested associations would, given the opportunity, have reacted in the same way. However, this possibility is not strong, *A priori*, one would expect an M.P. to have an easier time with local party leaders who were doing relatively little to build the organization. Their absence of zeal in that respect would seem likely to correspond with absence of zeal generally. Such scattered testimony as is available from M.P.s is in accord with this supposition, and particularly with the view that in Labour constituencies where trade unions are strong and where there is little incentive to build an active party organization the M.P. may be subject to less pressure on most issues.

Whether there is a difference in behavior between urban and rural associations does not emerge from the Suez experiences. Most of the constituencies concerned were urban–as indeed are most British constituencies—but two rural associations, Nutting's and Medlicott's, also reacted sharply against their M.Ps. Nor is it possible, beyond urban-rural differences, to do any more generalizing about the nature of constituencies. It is true that on Suez it was the association at Bournemouth, a resort area containing many retired military officers, which dealt most vigorously with its M.P. But in the other cases it was not so clear that older retired people were more decidedly against the anti-Suez M.P.s. Even if they were, the reaction could be accounted for by the fact that the particular issue was especially emotive for an older imperialist generation of Conservatives.

7. *Safeness of the seat*

Here the generalization, though hardly conclusive, can start with a widely believed view: the safer the seat, other things being equal, the more vulnerable the M.P. to local party pressure.[63] The logic is apparent. The more nearly the association can regard its candidate-selection as the bestowal of a parliamentary seat, the more confident can it afford to be that it owes the M.P. little while he owes it much. In a safe seat, the association knows it can win the constituency with someone else about as easily as with the current M.P. since no particular candidate is calculated to be worth more than about 500 votes above what the party can obtain for anybody. And in a very safe seat even the intervention of a third candidate, either a Liberal or the rejected M.P. standing as an Independent, would not decisively affect the result. Nor in such a case would the association be greatly worried by a by-election brought about by its M.P.'s resignation under pressure.

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[61] *Interim and Final Reports of the Committee on Party Organization, 1948 and 1949* (London: National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 1949).

[62] Perhaps the survival of prewar Conservative deviants was easier for other reasons. The cases of the approximately 20 M.P.s who abstained at the time of Munich do evidently contrast with the experiences of the anti-Suez Conservatives. None of these, despite the fact that their leaders made particularly sharp attacks on the Chamberlain policy (339 *H. C. Deb.* 26–562; 28 Sept.–6 Oct. 1938), appear to have been dropped by their local associations. However, a number (including Winston Churchill and Alfred Duff-Cooper) had to do some explaining to their associations. *Times* (London), 5 Nov. 1938, p. 7; 12 Oct. 1938, p. 14.

[63] This is more applicable to Conservative seats than to Labour's since in the latter cases, as noted, the influence of a large party majority may be counteracted by the fact that in many safe Labour seats the local organization is small and nonmilitant. Conservative associations, however, are likely to be large in safe districts as well as in marginal ones.

Bournemouth supplies the classic example of this generalization. Here the Conservative majority was so large that the association could, and did, ignore local repercussions. Even two or three intervening candidacies by Liberals or Independendents could not upset an election result. Marginal or floating voters were of no local importance no matter how much they sympathized with the M.P. Clearly Nicolson was dispensable. So, in their safe constituencies, were Nutting, Banks, Medlicott and Evans, the four other M.P.s whose Suez deviations cost them their seats. Nevertheless, along with this impressive fact that the five M.P.s actually forced out all came from safe seats, it has to be appreciated that some of the surviving deviants, even among the anti-Suez Conservatives, also came from safe seats. In other words, a large party majority was not in itself *sufficient* to account for the fate of M.P.s who deviated on the Suez issue. On the other hand, safeness of the seat did appear in the anti-Suez Conservative cases to have been a *necessary* condition for removal of an M.P. Not only were just those with safe majorities actually purged, but the three (Yates, Astor and Kirk) in distinctly marginal constituencies survived. Granting that their survival could be accounted for in other ways as well, it is significant that each of these three M.P.s, in personal interviews, stressed the marginal character of his constituency in explaining how he rode out his association difficulties.

8. *Compounded offenses*

Some of the Suez deviants, it was noted, committed other earlier offenses against party orthodoxy, as interpreted by their constituency associations. These, especially their anti-hanging stands, had been important in rousing local opposition to most of the Conservative M.P.s who were later attacked for being anti-Suez. Perhaps there were some local critics who disliked their M.P. more for his stand on hanging than on Suez, and Suez might then have provided the opportunity for retaliation that the parliamentary free vote on hanging had not. Or it is possible that either offense could have been tolerated, but not both. In the words cruelly attributed to Bournemouth Conservatives: "Nicolson didn't want the blood of either Englishmen or Arabs. What's a Tory M.P. for?"

However, the hanging question complicates the analysis only because it was another emotional issue which had arisen at about the same time as Suez. It was important but not a prime determinant of what happened to the anti-Suez Conservatives. Some who were also against hanging survived both offenses, and some did not; and two of the anti-Suez Conservatives who had not been anti-hanging lost their seats. More significant is the consideration that an M.P.'s local critics, when aroused as they were in the Suez cases, could be expected to find other offenses to charge against an M.P. If it were not the hanging issue, there would almost certainly be something else in the M.P.'s record to hold against him along with the immediate deviation. The "something else" could be his personal life, his relations with constituents, or his campaigning, as well as his parliamentary record. To be sure, another actual deviation of recent origin is the most serious way for an offense to be compounded, but it is not the only way.

9. *Personal relations*

This is the variable hardest to estimate, but the M.P.'s purely personal relations with his local party leaders do apparently help to account for some of the consequences of the Suez deviations. For instance, one (Boyle) of the substantial anti-Suez deviators who survived association displeasure was especially well liked personally by key local officers. And in the case of one non-surviving deviator (Nicolson), relations with the local chairman had already been strained before Suez. However, the same sort of evidence is not available concerning the background in the other cases where Conservative M.P.s paid the ultimate political penalty for their deviation, and in at least one such case (Medlicott's) personal relations appeared particularly good over many years. Anyway the importance of good personal relations as an independent factor ought not be exaggerated. Obviously they are easier to maintain if there is no important political difference between an M.P. and his local supporters. And even if an unusual degree of friendship does exist there is nothing to suggest that it would be sufficient to enable an M.P. to survive more than one deviation.

Furthermore it must be stressed that it is often quite accidental for an M.P. to have close personal friends in his constituency at all, not to mention his association. Without the American-style residential requirement, in principle or in practice, the M.P. often starts as a stranger in his constituency. His acquaintances then become numerous, but their basis is political. By moving his residence to the constituency, an M.P. may develop some non-political ties. But few do this on a full-time basis.

IV. SUMMARY EVALUATION

When the Suez experiences displayed the local associations' self-generating pressure for parliamentary conformity to the national party leadership, these associations were severely criticized by the British intellectual establishment, including academics, M.P.s themselves and leader-writers for most of the serious national press. The editorial comment of the *Times* was typical: the Bournemouth affair, it said, left "a nasty taste in the mouths of all who are concerned to see representatives of integrity, and no mere delegates, sitting in the House of Commons."[64] And the *Times* quoted Burke, as did almost all critics of the associations. Plainly, however, this Burkean view of how M.P.s should function does not correspond to the realities of contemporary British party politics; nor, as Burke himself learned, did it correspond with the way politics worked even in late 18th century Bristol.[65] True, the modern British Burkeans would not deny the democratic electorate's power eventually to get rid of an M.P. whose convictions differ from its own. What is objected to is that the small portion of the electorate composing a local party's leadership should have this power, and that it should use it in the manner of a lynch mob in immediate retaliation against a deviating M.P. This latter point about method, while much was made of it concerning Nicolson and Evans, does not seem crucial. The association's power would be as great if it waited a few extra months before formally rejecting its M.P., or even if it merely threatened to do so. Anyway there is a strong practical reason for an association, once dissatisfied with its M.P., to secure quickly a new prospective general election candidate to fill the role which a locally-disowned M.P. can no longer play at party meetings.

Accordingly, the significant question is whether the associations should have the power at all to reject their M.P.s for their deviations. Once posed this way, the answer–given the British political system–has to be yes. It would be ridiculous to suggest that the groups which select candidates should not be able to reject them. If one wants to take away the power to reject, then the power to select must be shifted as well. It makes little sense to say that an M.P., when he is being rejected by the same group which selected him, should be able to appeal beyond this group to a larger section of the local electorate. Unless the British critics wish to substitute something like an American-style primary method of candidate selection–and they assuredly do not–then the power of constituency associations has to be borne.

More significantly, any shift in power from the associations might alter the basic arrangement for carrying on British parliamentary government. That arrangement, resting as it does on virtually complete party cohesion in the Commons, appears incompatible with a method of candidate selection which would transfer an M.P.'s loyalty from the zealous faithful of his association to those who are merely party voters. Such a transfer would have the effect, as it does in those American states where the primary is really effectual, of freeing the legislator from a complete dependence on party supporters for his political survival. This would not only allow an M.P. to use his own judgment; it would also subject him increasingly to the cross-pressures of various local interest groups. Both results would tend to work against parliamentary cohesion.

In other words, the British model of constituency association-M.P. relations is an integral part of the nation's working form of parliamentary government. Only the dislike of many Englishmen for the way that model functioned during the Suez crisis obscured this principle. However, even at the time, it was not obscure to an old hand at the maintenance of parliamentary party cohesion. Thus Earl Attlee, in a magazine debate with one of the anti-Suez Conservatives, wrote that there are "few, if any, Members who get into Parliament on account of their own qualities. They are elected because the politically active citizens select them as expressing broadly their views, and because these same citizens have worked to persuade a majority of the electors to support them."[66] So, Attlee continued, if an M.P. fails to support the government or fails to act with the opposition in its efforts to turn the government out, he acts contrary to the expectations of those who have put their trust in him. It follows, for Attlee, that when in disagreement with his party on a major issue an M.P. should submit the issue to his local association and resign if the association so wishes. However, such a situation, as Attlee indicates, arises but rarely. The rules of the game are too well understood by almost all of the participants. M.P.s know what their parties expect by way of loyalty to the national cause, and they know that such loyalty is of the essence of British politics. In Attlee's words, the party leader requires disciplined troops "unless one is prepared to lose the battle."[67] In this perspective, constituency associations are only the ultimate sanction for rules usually observed for other reasons.

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[64] 3 Oct. 1958, p. 7.

[65] What actually happened to Burke is worth looking at along with his more familiar classic apologia. There is a most judicious account by Ernest Barker, "Burke and His Bristol Constituency, 1774–1780," in his *Essays on Government* (London: Oxford Press, 1951), ch. vi. More details are supplied in a somewhat antiquarian manner by G. E. Weare, *Edmund Burke's Connection with Bristol, From 1774 till 1780* (Bristol: Wm. Bennett, 1894).

One can agree with Attlee about the role of constituency associations in preserving parliamentary party cohesion without sharing the dismay, first reflected by Ostrogorski and now by British liberals, concerning the power of the associations. Really how one regards this power depends on how one values the strong parliamentary party cohesion to which it contributes. And it is hard to see how British cabinet government, in contrast to the American style independent executive, can function satisfactorily in modern times without such party cohesion.

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[66] "Party Discipline is Paramount," *The National and English Review*, Vol. 148 (Jan. 1957), p. 15. Attlee's piece is published along with Sir Edward Boyle's case for only a slightly looser interpretation of party discipline—one just loose enough to justify his own Suez deviation.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF POLITICAL CHOICE IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA*

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Africans in French Tropical Africa have recently been called on to make several far-reaching political decisions. Two basic questions have been at issue: the nature of the relationship between France and the African territories, and the nature of relations between the African territories themselves. On the first question, the Referendum of September 28, 1958 on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic gave Africans the choice between total independence and internal autonomy within "The (French) Community."[1] With regard to their mutual relations, the territories which made up the federations of French West and French Equatorial Africa could remain tied together politically, or they could sever all formal political connections among themselves; in French African political terminology, the second issue has been whether or not the individual territories should form "primary federations."

The issue of total independence or internal autonomy within "The Community" was temporarily decided at the 1958 Referendum, when eleven of the twelve territories of French West and Equatorial Africa voted to remain with France, Guinea alone choosing immediate independence. Since then several members of "The Community" have initiated negotiations with France for the full transfer of sovereign powers to local African governments, and the indications are that all French-speaking West Africa will be fully independent within the near future.

The outcome of the second question—political relations among the African territories–is not so clear. The trend up to now has been against the re-creation of primary federations. The federations of French West and French Equatorial Africa ceased their legal existence in April, 1959. Two of the former territories of French West Africa—Senegal and the Soudan—have formed the Federation of Mali. And, under the sponsorship of the Ivory Coast, four of the others (the Ivory Coast, the Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey) have decided to join together in a loose organization. All seven of the states of West Africa under French influence have, finally, agreed to enter a customs union. Aside from the Federation of Mali, none of these new arrangements (and this goes also for the Ghana-Guinea Union, another loose association) involves the cession of genuine power to a federal body; all attempts at closer union have failed, mainly because of the opposition of the Ivory Coast to the rebirth of federal government in French-speaking West Africa.

Many complex factors enter into the explanation of why most of French tropical Africa refused independence when it was offered, and why the newly autonomous African states in what used to be French West Africa are having difficulty in re-uniting themselves. The fact that the new French Constitution allowed them the possibility of choosing independence at any time in the future swung many leaders into the Community. The *mystique* that guided M. Houphouet-Boigny, leader of the Ivory Coast, his belief that Africans and Frenchmen could show the world a new path in racial and international cooperation, is fundamental in explaining the Ivory Coast's adherence to the French Community, and its reluctance to enter a federation with other West African states. On the other side, the very different ideas of M. Sékou Touré, Guinea's leader, on the future of Africa influenced Guinea's decision to take its independence. French action in the internal politics of some of the territories affected the outcome of the referendum, and considerations of internal political balance led a number of African leaders to decide against independence.

All these factors and others are pertinent in understanding the direction of political events in French-speaking West Africa. But underlying them is a set of economic circumstances which have given shape to the political decisions made; in West Africa, as elsewhere, political choice is conditioned by the nature of the economic environment in which it takes place. It is the purpose of this paper to outline some of the main features of this economic setting, and to explore their political implications. More specifically, we first examine the characteristics of French West Africa's pattern of economic development, and then consider the economic background to the problem of refashioning a federal state in what was formerly a colonial federation. In the final section we consider the role of economic factors in explaining the French African states' temporary refusal of independence when it was first offered, and in accounting for the difficulties of political re-integration among them.

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[1] They also could choose to become departments of France, but this alternative was hardly relevant to the West African territories.

I. THE PATTERN OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA

The Relative Speed of Recent Development. One of the striking aspects of the economy of French West Africa (FWA) is the extent of its development since the end of World War II. Between the turn of the century, when settled administration began in most parts of the area, and 1939, changes in the economic and social structure of the country were few. New ideas, new ways of doing things, new wants did begin to penetrate traditional society and prepare the way for future changes. But the going was slow and actual achievements few. A railway system was laid down, some roads were built, some African farmers took to coffee and cocoa growing in the Ivory Coast, and in Senegal Africans continued the export of peanuts which they had been growing for sale since 1850. In 1913 about 240,000 tons of peanuts were exported from Senegal, making up over half the total value of FWA exports. In 1938 some 370,000 tons were exported, and peanuts were still 45 per cent of the total value of exports that year; except for the increasing output of cocoa and coffee from the Ivory Coast the volume and structure of production in 1938 differed little from that of 1913. The territories of the interior—the Soudan, Niger, Upper Volta and Mauritania remained largely outside the currents of modern economic life, except for their role as exporters of labor and cattle to the coastal areas. Even along the coast there was little industry, and practically none outside of Dakar in Senegal. No minerals were exported. Some 90 per cent of the population was bound up in a subsistence economy; only about 200,000 men (most of them temporary migrants) worked for wages, and of these fewer than 140,000 worked for private enterprises.[2]

The low-gear movement of the economy was matched by equally slow development on the social side. Relatively few Africans received any kind of education at all; fewer reached the secondary school level; a tiny handful got to the universities in France. In 1938 there were only 71,000 pupils in schools, or 3.2 per cent of the school-age population.

Then came the war, and after it a political and economic "new deal" in French Africa. Under it, the economy of FWA expanded at a rate unmatched in its earlier history. Between 1947 and 1957 coffee exports almost tripled—from 43,000 to 118,000 tons, making FWA (more precisely, the Ivory Coast) the world's third largest coffee producer. Cocoa exports during the same period increased from 28,000 to 76,000 tons. Peanut exports almost doubled, from 380,000 tons in 1947 to 710,000 in 1956. Secondary industry grew; food processing plants, flour milling and soap manufacture made their appearance for the first time or significantly expanded their capacity. Mining operations began in Guinea and in Mauritania. The urban population in the main towns expanded enormously: Dakar (in Senegal) and Conakry (in Guinea) doubled in size in 10 years; the population of Abidjan (in the Ivory Coast) tripled. The number of non-agricultural wage-earners doubled, and the total number of wage-workers increased at an even faster rate. Electricity production tripled during these years, a real beginning was made on the construction of a creditable road system, and the number of automobiles and trucks increased tenfold.

The economic achievements of the postwar period were not at the expense of social development, for the social services of the area expanded as well. The number of doctors serving FWA's people rose from less than 500 in 1946 to almost 650 in 1956, and the number of hospital beds increased from 10,000 to 20,000. Education began to touch substantial numbers of the school-age population for the first time. In 1947 only 128,000 were in school, out of an estimated school-age population of 2.4 million; in 1957 about 377,000 out of 2.8 million were in school. The rate of school attendance thus grew in 10 years from 5 per cent to over 13 per cent.

The increased rate of development since 1946 has not revolutionized FWA's economy. Over 80 per cent of its people still remain very large-

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[2] Agence Economique du Gouvernement-Général de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, *Annuaire Statistique de l'Afrique Occidentale Française et du Togo, 1934–1935–1936* (Paris, 1937), p. 121. The source of other statistical data in this section is: Haut Commissariat de la République en Afrique Occidentale Française, *A.O.F. 1957; Tableaux Economiques* (Dakar, 1958).

TABLE I. SOME INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA, NIGERIA, AND GHANA, 1956

	French West Africa	Nigeria	Ghana
(1) Population (millions)	18.8[a]	31.2	4.7
(2) Area (square miles)	1,800,000	373,000	78,800
(3) Exports per capita ($ U S.)	18.2[b]	12.1	51.6
(4) Imports per capita ($ U.S.)	20.3[b]	13.7	52.9
(5) Percentage of total population engaged in nonagricultural wage-earning[c]	1.4	1.2	4.6
(6) Electricity consumption per capita (kwh)	7.7	7.3	49
(7) Road density (miles of road per thousand square miles of area	27.1	99.2	49.0
(8) Number of inhabitants per automotive vehicle[d]	270	1,290	120
(9) Railway density (miles of railway track per thousand square miles of area)	1.4	15.1	7.0
(10) Per capita passenger miles travelled on railways	15	12	35
(11) Number of inhabitants per doctor[e]	33,000	54,000	25,000
(12) Percentage of school-age children attending schools[f]	13	37	86

Sources: French West Africa: *AOF 1957, Tableaux Economiques.* Nigeria: Federation of Nigeria, *Digest of Statistics,* Vol. 5, #3, 1956 and Vol. 7, #2, 1958; Federal Education Department, *Digest of Statistics, 1956;* Federal Department of Statistics, *Report on Employment and Earnings Enquiry,* September 1956. Ghana: *Digest of Statistics,* Vol. 7, #1, 1958; *Education Statistics, 1957; Economic Survey, 1957.*

[a] Recent sampling surveys have found a consistent understatement in previous population estimates. On the basis of the results of these surveys Government statisticians in FWA have unofficially re-evaluated FWA's 1956 population as between 22 and 24 million. (See Haut Commissariat Général à Dakar, Groupe d'Etudes des Comptes Economiques, *Comptes Economiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, 1956, Rapport #2, Inventaire des Ressources humaines en 1956* (Dakar, March 1959, p. 4). To the extent that these new estimates are more accurate than the official figures all the indicators in the table are of course overvalued.

[b] The official 1956 dollar-franc rate of exchange (175 cfa francs to $1 U.S.) is used in the conversion. Because the franc was considerably overvalued, the official rate inflates the real volume of FWA's exports and imports in dollar terms.

[c] The estimated nonagricultural wage-earning labor forces used in the calculation of these percentages are: FWA, 270,000; Ghana, 215,000; Nigeria, 410,000. Agricultural workers are omitted mainly because of the difficulty of estimating the number of sharecroppers and wage-earners at work for African farmers. These workers are more numerous in FWA and Ghana than in Nigeria.

[d] Trucks, buses, taxis and private cars.

[e] The Ghana figure refers to 1954.

[f] University students are excluded. Roughly, 2,000 FWA students were pursuing post-secondary studies, 1,300 Ghanaians, and 2,500–3,000 Nigerians.

ly within the subsistence sector of the economy. The exchange sector remains overwhelmingly devoted to the production of agricultural products for export; over 70 per cent of FWA's export earnings come from three crops (peanuts coffee, cocoa). Its industry is still insignificant, as witnessed by the low percentage of its population in industrial employment. But during the postwar period all sectors of the economy experienced a high and increasing level of activity. The pace of economic change was quickened by more intense contact between the money economy and ordinary villagers. Most important, FWA was effectively endowed with the social and economic base from which future growth can take place, for a substantial amount of social overhead capital has come into being—roads, ports, bridges, communications facilities, schools, markets, hospitals, buildings, educated people.

In order to get some idea of FWA's location in economic space, some idea of its degree of advancement, Table I lists a number of measures of social and economic development. To show how FWA compares with its main West African neighbors the same measures are given for Nigeria and Ghana. As indicators of development the measures are very rough. The data on which some of them are based are extremely crude; in the case of wage-earners, for example, a substantial number of workers in each of the countries (agricultural laborers, domestic servants, and most of those employed in enterprises with less than 10 workers) are excluded because they have never been accurately counted or reported. Some of the other indicators require careful interpretation; road densities, for example, are based on the official figures of road mileage, all roads being included, even those of very questionable quality. If paved roads alone are taken, the comparisons are much less favorable for FWA, which had in 1956 less than 1500 miles of paved roads as against Ghana's 1650 miles and Nigeria's 3400 miles. Similar problems of interpretation arise for most of the other indicators. Despite these difficulties, however, the figures given in Table I do tell us a good deal about the three countries.

Two general conclusions emerge from the table. The first is that Ghana is well ahead of the others, an indication of the solid economic base underlying its political independence. The second is that FWA and Nigeria are not so far from one another in their relative degrees of development. It is mainly in the extent of education that Nigeria shows a clear superiority.

The difference is in fact greater than the table suggests. For there were in 1956 about 90,000 Europeans in FWA, while Nigeria had only about 15,000 (and Ghana under 10,000). The European presence inflates most of the indicators, since Europeans are heavy importers of consumer goods, intensive users of automobiles, consumers of much electricity, etc. Even the education statistics are affected by their presence, since in FWA European children attend local schools, while they usually do not in Ghana and Nigeria. So while the general conclusion holds, that FWA and Nigeria are in roughly similar stages of economic and social development, the advantage of Nigeria is greater than appears on the surface of the figures. The comparisons cannot therefore be taken as indicating relative degrees of *African* development within each country. Nor, for similar reasons, can the comparisons be interpreted to indicate relative degrees of preparedness for self-government. For it is not only in social and economic results that such preparedness must be measured; the ways in which these results are achieved are also important. And while in Nigeria and Ghana the sources of development—especially the sources of development funds—have been essentially internal, FWA has been heavily dependent on France, particularly for the capital investments that have given impetus to its recent growth.

Dependence on French Capital Grants for Development Expenditure. We noted above the considerable post-World War II expansion of FWA's basic transportation, communication, education and health facilities. The kind of real capital formation involved in the development of these facilities can, in principle, be financed in any country in one or both of two ways: the authorities can draw on domestic resources, either by restricting the current consumption of its citizens or—where possible—by utilizing unused resources already existing in the country, mainly the "leisure" of its citizens. Or the country can get help from abroad, help which will make it easier to bring idle resources into use or make it possible to transfer resources from other uses to capital formation, *e.g.*, roads, hospitals and schools. The former way is the hard way; it involves belt-tightening of one kind or another. Countries that can finance their development the second way are—in one sense at least—lucky; they don't have to sacrifice for development, either immediately by restricting their current consumption or later by not participating in the higher incomes that development brings with it.

French West Africa is in the second category. Its postwar development has been accompanied by relatively heavy doses of public capital investment, the greatest part of which has come in the form of grants from France. Between 1947 and the end of 1956 public capital investment in FWA totalled 170 billion 1956 cfa francs, or—depending on the exchange rate used—between $750 million and almost $1 billion.[3] Of this total, about 106 billion francs, or

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[3] The franc in which this sum is expressed is the colonial franc, the cfa franc as it is called, which exchanges for two French francs. The current rate of exchange between the cfa franc and the U. S. dollar is, since January 1959, about 247 francs to one dollar.

The data on which this estimate of investment is based come from *AOF 1957*, *Tableaux Economiques*, pp. 336 ff. Annual investments are given there in current francs; the total 1947–1956 investment in current francs is 155 billion. I have converted these current francs into 1956 francs with the deflator used by government statisticians in France and Africa (*Cf. AOF, 1957*, p. 340). This deflator consists of an index based on an average of French wholesale and retail price indices.

To translate the franc investments into a dollar equivalent is an uncertain operation. The official rate of the franc was kept at artificial levels throughout the postwar period; use of this rate to convert franc investments into dollars therefore substantially inflates their real value in dollar terms. This kind of problem is not of course over 70 per cent, came from the French Treasury, most of it in the form of outright grants, and the rest in long-term, low-interest loans. To get some perspective on what kind of investment effort this represents it is enough to look at estimates of earlier public investment. Government statisticians in FWA have estimated that between 1903 and 1946 only 46 billion 1956 cfa francs flowed from French sources to public authorities in West Africa;[4] and all of this was composed of loans, not grants. This means that in 10 postwar years more than twice as much public capital investment took place in FWA as had been made in the 43 previous years. The fact that earlier public investments from France were repayable loans, while most of the more recent investments were outright grants, is not the least significant aspect of this contrast.

The extent of FWA's dependence on France for investment funds has been even greater than the above figures suggest. The territories have been able to contribute 30 to 35 per cent of the total public investment from their own resources only because France has paid for a substantial part of their ordinary administrative expenditures. The financial relationship between France and FWA is so complex, their economies and their administrations have been so integrated, that it is not easy to tell just how much of ordinary operating expenses has been covered by French contributions. The official estimates are that between 1950 and 1956 over 37 per cent of FWA's civil and military expenses were paid for by France.[5] The trend toward political autonomy between 1956 and 1959 did not decrease this percentage appreciably. Table II gives a breakdown of civil administrative expenditure for the fiscal year 1958. Of a total of about 55 billion cfa francs spent that year on normal running costs of civil administration in FWA, French sources contributed almost 27 per cent. If military expenditures were added, the percentage of French contribution to total civil and military expenses would be around 35 per cent.

TABLE II. SOURCES OF EXPENDITURE ON CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, GENERAL AND LOCAL BUDGETS, FRENCH WEST AFRICA, 1958
(*billions of cfa francs*)

i. Expenditures paid from locally raised revenues		40.6[a]
ii. Expenditures paid from French budget		14.25
Administrators and judges	1.9	
State services	6.0	
Civil and military pensions	3.5	
Subsidies to local budgets for administrative expenses	1.65	
Transfer to metropolitan budget of a part of salaries of French civil servants in FWA	1.2	
Total civil expenditure		54.85

Source: Direction Générale des Finances, Dakar.

[a] Municipal expenditures not included. Includes a 6 billion franc contribution to the expenses of State services.

The extent of this dependence on French help for ordinary expenses of government can nevertheless be exaggerated. Whether military expenditure can rightfully be counted as entirely essential is open to quesion. And if FWA were to be independent tomorrow it could surely do without many of the French administrative officers and other civil servants whose usefulness is equally open to question now. Furthermore, the pensions of retired civil servants and military personnel are fixed obligations assumed by the French government. Even after independence France would continue to pay them as she is doing in independent Guinea. This is a substantial part (25 per cent) of the total French assistance to civil administrative expenditures. On the other hand, payments for military security are completely excluded from Table II; but an independent FWA would have to set up some military establishment, and this would require transfer of resources now being used elsewhere. In any case, the main point is that French help in subsidizing ordinary operating costs of government has allowed the FWA authorities to transfer resources to public investment which would otherwise have been required for normal administration. Directly or indirectly, therefore, most of the relatively heavy government investment of the postwar period has depended on French aid.

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unique to the franc; it arises in all currency conversions, particularly in a world of managed currencies. But the difference between the official exchange rate of the franc and its rate on the world's money markets was so large during the period under consideration that it seems essential to note it here. To give a more meaningful dollar estimate of public investments in FWA I have therefore converted the franc investments into dollars at two different rates of exchange, the official 1956 rate of 175 cfa francs to one dollar, and the average free market rate that year of 225 francs to one dollar.

[4] *AOF, 1957*, p. 340.

[5] The total expenditure for operating costs, pension payments and the armed forces during this seven year period was 260 billion cfa francs, of which the French paid 97 billions. *AOF 1957*, p. 376.

Many Africans have dismissed this kind of cataloguing of French aid to Africa as irrelevant, and have raised doubts as to whether Africa has really benefited from it. They argue that Africans themselves have had little to do with planning how the aid should be used, that the big French firms (the "colonial trusts") have drawn disproportionate profits from it, that projects have been badly chosen. And more recently there has grown up a doctrine which argues, in effect, that "it all goes back to France anyway, so Africa gets little good out of French aid."

Some of these criticisms are well founded. Economic planning has been done without sufficient consultation of African opinion. Projects have too often been undertaken as much for their value as splashy propaganda as for their economic utility; they have too often been heavy on luxury and esthetic appeal—architectural or engineering *tours de force* which are pleasing and impressive but which represent added costs that a poor country can ill afford.[6]

There is no room here to consider in detail the recent, and perhaps the most significant African complaint about French economic aid—that it does no good because "it all goes back to France." It deserves some consideration, however, because it serves as an ideological underpinning for demands for independence: an obvious reply to the argument that Africa needs French economic aid is that this aid doesn't help Africans and so there would be no loss in their dispensing with it.

As it is generally expressed, the argument is unsound; Africans seeking economic arguments for independence can find better ones. French aid does indeed return in large measure to French individuals and enterprises, but it does so in payment for factors of production which are used either in Africa or in France for African purposes. In any underdeveloped economy which is interested in capital formation at the lowest cost, a high proportion of investment funds will inevitably go to the hire or purchase of foreign factors—machines, raw materials, technical skills. The impact of the investment expenditure on the domestic economy is thereby reduced; in technical terms the investment multiplier is low because of heavy leakages in the form of imports. But the fixed capital created by the foreign factors remains within the country. It may be in the form of roads or buildings, or it may be in educated or trained people. It may even be in an increase in technical knowledge, as is the case with investments in research.

In one sense the "it all goes back to France" argument does have real meaning. The critics might be suggesting that local factors of production should have been used more heavily. In building roads, for example, more local labor and less imported French machinery could have been used. This would mean that more of every injection of investment funds in Africa would be distributed as wages to Africans, and less as wages and profits to Frenchmen in the machine-making industry in France. It would mean a greater short-run rise in the national income of French Africa as a result of French aid. But it would also mean less capital formation in Africa. Building roads by means of unskilled laborers with shovels, for example, is more expensive (even where it is possible) than is road-building with modern machinery. It is not impossible for a government to plan its development projects so as to maximize the use of domestic factors of production; there are places where it would be economic to do so. But in a situation where investment resources are being granted from abroad it is not a very practicable alternative; and given the conditions of labor supply in West Africa, it is not clear that it would be economically justifiable.

Relatively Heavy Use of French Labor. We have so far outlined two characteristics of FWA's pattern of economic development—its relatively rapid postwar growth, and its heavy reliance on French economic aid for its development financing. A third feature is the extent to which Europeans have been used in staffing the administrative bureaucracy and in the ranks of skilled and lower-level supervisory employees in the private sector of the economy. For a number of reasons, Africans in FWA have held an extremely small proportion of managerial responsibility in the country, even responsibility of a limited sort. While this is a general characteristic of all colonial societies, it has been particularly true in French Africa. On the one hand, Europeans of modest attainments were more plentiful in FWA than in most other parts of colonial Africa. And on the other hand, the number of skilled and educated Africans was insignificant until quite recently. As a consequence, neither in the administration nor in private employment were there many Africans above the level of junior clerks.

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[6] The Grand Council building in Dakar and the Abidjan bridge are two well-known examples. Less known but more striking is the airport at Bouaké; this airport in the center of the Ivory Coast services about two local flights a week, yet it is far more luxurious than the airport at Lagos (Nigeria) which has a local and international traffic over 20 times as heavy.

The picture was not very different in Ghana and Nigeria until 1946, except that those countries had a wider educational base on which to build. But after 1946 Africanisation in British West Africa moved forward at a lively pace. In FWA, despite the other postwar changes, administrative responsibility and skilled or technical work remained almost entirely in the charge of Frenchmen. To some extent this was not easily avoidable. It takes time for the educational pipeline to turn out trained people. Also, many talented and able Africans entered political life, thereby drawing off ability which might otherwise have risen in the private or administrative bureaucracies. But there is more to it than this. Africanisation moved forward especially slowly in FWA because the haziness of the ultimate outcome of the French-African relationship prevented serious thinking about an Africa without the French, and the nature of FWA politics between 1946 and 1958 made it difficult for African leaders to do much about it.

In the British West African territories there was never any question that independence would, sooner or later, become reality; in FWA, on the contrary, the question of the ultimate relationship with France, once the period of stewardship was at an end, had never been squarely faced. Under the constitution of the Fourth Republic the overseas territories were an integral part of the French Republic. Despite the territorial assemblies established in each territory since 1946, sovereignty resided in the French Parliament. No specified end to the French-African connection was in sight, and certainly no possibility of legal accession to independence.

After 1946 African political parties gained increasing control of political power within each territory. Except for some incidents in the Ivory Coast and Guinea, they did so peacefully, working always within the legal framework of the Fourth Republic. The steady and quiet construction of a local power base was accompanied by no open demands for independence. Such demands were outlawed; the general strategy of most African leaders was to consolidate their power without alarming French officials. "Independence" therefore was a nasty word, banned for a decade in polite political society. This meant that African political leaders could not prudently push an intense and systematic Africanisation program in FWA as their counterparts in British West Africa had been doing, especially since 1946.

The peculiar legal structure of the Fourth Republic added an additional complicating element to the Africanisation problem. According to law, a citizen of the French Union had the right of free circulation in all parts of that Union—much as, in this country, Puerto Ricans as citizens are free to move to New York City. This meant that, provided he could meet some nominal entry requirements, no Frenchman could be prohibited from coming to FWA. And as the postwar boom got under way, many Frenchmen did come; between 1946 and 1956 the European population of FWA rose from 32,000 to 90,000—the great majority being French nationals. Employment in Africa had a great appeal. Not only were wages good, conditions attractive and social upgrading inevitable, but there was also an extra feature that served as a special lure: because of the rate of exchange between the French and colonial francs, each franc saved in Africa could be turned into two francs at home. This gave many French nationals, particularly those of lesser skill or training, a splendid chance to put a little something aside. Among the 60,000 new European entrants into FWA during the decade after 1946 were sizeable numbers of men with little skill, the much-discussed *petits blancs* who too often knew little more, as a Dakar newspaper editor once put it, than that "two metropolitan francs equal one cfa franc." To a great extent these men filled the many posts of lower supervisory rank that qualified Africans might have taken over, had there not been Europeans present in such number. Why European employers and the administration were willing to employ Europeans when similarly trained Africans could have been found at much lower cost is a complicated matter; elements of inertia, race prejudice, strike insurance, social compatibility, and a frequently genuine belief that Africans were less productive, less responsible and less trustworthy—all these factors and others were important.[7]

For all these reasons, responsible posts in FWA have remained in the nearly exclusive control of Europeans. Where Ghana and Nigeria have hundreds of Africans in higher level administrative positions in the civil service, and some even in private industry, there are only handfuls of such men in FWA. In the civil service Africanisation has barely begun. There were about 42,500 civil servants in FWA in 1951, including some 5,300 Europeans. Only about 2,000 of these Europeans were doing genuinely higher level adminstrative or technical work, of the sort that normally requires higher education. About 30,000 of the

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[7] *Cf.* E. Berg, "French West Africa," in *Labor and Economic Development,* Walter Galenson, ed. (New York, 1959), p. 258, note 110.

37,000 African civil servants were in the lowest classifications—the junior clerk grades; 5,500 were in the middle levels, in jobs for which teacher training school or some secondary school attendance is an entry requirement. The higher ranks of the service included 2,000 Africans, but most of these were not connected with administration; they were African auxiliary doctors, midwives, pharmacists, veterinarians.[8]

By 1956 the situation had not appreciably changed. The size of the civil service had increased to about 56,000. Some few African university graduates had moved into the higher posts of the service. But there were still 5,500 Europeans in the middle ranks, in jobs requiring no more than secondary school training. Just how little real inroad the Africans had made in taking over the administrative machinery of their country is suggested by more recent figures for the Ivory Coast. In that territory in 1958 there were fewer than 20 high-level African administrative and technical officers.[9] The degree of Africanisation was greater in the civil services of Senegal and Dahomey, but more so in the middle levels than at the top.

What was true of the bureaucracy in government was even truer in private industry. Not only were managerial jobs closed to Africans but to an extent unmatched outside of white-settler Africa, Europeans and Africans were in open competition for lower-level jobs. A study of the major trading firms in Senegal in 1957 showed that the middle skill categories contained 600 Europeans and over 300 Africans. The ranks of sales clerks and secretaries were continually replenished by wives of French servicemen (or wage-earners) stationed in FWA.[10] In 1954 there were about 22,000 Europeans working for wages in FWA, some 14,000 of them in the private sector. Of these 14,000, about 4,700 were managerial people; the rest were classified as follows: 540 "ordinary manual workers"; 2,000 "qualified manual workers"; 6,000 "office workers."[11]

The presence of these Europeans in the labor market had two effects. It blocked African accession to a wider range of jobs, for many of the Europeans were doing work that could have been done by Africans; it therefore hindered the development of African skills and responsibility. But it also magnified another obstacle for Africans aspiring to positions of authority in private industry. Employers were prevented by inertia, and by fear of unloosing a host of racial problems, from placing Africans in jobs that might involve giving orders to Europeans. It is no surprise that of the 250,000 African wage-earners in the private sector for whom statistics were available in 1954, only 1,600 qualified as *cadres*—men of responsibility.[12] By 1957 there had been no significant change; some 2,100 Africans were listed as *cadres* in the private sector in that year.[13]

The point is sufficiently clear. Between 1946 and 1958 Africans in FWA secured political power within their territories. But the apparatus of government and the administration of private economic activity remained in the hands of Europeans. There were two kinds of Africans: political leaders—ministers, deputies and their aides—and the rest, who were still to an extraordinary degree the hewers of wood and the drawers of water. In the middle was a great void, filled by the Frenchman in Africa.

Protection of FWA's Exports in French Markets. To the dependence on France for development funds and an (unwilling) dependence on Frenchmen for trained personnel must be added a third aspect of FWA's dependence on France, and a major characteristic of its economic development pattern: its close trade integration within the highly protected franc zone. Much more than the British or Belgian territories in Africa, the French areas have developed within the protective wall of the metropolitan country. Most FWA imports (over 70 per cent in recent years) come from France, and about the same proportion of its exports are sold there. FWA is, as a result, a high-price area. Because of restrictions on purchases in non-franc areas FWA's residents have had to pay higher than world prices for the goods they import. And as a counterbalance, FWA's exporters sell at higher than world prices in French markets protected by tariffs, quotas and exchange controls. For much of the postwar period FWA's peanuts have thus sold at 15 to 20 per cent above world prices; FWA's coffee has enjoyed the benefits of a 20 per cent French tariff on coffee from non-franc zone countries, and FWA's nascent food processing industry has been able to sell in France at prices substantially above the prices of comparable imports from elsewhere.

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[8] *Annuaire Statistique de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*, Vol. 5, tome 3 (Paris, 1957), pp. 97–103; and information supplied by the Direction Générale de Personnel, Dakar.

[9] Information supplied by the Ivory Coast Ministry of the *Fonction Publique*.

[10] One of the most striking differences between pre- and post-independence Guinea is the disappearance of European shop clerks in the main stores. Because the military left, and with them their wives, relatively inexpensive European clerks are no longer available.

[11] *Annuaire Statistique de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*, Vol. 5, tome 2 (Paris, 1957), p. 128.

[12] *Ibid.* In the official classification of the wage-earning population, 489 Africans were classified as "management"; most (358) of these were in the motor transport industry. Of the 1641 classified as *cadres*, almost 20 per cent (302 men) were found in the railway administration, a government corporation.

[13] Haut-Commissariat Général à Dakar, *Comptes Economiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, 1956. Rapport No. II: Inventaire des Ressources humaines en 1956* (Dakar), March 1959, p. 50.

It has recently become a favorite pastime in France to calculate "who overpays more," the French consumer of tropical products or the African buyers of French goods.[14] The calculations tend to show that (ignoring capital grants) France comes out ahead. And Africans have argued—rightly—that prices in FWA are high mainly because of high prices of imports from France, both of consumer goods and of equipment. Whatever the relative benefits and the causes, the fact is that FWA producers are high-price sellers who have grown accustomed to the hot-house conditions of the franc zone. This is less true of some exports than of others. Cocoa already competes fairly well, and coffee might not do too badly. But peanuts would have a very hard time. And banana producers might well be pushed to the wall. If FWA were suddenly to face the winds of open competition with other producers of tropical products in unprotected world markets, she would find them very cold winds indeed. Though she would surely recover, and face world competition on more even terms, the price paid and the temporary dislocations would be considerable.

Uneven Growth and the Absence of a National Economy. We have so far described characteristics of FWA's economic development pattern that derive directly from its relation with France. What aspects of the internal development of the country have been fundamental in determining recent political behavior?

One of the most striking facts has been the great unevenness of FWA's development. In general, the coastal states of Senegal, Guinea, the Ivory Coast and—to a much lesser extent—Dahomey, have flourished, while the vast interior states of the Soudan, the Upper Volta, Niger, and Mauritania have been relatively little touched by modern economic advance. The geographical origin of export production gives some indication of this differential rate of growth. In 1951 the littoral fringe of FWA (the western parts of Senegal and Guinea and the southern parts of the Ivory Coast and Dahomey) grouped about 7 million people in 500,000 square kilometers. From this region came 91 per cent of the value of exports in that year; the "continental sector" of around 12 million people and 4 million square kilometers produced the rest.[15]

Table III illustrates the unequal development of the different territories by comparing a number of specific economic and social indicators in each of them. It shows how much more advanced in almost all respects are Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Slightly less than three-quarters of all non-agricultural wage-earners are found in Senegal, Guinea and the Ivory Coast; if agricultural wage-earners, sharecroppers and domestic servants were included, the proportion of the total FWA wage-earning population in those three territories would probably approach 90 per cent. Guinea, whose industrial advance has moved forward significantly since 1956, compares more favorably now than the table shows. Dahomey shines only in educational achievements; it has long done so, and this is why one of Dahomey's main exports has been its skilled and educated people. The gap between the richer and the poorer areas has been growing larger; development since the war has concentrated on the coastal areas. As the per capita FIDES

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[14] *Cf.* Raymond Bertrand, "La construction et l'emploi d'un indice du rapport d'échange pour l'Afrique Occidentale Française," in *Revue Economique*, March 1956, pp. 280–307; and Pierre Moussa, *Les chances économiques de la communauté Franco-Africaine* (Paris, 1957), pp. 77–79. When capital grants from France to Africa are taken into account the balance of economic advantage swings of course in Africa's favor. The extent of the advantage, in fact, gave rise to considerable protest in France, particularly after 1956. This protest had its most concrete expression in the development of the doctrine known as "Cartierism" (after a popular French journalist), which argued in effect that France was wasting its time and its money on ungrateful colonies which would in any event demand independence. See the articles by Raymond Cartier in *Paris-Match*, August 11, 18 and September 15, 1956; also J. Ehrardt, *Le Destin du colonialisme* (Paris, 1958).

[15] See Speech of Governor-General Cornut-Gentille before the opening session of the Grand Council of FWA in Dakar, in *Procès-verbaux des délibérations du Grand Conseil, session extraordinaire, réunion de 21 mai 1954*, pp. 11 ff.

TABLE III. SOME INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TERRITORIES OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA, 1956

Territory	Population millions[a]	Area 000 sq. km.	Exports[b]		Imports % of total FWA	Public[c] investment per capita 1947–1956 (cfa francs)	Electricity consumed (KWH per capita)	Rate of school attendance, % of school age	No. inhabitants per vehicle	No. of non-agricultural wage-earners
			% of total FWA	per capita (cfa francs)						
Senegal	2.230	197	35	9,500	52	10,000	41.6	24	Dakar: 15 Rest: 225	83,600
Mauritania	.616	1,086	—[d]	—	—[d]	4,000	.3	7	620	3,900
Soudan	3,643	1,204	—[d]	—	—[d]	3,600	2.3	8	650	27,000
Guinea	2.507	246	8.5	2,000	10	5,000	5.6	10	320	44,500
Ivory Coast	2.482	322	43.8	10,600	30	7,000	9.4	28	120	75,000
Upper Volta	3.326	274	1.7	300	—[e]	2,000	.8	7	1,050	21,000
Dahomey	1.615	116	4.3	1,600	8	4,800	1.9	28	350	15,000
Niger	2.336	1,189	6.7[f]	1,500	—[e]	1,800	1.1	3	850	13,000

Source: AOF, 1957, Tableaux Economiques, Dakar, 1958.

[a] Includes Europeans.

[b] Interterritorial trade and smuggling excluded.

[c] Does not include all public investment, but only that substantial part of the total which was distributed through FIDES, the development fund.

[d] Since most of the exports and imports of Mauritania and the Soudan pass through the port of Dakar, separate foreign trade statistics do not exist for these territories. Their trade is counted with that of Senegal. Mauritanian exports have been practically nil, but the Soudan's peanut exports are significant. The per capita export figure of 9,500 francs, given for Senegal, thus overstates the Senegalese contribution.

[e] Foreign imports for the Upper Volta pass through Abidjan, and those for Niger come through Cotonou. Separate foreign trade statistics therefore do not exist for these two territories, though export estimates have been made.

[f] The Niger territory's 6.7 per cent contribution to the total exports from FWA in 1956 is unusually large. The supported peanut price in Niger was substantially higher than in neighboring Nigeria, so thousands of tons of Nigerian peanuts were smuggled across the border for sale in Niger.

investments given in the table show, Senegal and the Ivory Coast have benefited most. And available data on private investment suggest that Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Guinea have drawn the lion's share of it.[16]

A final feature of FWA's economic landscape is that a "national" economy has never developed to any significant extent. The productive coastal regions have been tied to the world market rather than to their own hinterlands or to each other. The territories of the interior send to the coastal and forest regions some of their food (mainly cattle and fish) and manpower. They receive in return European import goods; cola nuts and bottled beverages are about the only important domestically produced commodities which the regions near the coast export to the interior.

Table IV shows the pattern of interterritorial trade in FWA. These statistics are crude; measuring interterritorial trade is extremely difficult, since FWA has always formed one free trade area and West African frontiers are in all cases very permeable. Nonetheless, the figures do indicate the direction and probable order of magnitude of trade between the various territories.

The table suggests the existence of four separate economic units in FWA: the group Senegal-Mauritania-Soudan; Guinea alone; the Ivory Coast and the Upper Volta;[17] and Dahomey and Niger. Only the Soudan, because of its central geographic position, engages in noticeable commerce with both the Senegalese bloc and the Ivory Coast. The Soudan turns both ways in the labor market too, for it sends its men to work in both Senegal and the Ivory Coast.

Because an unknown but probably substantial amount of interterritorial trade is not included, Table IV understates the magnitude of the exchanges that occur. On the other hand, the degree of interpenetration of the territorial economies is less than the estimates in the table show, since much of the estimated trade does not reflect territorial specialization, but results rather from reliance of the territories of the interior on the ports of the coastal states. Since Mauritania and the Soudan rely on the port of Dakar, the Upper Volta on Abidjan,

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[16] *Cf. AOF, 1957*, pp. 363 ff.

[17] The Upper Volta, and to a lesser extent the Niger Republic, also have connections with Ghana, exporting migrant laborers and cattle and importing cola nuts, European manufactures and cash remittances.

TABLE IV. INTERTERRITORIAL TRADE IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA, 1956
(Millions of cfa Francs)[a]

Exports From:	Imports Into:								External Trade[c]		Total Exports[b]
	Senegal	Mauritania	Soudan	Guinea	Ivory Coast	Upper Volta	Dahomey	Niger	Smuggled Exports	Recorded Exports	
Senegal	X	1,590	17,230	1,330	2,000	—	450	—	20	21,090	43,690
Mauritania	1,090	X	1,400	—	—	—	—	—	—	—[d]	2,490
Soudan	5,590	60	X	500	890	2,050	—	120	20	—[d]	9,230
Guinea	300	—	210	X	240	—	10	—	320	5,070	6,160
Ivory Coast	370	—	1,100	340	X	4,830	90	—	550	26,290	33,570
Upper Volta	—	—	450	—	1,910	X	70	—	—	1,000	3,430
Dahomey	170	—	—	20	90	—	X	1,240	1,010	2,630	5,150
Niger	—	—	80	—	—	—	990	X	—	3,940	5,010
External Trade[c]											
Smuggled Imports	—	370	50	370	70	80	1,000	230	X	X	1,920
Recorded Imports	34,780	—	—	6,640	18,450	1,580	3,720	1,570	X	X	60,020
Total Imports[b]	42,300	2,020	20,520	9,200	23,650	8,540	6,320	3,150	2,170	66,730	—

Source: Haut-Commissariat-Général à Dakar, Groupe d'études des comptes économiques; *Comptes économiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, 1956,* Rapport No. VI, *Echanges interterritoriaux* (Dakar, March 1959), Table 38.

[a] All figures and totals are rounded.

[b] Discrepancies due to rounding.

[c] These figures refer to trade with countries outside of French West Africa, including trade with neighboring non-French territories in West Africa. The estimates for smuggling are very approximate; the figure of 70 million francs for smuggled imports entering the Ivory Coast seems to be particularly underestimated.

[d] The total of the external (non-FWA) trade of the Soudan and Mauritania is imputed to Senegal.

Niger on Cotonou, a substantial portion of the trade between coastal and interior states represents transit trade only.

The slight extent of interterritorial coastal trade is a good indication of the absence of a unified "national" economy. Of Senegal's total exports in 1956, less than a tenth went to Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey, and only about 2 per cent of its total imports came from these territories. The Ivory Coast sent less than 2 per cent of its exports to the other coastal territories, and took only a tenth of its imports from them. Guinea likewise sent less than 2 per cent of its exports to the other coastal territories, while receiving slightly less than a fifth of its imports from them.

The failure to develop more of a national economy has many causes, but perhaps the most important is the nature of the transportation system. The railway network in FWA was built not to tie the territories together but to draw the products of the interior to the seaports. Railways run from each main port (Dakar, Conakry, Abidjan, Cotonou) into the interior, and end there, as unconnected with the others as spokes in a hubless wheel. The road system which might conceivably bind the various spokes together has in fact never done so. Road transport in the interior tends to be expensive, and the cheapest way—sometimes the only way—to move goods from territory to territory is by sea. But sea transport is costly too; the rate structure of French shipping lines has made "inter-colonial" shipping relatively much more expensive than shipping from France to any of the "colonial" ports. These high shipping charges, in the absence of an internal road network, have worked against the development of any territorial specialisation. The best example is cement; there is a cement plant in Senegal, but none elsewhere in FWA. The Senegalese plant has not captured the whole FWA market, however, because high transport costs make Senegalese cement, delivered in Abidjan or Conakry, almost as expensive as French cement shipped from Marseilles. It is the same with flour. Heavy costs of shipment from Dakar to Abidjan have encouraged the establishment of a flour mill in Abidjan despite the fact that at Dakar a large flour mill operates at less than capacity. Thus the transportation system has encouraged in each of the territories a kind of autarchic development; it has not bound them together through specialisation and increased trade.

II. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERALISM IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA

The features of FWA's economy outlined above have obvious and direct political implications. We will consider their bearing on the two most important political questions in the area: the problem of political unity among the various territories of French-speaking West

Africa, and the choice between total independence and continued attachment to France.

Due to the "accident" of French colonial administration, disparate and separate economic units were forged together into one political body, the Federation of French West Africa. For the French the creation of the Federation was in part an administrative convenience. It enabled them to run general overhead coordinating services more cheaply, and it satisfied the French penchant for centralized government. But it was something else too. It was a financial necessity, a pooling device aimed at relieving the French Treasury of the charge of administering the poorer territories of the area.

In the very early days of the French occupation each of the territories was financially autonomous, and the poorer territories were subsidized by the *métropole*. But in 1900 a new finance law was adopted in Paris, laying down the principle of economic self-sufficiency for the colonies—the principle, that is to say, that the colonies would no longer receive economic help from France, and that like the British colonial territories they would in fact begin to contribute to their own administration and defense. The poorer territories, however, could never carry on unaided, much less contribute to general expenses of French administration. So the Ministry of Colonies decided to group the richer with the poorer territories into one administrative unit—the federation of FWA. By making the richer areas pay for the poorer, the principle of colonial self-sufficiency could be made operative. In 1904, therefore, the French set up the federation and in 1905 endowed the federal government with its own budget, the General Budget of FWA. Its essential purpose was to centralize much of the revenue and expenditure of the territories. Senegal, Dahomey and Guinea would henceforth replace the French Treasury as the source of support of the Soudan, Niger and other areas of the interior.

It is understandable that the richer territories did not like this at all. Senegal, then the most developed by far of the territories, was the scene of violent anti-federalism.[18] Dahomey was no less disturbed, and even in Guinea, then hardly a land of milk and honey, there were objections to the new financial arrangements.[19] The reasons for these protests are not hard to find. In the early days, as more recently, the revenues of the General Budget came from customs duties—taxes on exports and imports. And Senegal, Dahomey and to a lesser extent Guinea, were the sites of most of the exporting and importing. The burden of support of the entire Federation therefore fell on the traders and residents there. Table V shows that Senegal and Dahomey accounted for about 80 per cent of the total exports and imports in 1920. In the 1930s Dahomeyans no longer had that cause for complaint; by then Dahomey was no longer a major contributor to the revenues of the General Budget. Discontent persisted in Senegal until the end of the 1920s,[20] but the crash of peanut prices in the depression and the economic advances of the Ivory Coast reduced the sources of Senegalese displeasure; by the end of the 1930s the Ivory Coast was carrying a good part of the common burden. The economic surge of the Ivory Coast really began to weigh heavily in the postwar period, when the expansion of its cocoa and coffee production, coupled with high prices for those items, made the Ivory Coast the chief contributor to the general support of the federation. By 1957 the Ivory Coast was producing 46 per cent of the export income of FWA, as against 35 per cent for Senegal and the Soudan combined.

TABLE V. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT FWA TERRITORIES IN FOREIGN TRADE, SELECTED YEARS

	Senegal, Mauritania Sudan	Guinea	Ivory Coast Upper Volta	Dahomey Niger
	Imports (per cent of total)			
1920	61	9	10	20
1938	62	11	19	8
1947	70	8	15	7
1956	52	10	30	8
	Exports (per cent of total)			
1920	66	7	13	14
1938	50	13	27	10
1947	54	11	26	9
1956	35	9	46	11

Source: AOF, 1957; Tableaux Economiques, p. 127.

The Ivory Coast's economic outdistancing of the other territories contributed heavily to creating the political tensions which led to the ultimate disintegration of the federation of

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[18] *Cf.* R. L. Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa* (New York, 1928), Vol. 1, p. 933.

[19] A. Arcin, *Histoire de la Guinée Française* (Paris, 1911), p. 719. The main objectors, it should be noted, were not Africans but rather the European traders.

[20] Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 934.

TABLE VI. TERRITORIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND RECEIPTS FROM FEDERAL BUDGET OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA, 1949 AND 1954

	Federal Receipts by Territorial Origins				Federal Subsidies and Rebates to Territories				Net Contribution of Territories to Federal Budget		Per Capita Contribution to Federal Budget[b]
	(millions of francs)		% of total		(millions of francs)		% of total[a]		(millions of francs)		(francs)
	1949	1954	1949	1954	1949	1954	1949	1954	1949	1954	1954
Senegal	5,810	11,840	45.6	38.7	1,000	1,600	24.4	29.4	4,810	10,240	4,590
Mauritania	150	730	0.1	0.2	320	560	7.8	10.3	−170	170	28
Sudan	440	1,030	3.5	3.4	660	500	16.0	9.2	+220	530	15
Guinea	1,040	2,520	8.2	8.2	390	580	9.5	10.6	650	1,940	1,773
Ivory Coast	3,000	11,170	23.4	36.5	730	990	17.8	18.0	2,270	10,180	4,560
Upper Volta	210	690	1.6	2.3	320	340	8.3	6.2	−110	350	11
Dahomey	920	1,750	7.2	5.7	410	580	10.0	10.6	510	1,170	670
Niger	350	800	2.8	2.6	280	300	6.8	5.5	− 40	500	21
Unspecified	970	740	7.6	2.4							
Totals	12,740	30,620	100.0	100.0	4,100	5,450	100.6	99.8	7,700	25,080	

Source: Compiled from budget data in *Annuaire Statistique de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*, Vol. 5, Tome 3, p. 83, 106 ff. All francs are cfa francs.

[a] Errors due to rounding.

[b] Per capita contributions are slightly underestimated, due to the use of 1956 population figures in their calculation.

FWA. The Ivory Coast has been the main African agent in the destruction of the federal government, and the main opponent of any new federation. The Ivory Coast position rests on a profound sense of economic grievance—that it has been, as its leaders say, the cow that the other territories never tired of milking. The basis for this sense of injury lies in the recent history of federal finance in the country.

Duties on imports and exports were, as we have seen, the source of most internally raised government income in FWA. Establishment of these duties and the distribution of income derived from them was a federal function. Aside from the relatively small portion set aside for development expenditure, the revenues raised by the federal government were divided into two main parts. One portion was used by the federal government to finance its services. The second was distributed to the eight territories of the federation for their own use. In most recent years the portion spent by the federal government was about 50 to 60 per cent of the total; the federal government, that is, provided over half of the total government services in FWA. In 1956, for example, the federal government had about 35 billion francs for administrative expenditure; it spent 19 billion itself, and distributed the rest to local budgets.[21]

How the revenues of the federal government were distributed to the local budgets was obviously a matter of prime concern to all the territories. Rebates and subsidies from the federal government made up 35 to 50 per cent of the total government income of the richer territories such as the Ivory Coast and Senegal, and as much as 90 per cent of the government income of the poorer territories.

According to a Law of August 29, 1947, the revenue remaining in the General Budget after the expenses of federal services had been met was to be divided among the territories in accordance with what is known as the "Derivation Principle": each territory should receive in the form of a rebate an amount proportionate to its contribution to the revenues of the General Budget—essentially, that is, according to the importing and exporting each territory accounted for in the given year. In fact, however, the amount of rebate and subsidy each territory received was the subject of annual negotiations in the Grand Council, the federal assembly in Dakar. And as it turned out, the poorer territories always came out best. The Derivation Principle gave way to a redistribution principle.

Table VI shows what part of federal revenues was derived from each territory and what each territory received from the federal budget in the way of subsidies and rebates in 1949 and 1954. Revenues derived from economic activity in the Ivory Coast rose spectacularly in that period. It was the source of about 37 per cent of the total receipts collected by the General Budget in 1954, while it received only 18 per cent of the total federal rebates distributed to the territorial budgets. A somewhat greater portion of receipts originated in Senegal in 1954 (39 per cent as against 37 per cent from the Ivory Coast), but in contrast Senegal received almost 30 per cent of the total rebates. Whatever the relative distribution of the burden between them, it is clear from the table that these two territories were bearing most of the costs of central administration in FWA; all the other territories except Guinea made only token contributions.

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[21] Actually it distributed only 12.6 billion to local budgets; 3.5 billion went to municipal and special budgets within the territories. These figures have been calculated from the budgetary estimates in *Annuaire Statistique de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*, Vol. 5, tome 3, pp. 106 ff.

Senegal's large contribution to the federal budget was not a cause for dissatisfaction among Senegalese leaders. Senegal was, after all, the seat of federal government. Public administration was one of its main industries; the return on its contribution was direct and tangible. Ivory Coast leaders, on the other hand, felt that they were paying too much for too little, and that in addition the Ivory Coast was subsidizing not only the poverty but also the financial laxity of the other territories. Each year at budgetary sessions in the Grand Council the Ivory Coast representatives defended the Derivation Principle in the allocation of rebates. Each year they were voted down. The negotiations were always unpleasant for all parties. Ivory Coast representatives were in the uncomfortable position of being rich and surly defenders of the law and their own self-interest. The accumulated frustrations and resentments built up during these years certainly enter in no small way in explaining the present recalcitrance of the Ivory Coast leaders regarding federation with other West African states.[22] The Ivory Coast is willing to cooperate with other states. It is even willing to give them economic aid. But it does not appear ready to enter any constitutional arrangement which involves loss of control over its finances.

III. ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE DECISION ON INDEPENDENCE

We have already detailed the extent to which FWA has been dependent on France for money, for men and for markets. Evidently, this dependence is of prime importance in understanding the decision of most French African territories to remain within the French Community. When, quite suddenly, African leaders were given a chance to opt for immediate independence they hesitated to accept the possible economic consequences. Their civil services, on the upper and middle levels, were still almost entirely manned by Frenchmen. Their economic resources were insufficient to allow any substantial investment for development, and there was no good reason to believe that adequate help would come from non-French sources to allow them to maintain anything like the rate of investment that had characterized the 1946–1958 period. The break-up of the federation of FWA, furthermore, meant that the poorer territories could no longer count on the traditional support of the richer ones. For these poorer areas, independence from France would have meant severe cutbacks even in the ordinary services of government. For all the territories, independence involved the possible loss of protection in French markets and perhaps the need to seek new outlets for their exports.

There is no need to embroider this theme of African economic dependence on France; its significance is clear. There is, however, one aspect of the matter that deserves some further attention: the effect of the economic environment in producing a psychological unpreparedness for independence among African elites.

After 1945 African political parties won increasing control over their territories. But as their internal political control grew, so did their economic dependence on France; economic integration developed as fast as political decentralization. For this reason among others French Africa came to live in a kind of economic never-never land, a place where economic decision-making was unnecessary—key decisions were made in France—and economic responsibility not a serious concern. FWA's investment funds came from France. Its exports sold in protected French markets. Its internal price level was determined by French prices. Even the wage scales of its civil servants depended on French civil servants' wages.

In this environment there was little thought about some final reckoning, come Independence Day. No one encouraged such thought, since independence was not openly and frankly regarded as the ultimate outcome of the French-African relationship. No impetus nurtured a sense of economic responsibility, in the absence of any need for hard economic thinking. In fact, the political drives until 1956, drives which centered on obtaining *equality* with Frenchmen, only accentuated the economic problem. The demands for equal pay for equal work in the civil service, for example, operated to load the budgets of FWA with heavier wage bills than most poor governments can afford. But it didn't matter. The important consideration was equality, not economics.[23]

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[22] Nigerian experience in the field of federal finance has been different from that of FWA. In Nigeria the center has not acted as an agency for substantial redistribution of income from the richer (southern) regions to the poorer north. On the contrary, some evidence indicates that for some time a redistribution took place from the north to the other regions. *Cf. Report of the Commission on Revenue Allocation,* Nigeria, 1951, p. 72.

Given this heritage it is no wonder that when the option for independence was unexpectedly presented in 1958, most African leaders were not prepared to take it, particularly since they had the alternate possibility of taking it later when they were more ready. For independence would have meant a radical break with the economic past, a hand-to-hand dealing with the economic facts of life for which French Africa and French African political leaders had little training.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

To underline the economic factors which have played a part in shaping political developments in French-speaking West Africa is by no means to explain everything. Lines of economic determinism are loose. Men moved by strong passions and great ideas may step beyond them, particularly when profound psychological and ideological forces are at work, as they are in questions involving political independence in colonial situations. Even if all African leaders in ex-FWA were convinced that independence necessarily involved severe cutbacks in rates of economic growth and in current standards of living, most would still prefer it to *permanent* political dependence on France. So except for possible ties of a Commonwealth type, the separation of French-speaking West Africa from France is certain to occur, whatever its economic consequences.

That it did not take place in 1958 was due to many causes, not all of them economic. Senegal, despite the vulnerability of its peanut-based economy, might have chosen the path of immediate independence if its modern leadership had been in fuller control of the countryside. And the Niger territory, perhaps the feeblest economic unit in all of West Africa, might well have voted for independence if French influence had not been brought strongly to bear there during the September referendum. Nor are the decisions of the Ivory Coast and Guinea wholly reducible to economic terms. The Ivory Coast, despite its dependence on French markets for its coffee, is ex-FWA's soundest economic entity. Yet it most decisively turned its back on independence in 1958. About Guinea, it is only possible to say that economic and other conditions were more permissive there, allowing it to opt for independence with slighter risks than in most of the other territories: it was highly organized politically; it was not greatly dependent on aid from the other FWA territories through the federal budget; its mining boom was attracting new injections of foreign capital; its economic future was hopeful.

The same combination of economic and other factors that in the 1958 referendum led most African leaders to accept temporarily a status short of full independence is now leading them to negotiations with France, negotiations looking toward independence on terms that will retain French economic assistance.

On the question of internal political re-integration in French-speaking West Africa—a more important question in the long run than the timing of total independence—economic factors are even more fundamental. We have seen how the lack of economic community in FWA and the unequal geographical distribution of income provoked problems of federal finance and contributed, especially through the actions of the Ivory Coast, to the destruction of the old federation. Largely as a result of its fiscal experience the Ivory Coast is the most "anti-federalist" of the former FWA states.

In taking an anti-federalist stand, Ivory Coast political leaders risk placing their territory outside the ideological mainstream in French-speaking West Africa, for African unity is the most powerfully attractive political idea in this part of the world. But the sense of economic grievance runs deep in the Ivory Coast, and it exists on all levels of society. There are few sections of articulate Ivory Coast opinion which do not feel that their territory has been exploited by its ex-partners in the federation. Africans in other parts of French-speaking Africa tend to regard this as simply another manifestation of the "bourgeois" mentality dominant in the Ivory Coast. So it may be. But whatever it is called it has long roots, and there is no obvious reason why it should not for some time continue to dilute that like-minded sense of common African interest on which political unification must depend. Whatever happens to M. Houphouet-Boigny and his vision of a French-African Community (and recent events suggest that it will survive, if at all, only in the form of a loose association of independent states) the Ivory Coast is likely to remain one of West Africa's most unwilling candidates for political union with neighboring African states.

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[23] *Cf.* E. Berg, in *Labor and Economic Development*, pp. 232 ff.

ISSUE CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS AMONG PARTY LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS[1]

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American political parties are often regarded as "brokerage" organizations, weak in principle, devoid of ideology, and inclined to differ chiefly over unimportant questions. In contrast to the "ideological" parties of Europe—which supposedly appeal to their followers through sharply defined, coherent, and logically related doctrines—the American parties are thought to fit their convictions to the changing demands of the political contest.[2] According to this view, each set of American party leaders is satisfied to play Tweedledee to the other's Tweedledum.

I. PRESSURES TOWARD UNIFORMITY AND CLEAVAGE

Although these "conclusions" are mainly derived from *a priori* analysis or from casual observations of "anecdotal" data (little systematic effort having been made so far to verify or refute them), they are often taken as confirmed—largely, one imagines, because they are compatible with certain conspicuous features of American politics. Among these features is the entrenchment of a two-party system which, by affording both parties a genuine opportunity to win elections, tempts them to appeal to as many diverse elements in the electorate as are needed to put together a majority.[3] Since both parties want to attract support from the centrist and moderate segments of the electorate, their views on basic issues will, it is thought, tend to converge. Like giant business enterprises competing for the same market, they will be led to offer commodities that are in many respects identical.[4] It is one thing for a small party in a multi-party system to preserve its ideological purity, quite another for a mass party in a two-party system to do so. The one has little hope of becoming a majority, and can most easily survive by remaining identified with the narrow audience from which it draws its chief supporters; the other can succeed only by accommodating the conflicting claims of many diverse groups—only, in short, by blunting ideological distinctions.[5]

Constraints against enlarging intellectual differences also spring from the loosely confederated nature of the American party system, and from each national party's need to adjust its policies to the competing interests of the locality, the state, and the nation.[6] Many party units are more concerned with local than with national elections, and prefer not to be handicapped by clear-cut national programs. Every ambitious politician, moreover, hopes to achieve a *modus vivendi* tailored to the particular and often idiosyncratic complex of forces prevailing in his constituency, an objective rarely compatible with doctrinal purity.[7] Often, too, local politics are largely nonpartisan or are partisan in ways that scarcely affect the great national issues around which ideologies might be expected to form.[8] The development and enforcement of a sharply delineated ideology is also hindered by the absence in either party of a firmly established, authoritative, and continuing organizational center empowered to decide questions of doctrine and discipline.[9] Party affiliation is loosely defined, responsibility is weak or non-existent, and organs for indoctrinating or communicating with party members are at best rudimentary.

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[1] This article is the first of a series reporting the findings of a national field study of political belief and affiliation among American party leaders and followers. The study was carried out through the Laboratory for Research in Social Relations at the University of Minnesota under grants made to the senior author by the Committee on Political Behavior of the Social Science Research Council, and supplementary grants from the Graduate School Research Fund. The manuscript was prepared at the Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, under a Fellowship in Legal and Political Philosophy awarded to the senior author by the Rockefeller Foundation.

[2] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties, their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (New York, 1955), p. 102.

[3] The analysis of these and related tendencies associated with the American party system is ably set forth in Pendleton Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York, 1940), p. 102 and *passim.* Also, James M. Burns, *Congress on Trial: The Legislative Process and the Administrative State* (New York, 1949), p. 34.

[4] See especially E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942), p. 92 and *passim;* and V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups,* 4th ed. (New York, 1958), ch. 8; Howard R. Penniman, *Sait's American Parties and Elections,* 5th ed. (New York, 1952), p. 162.

[5] William Goodman, *The Two-Party System in the United States* (New Jersey, 1956), p. 43.

[6] Duverger, *op. cit.*, pp. 187, 418.

[7] Pendleton Herring, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

[8] *American State Legislatures,* ed. Belle Zeller (New York, 1954); but see also Malcolm E. Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (Sept. 1955), pp. 773–791.

Cultural and historical differences may also contribute to the weaker ideological emphasis among American, as compared with European, parties. Many of the great historical cleavages that have divided European nations for centuries—monarchism *vs.* republicanism; clericalism *vs.* anti-clericalism; democracy *vs.* autocracy, etc.—have never taken root in this country. Apart from the slavery (and subsequently the race) issue, the United States has not experienced the intense class or caste conflict often found abroad, and contests of the capitalism *vs.* socialism variety have never achieved an important role in American politics. In addition, never having known a titled nobility, we have largely been freed from the conflicts found elsewhere between the classes of inherited and acquired privilege.

Consider, too, the progress made in the United States toward neutralizing the forces which ordinarily lead to sharp social, and hence intellectual and political, differentiation. The class and status structure of American society has attained a rate of mobility equalling or exceeding that of any other long established society. Popular education, and other facilities for the creation of common attitudes, have been developed on a scale unequalled elsewhere. Improvements in transportation and communication, and rapid shifts in population and industry have weakened even sectionalism as a source of political cleavage. Rural-urban differences continue to exist, of course, but they too have been diminishing in force and have become less salient for American politics than the differences prevailing, for example, between a French peasant proprietor and a Parisian *boulevardier*.[10] In short, a great many Americans have been subjected in their public lives to identical stimuli—a condition unlikely to generate strong, competing ideologies.

The research reported here was designed not to refute these observations but to test the accuracy of the claim that they are sufficient to prevent differences in outlook from taking root in the American party system. We believed that the homogenizing tendencies referred to are strongly offset by contrary influences, and that voters are preponderantly led to support the party whose opinions they share. We further thought that the competition for office, though giving rise to similarities between the parties, also impels them to diverge from each other in order to sharpen their respective appeals. For this and other reasons, we expected to find that the leaders of the two parties, instead of ignoring differences alleged to exist within the electorate, would differ on issues more sharply than their followers would. We believed further that even in a brokerage system the parties would serve as independent reference groups, developing norms, values, and self-images to which their supporters could readily respond.[11] Their influence, we felt, would frequently exceed that of ethnic, occupational, residential and other reference groups. In sum, we proceeded on the belief that the parties are not simply spokesmen for other interest groups, but are in their own right agencies for formulating, transmitting, and anchoring political opinions, that they attract adherents who in general share those opinions, and that through a feedback process of mutual reinforcement between the organization and its typical supporters, the parties develop integrated and stable political tendencies. Other hypotheses will be specified as we present and analyze our findings.

II. PROCEDURES

The questions considered in this paper were part of a large field study made in 1957-1958 on the nature, sources, and correlates of political affiliation, activity, and belief in the American party system (hereafter referred to as the PAB study). Pilot studies on Minnesota samples had led us to suspect that many "settled" notions about party affiliation and belief in America would not stand up under careful empirical scrutiny; further, we felt that little progress would be made in the exploration of this subject until a comprehensive portrait of party membership in America had been drawn. Accordingly, a nationwide study was launched to acquire a detailed description of party leaders and supporters, gathering data on their backgrounds, political experiences, personality characteristics, values, motivations, social and political attitudes, outlooks on key issues, and related matters.

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[9] Report of the Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, *Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York, 1950), *passim.*

[10] Data bearing on these generalizations will be presented in companion articles which specifically deal with sectional and rural-urban influences on issue outlook.

[11] *Cf.* James W. Prothro, Ernest Q. Campbell, and Charles M. Grigg, "Two Party Voting in the South: Class vs. Party Identification," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (March, 1958), pp. 131–139. Also, Peter H. Odegard and E. Allen Helms, *American Politics: A Study in Political Dynamics* (New York, 1947 ed.), pp. 809–821.

For our samples of party "leaders" we turned to the Democratic and Republican national conventions, largely because they are the leading and most representative of the party organs, their delegates coming from every part of the United States and from every level of party and government activity. Our samples ranged from governors, senators, and national committeemen at the one end to precinct workers and local officials at the other. In the absence of comprehensive information about the characteristics of the party élites in America, no one can say how closely the convention delegates mirror the total party leadership. We felt it fair to assume, nevertheless, that the delegates represented as faithful a cross section of American party leadership as could be had without an extraordinary expenditure of money and labor. Using convention delegates as our universe of leaders also held some obvious advantages for research, since the composition of this universe (by name, address, party, state, sex, place of residence, and party or public office) can usually be ascertained from the convention calls. Of the 6,848 delegates and alternates available to be sampled, 3,193 actually participated; 3,020 (1,788 Democrats and 1,232 Republicans) completed and returned questionnaires that were usable in all respects.[12] The proportion of returns was roughly equivalent for both sets of party leaders.

The rank and file sample, which we wanted both for its intrinsic value and for its utility as a control group, was obtained by special arrangement with the American Institute of Public Opinion. In January 1958, Gallup interviewers personally distributed our questionnaire to 2,917 adult voters in two successive national cross-section surveys. Some 1,610 questionnaires were filled out and returned, of which 1,484 were completely usable. This sample closely matched the national population on such characteristics as sex, age, region, size of city, and party affiliation, and, though it somewhat oversampled the upper educational levels, we considered it sufficiently large and representative for most of our purposes. Of the 1,484 respondents, 821 were Democratic supporters (629 "pure" Democrats, plus 192 whom we classified as "independent" Democrats) and 623 were Republican supporters (479 "pure" Republicans, plus 144 "independent" Republicans). Forty respondents could not be identified as adherents of either party.

The lengthy questionnaire developed for the study was designed to be self-administered. It contained, in addition to questions on the respondents' personal backgrounds, a number of queries on their political history and experience, their attitudes toward the party system and toward such related matters as party organization, discipline and responsibility, their self-images with regard to social class and liberalism-conservatism, their reference group identifications, and their views on party leadership and ideology. The largest part of the questionnaire consisted of 390 scale items, randomly arranged, which when sorted and scored fell into 47 scales for measuring the personality, attitude, and value characteristics of each of the respondents. We had validated and used all but three of these scales in earlier studies.

The questions most relevant for the present article were those which asked each respondent to express his attitudes toward twenty-four important national issues, and to state whether he believed support for each issue should be "increased," "decreased," or "remain as is." The list of issues and the responses of each sample will be found in Tables II-a through II-e, where for convenience of analysis, the issues have been grouped under five broad headings: Public Ownership, Government Regulation of the Economy, Equalitarianism and Human Welfare, Tax Policy and Foreign Policy.

In tabulating the results, we first scored each individual on each issue and then computed aggregate scores for all the members of a given sample. To begin with, percentages were used to show the proportion who favored increasing, decreasing, or retaining the existing level of support on each issue. But as it was clumsy to handle three figures for each issue, we constructed a single index or "ratio of support" which would simultaneously take account of all three scores. The index was built by assigning a weight of 1.0 to each "increase" response in the sample, of 0 to each "decrease" response, and of .50 to each "remain as is" (or "same") response. Thus the ratio-of-support score shown for any given sample is in effect a mean score with a possible range of 0 to 1.0, in which support for an issue increases as the scores approach 1.0 and decreases as they approach 0. In general, the scores can be taken to approximate the following over-all positions: .0 to .25—strongly wish to reduce support; .26 to .45—wish to reduce support; .46 to .55—satisfied with the *status quo;* .56 to .75—wish to increase support; and .76 to 1.00—strongly wish to increase support. Note that the differences in degree suggested by these categories refer not to the *strength of feeling* exhibited by individuals toward an issue but rather to the *numbers of people* in a sample who hold points of view favoring or opposing that issue.

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[12] This gratifyingly large number of returns of so lengthy and detailed a questionnaire was attained through a number of follow-up mailings and special letters. These and other procedures designed to check the adequacy of the sample will be fully described in the volume containing the report of the overall study. The difference in the number of returns from the two parties was largely a result of the greater number of Democratic delegates to begin with.

Because they include "same" and "no code" as well as "increase" and "decrease" responses, our ratios of support sometimes flatten the differences between groups. Had we employed only the percentage scores for the "increase" or "decrease" responses, the differences between samples would in many instances have seemed larger. Nevertheless, the ratio of support offers so many advantages that we have employed it as our principal measure. For one thing, as the equivalent of a mean score, it takes into account all scores, omitting no respondent from the tabulation. For the same reason it enables us to assess the amount of dispersion or homogeneity exhibited by any sample and makes it easy to calculate significances of difference.[13] Reliance upon a single, uniform statistic also allows us to make ready comparisons not only *between* but *within* samples, and to determine quickly how large the differences actually are. By observing whether a ratio of support is above or below .50 we can see at once whether a particular group predominantly favors or opposes the issue in question, and how strongly it does so. The use of ratio scores also makes it possible to compare issues as well as groups, *e.g.*, to see whether one issue is more preferred than another.

For further information on the meaning of the issue responses, we also compared samples on a number of related scales and items. Tabulating and statistical operations were carried out to control for demographic influences like education, occupation, age, and sectionalism; to ascertain homogeneity of opinion within the several samples; to rank the issues according to the magnitude of the differences between samples; to compare members' positions on issues against official platform statements; and to determine whether leaders and followers are able to name the issues which actually divide the parties. Some of the findings yielded by these operations will be considered here, while others, for reasons of space, will have to be reserved for future publications.

A word of caution before we turn to the findings. The respondents were offered only the twenty-four issues that impressed us in February, 1957, as most significant and enduring. However, they may not all be as salient today as they seemed at that time. Nor, within the limitations of a single questionnaire, could we explore every issue that informed observers might have considered important. Some presumably vital issues such as states rights, political centralization, and expansion of government functions could not be stated explicitly enough within our format to be tested properly. These are issues that are so generalized as to encompass many other specific issues, and so highly charged as to awaken a profusion of symbolic and emotive associations.

The *form* of our issue questions may also be open to criticism, for space limitations prevented our subjects from indicating how strongly they felt and how much they knew about each of the issues. This deficiency, however, may be less important than it appears, since for the groups we most wanted to compare (*e.g.*, Democratic *vs.* Republican leaders), the degree of political knowledge and intensity is likely to be rather similar. The difficulty is greater when comparing leaders with followers, but is somewhat offset by controlling for education and socio-economic status. Although some subtleties of interpretation are bound to be lost because these variables have been omitted, we are satisfied that our issue questions in their present form furnish a useful measure for assessing *group* (as distinguished from *individual*) opinion.

Finally, one may wonder about the value of opinions stated on a questionnaire compared with the worth of views formally expressed by

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[13] The measure of dispersion used for this purpose was the standard deviation, which was computed by using the scores of 0, .50 and 1.00 as intervals in the calculations. To avoid having to calculate separate significances of difference for each of the comparisons we wanted to observe, we simply made the assumption—erring on the side of caution—that the maximum variance of .50 had occurred in each instance. The magnitude of the significance of difference is, in other words, often greater than we have reported. The significance test used in this procedure was the critical ratio. Unless otherwise indicated, all the differences reported are statistically significant at or beyond the .01 level.

TABLE I. AVERAGE DIFFERENCES IN THE RATIO-OF-SUPPORT SCORES AMONG PARTY LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS FOR FIVE CATEGORIES OF ISSUES

Category of Issues	Democratic Leaders vs. Republican Leaders	Democratic Followers vs. Republican Followers	Democratic Leaders vs. Democratic Followers	Republican Leaders vs. Republican Followers	Democratic Leaders vs. Republican Followers	Republican Leaders vs. Democratic Followers
a. Public Ownership of Resources	.28	.04	.06	.18	.10	.22
b. Government Regulation of the Economy	.22	.06	.08	.10	.12	.16
c. Equalitarianism, Human Welfare	.22	.05	.08	.21	.06	.25
d. Tax Policy	.20	.06	.06	.20	.04	.26
e. Foreign Policy	.15	.02	.05	.08	.07	.10
Average Differences in Ratio Scores for all Categories	.21	.04	.07	.15	.08	.20

Sample Sizes: Democratic Leaders, 1,788; Republican Leaders, 1,232; Democratic Followers, 821; Republican Followers, 623.

an organization or implicit in the actions of its leaders. Advantages can be cited on both sides. The beliefs expressed in official party statements or in legislative roll calls, it might be claimed, represent the *operating* beliefs of the organization by virtue of having been tested in the marketplace or in the competition of legislative struggle. Positions taken on issues on which a party stakes its future may be more valid evidence of what the party truly believes than are the opinions expressed by individual members under conditions of maximum safety. On the other hand, the responses to the issue and attitude questions in the PAB study represent the anonymous, private opinions of party leaders and followers, uncomplicated by any need to make political capital, to proselytize, to conciliate critics, or to find grounds for embarrassing the opposition at the next election. Hence they may for some purposes represent the most accurate possible reflection of the "actual" state of party opinion. The controversy over the value of the two approaches is to some extent spurious, however, for they offer different perspectives on the same thing. In addition, considerable correspondence exists between the party positions evident in congressional roll calls and the privately expressed opinions of the party leaders in our study.[14]

III. FINDINGS: COMPARISONS BETWEEN LEADERS

No more conclusive findings emerge from our study of party issues than those growing out of the comparisons between the two sets of party leaders. Despite the brokerage tendency of the American parties, their active members are obviously separated by large and important differences. The differences, moreover, conform with the popular image in which the Democratic party is seen as the more "progressive" or "radical," the Republican as the more "moderate" or "conservative" of the two.[15] In addition, the disagreements are remarkably consistent, a function not of chance but of systematic points of view, whereby the responses to any one of the issues could reasonably have been predicted from knowledge of the responses to the other issues.

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[14] See, for example, the congressional roll-call results reported by Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress*, The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science Series, LXIX, #1 (1951). The complexities affecting the determination of party votes in Congress are thoroughly explored in David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party: A Case Study* (New York, 1959).

[15] Conservatism is here used not in the classical but in the more popular sense, in which it refers to negative attitudes toward government ownership, intervention, and regulation of the economy; resistance to measures for promoting equalitarianism and social welfare through government action; identification with property, wealth, and business enterprise; etc.

TABLE II-A. COMPARISON OF PARTY LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS ON "PUBLIC OWNERSHIP" ISSUES, BY PERCENTAGES AND RATIOS OF SUPPORT

Issues	Leaders		Followers	
	Dem. N=1,788	Repub. N=1,232	Dem. N=821	Repub. N=623
	(%s down)			
Public Ownership of Natural Resources				
% favoring: Increase	57.5	12.9	35.3	31.1
Decrease	18.6	51.9	15.0	19.9
Same, n.c.*	23.8	35.2	49.7	49.0
Support Ratio	.69	.30	.60	.56
Public Control of Atomic Energy				
% favoring: Increase	73.2	45.0	64.2	59.4
Decrease	7.2	15.3	7.1	10.0
Same, n.c.	19.6	39.7	28.7	30.6
Support Ratio	.83	.65	.79	.75
Mean Support Ratios for the Public Ownership Category	.76	.48	.70	.66

* n.c. = no code.

Examination of Tables II-a–e and III shows that the leaders differ significantly on 23 of the 24 issues listed and that they are separated on 15 of these issues by .18 or more ratio points—in short, by differences that are in absolute magnitude very large. The two samples are furthest apart in their attitudes toward public ownership and are especially divided on the question of government ownership of natural resources, the Democrats strongly favoring it, the Republicans just as strongly wanting it cut back. The difference of .39 in the ratio scores is the largest for any of the issues tested. In percentages, the differences are 58 per cent (D) vs. 13 per cent (R) in favor of increasing support, and 19 per cent (D) vs. 52 per cent (R) in favor of decreasing support. Both parties preponderantly support public control and development of atomic energy, but the Democrats do so more uniformly.

V. O. Key, among others, has observed that the Republican party is especially responsive to the "financial and manufacturing community,"[16] reflecting the view that government should intervene as little as possible to burden or restrain prevailing business interests. The validity of this observation is evident throughout all our data, and is most clearly seen in the responses to the issues listed under Government Regulation of the Economy, Equalitarianism and Human Welfare, Tax Policy. Democratic leaders are far more eager than Republican leaders to strengthen enforcement of anti-monopoly laws and to increase regulation of public utilities and business. Indeed, the solidarity of Republican opposition to the regulation of business is rather overwhelming: 84 per cent want to decrease such regulation and fewer than .01 per cent say they want to increase it. Although the Democrats, on balance, also feel that government controls on business should not be expanded further, the differences between the two samples on this issue are nevertheless substantial.

The two sets of leaders are also far apart on the farm issue, the Democrats preferring slightly to increase farm supports, the Republicans wanting strongly to reduce them. The Republican ratio score of .20 on this issue is among the lowest in the entire set of scores. The magnitude of these scores somewhat surprised us, for while opposition to agricultural subsidies is consistent with Republican dislike for state intervention, we had expected the leaders to conform more closely to the familiar image of the Republican as the more "rural" of

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[16] Key, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

TABLE II-B. COMPARISON OF PARTY LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS ON "GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE ECONOMY" ISSUES, BY PERCENTAGES AND RATIOS OF SUPPORT

Issues	Leaders		Followers	
	Dem. N=1,788	Repub. N=1,232	Dem. N=821	Repub. N=623
		(%s down)		
Level of Farm Price Supports				
% favoring: Increase	43.4	6.7	39.0	23.0
Decrease	28.1	67.4	27.6	40.3
Same, n.c.	28.5	25.8	33.4	36.7
Support Ratio	.58	.20	.56	.41
Government Regulation of Business				
% favoring: Increase	20.2	0.6	18.6	7.4
Decrease	38.5	84.1	33.4	46.2
Same, n.c.	41.3	15.3	48.0	46.4
Support Ratio	.41	.08	.43	.31
Regulation of Public Utilities				
% favoring: Increase	59.0	17.9	39.3	26.0
Decrease	6.4	17.6	11.1	12.0
Same, n.c.	34.6	64.5	49.6	62.0
Support Ratio	.76	.50	.64	.57
Enforcement of Anti-Monopoly Laws				
% favoring: Increase	78.0	44.9	53.2	51.0
Decrease	2.9	9.0	7.9	6.6
Same, n.c.	19.1	46.1	38.9	42.4
Support Ratio	.88	.68	.73	.72
Regulation of Trade Unions				
% favoring: Increase	59.3	86.4	46.6	57.8
Decrease	12.4	4.5	8.9	10.6
Same, n.c.	28.3	9.2	44.5	31.6
Support Ratio	.73	.91	.69	.74
Level of Tariffs				
% favoring: Increase	13.0	19.2	16.6	15.2
Decrease	43.0	26.3	25.3	21.3
Same, n.c.	43.9	54.5	58.1	63.4
Support Ratio	.35	.46	.46	.47
Restrictions on Credit				
% favoring: Increase	24.8	20.6	26.1	25.7
Decrease	39.3	20.6	22.2	23.8
Same, n. c.	35.9	58.8	51.8	50.5
Support Ratio	.43	.50	.52	.51
Mean Support Ratios for "Government Regulation of the Economy" Category	.59	.48	.58	.53

TABLE II-C. COMPARISON OF PARTY LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS ON "EQUALITARIAN AND HUMAN WELFARE" ISSUES, BY PERCENTAGES AND RATIOS OF SUPPORT

Issues	Leaders		Followers	
	Dem. N=1,788	Repub. N=1,232	Dem. N=821	Repub. N=623
	(%s down)			
Federal Aid to Education				
% favoring: Increase	66.2	22.3	74.9	64.8
Decrease	13.4	43.2	5.6	8.3
Same, n.c.	20.4	34.5	19.5	26.8
Support Ratio	.76	.40	.85	.78
Slum Clearance and Public Housing				
% favoring: Increase	78.4	40.1	79.5	72.5
Decrease	5.6	21.6	5.8	7.9
Same, n.c.	16.0	38.3	14.6	19.6
Support Ratio	.86	.59	.87	.82
Social Security Benefits				
% favoring: Increase	60.0	22.5	69.4	57.0
Decrease	3.9	13.1	3.0	3.8
Same, n.c.	36.1	64.4	27.5	39.2
Support Ratio	.78	.55	.83	.77
Minimum Wages				
% favoring: Increase	50.0	15.5	59.0	43.5
Decrease	4.7	12.5	2.9	5.0
Same, n.c.	45.2	72.0	38.1	51.5
Support Ratio	.73	.52	.78	.69
Enforcement of Integration				
% favoring: Increase	43.8	25.5	41.9	40.8
Decrease	26.6	31.7	27.4	23.6
Same, n.c.	29.5	42.8	30.7	35.6
Support Ratio	.59	.47	.57	.59
Immigration into United States				
% favoring: Increase	36.1	18.4	10.4	8.0
Decrease	27.0	29.9	52.0	44.6
Same, n.c.	36.9	51.7	37.6	47.4
Support Ratio	.54	.44	.29	.32
Mean Support Ratios for "Equalitarian and Human Welfare" Category	.71	.50	.70	.66

the two parties.[17] It appears, however, that the party's connection with business is far more

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[17] The friendlier attitude toward farmers among Democratic leaders than Republican leaders is borne out in the responses to several other questions used in the study. For example, the Republican leaders list farmers as having "too much power" far more frequently than do the Democratic leaders. Equally, the Democrats are significantly more inclined to regard farmers as having "too little power."

TABLE II-D. COMPARISON OF PARTY LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS ON "TAX POLICY" ISSUES, BY PERCENTAGES AND RATIOS OF SUPPORT

	Leaders		Followers	
Issues	Dem. N=1,788	Repub. N=1,232	Dem. N=821	Repub. N=623
		(%s down)		
Corporate Income Tax				
% favoring: Increase	32.3	4.0	32.0	23.3
Decrease	23.3	61.5	20.5	25.7
Same, n.c.	44.4	34.5	47.5	51.0
Support Ratio	.54	.21	.56	.49
Tax on Large Incomes				
% favoring: Increase	27.0	5.4	46.6	34.7
Decrease	23.1	56.9	13.8	21.7
Same, n.c.	49.9	37.7	39.6	43.6
Support Ratio	.52	.24	.66	.56
Tax on Business				
% favoring: Increase	12.6	1.0	24.6	15.9
Decrease	38.3	71.1	24.1	32.6
Same, n.c.	49.1	27.8	51.3	51.5
Support Ratio	.37	.15	.50	.42
Tax on Middle Incomes				
% favoring: Increase	2.7	0.8	4.5	3.0
Decrease	50.2	63.9	49.3	44.3
Same, n.c.	47.1	35.3	46.2	52.6
Support Ratio	.26	.18	.28	.29
Tax on Small Incomes				
% favoring: Increase	1.4	2.9	1.6	2.1
Decrease	79.2	65.0	77.5	69.6
Same, n.c.	19.4	32.1	20.9	28.3
Support Ratio	.11	.19	.12	.16
Mean Support Ratios for "Tax Policy" Category	.36	.19	.42	.38

compelling than its association with agriculture. The Republican desire to reduce government expenditures and to promote independence from "government handouts" prevails on the farm question as it does on other issues, while the Democratic preference for a more regulated economy in which government intervenes to reduce economic risk and to stabilize prosperity is equally evident on the other side. Party attitudes on this issue appear to be determined as much by ideological tendencies as by deliberate calculation of the political advantages to be gained by favoring or opposing subsidies to farmers. Comparison of our findings with Turner's earlier data on farm votes in Congress[18] suggests, in addition, that the sharp party difference on the farm issue is neither a recent development nor a mere product of the personal philosophy of the present Secretary of Agriculture.

Having implied that agricultural policies partly result from principle, we must note that

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[18] Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

TABLE II-E. COMPARISON OF PARTY LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS ON "FOREIGN POLICY" ISSUES, BY PERCENTAGES AND RATIOS OF SUPPORT

	Leaders		Followers	
Issues	Dem. N=1,788	Repub. N=1,232	Dem. N=821	Repub. N=623
		(%'s down)		
Reliance on the United Nations				
% favoring: Increase	48.9	24.4	34.7	33.4
Decrease	17.6	34.8	17.3	19.3
Same, n.c.	33.5	40.7	48.0	47.3
Support Ratio	.66	.45	.59	.57
American Participation in Military Alliances				
% favoring: Increase	41.5	22.7	39.1	32.3
Decrease	17.6	25.7	14.0	15.4
Same, n.c.	40.9	51.6	46.9	52.3
Support Ratio	.62	.48	.62	.58
Foreign Aid				
% favoring: Increase	17.8	7.6	10.1	10.1
Decrease	51.0	61.7	58.6	57.3
Same, n.c.	31.1	30.7	31.3	32.6
Support Ratio	.33	.23	.26	.26
Defense Spending*				
% favoring: Increase	20.7	13.6	50.5	45.7
Decrease	34.4	33.6	16.4	15.4
Same, n.c.	44.8	52.8	33.0	38.8
Support Ratio	.43	.40	.67	.65
Mean Support Ratios for "Foreign Policy" Category (excl. Defense Spending)	.54	.39	.49	.47

* See footnote 23.

on three other issues in this category (trade unions, credit, and tariffs), principle seems to be overweighed by old-fashioned economic considerations. In spite of their distaste for government interference in economic affairs, the Republicans almost unanimously favor greater regulation of trade unions and they are more strongly disposed than the Democrats toward government intervention to restrict credit and to raise tariffs. Of course, party cleavages over the credit and tariff issues have a long history,[19] which may by now have endowed them with ideological force beyond immediate economic considerations.[20] The preponderant Democratic preference for greater regulation of trade unions is doubtless a response to recent "exposures" of corrupt labor practices, though it may also signify that the party's perspective toward the trade unions is shifting somewhat.

The closer Republican identification with business, free enterprise, and economic conservatism in general, and the friendlier Democratic attitude toward labor and toward government regulation of the economy, are easily observed in the data from other parts of our questionnaire. Republican leaders score very much higher than Democratic leaders on, for example, such scales as economic conservatism, independence of government, and business attitudes. On a question asking respondents to indicate the groups from which they would be most and least likely to take advice, 41 per cent of the Democratic leaders but only 3.8 per cent of the Republican leaders list trade unions as groups from which they would seek advice. Trade unions are scored in the "least likely" category by 25 per cent of the Democrats and 63 per cent of the Republicans. Similarly, more than 94 per cent of the Republican leaders, but 56 per cent of the Democratic leaders, name trade unions as groups that have "too much power." These differences, it should be noted, cannot be accounted for by reference to the greater number of trade union members among the Democratic party leadership, for in the 1956 conventions only 14 per cent of the Democrats belonged to trade unions, and while an even smaller percentage (4 per cent) of the Republicans were trade unionists, this disparity is hardly great enough to explain the large differences in outlook. The key to the explanation has to be sought in the symbolic and reference group identifications of the two parties, and in their underlying values.

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[19] See John B. Johnson, Jr., *The Extent and Consistency of Party Voting in the United States Senate*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1943. By applying the Rice Index-of-Likeness to Senate votes, Johnson finds the tariff to have been the most partisan issue before the Congress in the years 1880–1940.

[20] Corinne Silverman, "The Legislator's View of the Legislative Process," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 18 (1954–1955), p. 180.

Nowhere do we see this more clearly than in the responses to the Equalitarian and Human Welfare issues. The mean difference in the ratio scores for the category as a whole is .22, a very large difference and one that results from differences in the expected direction on all six issues that make up the category. On four of these issues—federal aid to education, slum clearance and public housing, social security, and minimum wages—the leaders of the two parties are widely separated, the differences in their ratio scores ranging from .36 to .21. The percentages showing the proportions who favor increased support for these issues are even more striking. In every instance the Democratic percentages are considerably higher: 66 *vs.* 22 per cent (education); 78 *vs.* 40 per cent (slum clearance and housing); 60 *vs.* 23 per cent (social security); and 50 *vs.* 16 per cent (minimum wages). The Democratic leaders also are better disposed than the Republican leaders toward immigration: twice as many of them (36 per cent *vs.* 18 per cent) favor a change in policy to permit more immigrants to enter. The over-all inclination of both party élites, however, is to accept the present levels of immigration, the Democratic ratio score falling slightly above, and the Republican slightly below, the midpoint.

More surprising are the differences on the segregation issue, for, despite strong Southern influence, the Democratic leaders express significantly more support for enforcing integration than the Republicans do. Moreover, the difference between the two parties rises from .12 for the national samples as a whole to a difference of .18 when the southern leaders are excluded. In his study of Congress, Turner found that the Republicans gave more support to Negro rights than the Democrats did.[21] The reversal of this finding in our data does not necessarily mean that a change has occurred since Turner made his study, but only that the votes of the congressional parties do not always reflect the private feelings of the national party leadership. Then, too, Southern influence is disproportionately stronger in the Democratic congressional party than in the national Democratic organization as a whole, and disproportionately weaker in the Republican congressional party than in the Republican organization as a whole.

Examination of the actual magnitude of the ratio scores in this category reveals that the Republicans want not so much to abrogate existing social welfare or equalitarian measures as to keep them from being broadened. The Democrats, by comparison, are shown to be the party of social equality and reform, more willing than their opponents to employ legislation for the benefit of the underprivileged. Support for these inferences and for the greater liberalism of the Democrats can be found elsewhere in our data as well. Analysis of the scale results show Republican leaders scoring higher than Democratic leaders on such measures as chauvinism, élitism, conservatism, and right-wing values, and lower on tolerance, procedural rights, and faith in democracy. No differences worth noting, however, were found for ethnocentrism, faith in freedom, or the California F scale. The Democrats had a slightly higher average score on the left-wing scale, but the number of leaders in either party who scored high on this measure was fairly small.

The self-images and reference group identifications of the two parties also should be noted in this connection. For example, many more Democratic than Republican leaders call themselves liberal and state that they would be most likely to take advice from liberal reform organizations, the Farmers' Union, and (as we have seen) from the trade unions; only a small number consider themselves conservative or would seek advice from conservative reform organizations, the National Association of Manufacturers, or the Farm Bureau Federation. The Republicans have in almost all instances the reverse identifications: only a handful regard themselves as liberal or would seek counsel from liberal organizations, while more than 42 per cent call themselves conservative and would look to the NAM or to conservative reform organizations for advice. Almost two-thirds of the Republicans (compared with 29 per cent of the Democrats) regard the Chamber of Commerce as an important source of advice. Businessmen are listed as having "too much power" by 42 per cent of the Democrats but by only 9 per cent of the Republicans. The Democrats are also significantly more inclined than the Republicans to consider Catholics, Jews, and the foreign born as having "too little power." While self-descriptions and reference group identifications often correspond poorly with actual beliefs—among the general population they scarcely correspond at all, in fact—we are dealing, in the case of the leaders, with a politically informed and highly articulate set of people who have little difficulty connecting the beliefs they hold and the groups that promote or obstruct those beliefs.

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[21] Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

Our fourth category, Tax Policy, divides the parties almost as severely as do the other categories. The mean difference for the category as a whole is .20, and it would doubtless have been larger but for the universal unpopularity of proposals to increase taxes on small and middle income groups. Table II-d shows that the differences between the parties on the tax issues follow the patterns previously observed and that tax policy is for the Democrats a device for redistributing income and promoting social equality. Neither party, however, is keen about raising taxes for *any* group: even the Democrats have little enthusiasm for new taxes on upper income groups or on business and corporate enterprises. The Republican leaders are overwhelmingly opposed to increased taxes for *any* group, rich *or* poor. This can be seen in their low ratio scores on the tax issues, which range from only .15 to .24. But while they are far more eager than the Democratic leaders to cut taxes on corporate and private wealth, they are less willing to reduce taxes on the lower income groups. These differences, it should be remarked, are not primarily a function of differences in the income of the two samples. Although there are more people with high incomes among the Republican leaders, the disproportion between the two samples is not nearly great enough to account for the dissimilarities in their tax views.

Of the five categories considered, Foreign Policy shows the smallest average difference, but even on these issues the divergence between Democratic and Republican leader attitudes is significant. Except for defense spending the Democrats turn out to be more internationalist than the Republicans, as evidenced in their greater commitment to the United Nations and to American participation in international military alliances like NATO. Twice as many Democrats as Republicans want the United States to rely more heavily upon such organizations, while many more Republicans want to reduce our international involvements. Both parties are predominantly in favor of cutting back foreign aid—a somewhat surprising finding in light of Democratic public pronouncements on this subject—but more Republicans feel strongly on the subject. Our data thus furnish little support for the claim that the parties hold the same views on foreign policy or that their seeming differences are merely a response to the demands of political competition.[22]

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to conclude that one party believes in internationalism and the other in isolationism. The differences are far too small to warrant any such inference. Traces of isolationism, to be sure, remain stronger in the Republican party than in the Democratic party—an observation buttressed by the finding that twice as many Republicans as Democrats score high on the isolationism scale. The pattern of Republican responses on both the issue and scale items signifies, however, that the leaders of that party generally accept the degree of "internationalism" now in effect, but shrink from extending it further. Consider too, the similarities in the leaders' scores on defense spending, for despite their greater leaning toward isolationism, the Republicans are no more inclined than the Democrats to leave the country defenseless.[23]

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[22] *Cf.* Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 56, in which he found differences on foreign policy difficult to assess in Congress, partly because of its tie with the executive branch; see also, George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15 (Winter, 1951–52), pp. 608–619.

[23] The issue of defense spending has been kept separate from the other foreign policy issues because the magnitude of the scores for some of the leaders and all of the followers were obviously inflated by the launching of Sputnik I in Novem-

In treating issues in the Elmira election study of 1948, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee[24] found it helpful to distinguish between "style" and "position" issues. "Style" issues principally yield symbolic, psychological, or subjective gratifications, and have relatively intangible consequences; "position" issues reflect direct, personal and material interests, and have more objective consequences. According to the Elmira report, "position" issues (or what politicians might call "bread and butter" issues) divide voters more sharply than style issues. Most of the issues tested in the present study would have to be classified as "position" issues, but five of them—United Nations, international alliances, foreign aid, immigration, and segregation—could be classified as style issues. Four others—natural resources, atomic energy, education, and slum clearance—contain both symbolic and material elements and can best be described as "mixed."

Although the classification is crude, the findings it yields are generally consistent with the claims of the Elmira study. On the fourteen position issues—taxes, trade unions, tariffs, minimum wages, farm prices, social security, credit restrictions, and the regulation of business, public utilities and monopolies—Democratic and Republican leaders show an average ratio score difference of .21. On the style issues the two parties differ by .13—a significantly smaller difference. Largest of all, however, are the differences for the "mixed" issues, which average more than .30. This result should occasion little surprise, for when ideology and interest are *both* at work, partisanship is likely to be intensified. Several considerations could account for the superiority of position over style issues as causes of political cleavage: they are "bread and butter" issues, and are thus more often subject to pressure by organized interest groups; they have immediate and tangible consequences, which may lead politicians to pay greater attention to them than they do to issues whose payoff is more uncertain; and, finally, they are not so likely to be part of the common core of values upon which the community structure rests.

Comparison of the magnitude of the differences between groups can be seen in Table III, p. 422, where we have ranked the issues, high to low, according to the size of the difference between the groups being compared. By presenting a rank-order of differences for the two leader groups, for the two follower groups, and for the leaders and followers of each party, this table makes it possible to observe not only which issues most and least divide the several party groups, but whether they divide the leaders and followers in the same way.

Notice that the issues commonly thought to be most divisive do not always evoke the greatest cleavage between the parties. Immigration, tariffs, civil rights, monopoly control, and credit regulation fall toward the lower end of the rank order, while farm supports, federal aid to education, slum clearance, social security, minimum wages, public housing, and issues dealing with the regulation and taxation of business fall toward the upper end. Though by no means uniformly, the older, more traditional issues appear to have been superseded as sources of controversy by issues that have come into prominence chiefly during the New Deal and Fair Deal.

IV. COMPARISONS BETWEEN FOLLOWERS

So far we have addressed ourselves to the differences between Democratic and Republican *leaders*. In each of the tables presented, however, data are included from which the two sets of party *followers* may also be compared.

The observation most clearly warranted from these data is that the rank and file members of the two parties are far less divided than their leaders. Not only do they diverge significantly on fewer issues—seven as compared with 23 for the leader samples—but the magnitudes of the differences in their ratio scores are substantially smaller for every one of the 24 issues. No difference is larger than .14, and on the majority of the issues the disparity is smaller than .05. Insofar as they differ at all, however, the followers tend to divide in a pattern similar to that shown by the leaders, the correlation between their rank orders being .72.

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ber, 1957. The Sputnik incident occurred between the first and second wave of the leader survey and produced an increase in the number favoring defense spending of 40 per cent for the Democrats and 33 per cent for the Republicans. While this is a fascinating testimonial to the influence sometimes exercised by events on public opinion, its effect in this case was to distort scores in such a way as to make the leader and follower samples non-comparable. With proper caution, however, comparisons can be made between the Democratic and Republican leaders since both samples were affected in roughly the same way by Sputnik. For a similar reason we can also compare the Democratic followers with the Republican followers. Comparisons between leaders and followers on this issue cannot, however, be justified from our data.

[24] Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954), ch. 9.

All the issues on which the followers significantly disagree are of the "bread and butter" variety, the more symbolic issues being so remotely experienced and so vaguely grasped that rank and file voters are often unable to identify them with either party. Policies affecting farm prices, business regulation, taxes, or minimum wages, by contrast, are quickly felt by the groups to whom they are addressed and are therefore more capable of arousing partisan identifications. It should also be noted that while the average differences are small for all five categories, they are smallest of all for foreign policy—the most removed and least well understood group of issues in the entire array.[25]

Democratic and Republican followers were also compared on a number of scales and reference group questions. The results, while generally consistent with the differences between the leaders, show the followers to be far more united than their leaders on these measures as well. Even on business attitudes, independence of government, and economic conservatism, the differences are small and barely significant. No differences were found on such scales as tolerance, faith in democracy, procedural rights, conservatism-liberalism (classical), the California F scale and isolationism. The average Democrat is slightly more willing than the average Republican to label himself a liberal or to seek advice from liberal organizations; the contrary is true when it comes to adopting conservative identifications. Only in the differential trust they express toward business and labor are the two sets of followers widely separated.

These findings give little support to the claim that the "natural divisions" of the electorate are being smothered by party leaders.[26] Not only do the leaders disagree more sharply than their respective followers, but the level of consensus among the electorate (with or without regard to party) is fairly high. Inspection of the "increase" and "decrease" percentage scores (Tables II-a–e) shows that substantial differences of opinion exist among the electorate on only five of the 24 issues (credit restrictions, farm supports, segregation, and corporate and business taxes). Of course, voters may divide more sharply on issues at election time, since campaigns intensify party feeling and may also intensify opinions on issues. Available data from election studies allow no unequivocal conclusion on this point,[27] but even the party-linked differences found among voters during elections may largely be echoes of the opinions announced by the candidates—transient sentiments developed for the occasion and quickly forgotten.

V. LEADER CONFLICT AND FOLLOWER CONSENSUS: EXPLANATIONS

Considering the nature of the differences between the leader and follower samples, the interesting question is not why the parties fail to represent the "natural division" in the electorate (for that question rests on an unwarranted assumption) but why the party élites disagree at all, and why they divide so much more sharply than their followers?

Despite the great pressures toward uniformity we have noted in American society, many forces also divide the population culturally, economically, and politically. The United States is, after all, a miscellany of ethnic and religious strains set down in a geographically large and diverse country. Many of these groups brought old conflicts and ideologies with them, and some have tried to act out in the new world the hopes and frustrations nurtured in the old. Then, too, despite rapid social mobility, social classes have by no means been eliminated. No special political insight is needed to perceive that the two parties characteristically draw from different strata of the society, the Republicans from the managerial, proprietary, and to some extent professional classes, the Democrats from labor, minorities, low income groups, and a large proportion of the intellectuals.[28] Partly because the leaders of the two parties tend to overrespond to the modal values of the groups with which they are principally identified, they gradually grow further apart on the key questions which separate their respective supporters.[29] The Republican emphasis on business ideology is both a cause and a consequence of its managerial and proprietary support; the greater Democratic emphasis on social justice, and on economic and social levelling, is both the occasion and the product of the support the party enjoys among intellectuals and the lower strata. These interrelationships are strengthened, moreover, by the tendency for a party's dominant supporters to gain a disproportionate number of positions in its leadership ranks.[30]

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[25] For comparative data on party affiliation and issue outlooks among rank and file voters, see Angus Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (in press), especially chs. 8 and 9 dealing with issues and ideology. The text of this important report on the 1956 election study carried out by the Michigan Survey Research Center unfortunately reached us too late to be used to full advantage in the present analysis. The findings of the Michigan and the PAB studies, relative to the role of issues and ideology among the general population, corroborate and supplement each other to a very great degree.

[26] *Cf.* Stephen K. Bailey, *The Condition of Our National Parties* (monograph), Fund for the Republic, 1959.

[27] The data reported by the Elmira study of 1948 show the supporters of the two parties to be largely in agreement on issues. See Berelson, *et al.*, *Voting*, pp. 186, 190, 194, 211. The findings of the 1956 Michigan Survey suggest strongly that most voters, even at election time, do not know much about issues and are unable to link the parties with particular issues. Campbell and his associates conclude, for example, that "many people fail to appreciate that an issue exists; others are insufficiently involved to pay attention to recognized issues; and still others fail to make connections between issue positions and party policy." *The American Voter*, ch. 8.

The differences which typically separate Democratic from Republican leaders seem also to reflect a deep-seated ideological cleavage often found among Western parties. One side of this cleavage is marked by a strong belief in the power of collective action to promote social justice, equality, humanitarianism, and economic planning, while preserving freedom; the other is distinguished by faith in the wisdom of the natural competitive process and in the supreme virtue of individualism, "character," self-reliance, frugality, and independence from government. To this cleavage is added another frequent source of political division, namely, a difference in attitude toward change between "radicals" and "moderates," between those who prefer to move quickly or slowly, to reform or to conserve. These differences in social philosophy and posture do not always coincide with the divisions in the social structure, and their elements do not, in all contexts, combine in the same way. But, however crudely, the American parties do tend to embody these competing points of view and to serve as reference groups for those who hold them.

Party cleavage in America was no doubt intensified by the advent of the New Deal, and by its immense electoral and intellectual success. Not only did it weld into a firm alliance the diverse forces that were to be crucial to all subsequent Democratic majorities, but it also made explicit the doctrines of the "welfare state" with which the party was henceforth to be inseparably identified. Because of the novelty of its program and its apparently radical threat to the familiar patterns of American political and economic life, it probably deepened the fervor of its Republican adversaries and drove into the opposition the staunchest defenders of business ideology. The conflict was further sharpened by the decline of left-wing politics after the war, and by the transfer of loyalties of former and potential radicals to the Democratic party. Once launched, the cleavage has been sustained by the tendency for each party to attract into its active ranks a disproportionate number of voters who recognize and share its point of view.

Why, however, are the leaders so much more sharply divided than their followers? The reasons are not hard to understand and are consistent with several of the hypotheses that underlay the present study.

(1) Consider, to begin with, that the ledders come from the more articulate segments of society and, on the average, are politically more aware than their followers and far better informed about issues.[31] For them, political issues and opinions are the everyday currency of party competition, not esoteric matters that surpass understanding. With their greater awareness and responsibility, and their greater need to defend their party's stands, they have more interest in developing a consistent set of attitudes—perhaps even an ideology. The followers of each party, often ignorant of the issues and their consequences, find it difficult to distinguish their beliefs from those of the opposition and have little reason to be concerned with the consistency of their attitudes. Furthermore, the American parties make only a feeble effort to educate the rank and file politically, and since no central source exists for the authoritative pronouncement of party policy,[32] the followers often do not know what their leaders believe or on what issues the parties chiefly divide. In short, if we mean by ideology a coherent body of informed social doctrine, it

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[28] For an analysis of the connection between intellectuals and liberal politics, see Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York, 1960), ch. 10; also Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind* (Glencoe, 1958), chs. 1 and 2.

[29] Samuel P. Huntington, "A Revised Theory of American Party Politics," this REVIEW, Vol. 44 (1950), p. 676.

[30] PAB data supporting this generalization will be presented in a future publication.

[31] For the effects of education on issue familiarity, see Campbell *et al.*, *The American voter*, ch. 8.

[32] E. E. Schattschneider, *op. cit.*; *Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System*, *passim.*

possessed mainly by the articulate leadership, arely by the masses.

(2) Differences in the degree of partisan inolvement parallel the differences in knowledge nd have similar consequences. The leaders, of ourse, have more party spirit than the followrs and, as the election studies make plain, the tronger the partisanship, the larger the differnces on issues. The leaders are more highly moivated not only to belong to a party appropriate o their beliefs, but to accept its doctrines and to earn how it differs from the opposition party. ince politics is more salient for leaders than for ollowers, they develop a greater stake in the utcome of the political contest and are more ager to discover the intellectual grounds by vhich they hope to make victory possible. Through a process of circular reinforcement, hose for whom politics is most important are ikely to become the most zealous participants, ucceeding to the posts that deal in the formaion of opinion. Ideology serves the instrumenal purpose, in addition, of justifying the heavy nvestment that party leaders make in political ctivity. While politics offers many rewards, it lso makes great demands on the time, money, nd energies of its practitioners—sacrifices vhich they can more easily justify if they beieve they are serving worthwhile social goals. The followers, in contrast, are intellectually far ess involved, have less personal stake in the utcome of the competition, have little need to e concerned with the "correctness" of their views on public questions, and have even less eason to learn in precisely what ways their pinions differ from their opponents'. Hence, the party élites recruit members from a populaion stratified in some measure by ideology, while the rank and file renews itself by more random recruitment and is thus more likely to mirror the opinions of a cross section of the population.

(3) Part of the explanation for the greater consensus among followers than leaders resides n the nature and size of the two types of groups. Whereas the leader groups are comparatively small and selective, each of the follower groups number in the millions and, by their very size and unwieldiness, are predisposed to duplicate the characteristics of the population as a whole. Even if the Republicans draw disproportionately from the business-managerial classes and the Democrats from the trade union movement, neither interest group has enough influence to shape distinctively the aggregate opinions of so large a mass of supporters. Size also affects the nature and frequency of interaction within the two types of groups. Because they comprise a smaller, more selectively chosen, organized, and articulate élite, the leaders are apt to associate with people of their own political persuasion more frequently and consistently than the followers do. They are not only less cross-pressured than the rank and file but they are also subjected to strong party group efforts to induce them to conform. Because their political values are continually renewed through frequent communication with people of like opinions, and because they acquire intense reference group identifications, they develop an extraordinary ability to resist the force of the opposition's arguments. While the followers, too, are thrown together and shielded to some extent, they are likely to mingle more freely with people of hostile political persuasions, to receive fewer partisan communications, and to hold views that are only intermittently and inconsistently reinforced. Since, by comparision with the leaders, they possess little interest in or information about politics, they can more easily embrace "deviant" attitudes without discomfort and without challenge from their associates. Nor are they likely to be strongly rewarded for troubling to have "correct" opinions. The followers, in short, are less often and less effectively indoctrinated than their leaders. The group processes described here would function even more powerfully in small, sectarian, tightly organized parties of the European type, but they are also present in the American party system, where they yield similar though less potent consequences.

(4) Political competition itself operates to divide the leaders more than the followers. If the parties are impelled to present a common face to the electorate, they are also strongly influenced to distinguish themselves from each other.[33] For one thing, they have a more heightened sense of the "national interest" than the followers do, even if they do not all conceive it in the same way. For another, they hope to improve their chances at the polls by offering the electorate a recognizable and attractive commodity. In addition, they seek emotional gratification in the heightened sense of brotherhood brought on by the struggle against an "outgroup" whose claim to office seems always, somehow, to border upon usurpation. As with many ingroup-outgroup distinctions, the participants search for moral grounds to justify their antagonisms toward each other, and ideologies help to furnish such grounds. Among

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[33] See E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government*, p. 192.

the followers, on the other hand, these needs exist, if at all, in much weaker form.

VI. LEADERS VERSUS FOLLOWERS

In comparing each party élite with its own followers we were mainly interested in seeing how closely each body of supporters shared the point of view of its leaders, in order to test the hypothesis that party affiliation, even for the rank and file, is a function of ideological agreement. In predicting that the parties would tend to attract supporters who share their beliefs, we expected, of course, to find exceptions. We knew that many voters pay little attention to the ideological aspects of politics and that, in Gabriel Almond's phrase, a party's more "esoteric doctrines" are not always known to its followers.[34] Nevertheless we were not prepared for the findings turned up by this phase of the inquiry, for the differences between leaders and followers—among the Republicans at least—are beyond anything we had expected. Indeed the conclusion is inescapable that the views o the Republican rank and file are, on the whole much closer to those of the Democratic leader than to those of the Republican leaders. Although conflicts in outlook also exist betwee Democratic leaders and followers, they are les frequent or severe.

If we turn once again to the table of rank order differences, we see that the Democratic followers differ significantly from their leaders o twelve of the 23 issues, and that the averag difference in the ratio scores of the two sample is .07. Democratic leaders and Republican followers differ significantly on only eleven of th 23 issues, with an average difference betwee

TABLE III. RANK ORDER OF DIFFERENCES IN THE SUPPORT-RATIO SCORES OF PARTY LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS*

Democratic *vs.* Republican Leaders	Diff. between ratio scores***	Democratic *vs.* Republican Followers	Diff. between ratio scores	Democratic Leaders *vs.* Followers	Diff. between ratio scores	Republican leaders *vs.* Followers	Diff. between ratio scores
Issues		Issues		Issues		Issues	
1. Natural Resources	+.39	Farm Supports	+.14	Immigration	+.25	Fed. Aid to Edu.	−.39
2. Farm Supports	+.38	Gov't. Reg. of Business	+.12	Anti-Monopoly	+.15	Taxes-Large Income	−.32
3. Fed. Aid. to Edu.	+.37	Taxes-Large Income	+.10	Taxes-Large Income	−.15	Taxes-Corp.	−.28
4. Taxes-Corp.	+.33	Minimum Wages	+.09	Taxes-Business	−.13	Taxes-Business	−.27
5. Reg.-Business	+.33	Taxes-Business	+.09	Reg. Pub. Util.	+.12	Natural Resources	−.25
6. Taxes-Large Inc.	+.28	Reg. Pub. Util.	+.07	Tariffs	−.11	Pub. Housing	−.23
7. Pub. Housing	+.27	Taxes-Corp.	+.07	Restrict. Credit	−.09	Reg. Business	−.22
8. Reg. Pub. Util.	+.26	Social Security	+.07	Natural Resources	+.09	Social Security	−.22
9. Social Security	+.23	Fed. Aid to Edu.	+.06	Fed. Aid to Edu.	−.08	Farm Supports	−.22
10. Taxes-Business	+.22	Reg. Trade Unions	−.05	Foreign Aid	+.08	Minimum Wages	−.18
11. Minimum Wages	+.21	Natural Resources	+.05	Reliance on U.N.	+.07	Reg. Trade Unions	+.17
12. Reliance on U.N.	+.21	Public Housing	+.05	Minimum Wages	−.05	Immigration	+.13
13. Anti-monopoly	+.20	Taxes-Small Income	−.04	Social Security	−.05	Reliance on U.N.	−.12
14. Atomic Energy Control	+.18	American Participation, NATO	+.04	Reg. Trade Unions	+.05	Enforce Integration	−.12
15. Reg. Trade Unions	−.18	Atomic Energy Control	+.04	Atomic Energy Control	+.04	Taxes-Middle Income	−.11
16. American Participation, NATO	+.13	Immigration	−.03	Farm Supports	+.02	Atomic Energy Control	−.10
17. Enforce Integration	+.12	Defense Spending	+.02	Reg. Business	−.02	American Participation, NATO	−.10
18. Tariffs	−.11	Taxes-Middle Income	−.02	Enforce Integration	+.01	Reg. Public Utilities	−.07
19. Foreign Aid	+.10	Reliance on U.N.	+.02	Taxes-Middle Income	−.01	Anti-Monopoly	−.04
20. Increase Immigration	+.10	Tariffs	−.01	Taxes-Corporation	−.01	Foreign Aid	−.03
21. Taxes-Small Income	−.08	Enforce Integration	−.01	Taxes-Small Income	−.01	Taxes-Small Income	+.03
22. Taxes-Middle Income	+.08	Restriction Credit	+.01	American Participation, NATO	−.01	Restriction Credit	−.01
23. Restriction Credit	−.07	Foreign Aid	−.01	Public Housing	.00	Tariffs	−.01
24. Defense Spending	+.03	Anti-Monopoly	.00	Defense Spending	**	Defense Spending	**

N's. Democratic Leaders: 1,788; Republican Leaders: 1,232; Democratic Followers: 821; Republican Followers: 623.

* The plus sign means that the first group listed in the heading is more favorable to the issue named than the second group; the minus sign means that the second group is the more favorable.

** Leaders and Followers cannot be compared on defense spending, for reasons given in footnote to Table II-E.

*** Size of difference required for differences to be significant at .01 level: Democratic Leaders *vs.* Republican—.048; Democratic Followers *vs.* Republican Followers—.068; Democratic Leaders *vs.* Democratic Followers—.054; Republican Leaders *vs.* Republican Followers—.063.

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[34] Gabriel Almond, *The Appeals of Communisn* (Princeton, 1954), pp. 5–6, and ch. 3.

them of only .08. Notice, by contrast, that Republican leaders and followers diverge significantly on 18 of the 23 issues, and show an average difference of .16. To complete the comparison, the Republican leaders and Democratic followers were in disagreement on 19 of the 23 issues, their average difference being .20. As these comparisons make plain, there is substantial consensus on national issues between Democratic leaders and Democratic and Republican followers, while the Republican leaders are separated not only from the Democrats but from their own rank and file members as well.

Examination of the Democratic scores shows the leaders to be slightly more "progressive" than their followers on most of the issues on which differences appear. The leaders are, for example, more favorable to public ownership of natural resources, to regulation of monopolies and public utilities, to a reduction of tariffs, and to a liberalized credit policy. They are more internationalist on the foreign aid and United Nations issues and substantially more sympathetic to the maintenance and expansion of immigration. The results showing the relative radicalism of the two samples are not unequivocal, however, for on several issues—federal aid to education, minimum wages, and taxes on business enterprise and large incomes—the followers take the more radical view. Nor are the differences significant on such issues as atomic energy, slum clearance, segregation, farm price supports, government control of business and trade unions, and taxes on middle and small income groups. In general, the followers turn out more radical chiefly on a few of the bread and butter issues—a reflection, no doubt, of their lower socio-economic status. When we control for occupation, the differences between Democratic leaders and followers on these issues largely disappear.

Consideration of the scores of Republican leaders and followers shows not only that they are widely separated in their outlooks but also that the leaders are uniformly more conservative than their followers. Only on the immigration issue is this trend reversed. The followers hold the more "radical" ideas on the two public ownership issues, on five of the six equalitarian and human welfare issues, on four of the seven regulation-of-the-economy issues, and on four of the five tax policy issues. They are also more willing to place greater reliance upon the U.N. and upon international military alliances. Observe that the largest differences occur on those issues which have most sharply separated New Deal-Fair Deal spokesmen from the hard core of the Republican opposition—federal aid to education, redistribution of wealth through taxes on business, corporations and the wealthy, public ownership of natural resources, public housing, regulation of business, social security, farm price supports, minimum wages, and trade union regulations.

In short, whereas Republican leaders hold to the tenets of business ideology and remain faithful to the spirit and intellectual mood of leaders like Robert A. Taft, the rank and file Republican supporters have embraced, along with their Democratic brethren, the regulatory and social reform measures of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. This inference receives further support from the scores on our Party Ideology scale where, on a variety of attitudes and values which characteristically distinguish the leaders of the two parties, the Republican followers fall closer to the Democratic than to the Republican side of the continuum. Thus, in addition to being the preferred party of the more numerous classes, the Democrats also enjoy the advantages over their opponents of holding views that are more widely shared throughout the country.

Assuming the findings are valid, we were obviously wrong to expect that party differentiation among followers would depend heavily upon ideological considerations.[35] Evidently, party attachment is so much a function of other factors (*e.g.* class and primary group memberships, religious affiliation, place of residence, mass media, etc.) that many voters can maintain their party loyalties comfortably even while holding views that contradict the beliefs of their own leaders.

Still, we are not entitled to conclude that issue outlook has no effect on the party affiliation of ordinary members. It is conceivable, for example, that the Republican party has come to be the minority party partly because the opinions of its spokesmen are uncongenial to a majority of the voters. We have no way of knowing from our data—collected at only a single point in time—how many "normally" Republican voters, if any, have defected to the Democrats or fled into independency because they disapprove of Republican beliefs. At the present stage of the analysis, we have no grounds for going beyond the proposition that political affiliation without conformity on issues is possible on a wide scale. In future analyses we shall attempt to learn more about the nature of the relationship between belief and party affiliation by stratifying voters according to the frequency with which they conform to the beliefs of their party leaders. We hope, in this way, to discover whether those who conform least are also less firm in their party loyalties.

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[35] See the discussion bearing on this conclusion in Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, chs. 8 and 9. Also, Avery Leiserson, *Parties and Politics, An Institutional and Behavioral Approach* (New York, 1958), pp. 162–166.

VII. THE HOMOGENEITY OF SUPPORT FOR LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS

So far we have only considered conflict and agreement *between* groups. We should now turn to the question of consensus *within* groups. To what extent is each of our samples united on fundamental issues?

In order to assess homogeneity of opinion within party groups, standard deviation scores were computed on each issue for each of the four samples. The higher the standard deviation, of course, the greater the disagreement. The range of possible sigma scores is from 0 (signifying that every member of the sample has selected the same response) to .500 (signifying that all responses are equally divided between the "increase" and "decrease" alternatives). If we assume that the three alternative responses had been randomly (and therefore equally) selected, the standard deviations for the four samples would fall by chance alone around .410. Scores at or above this level may be taken to denote extreme dispersion among the members of a sample while scores in the neighborhood of .300 or below suggest that unanimity within the sample is fairly high. By these somewhat arbitrary criteria we can observe immediately (Table IV) that consensus within groups is greater on most issues than we would expect by chance alone, but that it is extremely high in only a few instances. Although the Republican leaders appear on the average to be the most united and the Democratic leaders the least united of the four groups, the difference between their homogeneity scores (.340 vs. .310) is too small to be taken as conclusive. The grounds are somewhat better for rejecting the belief that leaders are more homogeneous in their outlooks than their followers, since the hypothesis holds only for one party and not for the other.

While generalizations about the relative unity of the four samples seem risky, we can speak more confidently about the rank order of agreement *within* samples. In Table IV we have ranked the issues according to the degree of consensus exhibited toward them by the members of each of the four party groups. There we see that the leaders of the Republican party are most united on the issues that stem from its connections with business—government regulation of business, taxes (especially on business), regulation of trade unions, and minimum wages. The Democratic leaders are most united on those issues which bear upon the support the party receives from the lower and middle income groups—taxes on small and middle incomes, anti-monopoly, slum clearance, social security, and minimum wages. The Republican leaders divide most severely on federal aid to education, slum clearance, U.N. support, segregation, and public control of atomic energy and natural resources; the Democratic leaders are most divided on farm prices, segregation, credit restrictions, immigration, and the natural resources issue. Among the followers the patterns of unity and division are very similar, as attested by the high correlation of .83 between the rank orders of their homogeneity scores. Both Republican and Democratic followers exhibit great cohesion, for example, on taxes on small and middle incomes, social security, slum clearance, and minimum wages. Both divide rather sharply on segregation, farm price supports, defense spending, U.N. support, and taxes on large incomes. The two sets of followers, in short, are alike not only in their opinions on issues but in the degree of unanimity they exhibit toward them.

Inspection of the homogeneity data furnishes additional evidence on the between-group comparisons made earlier. Whereas Democratic and Republican followers divide on issues in approximately the same way, the two sets of leaders differ from each other in this respect also (the correlation between their rank orders on homogeneity is only .28). Democratic leaders and followers tend to unite or divide on the same issues for the most part (r equals .77), but Republican leaders and followers are not parallel in this respect either (r equals .30). The pattern of homogeneity and dispersion among Republican followers is, in fact, much closer to that of the Democratic leaders (r equals .75).

In computing scores for homogeneity we were in part concerned to test the belief that political parties develop greatest internal solidarity on those questions which most separate them from their opponents. According to this hypothesis, external controversy has the effect of uniting the members further by confronting them with a common danger. Whether or not this hypothesis would be borne out in a study of small, sectarian parties we cannot say, but it receives no support from the present study of the American mass parties. Comparisons of the rank order data in Tables III and IV show that there is no consistent connection between inter-party conflict and intra-party cohesion. The correlations between the rank orders of differ-

TABLE IV. CONSENSUS WITHIN PARTY GROUPS: RANK ORDER OF HOMOGENEITY OF SUPPORT ON TWENTY-FOUR ISSUES

Average Rank Order*	Issue	Democratic Leaders		Republican Leaders		Democratic Followers		Republican Followers	
		Rank Order	Sigma	Rank Order	Sigma	Rank Order	Sigma	Rank Order	Sigma
1	Tax on Small Incomes	1	.220	6	.270	1	.224	1	.250
2	Tax on Middle Incomes	3	.276	4	.248	6	.292	2	.278
3	Social Security Benefits	5	.282	8	.296	2	.266	3	.286
4	Minimum Wages	6	.292	5	.268	4	.276	4	.294
5	Enforcement of Anti-Monopoly	2	.246	13	.321	8	.324	7	.314
6	Regulation of Public Utilities	8	.307	10	.300	10	.336	5.5	.310
7	Slum Clearance	4	.276	23	.386	3	.274	5.5	.310
8	Regulation of Trade Unions	12	.356	3	.240	9	.331	15	.345
9	Government Regulation of Business	17	.376	1	.192	20	.363	8	.315
10	Tax on Business	9	.338	2	.236	19	.362	16	.348
11	Level of Tariffs	10	.350	16	.344	11	.338	9	.316
12	Public Control of Atomic Energy	7	.302	20	.362	7	.312	13	.340
13	Federal Aid to Education	13	.360	24	.394	5	.283	11	.322
14	Foreign Aid	19	.383	12	.317	12.5	.340	12	.340
15	Tax on Large Incomes	11	.356	9	.298	17	.358	22	.379
16	American Participation in Military Alliances, NATO	14	.370	18	.351	14	.350	14	.344
17	Immigration into U.S.	21	.399	17	.345	12.5	.340	10	.318
18	Corporate Income Tax	16	.375	7	.284	21	.371	17	.361
19	Restrictions on Credit	22	.400	14	.324	16	.358	18	.362
20	Defense Spending	15	.371	15	.334	22	.380	21	.366
21	Public Ownership of Natural Resources	20	.393	19	.354	15	.352	19	.362
22	Reliance on U.N.	18	.380	22	.384	18	.359	20	.365
23	Level of Farm Supports	24	.421	11	.306	23	.414	23	.397
24	Enforce Integration	23	.416	21	.382	24	.418	24	.399

* The range of sigma scores is from .192 to .421, out of a possible range of .000 (most united) to .500 (least united). Hence, the lower the rank order the greater the unity on the issue named.

ence and the rank orders of homogeneity are in every case insignificant.[36]

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The research described in this paper—an outgrowth of a nationwide inquiry into the nature and sources of political affiliation, activity, and belief—was principally designed to test a number of hypotheses about the relation of ideology to party membership. Responses from large samples of Democratic and Republican leaders and followers were compared on twenty-four key issues and on a number of attitude questions and scales. Statistical operations were carried out to assess conflict and consensus among party groups and to estimate the size and significance of differences. From the data yielded by this inquiry, the following inferences seem most warranted:

1. Although it has received wide currency, especially among Europeans, the belief that the two American parties are identical in principle and doctrine has little foundation in fact. Ex-

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[36] For an interesting set of comparative data on the relation of internal party cohesion to issue outlook, see Morris Davis and Sidney Verba, "Party Affiliation and International Opinions in Britain and France, 1947–1956," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter 1960–61 (forthcoming).

amination of the opinions of Democratic and Republican leaders shows them to be distinct communities of co-believers who diverge sharply on many important issues. Their disagreements, furthermore, conform to an image familiar to many observers and are generally consistent with differences turned up by studies of Congressional roll calls. The unpopularity of many of the positions held by Republican leaders suggests also that the parties submit to the demands of their constituents less slavishly than is commonly supposed.

2. Republican and Democratic leaders stand furthest apart on the issues that grow out of their group identification and support—out of the managerial, proprietary, and high-status connections of the one, and the labor, minority, low-status, and intellectual connections of the other. The opinions of each party élite are linked less by chance than by membership in a common ideological domain. Democratic leaders typically display the stronger urge to elevate the lowborn, the uneducated, the deprived minorities, and the poor in general; they are also more disposed to employ the nation's collective power to advance humanitarian and social welfare goals (*e.g.*, social security, immigration, racial integration, a higher minimum wage, and public education). They are more critical of wealth and big business and more eager to bring them under regulation. Theirs is the greater faith in the wisdom of using legislation for redistributing the national product and for furnishing social services on a wide scale. Of the two groups of leaders, the Democrats are the more "progressively" oriented toward social reform and experimentation. The Republican leaders, while not uniformly differentiated from their opponents, subscribe in greater measure to the symbols and practices of individualism, *laissez-faire*, and national independence. They prefer to overcome humanity's misfortunes by relying upon personal effort, private incentives, frugality, hard work, responsibility, self-denial (for both men and government), and the strengthening rather than the diminution of the economic and status distinctions that are the "natural" rewards of the differences in human character and fortunes. Were it not for the hackneyed nature of the designation and the danger of forcing traits into a mold they fit only imperfectly, we might be tempted to describe the Republicans as the chief upholders of what Max Weber has called the "Protestant Ethic."[37] Not that the Democrats are insensible to the "virtues" of the Protestant-capitalistic ethos, but they embrace them less firmly or uniformly. The differences between the two élites have probably been intensified by the rise of the New Deal and by the shift of former radicals into the Democratic party following the decline of socialist and other left-wing movements during and after the war.

3. Whereas the leaders of the two parties diverge strongly, their followers differ only moderately in their attitudes toward issues. The hypothesis that party beliefs unite adherents and bring them into the party ranks may hold for the more active members of a mass party but not for its rank and file supporters. Republican followers, in fact, disagree far more with their own leaders than with the leaders of the Democratic party. Little support was found for the belief that deep cleavages exist among the electorate but are ignored by the leaders. One might, indeed more accurately assert the contrary, to wit: that the natural cleavages between the leaders are largely ignored by the voters. However, we cannot presently conclude that ideology exerts no influence over the habits of party support, for the followers do differ significantly and in the predicted directions on some issues. Furthermore, we do not know how many followers may previously have been led by doctrinal considerations to shift their party allegiances.

4. Except for their desire to ingratiate themselves with as many voters as possible, the leaders of the two parties have more reason than their followers to hold sharply opposing views on the important political questions of the day. Compared with the great mass of supporters, they are articulate, informed, highly partisan, and involved; they comprise a smaller and more tightly knit group which is closer to the wellsprings of party opinion, more accessible for indoctrination, more easily rewarded or punished for conformity or deviation, and far more affected, politically and psychologically, by engagement in the party struggle for office. If the leaders of the two parties are not always candid about their disagreements, the reason may well be that they sense the great measure of consensus to be found among the electorate.

5. Finding that party leaders hold contrary beliefs does not prove that they *act* upon those beliefs or that the two parties are, in practice, governed by different outlooks. In a subsequent paper we shall consider these questions more directly by comparing platform and other official party pronouncements with the private opinions revealed in this study. Until further inquiries are conducted, however, it seems reasonable to assume that the views held privately by party leaders can never be entirely sup-

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[37] Max Weber, *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London, 1948), ch. V.

pressed but are bound to crop out in hundreds of large and small ways—in campaign speeches, discussions at party meetings, private communications to friends and sympathizers, statements to the press by party officials and candidates, legislative debates, and public discussions on innumerable national, state, and local questions. If, in other words, the opinions of party leaders are as we have described them, there is every chance that they are expressed and acted upon to some extent. Whether this makes our parties "ideological" depends, of course, on how narrowly we define that term. Some may prefer to reserve that designation for parties that are more obviously preoccupied with doctrine, more intent upon the achievement of a systematic political program, and more willing to enforce a common set of beliefs upon their members and spokesmen.

6. The parties are internally united on some issues, divided on others. In general, Republican leaders achieve greatest homogeneity on issues that grow out of their party's identification with business, Democratic leaders on issues that reflect their connection with liberal and lower-income groups. We find no support for the hypothesis that the parties achieve greatest internal consensus on the issues which principally divide them from their opponents.

In a sequel to this paper we shall offer data on the demographic correlates of issue support, which show that most of the differences presented here exist independently of factors like education, occupation, age, religion, and sectionalism. Controlling for these influences furnishes much additional information and many new insights but does not upset our present conclusions in any important respect. Thus, the parties must be considered not merely as spokesmen for other interest groups but as reference groups in their own right, helping to formulate, to sustain, and to speak for a recognizable point of view.

HOBBES'S CONFUSING "CLARITY"—THE CASE OF "LIBERTY"

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The *Leviathan* has been described as "original, persuasive, solid, coherent."[1] General commentaries on Hobbes usually single out his logic for special praise; more detailed critiques generally unearth a mass of confusions and inconsistencies.[2] Confusions and inconsistencies there certainly are; more, I believe, than one would expect to find in the work of a man of such undeniable logical powers. Speculation upon the psychological explanation of this fact is intriguing, but no part of the purpose of the present article.[3] It *is* part of my purpose, however, to contend that Hobbes's passion for clarity and certainty may have played a part in leading him to adopt perverse definitions, to which even he did not consistently adhere and which constituted a major source of confusion.[4] Conversely, I disagree with those who say his analytical system is sound and only his empirical assumptions about human nature are open to serious criticism.[5]

More specifically, one may profitably inquire whether there is some central concept that serves as a focal point for many of these difficulties. For example, it is often suggested, with merit, that Hobbes's perversion, or inversion, of the traditional meaning of "*jus naturale*" plays such a role. Without making any exclusive claim or denying the insights that may be gained by concentrating attention upon other focal points, my hypothesis is that understanding of Hobbes may be deepened by an examination of his use of the word "liberty." I shall deal first with his definitions of the term, and then in turn with his applications of it to natural right and natural law, to sovereignty by acquisition, and finally to the social contract. I shall argue that his method, as illustrated by his definitions, leads him occasionally into confusion or inconsistency, and more frequently tends to confuse the reader and so to enable Hobbes to make an unsound conclusion appear sound, by means of specious reasoning. In particular, I shall contend that Hobbes's treatment of liberty (1) leads him into self-contradiction regarding the extent of natural liberty, (2) enables him to argue persuasively but speciously in support of the obligation to obey a sovereign who has attained his position by violence, and (3) prevents him from developing an acceptable theory of political obligation.

I. THE DEFINITION OF LIBERTY

Hobbes uses different definitions of liberty for different circumstances. Particularly, he finds it useful to adopt one definition of liberty for the state of nature and another for civil society. Of course, this in itself involves no inconsistency. (Indeed, I believe it can be shown that the two definitions can be reduced, *au fond*, to the same.) My point is rather that both the fact of having two definitions and the particular definitions he chooses contribute to the confusion of Hobbes or his readers or both.

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[1] John Plamenatz, "Hobbes's 'Leviathan'," *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Vol. 64, April 19, 1951.

[2] Note Plamenatz's own conclusion, in "Mr. Warrender's Hobbes," *Political Studies*, Vol. 5 (Oct. 1957), pp. 295–308, at 307, that Hobbes "is much more ambiguous and illogical than at first reading he appears to be." It may be remarked at this point that there is a degree of parallelism between certain of Howard Warrender's arguments concerning Hobbes's theory of obligation and my arguments concerning his use of the concept of liberty. See his *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes—His Theory of Obligation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957). However, I am not concerned to take sides in the controversy over Warrender's thesis and my argument does not depend upon it. Both Warrender and his critics (see below, note 38) admit that Hobbes says things that are inconsistent with their interpretations of his meaning. I would be inclined to argue that he is so inconsistent that it is impossible to construct a single, coherent argument and defend the proposition that it represents the real Hobbes.

[3] In his very enlightening book, *Hobbes* (Penguin Books, 1956), Richard Peters declares that "It was the possibility of attaining certainty which so attracted Hobbes whose deep-seated feeling of insecurity was aggravated by the objective facts of the political situation." (p. 49)

[4] "The only way to *know*," said Hobbes, "is by definition." Sir William Molesworth (ed.), *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes* (London: John Bohn, 1841), Vol. II, p. 305 (henceforth to be cited *E.W.*, II, 305). The importance of definition is not to be gainsaid; but Hobbes's eagerness for certain knowledge in areas where something less than this is all that can be expected led him astray.

[5] For instance, J. W. Gough writes, "Hobbes's political theory is explained by his general theory of human nature. . . . " *The Social Contract* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 105. Hobbes sought to develop a theory of political obligation, and in doing so he relied on much more that is open to challenge than his theory of human nature.

In Chapter 14 of *Leviathan*, Hobbes defines liberty as "the absence of external impediments," or, as he states it in Chapter 21, the absence of hindrance to doing whatever man has the will, wit, and ability to do.[6] This definition appears to fall within what has become and, according to Hobbes, was already the "generally received" meaning of the word, in England.[7] Closer examination reveals, however, that Hobbes pushes his analysis to conclusions not generally accepted by those who concur in the "generally received" definition. In defining liberty as "the absence of . . . external impediments of motion," he insists on the qualification "external." Thus liberty is consistent with fear.[8] A man robbed at gunpoint would be free, according to Hobbes's doctrine. Not the robber (external), but the fear (internal) constitutes the impediment. If the victim hands over his wallet he is acting voluntarily; and, for Hobbes, a voluntary action and a free action are one and the same. A man who makes a contract in the state of nature is not relieved of obligation by the fact that his action may have been the result of coercion, for he acted freely.[9]

Why did Hobbes take this curious position? It seems unlikely that in his day any more than in ours a man who, for fear of losing his life, allowed a robber to take his money would be generally considered to be free—as free, that is, as the man who was faced with no such hard choice. Perhaps the first explanation that suggests itself is that Hobbes needed to define liberty in this fashion in order to be able later to say that men who covenant to obey a usurping tyrant are bound by their promises. A better explanation might be that Hobbes, who valued security far more than liberty, wished to define the latter in such a way that it would be at once widespread and of little importance. What may be an even more fundamental explanation is to be found in connection with his theory of determinism. All actions are caused, necessitated, he maintained. To speak of actions that are "freely willed" or "freely chosen" accordingly makes no sense to Hobbes. Freedom must be compatible with necessity. The only useful basis for distinguishing free acts from unfree acts, or certainly the most fundamental basis, we can imagine Hobbes saying, is to draw the line between voluntary and involuntary acts; that is, between those where the line of causation moves through the mind and those where it does not. Something either checks me from doing what I will or it does not. If it does, I am not free; otherwise I am. In other words, wishing to deny that 'caused' acts, as such, are unfree, he seized upon *will* as the test. All voluntary acts (or forbearances), the product of will, are free.[10]

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[6] *Leviathan,* edited with an Introduction by Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), pp. 84 and 136–137. (This edition will henceforth be cited "*Lev.*") The second formulation comes from the chapter on "the liberty of subjects," but it appears in that portion of the chapter in which Hobbes is still discussing liberty in general. He writes: "Liberty, or freedom, signifieth, properly, the absence of opposition; by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion. . . . " (*Lev.*, 136). And again: "according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the word, a FREEMAN, *is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he* has a will to." *Lev.*, 137.

[7] Mortimer J. Adler has recently pointed out that the prevalence of this concept of freedom in England is in sharp contrast to Continental European ideas. See his "Freedom: a Study of the Development of the Concept in the English and American Traditions of Philosophy," *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 11 (1958), 380–410, at 395.

[8] *Lev.*, 136.

[9] "Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature are obligatory." *Lev.*, 91. According to normal usage such covenants are coerced, creating no obligation, and leaving us free to disregard them. According to Hobbes, such covenants (in a state of nature) are freely made, they are obligatory, and hence they limit our liberty.

At one point Hobbes flatly contradicts his general contention that liberty is consistent with fear—interestingly enough, in his discussion of the obligation to obey God. He speaks of this obligation as a limitation upon liberty and says it comes from "hope or fear, according to which the weaker, despairing of his own power to resist, cannot but yield to the stronger." *E.W.*, II, 209.

[10] *Lev.*, 137–138. Hobbes could not accept a doctrine of "internal" restraints. Restraints upon what? he would ask. Upon will, presumably. But will, he held, is merely "the last appetite in deliberating" (*Lev.*, 38); it is not a "faculty." If any "internal" source controls behavior, it does not limit or restrain the will, it *is* the will.

It is worth noting in passing an instance of the difficulty Hobbes had in holding to his own defi-

Closely related to the last point, and perhaps most fundamental of all, is the fact that Hobbes's chosen definition was one admitting of easy and clear application. Liberty thus defined was sharply delimited and was not a matter of degree. Such definitions were essential for his mode of reasoning. His method was logical and deductive, not empirical. Empirical science deals constantly with matters of degree; but classical logic and its deductive reasoning seek to avoid measurement. Two statements are either mutually contradictory or they are not, as two lines are either parallel or not parallel; and so, according to Hobbes, an act is either free or it is unfree—there are no half-way houses.

What has been said thus far relates to *natural liberty*, "which only," says Hobbes, "is properly called *liberty*."[11] Hobbes goes on, however, to speak of "the liberty of subjects." In this context he recognizes that civil laws, while not really "external impediments" as previously discussed, are "artificial chains," "made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them."[12] Liberty for subjects, accordingly, consists in those things not forbidden by law, that is by the law of the state.

Why should Hobbes, in the context of the state, modify the definition of liberty as the absence of external impediments and admit the impediment of fear, which he had so recently ruled out? Apparently he makes exception only for the fear of the sovereign. (Obviously he does not wish to say that men are generally free to disobey the laws!) But if a man is free when his action is prompted by fear of a highwayman, why should not the same be true when a policeman provides the motive? An answer to these puzzling questions begins to take shape if we examine the continuation of his argument. After dismissing certain misconceptions that need not concern us here, Hobbes proceeds to discuss what he calls "the particulars of the true liberty of the subject."[13] Under this head he speaks of those things in which the subject may defy the sovereign's commands "without injustice." What are they? They are the rights that cannot by covenant be transferred. And he speaks of these rights as "liberty." He had said, just before, that the liberty of the subject consisted "only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the sovereign hath praetermitted."[14] But now he speaks of those instances in which subjects enjoy the liberty to defy and resist the laws! To resolve this paradox, Hobbes is forced to argue that *natural* liberty, which is unhindered by law, *is retained, in part, even in civil society*. He does this by arguing that man is psychologically incapable of giving up the liberty (right) of defending himself.[15]

For a better understanding of Hobbes's reasoning here, we must go back and examine his words more carefully. Let us have the whole paragraph in question before us:

> But as men, for the attaining of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an artificial man, which we call a commonwealth; so also they have made artificial chains, called *civil laws*, which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips of that man, or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power; and at the other end to their own ears. These bonds, in their own nature but weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.[16]

Why the reference to "mutual covenants"? It would appear that they, as well as the fear of the sovereign power, must be thought to add something to the binding power of the artificial chains. (Hobbes's words in the last sentence, "these bonds in their own nature weak," must be taken, despite the syntax, to refer to covenants rather than to laws; for the laws, as such, apart from covenant and "danger," would be completely powerless.) Moreover, Hobbes persistently thinks of the covenant as having force (binding quality) of its own. In the succeeding paragraph he declared that the sovereign can never do injustice to the subject "because every subject [by the compact] is author of every act the sovereign doth."[17] Also, two pages later, Hobbes speaks of "what liberty we deny ourselves" by acknowledging the acts of the sovereign as our own. But how can we, in Hobbes's terms, deny ourselves liberty, either

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nition. Deliberation, he says, is so called (apparently assuming a false etymology) "because it is putting an end to the *liberty* we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own appetite or aversion." *Ibid.*, 37. Here he appears to have forgotten about "external impediments."

[11] *Ibid.*, 138.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *Ibid.*, 141.

[14] *Ibid.*, 139. This is consistent with his reasoning that liberty is freedom from chains and that the commands of the sovereign (civil laws) are "artificial chains" and, as such, limit the liberty of the subject just as actual chains limit the liberty of the natural man.

[15] *Lev.*, 91–92.

[16] *Ibid.*, 138.

[17] *Ibid.*, 139.

natural or artificial? The answer appears in the next sentence, which reads ". . . . in the act of our *submission*, consisteth both our *obligation*, and our *liberty;* which must, therefore, be inferred by arguments taken from thence; there being no obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some act of his own; for all men equally, are by nature free."[18] In the following sentence, too, "liberty" and "obligation" are placed in opposition to each other. It seems clear from these examples that Hobbes, without explicitly saying so, has introduced a new and significant item into his definition of liberty. The liberty of a subject is now, partly by implication, defined as that area in which a man is not prevented from doing what he has the will, wit, and ability to do, by external impediments, by civil laws, or by *obligations.*

Other passages confirm this interpretation. A page later, when he is considering the obligation of a subject to perform "any dangerous or dishonorable office," Hobbes concludes that, if refusal frustrates the end for which sovereignty is ordained, "then there is no liberty to refuse; otherwise there is."[19] Clearly the difference between the two situations is neither one of external impediment nor of civil law; it is a matter of obligation—an obligation arising in this case from the covenant. This argument reinforces the suggestion that perhaps, in Hobbes's original discussion of civil laws as limiting liberty, the reference to "mutual covenants" was not without significance.[20]

To recapitulate: Hobbes's principle now appears to be that the only limits on man's freedom, besides physical ones, are obligations.[21] Civil laws limit freedom because they are authorized by the subject himself, because he has covenanted to obey them (rather than because of the danger to the lawbreaker). Moreover, all obligations, whether or not enacted as civil law, limit freedom. This theory of Hobbes's meaning not only seems to accord with what he says, but also has the virtue of greater simplicity. He now has one concept of liberty that applies under all conditions: *liberty comprises the area in which a person is not prevented by* OBLIGATIONS *or external impediments from doing whatever he has the will, wit, and ability to do.*[22]

One might add that since, according to Hobbes, all obligations are self-imposed, this element of the definition is not so much an addition to the notion of "external impediments" as an elaboration of what is implied by the term "will" in the definition. One cannot be assumed to will something contrary to what he has bound himself to by an act of will. Although such a "real will" theory would do violence to Hobbes's definition of the will as merely "the last appetite in deliberating," it comes perilously close to being implied by the statement that "every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth,"[23] and it may well explain his enlargement of his original definition of liberty.[24]

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[18] *Ibid.*, 141; and see *ibid.*, 84.

[19] *Ibid.*, 142.

[20] Above, p. 430. It may be argued that, for Hobbes, all obligations are laws, either civil laws or laws of God, and that therefore the liberty of the subject is simply absence of law or, better, what is not prohibited by law. I agree that Hobbes assimilates civil laws and other obligations, as they affect liberty. The point is, however, that he does so, in the present context, by referring to their common origin in consent.

[21] Since Hobbes is discussing whether there is an obligation to obey the law, he clearly does not refer to legal obligations. Whether what he refers to corresponds to the usual understanding of "moral obligations" is open to question and need not be decided here. Warrender would answer the question affirmatively, with qualifications (*op. cit.*, p. 10). Oakeshott believes he finds in Hobbes, besides "physical obligation," "rational obligation," "moral obligation," and "political obligation." *Lev.*, lix–lxi.

[22] Whether Hobbes's failure to mention obligations along with "external impediments" as limitations on liberty in his discussion of liberty in the state of nature signifies that he believed there were no obligations in that state, or only that obligations in such a situation were so few and weak that they could be disregarded for all practical purposes is a question that need not concern us here. The first explanation accords with the conventional interpretation of Hobbes; the second with the view set forth by Warrender, *op. cit.* Hobbes's statement, cited above, that men are subject to no obligations except those that arise from their own acts tends to support the conventional interpretation. *Lev.* 141.

[23] *Ibid.*, 139.

[24] It will be noticed that the discussion above is based entirely upon the *Leviathan.* Hobbes scarcely mentions the subject of liberty in *De Cive* (except to use it as the title of the section dealing with the state of nature and natural rights) and does so only briefly in *The Elements of Law.* What he does say in the latter work is consistent with the treatment in *Leviathan.* Liberty of the subject in a commonwealth is nothing more than equality of opportunity for preferments, "for in all other senses, liberty is the state of him that is not subject." *E.W.*, IV, 158.

II. LIBERTY AND THE RIGHT OF NATURE

Among Hobbes's applications of the concept of liberty perhaps the most significant relates to the *jus naturale* or Right of Nature. Contrary to the most common tradition, Hobbes insisted not only on sharply distinguishing the *jus naturale* from the *lex naturalis* but even on opposing them to each other. He translates the terms "*jus*" and "*lex*" as "right" and "law" and declares that the former "consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear" while the latter "determineth and bindeth to one of them: so that law, and right, differ as much as obligation and liberty."[25] Thus on one side we have "*jus*," "right," and "liberty," and, opposed to them, "*lex*," "law," and "obligation." The nearest Hobbes comes to trying to justify this usage is a passage in the *Dialogue of the Common Law* in which he defines *lex* as what the law commands or prohibits and *jus* as what the law permits, going on to say that "my right is a liberty left me by the law to do anything which the law forbids me not, and to leave undone anything which the law commands me not."[26] Here of course Hobbes is speaking of liberty within a regime of law. It is the underlying assumption of such a regime that what is not prohibited is permitted; that where there is no law there is no obligation, and rightful liberty prevails. But what of the state of nature? For the same reasoning to hold, Hobbes would have to identify the Right of Nature with the area of "no obligation," or "no law," civil *or natural.* If he did so, the Right of Nature would appear to be liberty without limit, a conclusion that would accord with his statement in *Leviathan* that all our obligations proceed from some act of our own. However, he does not extend his remarks about liberty and law to the state of nature in the *Dialogue;* and as will appear, it is doubtful whether he was prepared to defend the full implications of such an extension.

In Chapter 14 of *Leviathan,* however, Hobbes argues that the Right of Nature is "the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto."[27] In the parallel passage in *The Elements of Law,* he declares that "that which is not against reason, men call *right,* or *jus,* or *blameless liberty* of using our own natural power and ability."[28] True, if liberty means absence of moral (assuming that "obligation" includes moral obligation) as well as physical impediment, the phrase "blameless liberty" is redundant. Nevertheless, the most sensible interpretation appears to be to assume that this was a deliberate redundancy for the sake of making the meaning doubly clear. The significant point is that he identifies right, or *jus,* not (as sometimes has been thought) with power or with liberty without limit but with the *blameless* liberty of using power. Also, one of the major points of Chapter 14 of *Leviathan* is to prove that it is a law of nature that men be willing to "lay down," or "transfer" certain rights. If a right (liberty) is merely a power, an absence of chains (physical impediments), it is hard to see how this would be possible. Clearly it is not the power but the right (liberty) to exercise the power that can be renounced or transferred, and this by accepting an obligation, an obligation to restrain the exercise of power.[29]

It appears, then, that Hobbes admits, at least tacitly, the need to justify man's use of his liberty. The question then arises why, in the state of nature, man is free (under no contrary obligation) "to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature."[30] Hobbes's reply, stated more clearly in *The Elements of Law* and in *De Cive* than in *Leviathan,* is (1) that men of necessity seek their own good and seek to avoid all evil, of which death is the greatest, and (2) that, therefore, it cannot be against right reason (and "which is not contrary to right reason, that all men account to be done justly"), for a man to use all his powers to defend himself.[31] While in the state of nature, right or liberty is *almost* without limit, since the nature of man is such that in the absence of a sovereign power almost anything might not unreasonably be judged necessary to protecting one's life and limbs; yet it is not *quite* so (at least according to the *De Cive* argument). A man must be his own judge of what is necessary for his preservation, and from his judgment in the state of nature there can be no appeal, but "if any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his own preservation, which yet he doth not confidently believe so, he may offend against the laws of nature."[32] This proviso, which is not repeated in *Leviathan,* appears to qualify the statement that "every man has a right to every thing" (*Lev.*, 85) by the addition of the clause "insofar as he honestly judges it necessary for his preservation."

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[25] *Lev.,* 84.

[26] *E.W.,* VI, 30. Although it is true that the distinction between *jus* and *lex* was generally disregarded or minimized, and Hobbes declares that Coke uses the terms interchangeably, it is interesting to note that Suarez, in one of the most careful of seventeenth century treatments of the subject, discusses two meanings of *jus,* one synonymous with *lex* and the other opposed to it. The latter, he declares, is "a certain moral power which every man has, either over his own property or with respect to that which is due him." Moreover, it is 'natural' when it is granted by or originates in nature." "A Treatise on Laws and God the Lawgiver," in James Brown Scott (ed.), *Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suarez, S.J.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), Vol. 2, pp. 30–31.

[27] *Lev.,* 84. This argument is paralleled in *De Cive, E.W.,* II, 8–10 and in *The Elements of Law, E.W.,* IV, 83.

[28] *E.W.,* IV, 83.

[29] Note also the sentence in *De Cive* reading "For although any man might say of every thing, *this is mine,* yet could he not enjoy it, by reason of his neighbor, who having equal right, *and* equal power (italics added), would pretend the same thing to be his." *E.W.,* II, 11. Here Hobbes clearly does not consider "right" and "power" to be the same thing. Finally, one may refer again to the passage in which Hobbes upholds the obligation to pay ransom in a state of nature, although clearly the erstwhile captive has the power to disregard his promise. *Lev.,* 91.

Yet how much does the proviso mean? Why would a man take anything if he did not judge it necessary for his preservation? Presumably because he judged it in some other way profitable to him. But Hobbes has also said that "in the state of nature profit is the measure of right."[33] And this significant expansion of the claim of liberty beyond what is necessary for self-preservation is implicit in Hobbes's theory and is often made explicit but not elaborated. It is implicit because of his doctrine that man *necessarily* chooses that which appears to him the less evil.[34] It is made explicit when Hobbes refers from time to time to other goods than life itself, to comforts, commodious living, and the "means to live well."[35] But this line of reasoning proves too much—more than Hobbes wishes to prove (which is doubtless why his emphasis is always on the preservation of life and limb rather than on commodious living and other aids to felicity). For what he has said is (1) that whatever a man does, he does of necessity; and (2) that it cannot be wrong to do what he cannot help but do, so it must be right.[36] From these propositions it would follow that whatever a man does is right; and this would hold for civil society as well as for the state of nature.[37]

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[30] *Lev.*, 84.

[31] *E.W.*, II, 8-9; and see *E.W.*, IV, 83.

[32] *E.W.*, II, 10.

[33] *E.W.*, II, 11.

[34] *E.W.*, II, 75; also 26.

[35] See *Lev.*, 64; also 81 and 84.

[36] It is true that Hobbes appears to be trying to identify what is right with what is reasonable. How he obtains radical conclusions from this traditional position appears, however, when we inquire why it is always reasonable and right to seek what is good for oneself. Hobbes's answer is that one does so necessarily ("by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward"), and that it cannot be unreasonable for one to do what he cannot help but do, and that therefore it must be right. *E.W.*, II, 8-9.

[37] Of course this was not Hobbes's meaning; but it is my contention that it is the logical conclusion of his line of argument. His intention, on the other hand, was clearly to deduce and lay down certain standards of right conduct. Whether these standards, these "laws of nature," were more than prudential rules, more than theorems about what man's interest is and about how he would behave if he reasoned accurately, is not my present concern. It is clear, however, that whatever their nature, Hobbes believed they applied, in certain instances, in the state of nature. Under certain circumstances, this was true, for example, of the third law of nature, "that men perform their covenants." Thus, a covenant to pay ransom, though made in the state of nature, would be binding. *Lev.*, 91. The same is true of the social compact itself.

The case for believing that Hobbes's laws of nature and other obligations had more than a prudential foundation has been argued persuasively by A. E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," *Philosophy*, Vol. 13 (1938), pp. 406–424; by Sterling Lamprecht in his Introduction to Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive or The Citizen* (New York, 1949), xv–xxx); and most fully by Howard Warrender, *op cit.* Recently the Taylor thesis has been subjected to powerful attack by Stuart M. Brown, Jr., "Hobbes: the Taylor Thesis," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 68 (July, 1959), pp. 303–323. See also Thomas Nagel, "Hobbes's Concept of Obligation," *loc. cit.* (Jan., 1959), pp. 68–83. Without choosing sides in this controversy, it is enough for present purposes to note two or three points. First, the whole concept of transferring rights, upon which Hobbes based the contract, would be impossible unless this may be done by accepting obligations, which in turn cannot be done in a state of nature unless, in that state, there is an obligation to keep one's promises. That is to say, if we accept the "prudential" theory of the laws of nature, then the contract drops out as a logi-

In other words, if, on the one hand, natural liberty is to be equated with power (an interpretation of Hobbes to which I do not subscribe), then, as has been pointed out by many writers from Rousseau's time to the present, there is no basis for any moral obligation, or for obligation in any sense other than that of necessity. And this proposition holds as well for civil society as for the state of nature. But if, alternatively, there are obligations (even of the prudential variety) in the state of nature, then natural liberty is not without limit: it is not the right to everything, as Hobbes declares it to be.

Moreover, if Hobbes is mistaken in concluding that natural liberty is unlimited, something must be wrong with at least one of the two propositions just stated above, by which he seeks to substantiate that conclusion: namely, (1) that all human actions are necessitated, and (2) that what is necessitated cannot be wrong, and therefore, must be right. The error, for present purposes, is in the second of these propositions. Whether or not we accept determinism, we distinguish in moral discourse (as Hobbes himself does) between voluntary and involuntary actions, and we hold men morally responsible for the former (or rather for that class of voluntary actions we call "free") *whether or not they are necessitated.* Thus, we deny the second proposition above; and Hobbes himself does so, by implication, whenever he refers to any human action as wrong, and explicitly, in his controversy with Bishop Bramhall.[38] Herein lies one of his basic inconsistencies. At one moment he relies on determinism to excuse any action; but at other times he is unwilling to excuse all actions, as is implied indeed by the enumeration and elaboration of "immutable and eternal" natural laws.[39]

Hobbes could have avoided this serious inconsistency in either of two ways. He might have held that what is necessitated may still be wrong if it is voluntary ("free" in Hobbes's sense). This line of argument would have been completely unsatisfactory to him, however, because it would have undercut his justification for acts of self-preservation. He could also have argued that acts which are necessitated may be wrong if they are free in a more commonly accepted sense of that term—for instance, acts taken from a desired or neutral motive. According to such a definition, acts motivated by fear of violent death would not be free and might be justified on that ground. This escape from his dilemma was denied to Hobbes by his definition of liberty.

III. LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY BY ACQUISITION

We noticed earlier that Hobbes departed from most usual notions of freedom by making it compatible with fear. He stuck rigidly to the idea that voluntary actions are free, refusing to recognize that the nature of the immediate cause of the volition was relevant. One of his most significant applications of this idea appears in his discussion of sovereignty "by acquisition." There he uses it to support the proposition that a subject who agrees, explicitly, to obey a conqueror as the price of his life has made a binding contract. After all, he was "free" to go on resisting![40] But surely he is here

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cally significant element in Hobbes's theory—a point that has often been made. Moreover, whether or not Hobbes meant more than the prudential argument, he clearly seeks to give the *impression* that he meant and proved more—*e.g.*, that the contract played a very important role in his theory. Accordingly, we are justified in taking seriously parts of his argument that seem to go beyond the prudential.

Stuart Brown, Jr. (*loc. cit.*, 313) contends that it is absurd to argue that grounding obligation on covenants implies a prior principle regarding the validity of covenants, because the very notion of covenants *implies* obligation to perform. But surely it must imply an obligation independent of, and prior to the covenants; hence this leaves unanswered the question of how it is possible to have covenants in a situation (state of nature) in which no obligations exist. Later he declares "Hobbes never doubts the general validity of covenants and thus never requires any guarantee of their obligatory character." *Loc. cit.*, 319, note 41. The fact that Hobbes *assumes* the validity of covenants and their obligatory character appears, however, to support rather than to negate the proposition that he believes his third law of nature is applicable in a state of nature.

[38] *E.W.*, IV, 252–254.

[39] *Lev.*, 104. Warrender, confining his analysis mainly to contractual obligations, argues that such obligations normally do not hold in the state of nature because of the absence of the "validating condition" of security. Yet much of the force of his main argument derives from instances such as the promise to pay ransom after being freed, where Hobbes does hold that there is obligation in the state of nature. See *Lev.*, 91 and Warrender, *op. cit.*, ch. 5.

[40] The argument stressed at this point (*Lev.*, 130) is that the vanquished subject is just as free as those who institute sovereignty by compact among themselves, for they too are motivated by fear—in that case, fear of each other. But if this is so, then the argument set forth below against

using his unusual definition of liberty to achieve a result that would not be generally acceptable. Normally we would not acknowledge as morally binding (quite apart from law) a promise constrained at sword's point. The action is to be sure voluntary, but it is not "free"; or, we would say, if freedom be defined in this perverse way, then not all "freely" made contracts are binding. Freely accepted obligations are binding only when "freely" means more than "voluntarily," when it refers to a certain class of voluntary actions only. We look at the circumstances attending the choice, the act of deliberation or will. If the motive, or (to use Hobbes's terms) the last appetite or aversion, is fear, we do not call the act free. If you influence my action by a threat (*i.e.*, by fear of you), it would generally be said that I am not free with respect to the behavior in question; while if you achieve your purpose by appeal to hope I am considered to be free. At least, I believe, this is true when it is a question of fear of death. Whether or not milder threats are generally thought to be compatible with liberty is perhaps debatable, and need not be decided for present purposes.[41] But Hobbes preferred the sharp line between voluntary and involuntary to the less clear distinction between actions motivated by fear and those not so motivated—often a matter of degree. Of course he may use any definition he likes. The point is that, by using the one he does, he tends to confuse the reader and to add a specious persuasiveness to his argument.

IV. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Finally, let us look at the social contract in the light of what Hobbes says of it in his discussion of commonwealths by acquisition. We must now think of the contracts which each makes with each other as though they were compelled by a conqueror on pain of death—coerced in the strongest sense of that word. If we do think of them that way, most of us would feel they were not morally binding and that they would control our action only as long as, and in proportion to, the apprehension of danger that prompted them. The common teaching of the history of conquests supports this view. Beyond this, such social contracts would be effective only to the extent that men had some faith in other men's tendency to abide by an agreement for its own sake, or that the conqueror afterward acted benignly. But if Hobbes had been willing to say that freedom and fear were not compatible and that freedom was a matter of degree, it would have followed that the social contract itself would be morally binding and practically effective just as far as it was not the result of fear and was freely made. It would be morally binding because freely made and it would be practically effective because men, having acted freely in making it, must be assumed to have some desire to keep it, apart from fear of the consequences.

Of course Hobbes did make the latter assumption. It appears in various places, but perhaps most clearly in that passage in *De Cive* in which he writes: "More clearly, therefore, I say thus: that a man is obliged by his contracts, that is, that he ought to perform for his promise's sake."[42] The trouble is that he is constantly obscuring this assumption, indeed contradicting it, by saying that covenants without a sword are but words, that in the state of nature profit is the measure of right, and, not least, by asserting that the contracts by which sovereignty is established are based upon fear alone. To the modern reader, he would have been much more persuasive if he had sought to show that the whole process of forming civil society is a matter, almost, of pulling oneself up by his bootstraps. Just a *little* feeling that an agreement ought to be kept and that others will have this same feeling and modify their behavior even a little bit in consequence, is enough to make possible the establishment of government with a modicum of authority. This first step itself increases the general security and so diminishes fear, thereby providing a necessary validating condition for moral obligation.[43]

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his sovereignty by acquisition is equally applicable to his sovereignty by institution.

[41] John Plamenatz has argued that the line is properly drawn as between motives toward which one has a positive or neutral reaction and those by which one dislikes to be moved. See his *Consent, Freedom, and Political Obligation* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), ch. 5. Courts of law regularly draw such distinctions in deciding, *e. g.*, when a contract may be disregarded, as made under duress, and when a will should be set aside as drawn under improper influence.

[42] *E.W.*, II, 185, note. Also the passage concerning a promise to pay ransom in a state of nature, *Lev.*, 91.

[43] Note how Hobbes adopts the curious position of admitting, indeed proclaiming, that fear of death *after the covenant* absolves one of any obligation not to resist the threatening person, yet fear of death before the covenant is an acceptable motive for the formation of a valid covenant. The contradiction is complete. Hobbes holds that a contract not to defend one's life is void because one could not make such a contract, "for man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of

With the ensuing greater obligation (and general recognition thereof) security is further increased, and so on in an ascending spiral.

But this account of the growing facts of political security and political obligation, mutually interacting and reinforcing, is a matter of degree, of more or less, and tends to be obscured by the black and white distinctions so dear to Hobbes. For him, an act is either voluntary or it is not, a man is either obliged or he is not, and he is either free or he is unfree. The whole contractual apparatus tends to be incompatible with a philosophy, more congenial to the modern mind, that makes both liberty and obligation matters of degree.

V. CONCLUSION

Hobbes's political philosophy contains too many confusions and inconsistencies to be covered by any single explanation. Probably the nearest approach to such a single explanation, however, runs in terms of his methodology, his addiction to all-or-nothing arguments, his unwillingness to qualify or to deal in matters of degree. Substantively, it has been my thesis here that an examination of Hobbes's concept of "liberty" and related notions at least throws some fresh light on the tangled web of his system. Moreover, perhaps the most persistent and pervasive of Hobbes's confusions grow out of his belief in determinism—not out of determinism itself, but out of the way in which he interpreted it and the conclusions he drew from it. Not only is this a matter closely related to the idea of liberty, but Hobbes's very definition of liberty, as consistent with fear, appears in his thought to have been a consequence of it. For if freedom was to be defined compatibly with determinism and at the same time as a "clear and distinct idea" (to borrow Descartes's phrase), he saw no other way to do it than to make it turn on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions. He would have done better to have been content with making it a somewhat less "clear and distinct" idea. The very trait that has given Hobbes his reputation for clarity, coherence, and logic has contributed mightily to his confusion and inconsistencies, and to the speciousness of his reasoning.

No belittlement of the importance of defining terms is intended. Hobbes's definition of liberty was a bad definition: it led him into inconsistency at certain points while at others it facilitated his misleading the reader. Why did he choose it? Partly, it would appear, because it seemed to lend itself to clarity of demonstration. Unfortunately, Hobbes sought a degree of clarity and finality incompatible with his subject matter. A definition of liberty in terms of motives would have seemed to Hobbes unsatisfactory. Motives are usually mixed; hence liberty becomes a matter of degree; and likewise rights. But Hobbes would not have it so. It may be, to be sure, that it was not commitment to differences of kind rather than of degree that governed Hobbes's choice of a definition of liberty. We have seen that he also had ground for preferring this definition because it eased his task of persuading his readers to accept dubious conclusions. It would appear, in any case, that there was either madness in his method or method in his madness, or both.

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death in resisting." *Lev.*, 91–92. At the same time he holds that a man who makes a covenant to save his life is bound, because he was "free" to do otherwise; although of course he could not help acting as he did! *Ibid.*

DEGREES OF POWER AND FREEDOM

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Basic concepts in political science have been used in a purely classificatory way ever since Aristotle established the sixfold classification of the forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy, constitutional government, and their respective "perversions": tyranny, oligarchy, democracy. Similarly, a modern writer distinguishes among four types of political systems: the Anglo-American, the Continental European, the pre-industrial (or partially industrial), and the totalitarian.[1] All these are categorical concepts; a political system is either monarchical or not, either of the Anglo-American or of another type. Such key terms as influence, control, authority, power, and freedom also tend to function categorically: one actor either has or lacks power over some activity of another actor; with respect to one actor, another is either free or unfree to act in a certain way.

However, concrete political situations exhibit such characteristics to different *degrees*. Just as the substances we encounter in nature have varying degrees of hardness (rather than being either hard or soft), so a given political system is more, or less, totalitarian (or of the Anglo-American or of the pre-industrial type) than another. The United States and Soviet Russia have at present more power than any other country, and both are perhaps about equally powerful. Soldiers in general have less freedom than civilians, but they have more than prisoners. There can (or there cannot) be equal freedom for all.

Since we do make such assertions, the question arises whether it is possible to give them precise empirical meaning. To do so, we must replace such categorical concepts as power and freedom by the corresponding comparative concepts, *e.g.*, "more power than," "as much freedom as," and provide operational definitions for these expressions.

Here we are faced with two difficulties. The word "hard" signifies a *property* of a substance, and the concept "harder than" pertains to a comparison between two simple objects, like diamond and steel. On the other hand, "power" and "freedom" stand for *relationships* of interaction among persons or groups.[2] Consequently, when we are using expressions such as "more power than" or "more freedom than," we are comparing two complex entities each of which involves at least two actors and their respective actions. One who asserts that Khrushchev wields greater power than Eisenhower may believe that he is simply comparing these two individuals. Actually, he is drawing a comparison between (1) the Soviet Premier, the Russian people, and some activity such as choosing an occupation, and (2) the President of the United States, Americans, and the same (or possibly a different) kind of action. Schematically, he is making an assertion of the type: Y_1 has more power over X_1 with respect to x_1 than Y_2 has over X_2 with respect to x_2. Similarly, "Soldiers have less freedom than civilians" might be construed as a shorthand expression for: With respect to their officers, soldiers have less freedom, *e.g.* of movement, than civilians have with respect to the government.[3]

The second difficulty concerns the operational testing of such comparative concepts. "Harder than" can be defined by reference to a single operation, the "scratch test": x is harder than y if x scratches y but not *vice versa.* On the other hand, the relative extent to which Y has power over X's doing x will have to be construed as a function of a number of independent variables, such as the probability that Y will punish X if X fails to do x, the severity of X's deprivation in this case, the number of alternatives to x which Y leaves open to X. Power in the comparative sense may therefore be said to have many components or dimensions, and the same applies to interpersonal freedom.

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[1] Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (1956), p. 392.

[2] *E.g.:* Y has power over X's doing x; with respect to Y, X is free to do x. Here I shall be concerned only with freedom in the interpersonal sense, which is closely connected with the key concept of power. Interpersonal freedom must be distinguished from freedom of choice, the feeling of freedom, free actions, and of course from the many normative meanings this word tends to assume.

[3] Some examples of other types of comparative statements in this area: Y_1 has more power over X's doing x than has Y_2. (*E.g.*, parents have greater power over their children's attending Sunday School than the Church, and children have greater freedom to stay away from Sunday School with respect to the latter than with respect to the former.) Y has greater power over X_1's doing x than over X_2's performing the same kind of action. With respect to Y, X is more free to do x_1 than to do x_2.

I shall first define the relative degree of power and of freedom with respect to these various components, dealing with each of these variables separately and in turn, while holding the others constant. As these several components vary independently, the question will arise whether it is nevertheless possible to draw them together, as it were, and to arrive at a comparative (if not quantitative) concept of the total power and of the total freedom of an actor within a group.[4]

I. COMPONENTS OF INTERPERSONAL POWER AND FREEDOM

Probability of Being Prevented or Penalized. If one person or group Y makes it either impossible or punishable for another person or group X to perform a certain kind of action x, Y has power over X's not doing x, and X is, with respect to Y, unfree to do x.[5] For example, the traffic police has power over drivers as to their obeying traffic rules, and the latter are officially unfree to violate them. Suppose that the law enforcement in this area is more effective in the United States than in France, where there are fewer patrol cars and where it is easier to argue one's way out of a fine. As judged by the probability that the penalty will be applied to violators, American authorities have more power over driving behavior than does the French police, and automobile drivers are less free to disregard traffic rules in the United States than in France. Another example: During the Fourth French Republic, the Assembly voted down a great proportion of the bills introduced by the succeeding cabinets, thereby making it impossible for the latter to carry out their programs. Under the new constitution it is much less likely that parliament will by means of adverse votes prevent the Executive from putting its policies into effect. As judged by the probability of a preventive action, the new Assembly has less power over governmental policies than its predecessor, and the government has at present greater freedom to make effective policy decisions than it used to have.

We may generalize as follows: The greater the probability that Y would prevent X from doing x (if X attempted to do x) or that Y would punish X for doing x (if X did x), the greater Y's power over X's not doing x, and the greater X's unfreedom to do x with respect to Y. From the point of view of the component of being prevented from acting in a certain way (or being forced to do so) or being otherwise punished, it is in principle possible to rank any two actors who stand in some power relation to each other according to the relative degree of power which they either have over others or which others have over them.[6] We may ask, for example: As judged by the probability of success, which of several pressure groups has the strongest power over Congress—or over some Congressman—with respect to the passage of a certain bill? Or, is the Polish Government, with respect to the Kremlin, as unfree to adopt certain policies as are the Hungarian leaders?

Again from the standpoint of the dimension which we are at present considering, the degree of X's freedom to do x is a function of the probability that there is no actor Y who makes it either impossible or punishable for X to do x. If the concepts of interpersonal freedom and unfreedom are used in a categorical way, we have a clear-cut dichotomy: Either it is, *e.g.*, punishable for X to do *x* and consequently X is unfree to do *x*, or doing *x* is not punishable and X is therefore free to do so.[7] There is unfreedom in the categorical sense whenever there is even the slightest chance of prevention or of punishment, and there is no freedom in the categorical sense unless it is practically certain that there will be neither. By using comparative concepts, interpersonal freedom and unfreedom become matters of degree; the smaller the probability of prevention or punishment, the less unfreedom and the more freedom. The two extremes on this continuum are (1) maximum unfreedom, *i.e.*, practical certainty of prevention or punishment and (2) maximum freedom, *i.e.*, practical certainty of their absence. Any situation which falls between these two extremes can be described in terms of either more or less unfreedom or of more or less freedom. Frenchmen are to a certain extent officially unfree to violate traffic regulations; yet, in comparison with circumstances in the United States, they are relatively free to disregard them; in other words, there is less unfreedom and more freedom in this area in France than in America. Similarly, the greater the chance that the French Parliament will endorse bills submitted by the cabinet (*i.e.*, that the one will not prevent the other from translating its program into action), the greater the other's freedom to govern effectively.

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[4] Some recent attempts to explicate the concept of degree of influence or power are: Herbert A. Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15 (1953), pp. 500–516; James G. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence," this REVIEW, Vol. 59 (1955), pp. 431–451 and "Measurement Concepts in the Theory of Influence," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 19 (1957), pp. 202–226; Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2 (1957), pp. 201–215. However, these authors do not consider all of the components which seem to me important. Furthermore, they are concerned only with the degree of influence or power, and I shall extend the analysis to the concepts of degree of interpersonal unfreedom and freedom.

[5] Influence (*e.g.*, persuasion, with or without threat of sanction) is another instance of power, but not of unfreedom. If Y dissuades X from doing x, Y has power over X's not doing x, but X remains, with respect to Y, free to do x. A complete definition of "Y has power over X's *doing* x" would be as follows: Y either influences X to do x or makes it necessary for him to do so or punishable to act otherwise. Concerning the relationships between influence and power (or control), *cf.* Felix E. Oppenheim, "An Analysis of Political Control: Actual and Potential," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 20 (1958), pp. 515–534.

[6] Dahl holds that this can be done only if the actors are "power comparable," *loc. cit.*, p. 208. However, we need not make this restriction, once we have made the other one, namely that we consider only the component of probability of being prevented or penalized.

A relationship of interpersonal freedom may hold between any two actors, whether they are power-related or not. Consequently, given *any* two pairs of actors X_1, X_2 and Y_1, and Y_2 and any two actions x_1 (of X_1) and x_2 (of X_2), it is possible in principle to determine whether or not X_1 is more free to do x_1 with respect to Y_1 than X_2 is free to do x_2 with respect to Y_2—as judged by the probability of absence of prevention or of punishment.

It is sometimes feasible to assign cardinal numbers to the degree of probability that Y will (or will not) prevent X from doing *x* or would (or would not) penalize him if he did. If so, we can measure the degree of Y's power, or X's freedom, from the point of view of this dimension.[8] For example: Suppose the available statistical evidence allows us to draw the conclusion that 70 per cent of all parking violations which actually occurred in a given city were detected and led to a fine. If we make the usual assumption that the relevant conditions will remain unchanged, we can predict that any driver who overparks will be fined with 70 per cent probability and conclude that, as judged by the probability of punishment, drivers in that city are officially unfree to a degree of 0.7 to overpark and that their freedom to do so is 0.3.

Degree of Deprivation. Suppose it is equally probable that drivers who overpark will be fined in city A and in city B, but that the penalty is three dollars in the one place and two dollars in the other. We are inclined to say that city A has more power over drivers than does city B, and that drivers are officially more unfree, or less free, to overpark in city A than in city B. Disregarding all other components, X's unfreedom to do *x* is the greater, and his freedom to do so the smaller, the more he would be deprived by the penalty attached to his doing *x*.

When we examine the effects of legal sanctions on large groups, we may sometimes assume—as I did in this example—that everyone would be deprived to the same degree by one and the same penalty and that all are therefore equally unfree to commit the punishable offense. But we must also take into account that, *e.g.*, a taxi driver would be more deprived by a three dollar parking fine than a millionaire, and a miser more than a spendthrift. The "majestic equality of the law" imposes (theoretically) the same penalty on whoever commits larceny and makes everyone unfree to steal—but not everyone to the same extent. The degree of deprivation to an actor depends, not on the penalty itself, but on the *negative utility of the penalty to him*.

The second factor of the degree of an actor's deprivation is the *positive utility of the punishable action to him.* A landlord in New York City may be fined $200.00 for making thousands out of defrauding his tenants. He derives great utility from this punishable action; his unfreedom to do so is relatively small and his freedom correspondingly great. The same fine for overparking is applicable to me in an emergency and under ordinary circumstances. Suppose I am on a trivial errand which will take twenty minutes and the only place I find to park is limited to fifteen minutes. I will be greatly annoyed by the risk—or, as we assume here, the certainty—of the fine, and the fact that the regulation is in force deprives me a great deal. While I could easily pay the fine, it seems hardly worth while to overpark. But the same punishable action of overparking may be very valuable to me in an emergency, and the penalty would deprive me very little. My unfreedom to overpark is greater in the first case than in the second. The greater an actor's desire to perform a punishable action, the penalty remaining constant, the greater his freedom (and the smaller his unfreedom) to do so.

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[7] Actually, interpersonal freedom is not the opposite of interpersonal unfreedom. With respect to Y, X is free to do *x* if and only if X is, with respect to Y, neither unfree to do *x* nor unfree to abstain from doing *x*. However, the second condition is often trivially fulfilled, and we may therefore disregard this clause in the present context.

[8] *Cf.* Dahl, *loc. cit.* p. 203. Herbert Goldhamer and Edward E. Shils claim that "the amount of power exercised by an individual may be measured . . . by the ratio of successful power acts to all his attempted power acts." "Types of Power and Status," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45 (1939), p. 176. By this test, someone who attempts little but is always successful would be more powerful than someone who achieves just as much but tries for more. Power is by definition successful; if Y makes an unsuccessful attempt at preventing X from doing *x* (or constraining him to do so), no power relation obtains between Y, X and the latter's action *x*. However, Y's unsuccessful endeavor may generate future power relations between himself and X.

To determine the degree of X's deprivation and hence of his unfreedom to perform a punishable action, we ask the two following questions: (1) How highly would X value the outcome of his doing *x* under the contrary-to-fact assumption that he would (certainly) not be punished if he did *x*? (2) How valuable (or disvaluable) would it be to X to do *x* if the outcome of doing so includes (certainly) suffering the penalty attached to performing this action? The deprivation to X is the greater, the greater the difference between the utility of these two hypothetical states of affairs; in other words, the greater the reduction in utility because of the penalty.[9] This formula covers all three of the following possibilities: (1) The utility of doing *x* is so great and the disutility of the penalty so small, that doing *x* remains valuable to X even if the outcome includes suffering the punishment. For example: I may be willing to pay the fine for overparking as the price for meeting the emergency, although I would of course attach a still greater utility to overparking without penalty. (2) X attaches positive utility to doing *x*, disregarding the sanction, but negative utility to doing *x* and suffering the penalty. For example: I would like to overpark even without an emergency, but I do not want to be fined. (3) X is indifferent to doing *x* or disvalues doing so, even without a penalty; if so, he disvalues doing *x* and being punished for it even more. In the first of these three cases, X is likely to perform the punishable action; in the second and third, he is likely to refrain from doing so. If X abstains from doing *x* because the sanction is sufficiently severe to deter him from doing what he greatly desires to do, he is to a high degree unfree to do it. His unfreedom is comparatively small if he disvalues doing *x* and would not even want to do so were he free to. One is only slightly unfree to do what one does not care to do. However, the degree of X's freedom or unfreedom is not affected by whether or not he actually does *x*. Therefore the utility or disutility to X of complying (*i.e.*, not doing *x* and avoiding punishment) has no bearing on the degree of his deprivation and unfreedom.

If Y makes X unfree to do *x* by preventing him from doing so, the degree of X's deprivation—and hence the degree of his unfreedom to do *x*—is a function of the utility of doing *x* (assuming, contrary to fact, that he can do so) and of the disutility of being prevented by Y from doing so. Thus, the greater the utility to the actor of the blocked alternative, the greater the deprivation. For example, if a minority in a society strongly desires to do *x* and the majority (perhaps weakly) prefers some alternative policy, the majority which prevents the minority from implementing *x* (*e.g.*, by defeating a bill to that effect which the minority had sponsored) imposes a comparatively heavy deprivation on the minority and limits its freedom to do *x* to a greater degree than if this were a matter less vital to the minority. If the actor is indifferent to doing what he has been made unable to do, or if he would not want to do it even if he could, the deprivation is comparatively small. Yet, even in this case, X suffers some deprivation, since it is normally disvaluable to anyone to be "deprived" of any option. The fact that Y encloses his property by a high wall, making it impossible for X to enter, deprives X and limits his freedom to enter to some degree, however small, even if he has no desire to trespass.

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[9] However, the following two problems in utility theory are still controversial: (1) Is it possible to attach a rigorous meaning to interpersonal comparisons of utility (*e.g.*, to the assertion that a miser is more deprived by a parking rule than a spendthrift)? *Cf.* Lionel Robbins, *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science*, 2d ed. (London, 1940), ch. 6; I. M. D. Little, *A Critique of Welfare Economics*, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1957), ch. 4. (2) Is it possible to attach numerical values to utilities, and to add or subtract them? *Cf.* J. R. Hicks, *Value and Capital* (Oxford, 1939), ch. 1; J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, 3d ed. (Princeton, 1953), ch. 1, pt. 3; D. H. Robertson, "Utility and All What?," *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 64 (1954), pp. 665–678.

Would X's unfreedom to enter Y's property be greater or smaller if Y erected a "No trespassing" sign instead of a wall, and if the fine for trespassing were ten dollars? Or one hundred dollars? There is no general way of determining which kind of punishment (*e.g.*, which amount of fine) for doing x represents a disutility equal to that of being prevented from doing so. Someone may find it less irksome to pay a fine of ten dollars for parking in a restricted area than to be made unable to do so by having his car towed away, but he may disvalue still more leaving his car and paying a twenty dollar fine.

To summarize: The intensity of X's deprivation due to the fact that Y prevents him from doing x or makes it punishable for him to do so is another component of the degree of Y's power over X's not doing x and of X's unfreedom to do x with respect to Y. And while X is completely free to do x only if nobody makes the act impossible or punishable, it may be said that X is free in this respect to a certain degree even in case of prevention or punishability, if the corresponding deprivation is a relatively slight one.

Scope. It agrees with our intuition that sergeants have more power over privates than do traffic policemen over drivers, even if we assume that there are no differences in the probability of punishment in case of non-compliance nor in the degree of deprivation. The reason is that a sergeant, and the army as a whole, has power over a soldier with respect to a great number of his activities, when compared with the range of behavior of drivers over which the police has control. The scope of the army's power is wider than that of the traffic police. Similarly, the number of actions which soldiers are unfree to perform is greater than that of civilians; for this reason alone we are inclined to consider the latter to have more freedom than the former. In general, Y's power over X increases with the number of X's activities over which Y has power, and X's freedom with respect to Y depends among other things on the quantity of actions which Y leaves X free to do.

Such considerations have led to the distinction between monomorphic and polymorphic influentials; the former are said to be influential "only in one rather narrowly defined area—*e.g.*, the area of politics *or* of canons of good taste *or* of fashion," while the latter exert "interpersonal influence in a variety of (sometimes seemingly unrelated) spheres."[10] Consequently, if all other components remain the same, polymorphic influentials have more influence and power than monomorphic influentials. The same idea has been applied to freedom: "... the amount of freedom that an individual possesses is measured by the number of things he can do without interference from others."[11]

But is it possible to determine "the number of things" which an actor is free to do or the quantity of actions over which another actor has power? In most cases it is simply not feasible to count actions, let alone potential actions or kinds of actions. Citizens being officially unfree to commit larceny, what is the number of actions—or the number of types of actions—which they are unfree to perform? Is larceny to be counted as one kind of action, or should we distinguish between grand and petit larceny? All possible answers would be equally arbitrary. Furthermore, actions often differ so much in significance that it would go against our intuition to count each as one. We would surely not say that Congress exercises more power over the President by overriding his veto on several occasions than by impeaching him—once. A statement to the effect that Y has power over a greater number of X_1's actions than over X_2's is irrelevant unless the several actions of X_1 and X_2 are "power comparable."[12]

When several actions constitute a set of *alternatives* open to an actor in a given situation, they are sufficiently similar to fulfill this criterion of power comparability. Within a given total scope of alternatives, X is the more unfree with respect to Y, the larger the partial scope of alternative actions which Y makes X unfree to perform. For example, if my passport is not valid for travel in Hungary and Communist China, I am officially not as free to travel (anywhere) as I would be without these restrictions, but I have greater freedom to travel than do Hungarians and Chinese with respect to their own governments. In Belgium, where voting is compulsory, there is less electoral freedom than in most other democratic countries where voters are free to abstain. Who has greater freedom in this respect, a French voter or an American? Frenchmen can choose among many more parties, and consequently have greater freedom of *choice;* but is the extent of their *interpersonal* freedom greater? The total scope of alternatives consists of voting for any party or candidate on the ballot or abstaining. *With respect to this scope,* both American and French voters have equal, namely total, freedom. If Y delegates power to X, then X, while dependent on Y, is free to act within the scope of his delegated authority, but unfree to act outside this range; the larger the former range as compared with the latter, the greater the extent of X's freedom with respect to Y. "Freedom is proportional to wealth": the greater someone's wealth, the greater the partial scope of alternative actions which are left open to him by others, in relation to the range of actions which are being closed to him.

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[10] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, rev. ed. (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), p. 414.

[11] Gerard DeGré, "Freedom and Social Structure," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 11 (1946), p. 529; *cf.* also Lon L. Fuller, "Freedom—A Suggested Analysis," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 68 (1955), p. 1317: "... the widest range of possible choice—that is freedom."

[12] *Cf. supra*, note 6.

Domain. Who is more powerful, the Governor of New York or the Governor of Rhode Island? As judged by the scope of the citizen's activities over which they have power, or the probability of prevention or punishment, or the degree of deprivation, one has perhaps about as much power as the other. If we nevertheless consider the Governor of New York more powerful than the Governor of Rhode Island, it is because the power of the former extends over a greater number of citizens, or commands greater financial and administrative resources, than does the power of the latter. The extent of Y's power over a certain kind of activity x is thus a function of the domain of his power,[13] *i.e.*, the number of actors X over whom he has power with respect to x. So also Y's power within a group increases with the size of the subgroup over which he has power. The influence of a newspaper over the Republican vote can be measured by the number of readers whom it persuades to vote Republican. Newspapers may be ranked according to the degree of their influence on voting behavior by the proportion of voters out of the total electorate whose vote they influence. Power relationships can be compared from the point of view of this component only if the respondents are power comparable. Someone who can influence millions of newspaper readers to support or oppose United States recognition of Communist China would nevertheless be considered less powerful than someone who can convince the Secretary of State that one or the other policy should be adopted.[14]

Similarly, the more actors having power over a given respondent, the greater the power which is being exercised over him. Accordingly, the degree to which X is unfree to do x is a function of the number of actors Y who limit his freedom in this regard; and X's freedom to do x within a group depends on the proportion of actors Y out of the whole group with respect to whom X is free to do x. Someone who is left free to express his views by his government, his church, his trade union, his employers, his neighborhood, has more freedom of speech than if his liberty of expression were restricted by one or by several of these groups. My freedom to travel depends not only on the countries to which my own government permits me to go, but also on the number of foreign governments who leave me free to enter their territory. There are other situations however, in which this component of power and freedom is of no significance. The freedom of Americans is being limited by local, state, and federal authorities; but we do not for this reason consider Americans to have less freedom than citizens in a unitary state.

If we consider only the number of actors linked by power relations and disregard all other components, we may make certain generalizations in regard to the extent of an actor's power or freedom within a strictly hierarchical group like an army or a totalitarian dictatorship without rival power centers. The higher an actor's position within such a power pyramid: (1) the greater the domain of his power, and therefore the greater his power within the group; (2) the smaller the number of actors who have power over him, and hence the smaller the degree of his unfreedom with respect to the group as a whole; (3) the greater the number of actors with respect to whom he is free, and consequently the greater his freedom within the group. The actor who occupies the top position of the pyramid has both the maximum degree of power and the maximum degree of freedom: he has power over all other members of the group and is free with respect to all of them. Actors who occupy the bottom row have no power (over anyone) and are under the power, directly of their immediate superiors, and indirectly of the top leader. With respect to each other, however, all who occupy the same level are free in every respect, at least in theory. Even an actor who is powerless has a certain amount of freedom within the total group, since he is free with respect to all the other powerless group members. If the pyramid has a broad base, the number of actors with respect to whom a given actor at the bottom is free (his equals) will be greater than the number of actors who limit his freedom (his supeiors); hence his freedom within the total group may be, from this point of view, relatively great.

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[13] This term is used by H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society,* (New Haven, 1950), p. 73.

[14] *Cf.* Dahl, *loc. cit.* p. 207.

But are we then not driven to the paradoxical conclusion that, *e.g.*, the freedom of Soviet citizens is much greater than their unfreedom, since the number of those who make up the Soviet bureaucracy is small in comparison to the Soviet population at large? This would be true if the number of actors involved were the only component of the extent of someone's freedom. If we regard the Russian people as essentially unfree, this indicates that they have comparatively little freedom as judged by other more important components. This brings us back to the problem of combining the various dimensions of the extent of power and of freedom into one overall criterion.

II. POWER AND FREEDOM AS COMPARATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ACTOR

An Actor's Total Power or Freedom. Suppose one car rates highest as to road performance, another as to economy of oil consumption, a third as to styling, etc. A great deal of arbitrariness would be involved in any attempt to combine these various components into one compound characteristic, overall quality. Besides, much information would be lost by such a replacement; for it would not be possible to infer the relative positions of the cars in each of the separate dimensions from their relative positions in the combined scale of overall quality. But one does, after all, have to choose a car, and must therefore somehow determine which one has the highest overall quality.

The problem here is of the same type. While the different components of power and freedom vary independently, it is nevertheless possible under certain conditions to draw them together and to speak of an actor's total power or total freedom within a group. Power becomes then a comparative characteristic of an actor Y, and it is no longer necessary to make explicit reference to another actor X and his action x, because X and x are now given by the fixed class of all actors and all their actions over which Y has power. Instead of speaking of Y's power over X's doing x, we can make assertions of the following kind: Y_1 has more total power than Y_2 (or simply: Y_1 is more powerful than Y_2); Y's total power is relatively great (or simply: Y is very powerful). Similarly, we may now dispense with the relationship: "with respect to Y, X is unfree—or free—to do x" and use "unfree" and "free" (in the sense of total unfreedom and total freedom) as an overall comparative characteristic of an actor X. Let us now point out some situations in which it may reasonably be said that one actor has more total power or more total freedom than another.

(1) An actor has more total power or freedom as judged by each component. For example, we do not hesitate to assert that Hitler was more powerful than Adenauer. Both the domain and the scope of Hitler's power was greater—over a larger population and over a wider range of activities. Furthermore, since a dictator's commands and sanctions are, at least in certain areas, more effectively enforced, the probability of punishment in case of unlawful behavior was on the whole higher under the Nazi regime than it has been since. Finally, Hitler's rule inflicted greater deprivations on a segment of the German population than the present regime has on most Germans, since certain activities which at least some valued very highly were more severely punished. It is equally certain that Hitler had more total freedom than Adenauer. The dictator was to a great extent free to act as he pleased with respect to his cabinet, the party, the army, and the (much larger) population; under the present constitutional regime, the Chancellor's freedom is limited by the other branches of the government and by the electorate. Consequently, both the domain and the scope of Hitler's freedom was greater. And since there was, at least during a certain period of time, nobody who limited Hitler's freedom in any significant way, the components of probability of punishment and of deprivation do not even apply.

(2) One actor is more powerful or more free as judged by one component, and both actors are equally powerful and equally free as judged by all other components. For example: The domain of power of the Governor of New York is greater than that of the Governor of Rhode Island, while both are about equally powerful in regard to all other components; we conclude that the former wields greater total power than the latter. Roughly the same kinds of action are prohibited by traffic regulations in the United States and in France, and the fines are similar, but the probability that offenders will be fined is higher in the United States; this is a sufficient reason to consider drivers in America to be on the whole less free to violate traffic regulations than they are in France, and we need not add the clause: as judged by the probability of being punished.

(3) An actor is more powerful or more free as judged by the most significant component—even if he should have less power or freedom than the other as judged by some different, but less relevant, dimension. However, there are no

general operational criteria by which to judge the comparative significance of the various components of power and of freedom. Their relative weight depends in every case on the topic of research. Furthermore, the concept of importance or significance has a strong valuational ingredient, and it is therefore hardly possible to give it an unambiguous intersubjective meaning. At this point, the concept of an actor's total power or freedom necessarily involves an element of arbitrariness.[15]

There are nevertheless situations in which one component would clearly be considered by everyone as more significant than any other. For example: Who is more powerful, the Governor of New York or the Prime Minister of Austria? As judged by the domain of power, the former; as judged by the scope of power, the latter.[16] In this context, the scope is obviously so much more significant than the domain, that we disregard the difference in size between the population of New York State and of Austria, and conclude that the Premier wields greater total power than the governor. So, Soviet citizens have comparatively little freedom because they are officially unfree with respect to a large scope of activities; that their freedom is being limited by a relatively small proportion of individuals out of the total population of Soviet Russia matters little in this connection.

If we consider only the number of actors involved, then (as mentioned before), the higher an actor's position in a strictly hierarchical group, the greater both his power and his freedom. But if other components are more significant, this generalization no longer holds. A high Communist Party official in the Soviet Union is very powerful, as judged by each of the dimensions which we have examined. He himself is under no one's power except the few leaders at the top; but these "lay down the line" very strictly and would with practical certainty punish him severely if he deviated even slightly from the narrowly defined party line. That the top leaders have a great deal of power over the party official does not diminish his own power over his subordinates, but it makes him very unfree with respect to his superiors. His unfreedom with respect to the few at the top is far more significant than his freedom with respect to the many at the bottom; we consider him therefore as endowed with *much total power* but with *little total freedom.*Conversely a United States Senator has less total power than a high Soviet official, but more total freedom. It is true that the Senator's freedom is limited by a greater number of actors, *e.g.*, by other Senators, by his party, by certain pressure groups, by his constituents. However, this factor is of little importance in comparison to the other components; as judged by these, his total freedom is comparatively great.[17]

Net Amount of Total Power. It will be possible in certain cases to speak not only of an actor's total power within a group, but even of the net amount of his total power (but not of his freedom, as we shall see).

Let us first take the case of indirect power, where Z has power over X via Y. If Z can order Y to order X to do x, Y's power over X depends on Z's power over Y. For example, the power of a Louisiana registrar to bar Negroes in his parish from voting depends on the power of the Federal District judge to enjoin him from denying the equal protection of the laws. Here the net amount of Y's total power is a function of his own power over X and the power of Z over him.

The concept of an actor's net amount of total power may also be applied to situations in which the domain is the significant variable.

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[15] Even if "significance" could be defined operationally, we would still be confronted with problems of the following kind: Suppose that Y_1 is *just a little* more powerful than Y_2 in the *most significant* component, but *a great deal* less powerful in *all other* components, would we nevertheless consider Y_1 to have more total power than Y_2?

[16] Indeed, the power of the Governor extends only to part of that range of the citizen's activities over which the Federal Government has no jurisdiction. As judged by the probability of sanctions and by the degree of deprivation, there is no significant difference between the power of the two officials.

[17] In cases in which probability of prevention or punishment and degree of deprivation are the significant components, it might be possible to combine these two variables into a single one which describes the degree of an actor's total power or freedom in different circumstances. Indeed, economists, following Von Neumann and Morgenstern, have shown that for persons whose psychological make-up can be described by a standard set of axioms, utility and probability numbers can be combined into a single figure which predicts their preferences correctly. If deprivation itself could be assigned a utility number, this device might be useful in reducing the two variables of probability and deprivation down to one. However, the relevance of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility axioms to the political concepts and problems under discussion remains to be explored.

It is true that the number of actors X over whom a given actor Y has power is not diminished by the number of actors Z who wield power over Y. For example, the domain of lieutenant Y's control (namely the size of his platoon X) does not depend on the number of his own superiors. But the net amount of Y's power within a given group is a function of both these variables. For example, the net amount of the domain of lieutenant Y's power within the army depends on the number of men under his command and the number of officers who outrank Y.[18]

This does not mean, of course, that we may simply count, *e.g.*, the number of actors over whom Y has power and subtract the number of actors who have power over Y. We can, however, draw rough comparisons such as the following: The net amount of power of the Governor of New York is smaller than that of the Prime Minister of Austria, because the former's own power is limited, not only by the other branches of his own government and by the electorate, but also by the federal government, while the latter is the head of a sovereign state. While a high Soviet official is very powerful, the net amount of his power is relatively small, because the top leaders have power over a very large scope of his activities.

But there can be no corresponding concept of the net amount of an actor's freedom within a group. As judged by the scope and domain, an actor's freedom depends exclusively on the range of activities which he is being left free to pursue and on the number of actors with respect to whom he is free to do so. It does not matter whether the actor in turn limits the freedom of others (who become unfree with respect to him) or leaves them free to act as they please (so that he and they are mutually independent). The high Soviet official is essentially unfree, because his superiors severely limit the scope of his freedom. That he in turn greatly restricts the freedom of his many subordinates increases the net amount of his power within the Soviet hierarchy, but has no bearing on the scope of his freedom. The average citizen n a democracy is essentially free, because he s free with respect to a large number of other citizens, and even though there are comparatively few other citizens whose freedom he limits.

This is not to deny that Y, by limiting the freedom of X, may thereby increase his own freedom, not only with respect to X but also with respect to some other actor Z. The fact that Senator McCarthy retaliated with devastating effect on Senator Tydings increased McCarthy's freedom with respect to other Senators who disapproved of him but were intimidated from limiting his freedom (at least temporarily, until they decided to do so by censure and ostracism). However, while the net amount of a Senator's *power* within the Senate depends both on his own power over his colleagues and on their power over him, the degree of a Senator's *freedom* within the Senate is defined by reference to the class of Senators with respect to whom he is free (and who consequently have no power over him, regardless of whether or not he has power over them).[19]

Another way by which an actor increases his own freedom is by forcing another actor to leave him free to act in a certain way. If Y makes X unfree to make Y unfree to do y, Y's total freedom within the group is greater than it would be otherwise. But we should not speak of net amount of freedom even in this case, since we are merely comparing an actual with a hypothetical situation. When we are using the concept of an actor's net amount of total power, we are referring to two or more *actual* power relationships in which the actor plays the role of both holder and subject of power.

A "Free Society." Can we go a step further and consider freedom a characteristic, not only of actors within a group, but of the group itself? Is there any empirical meaning to the commonly made allegations that "there is more freedom" in a democracy than in a dictatorship, that democracy "maximises freedom"[20] and constitutes the prototype of a "free society"?

One might think that a society is free to a maximum degree if each of its members has the maximum extent of total freedom, and that a society is totally unfree if everyone is totally unfree. However, there never has been a society which even approximates either of these two extremes. As we have seen, in a hierarchical society those at the bottom have no power and may have little or practically no freedom, but the top leaders have a great deal of freedom as well as power—as judged by every component. It would simply be mistaken to conclude that the total amount of freedom in a dictatorship is small.

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[18] *Cf.* David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 191: " . . . leadership can be measured in quantitative terms by a ratio between the frequency with which an individual initiates actions in a group situation and the frequency with which he responds to the initiative of others."

[19] In the case of McCarthy this class consisted at one time of all other Senators, including of course Senator Tydings.

[20] Franz L. Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), p. 76.

A group in which all are totally free would be one in which all are independent of each other. This would amount to pure anarchy, which does not exist in practice any more than a society in which everyone is totally unfree. Either some actors will use their independence from all others to reduce some others to dependence on them, or society itself will appoint actors provided with sufficient power to regulate the activities of all and hence to limit freedom. Citizens are not effectively free in most respects unless their liberties are institutionally guaranteed by a central authority imposing on all the duty to respect each other's freedom. This leads to mutual dependence as the only alternative to hierarchical, one-sided dependence. Democracy is characterized by such reciprocal power relationships—between government and governed, majority and minority, the several branches of government, and between the citizens themselves because of their respective rights and duties. Now, actors who are linked by mutual dependence relationships tend to be both unfree and free to the same extent.

The essential difference between dictatorship and democracy is not that there is little total freedom in one and much in the other,[21] but that freedom—and power as well—is more evenly distributed in the latter. All citizens in a democracy have less total freedom and power than a dictator, but more than his subjects. If we want to use the expression "a free society," we would have to define it, not as a society with a great amount of freedom, but as one in which freedom is relatively evenly distributed among its members. But when one contrasts "free" with "unfree" societies (or "worlds"), one usually has something quite different in mind; it is a way of voicing approval of one kind of political system and condemnation of another. No doubt, there is more freedom of speech in the United States than in the Soviet Union. But is there "more freedom" in America than in Russia? If we answer this question in the affirmative, it is not, *e.g.*, because United States citizens are subject to fewer regulations than Soviet citizens,[22] but because they are free in those respects which we value most. The concept of a free society is thus a normative one: a society is free whose members are free to do what they *ought* to be left free to do and unfree with respect to those activities which *should* be made impossible or punishable. And a society is the more free, the closer the correspondence between its actual network of both power and freedom relationships and the kind of politica system deemed desirable.

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[21] It is therefore meaningless to claim that "any interference with individual freedom . . . even by the most ideally democratic government, is to be justified only on the ground that it increases total freedom, immediately or in the long run." Frank Knight, *Freedom and Reform* (New York, 1947) p. 192.

[22] If it were possible to count them, we would perhaps come to the opposite conclusion, at leas in certain areas. There are probably "more" income tax and traffic regulations in the United States than in Soviet Russia.

POLITICS AND THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE

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If there is practice without theory, perhaps there is theory without practice. We have fairly fixed notions of practice without theory—action without reflection, hand-to-mouth existence, meeting problems as they arise, disdain of plans or strategy, and so on. Of theory without practice there seems but one common idea—theory that because of abstraction or irrelevance cannot be applied. Plato told us the story of Thales of Miletus who, gazing at the stars, fell into a well. A little maid laughed to see such sport. Her laughter still rings in our ears, reminding us to practice navigating the earth rather than contemplate the stars.

Theory without practice, then, seems to be theory that cannot be applied. Applied to what? Applied to problems. Which problems? Problems that arise among men or in the community. Who there defines a problem? Not to get bogged down at the start, let us say merely that some men do or that some part of the community does.

We can also conceive of a theory not being applied because it seems farfetched or too costly or immoral, or because the moment for its need is not yet at hand. These are not the main objections, even though they all have a bearing in one way or another on the ideas we are about to discuss. The main objections are usually the ones already mentioned—theory irrelevant or too abstract. Abstractness, for our purposes, can be dismissed. It means either that the theory cannot be understood—a matter of communication, we assume—or that steps are lacking to bring the theory down to the applied level. We are really back to the question of application. Either a theory has relevance but for one reason or another cannot be put into practice, or it has no relevance at all and that is the end of that.

This latter category is the interesting one. What kind of theory is it that has no relevance to anything? The theory I have found to fit the bill is a theory that has as its only aim the seeking of knowledge. This is not a theory, one might say with a smile, this is philosophy itself. So it is, or at least, so it was. The search for knowledge without concern for possibly applying that knowledge, for putting it to action, used to be a definition of philosophy. But for some time now it seems to have taken on a different hue. Whether we date this change from Bacon's "knowledge is power," power that can be applied to man and earth, or from Marx's contention that philosophy ought to busy itself with changing, not interpreting the world, or take an earlier point in Occam or Petrus Aureoli or Galileo, does not directly concern us now. Nor need we ask whether philosophy should occupy itself with applying knowledge. I prefer instead to spend this time on the ensemble of ideas that goes by the name of the contemplative life.

This paper will accent first the philosophical rather than the theological (though similarities will be obvious), second the West rather than the East (though here too relationships will be apparent), and then the Greek rather than the later course of European ideas. In several ways the argument may be unhistorical. It may lay more stress on certain parts of philosophical schools than is usually done in the history of thought. It may sometime use words that belong to a more modern vocabulary. I should not like an idea to lose its pertinence in a cloud of antique veils.

Philosophical circles today do not write much about the contemplative life of the West. Hardly a political philosopher can be found to take it seriously. The stress falls, as you know, on empiricism, pragmatism, positivism, experiment, theories of action or practice. What is the contemplative life? Perhaps it is not a theory at all. How can it be? If a political theory is an explanation of political phenomena or a set of principles of a political science, the contemplative life is not a political theory, at least not the contemplative life one calls up from the warehouse of memory. Yet a number of celebrated political theorists got involved with it, among them the giants, Plato and Aristotle. The word they had for it was the *bios theoretikos*. Had it not come down to us from the Latin, we might have called it the theoretical life. So theory comes from a word meaning behold or contemplate. And the prototypes of this life were the Ionian philosophers—Thales is one—whose absorption in knowledge for its own sake inspired the Academy and the Peripatetic school.

I propose to look more closely at the *bios theoretikos* as it was conceived by Plato and Aristotle but specially in the particular turn given it by Epicurus. Not the polemical Epicurus, nor the one famous for his pleasures, but the Epicurus of peace and quiet, the one of whom it was said, "No one is less epicurean than Epicurus." So little remains of his writings that I, bent here on sketching their political shape, might occasionally overstep him. I hope not. If I do, I trust my step will swing onto the path long trod by contemplative travelers of both philosophy and theology of East and West.

I

The contemplative life holds claim to being the only or best way of truth-finding. At the base of its superiority lies detachment or objectivity. If you look on the world with intent, you can see little, or but partially. You are observing, not contemplating. You are taking a slice, not the whole. Your aim on the world puts lenses before your eyes; you do not even know your sight is distorted. The only solution is to cut off your design on the world. Desire for corporeal or material goods, attachment to family, concern for reputation—these are things that lead men to try to manipulate nature and other men. There is one more area of temptation—politics. Keep away from political activity. This last injunction is one that for us has importance. The sage breaks away from the *polis,* his chosen field of action.

Plato, who esteemed the contemplative life above all others, never let this injunction pass. The *bios politikos* has the final say. Aristotle after exalting the contemplative life as perfect happiness said, "Where there are things to be done, the end is not to survey and recognize the various things, but rather to do them." He then called on the legislator and proceeded to lay out a program for the *Politics*, in which he again exalts the contemplative life. We know, too, how difficult it was even for the imperial Romans to swallow this idea, however much the thought of *otium* was to lure them. But there were signs before in Antistenes, who declared that the wise man lives not by enacted laws but by those of virtue; in Diogenes, who praised whoever was about to take part in politics and then did not; in Theodorus the Atheist, who said it was logical that the wise man does not give his life for his country: one does not renounce one's wisdom for the benefit of fools. I have the impression that political philosophers have neglected this epoch's fund of anti-political ideas. As political theory the contrasts it offers to anarchism alone are instructive.

It is easy to say, "Cut off your intent on the world", but doing it is another matter. Certain actions can be avoided. Marriage, for example, and if not marriage, children. One can remain in the country and so avoid the city. But all attempts will be half-hearted unless one realizes that family and the pleasures of the city truly have no value, that action directed toward controlling man and nature is not only improper but futile. We have already said that intent on the world fractionizes one's view. Not only that, it unsettles one's mind. The crowding of desires, one upon the other, can shake a man's head until it rattles. In the end he has not only bias but confusion to contend with. To contemplate, one must be tranquil.

Continuous drinking and revelry are illusionary pleasures, yet one need not play the ascetic. Man is not different from other creatures. The flesh makes fugitive but recurrent demands and must be satisfied. According to Epicurus, "The voice of the flesh speaks and says not to have hunger nor thirst nor cold." Give the flesh its due, the spirit is freed of insuperable carnal obstacles. Not yet, though, has man arrived at serenity, the real and permanent pleasure, the stage at which a sensitivity to wisdom is reached. By nature he is not social. Laws over a long period were needed to tame him. A natural society does not and has never existed. Each man is closed in for himself. Society is an unnatural contract, useful, perhaps even necessary for the people, but external, understandable only as a measure of safety. Friendship is born out of egoism, and so too may be useful but not natural. If possible, the man of good sense does not marry. I repeat, "if possible." Epicurus did not believe in forcing one's nature toward something it could never reach. If a man must marry, he does not beget children. If children arrive he had better give up the climb toward serenity. Children bring great risks and much pain. Their upbringing is difficult and full of anxieties. If they turn out bad, the worry and shame they cause are among the worst that man can experience. Paternal love is a fact of nature. You can only try to avoid having children. Once you have them, your love for them is inevitable. You cannot fight against it, nor can you abandon them.

Society and politics, unnatural as they are, can and should be abandoned. Who goes into politics or business or military affairs is headed for frustration. Ambition in any of these fields is sure to lead to the orders or influence or money of others. Accepting money from anyone, Socrates had said, is to create a boss and a slavery for yourself. Epicurus went further: the wise man should not even beg for his bread. If you engage in social life you become dependent on others, get attached to them, come under their influence, wrapped up in hundreds of activities for them, activities that seem so important—and then all tumbles in disillusion. These activities and desires for the most part do not originate in yourself anyway. They originate in the others who pull you into the whirlpool of false sensations, hopes, struggles, disappointments. When you seek their approval and respect, you fall in their power.

The only solution is to withdraw from activity and people of this kind into yourself where you alone are the one to command. Nothing, says Epicurus, generates quiet in the soul like doing but a few things, not giving a hand to unpleasant enterprises, and not exceeding one's own strength. All these things cause disturbances in human nature. Once you have detached yourself from persons and activities, your sufferings will diminish and over you will steal a calm that is healthful and lasting, unlike the fluttery pleasures of Aphrodite or the violent ones of power. The country is ideal, with its minimum of activities, far from politics and wars, from business, intrigues, the noises and temptations of the city. The siesta in the country, stretched out on the grass, under a tree, near fountain or stream—these are the particulars of the *beata solitudo* that reach us from Plato's *Phaedrus*, after the seduction on the way of uncounted poets and philosophers. Here the lover of pure knowledge, freed of the chains of personal and political activity, having reached *ataraxia*, will find in the contemplative life what he could never achieve by riches, political glory, a royal crown, an elegant tenor of life, the luxuries of the table, love's delights, or any others.

II

In cutting off intent on the world there is implicated not only a regimen of practice but a theory of action or motivation. Eliminate the pursuit of material and corporeal indulgence, of family, marriage and children, of the respect of others, the compulsion to do well in their eyes—eliminate them, and you have eliminated many of the motives that push men to manipulate the world and its creatures. You are getting near a stoic autarchy. But even before the stoics, many philosophers, major and minor, had pointed to the need to curb appetites and desires. Socrates, says Xenophon, "could be conquered neither by bodily pleasures nor by those of riches." In the *Apology* Socrates proudly proves his disinterest. "Here is the witness that I speak the truth—my poverty." But though Plato and Aristotle prized the contemplative life as a way to truth more than did Epicurus who offered it also as a medicine for the soul, they never denied their political mission. In this sense their theory is applied. The *polis* is their problem. If they have a problem, they are no longer objective. Their autarchy, their capacity to be their own company is gone. Knowledge now has to pertain to the *polis*. They wear the livery of the prince, the legislator, or the tyrant. They cannot contemplate, they can only intently observe the slice they are cutting. Those in Plato's Republic who pass every test and trial with honors can "lift up the eye of the soul and fix it upon that which gives light to all things." But having seen the good in its essence, "they are to take it as a model for the rest of their life and must use it in giving order to the *polis* and private persons and themselves in turn. Most of the time they will occupy themselves with philosophy, but when their turn comes they one at a time for the sake of the *polis* take over rulership, looking on it not as a gentlemanly activity but as if it were labor done out of the necessity of making a living." The true follower of the contemplative life, if you throw him a problem, walks around it—no, he walks right over it. He does not see it. The problem-approach that opens doors to modern science, walks into a gate barring the path to the contemplative life.

We are in the presence of a radical theory of detachment that looks on Galileo, Einstein and Newton as technicians or specialists. No discipline today dares set up the standards for objectivity of the contemplative life. All sciences talk of objectivity as desirable. Some say they have it, at least in comparison with others. Why it should be more possible in the sciences than in any other field of learning is not made clear. Awareness of bias is supposed to help, but the only painless way to it seems to be teaching by bad example, namely giving students historical cases of partiality and superstition. Compared to the contemplative life, modern science seems not really serious about objectivity.

III

The contrast—theory alone *vs.* theory for practice's sake—contains divergent ideas of change in man and nature. Theories entwined with practice look on the world as needing some change, believe that it can be changed at least in part as desired, hold that man can accomplish such change with—or else without—the help of the gods. With change a terrestrial life can be worthwhile, the winning of earthly happiness and justice is possible, and politics is a means of securing them. The theorist of the contemplative life does not quite agree. Politics is not so important. A measure of happiness and justice might be possible but it cannot be won. Remolding the world to desire turns out to be a desire for something else. The more it changes, the more it stays the same. The world is to be received, marvelled at, not subdued.

The theory of theory-plus-practice looks on man and earth as malleable objects, whereas the theory of the contemplative life or of knowledge for its own sake has no such active intent; it is more at peace with the world. Hardly can the world be called an object. The flower is there but can you feel its fragrance? The bird, yes, but do you burst to sing its song? With understanding, the line between subject and object begins to fade. As all mediating interests go, so goes that line.

What is it the contemplator contemplates then, nature? Socrates was interested in men, not nature; but the philosopher who divests himself of the *polis* is far from the *hoi polloi*. He is in the country either alone or with one of a few choice souls. The hot waters of politics do not boil before his eyes. What stretches before him is the landscape; or as in a Taoist painting of the sage contemplating nature, what becomes part of him is the landscape. The realities of the contemplative life include nature, all right, but not for this does he become a physicist only. Able to be his own company, he has himself as reality too, the immanent, the indwelling, the in-remaining. Before him stretches his past. In it are the experiences of the active life that preceded the contemplative. This former world, full of the turbulence of petty passions, included a relation to the *polis*. Some of the greatest figures in the history of the contemplative life—Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, Boethius—were deeply involved in political life and died or stood to die for it. Memory is thus the theater of politics. No ordinary theater where love and hatred and ambition rage but rather a distant basilica from which the shouts arrive muted. To be able to play politics with this perspective is no mean advantage.

The image of the wise man who has shaken off the shackles of education and society, who counts on himself alone, who contemplates the whole world and looks deeply into himself at the same time—when this appeared in Greece it was new: It was new for the autarchy it expressed. This man was an individual. It was new in the inwardness of its mood. This man was introspective. It was new in its role of the past. This man favored memory, he enjoyed, he learned from what he had already been through. Contrarily, the sciences awaken curiosity and push man into futile agitated researches on present and future. They look at man and nature with a shrewd eye and lay them out with Procrustean nicety. History disturbs nothing. The events it treats, having long ago passed, do not resent the scholar's sympathetic glance. The history of memory is special: all other kinds show the hand of someone else.

IV

One might well ask at this point whether memory is not active. The question might be asked in more general form. What is the distinction between action and contemplation? We have talked about the voice of the flesh as well as about memory. Epicurus lived on water and cornmeal, but even obtaining so little requires some action. The pleasures of Aphrodite have been known to become quite energetic. The fun of youth is well known for being irrepressibly active. And come to think of it, if attacked, what does a man do, lie down and play "'possum"? I am not trying to be satirical in raising these questions.

Even in thought our muscles contract and in sleep we move about and in dreams our eyes follow players on a stage. Contemplation itself is activity. Aristotle in the *Politics* was clear about it. "Thoughts with no object beyond themselves, and speculations and trains of reflections followed purely for their own sake are far more deserving [than actions in relation to others and objects] of the name of active." Epicurus too did not think the new knowledge received of contemplation was inert. It had a richness and fascination all its own, not to be confused with the narcosis that affects the masses whenever they thought they were being tranquil. "In the majority of men, the part that is at rest gets sluggish, the part in movement gets restless." The important distinction lies in the "for its own sake" which implies no purpose, exploitative or utilitarian or otherwise, on objects or persons in sight. It seems that the opposite of the *vita contemplativa* is not the *vita activa*. Instead, the words that suggest themselves as contrasts to contemplative are observational (in the sense of looking on with intent to change) or calculating or manipulative. If one takes typical categories of mental activity, one can compare those mentioned by Aristotle above with a group of others that seem less contemplative—observing, examining, comparing, relating, distinguishing, abstracting, deducing, calculating.

Now what of food, someone asks. The contemplator needs food for the body. When hungry he must look on the world with intent, especially if he hasn't eaten for several days. The hare in a trap, the berry being picked, the corn being shucked, the rock sat upon, all can legitimately claim to be the object of aggressive design. Nature, it seems, permits a kind of interspecies help-yourself, so long as it remains within the limits of necessity. If it goes beyond, into the unnatural realm of cravings, the result is temporary pleasure, perhaps, but ultimately pain. Nature, if one does not regard it as something to be yoked, if one is natural with it, is not hostile. "Who takes his norm from nature," says Epicurus, "will in any circumstance be sufficient to himself." A similar question was put to Bokuju (Mu-chou) in the latter part of the ninth century. "We have to dress and eat every day, and how can we escape from all that?" The master replied, "We dress, we eat." "I do not understand you," said the questioner. "If you don't understand, put your dress on and eat your food." As an everyday thought (*hsin*), the highest teaching of Buddhist philosophy, the ultimate Tao is said to be: "I sleep when I am tired, I eat when I am hungry."

A somewhat different justification belongs to the exhausting or even violent bodily action sometimes part of the contemplative life. It seems acceptable so long as it is for the purpose of attaining contemplation. To abandon the *polis*, for example, might create bitter scenes, or it might require travel over long distances. Contemplative monks devised one of the deadliest styles of unarmed combat. They used it on their travels to keep from falling victim to murdering bandits.

The liver of the contemplative life is not against action or practice itself. He sees people all about him who merely think they are doing something. Unimportant practice is simply uninteresting. He is not fleeing real life but making his way toward it. On the way he may trip over his own feet, not recognize his neighbor, be ignorant of feminine wiles or where the shopping center might be or what the boys in the back room are saying about machines, but what he knows would make them all dizzy, all those whose time is not free for learning, including the maids of Thrace. Of the contrast between his *praxis* and that of the unfree I need not say more. Plato has taken care of it in the *Theaetetus*. Action, then, is not the point. To try to avoid all action would be unnatural and therefore futile. Reducing intent on the world does seem to reduce activity to a minimum, but only because our present standards push it to an artificial maximum.

V

Who is it now who is to make his way to real knowledge? Is there a principle of selection or recruitment? Lack of age is no barrier nor is lack of learning. Nor is sex an obstacle. Women were admitted to Epicurus's garden, and you must remember that just after the passage on contemplation I quoted earlier, Glaucon says, "You have worked out the image of your rulers to perfection, Socrates, as if it were the statue of a man." And the reply comes: "But female rulers are included, Glaucon, for you must not at all think that I spoke in any way more in regard to men than to women." Woman too, evidently, can contemplate, or at least will have the chance. There can be no doubt, though, that the *hoi polloi* are excluded. The people are regarded not with fear nor with hate but with aloofness if not revulsion. They are the ones who exemplify the craving for material things and provide the alternating adulation and vituperation in politics that one must shun. There seems to be, furthermore, a conviction that the sorry state of the public cannot be changed. If the masses took to the contemplative life, its real devotees—like those today who stay at home in the summer because the masses overwhelm the countryside—would have to return to the city. This happening is not to be feared. The people apparently will be as they are forever. They will never as a whole or in great numbers be called to the contemplative life.

Just who will be called to the contemplative life has been left rather uncertain. After the exclusion of the people or the masses or the many or the mob, there are still some of wealth or position left to qualify. For the necessities of life Aristotle's resource remains slavery. Plato draws his from a wider base; he secures his rulers' room and board by having the ruled provide for it in tribute or taxes, as you will. Elsewhere in contemplative writings the wherewithal gets little or no notice. Given that the well-off and the noble were the main groups from which philosophers were drawn, no requirement was necessary, probably, beyond the firm desire for the contemplative life.

A mere few are called, then. There is no propaganda to get more. The word of the wise man is not for the people or the crowd. He does not try to get their support or to convince them of their place in the scheme of things. Nor does he campaign for recruits or converts. At most there are letters like Epicurus's to Idomeneus and Seneca's to Lucilius. "I promise you, O Lucilius, that which Epicurus promised to his friend." Epicurus had written, "If glory is what your heart desires, my letters will make you more famous than all these splendors that you seek and for which you are sought after." Both of them kept their promise, else who would have ever heard of Idomeneus or Lucilius?

Success is not judged by the number of converts. If there is but one who contemplates, the theory is just as much practiced as if there were a thousand. If there were a million, the wise man would be convinced that they were all there by some grotesque misunderstanding. In theory, the contemplator is content if he is alone or with another person, at most with a small group. He may aspire to open a school so long as it is not to attract a crowd. He can also write books to be read by many but he should not be much in evidence, should be no great orator, should take no author's tours. His school should be in a garden or in the country. The market or the forum, the city as a whole, are undesirable places, although even in their hustle-bustle, the philosopher (the Oriental as well as the Stoic and the Epicurean) must find his own resources. Draw back into your own self, says Epicurus, specially when you must stay in the middle of the crowd.

Epicureanism never did succeed in winning the Greek and Roman world. It had much influence on literature but none on the rank and file. Theoretically the reason is that in a world turned upside down, only select spirits feel the company of others as a burden and a torment. The vast human mediocrity seeks out company because it fears being alone. Another reason is that the contemplative school—at the other pole from the rhetors or sophists—never went out of its way to flatter the people. "I have never wanted to please the common people. In fact what pleases them, I don't know. What I do know is far away from meeting their approval." Thus Epicurus.

VI

One may wonder why the contemplative philosophers should engage in talking and writing at all. Not all of them do, of course. The austerity of the Trappists is well-known. Zen teachings speak of leaving no trace behind. But the Greeks, our main stream, did write and talk. To write his many volumes, Epicurus, it seems, stayed up late at night and got up at dawn. Perhaps one form alone of ambition or desire for fame was not considered inappropriate—to be known and remembered in the world of philosophy or by whoever in that world is notable for his wisdom. Glory in the field of philosophy is not a flighty thing and provides lasting satisfaction. But the *motif* is not strong in contemplative writings; nor indeed is the argument for its defense: this *claritas* nourishes the germ of authority. However that may be, in writing books or holding schools, but contemplative life may be accused of resorting to persuasion, rhetoric, recruiting or publicity; yet there are, it seems to me, acceptable explanations. The contemplator's writings apart from letters can be considered a mnemonic device, or a way of reining in runaway thoughts, or else a celebration, an expression of immanence, an overflow of well-being, a richness, a song. "Verily—may the Lord shield me!—Well do I write under the greenwood."

In any case, teachings and writings do exist. If they happen to persuade large numbers of persons to adopt the contemplative life, do they become political tracts? Let us look again at the doctrine. Whoever loves the truth should quit indulging the body, disdain money and success, cut away family and political ties, fly the city with its thousand petty demands, and retire to the country by himself or with a few choice companions.

At some times a regime may regard the devotees of the contemplative life as politically indifferent gypsies or as priests. The state that houses and harms them not is fair in heaven's eyes. Under certain circumstances, however, a regime may consider the doctrine dangerous and actually subversive. It may then be useless to protest that the contemplative life shuns political power like the plague, that whoever holds political office is automatically prevented from leading that life, that the support of the masses is the last thing it would want, that existing laws, constitutions, forms of government, authorities, are not objects of attack, that the crown of *ataraxia* can not be compared to that of princes. A regime whose support is not too steady may fear that truth-seeking for itself may take a political turn. The seeker himself admits he does not know where his search will take him. A regime may also take the line that though scholars do not flock to the school, yet one day they might. In any case the school sets a bad example. By saying that patriotism is a hindrance, it affects loyalty. A bad example might not affect the many, but a few is already too much. Or if a regime is committed to great economic or military enterprises, the vaunting of a life of leisure in the country is a hostile doctrine. That the contemplative life may be under fire at times for political activity does not prove that its activity or lack of activity is political indeed. It merely illustrates how difficult it may be to keep one's skirts free of government or public opinion.

Criticism of the contemplative philosophers takes many forms: they do not have to worry about intent on the world because most of them are old; the charms of Aphrodite no longer attract them; they are ready for the rocking-chair. Coming largely from well-to-do or noble families, why should they have to act on the world to obtain food or success or esteem? It is theirs already. As for politics, their whole posture is summed up in the phrase, sour grapes. They are disillusioned with the state because of the failure either of their particular *polis* (Athens after the Sicilian defeat is the example) or else of their own political ambition (Plato's period in Syracuse, or Seneca's with Nero). They deserve to live in only their own state, a pig state.

These charges could be answered in kind but neither they nor the more serious criticisms one could make may detain us. We are not embarked so much on repudiating the epistemological claims of the contemplative life as on taking its bearings to politics. We can momentarily take a more modern angle, that of the biologist or sociologist and even some political theorists, to ask what function such persons serve in the organism, in society, or in the state. Here there is no excuse for theory without practice. Where is the benefit? On the contrary there is harm. In the modern view the contemplative life is anti-democratic, anti-social, against organization, opposed to work and to most of the things men work for, and indifferent to home, country and mother. One can see why the contemplative philosopher is a rare bird. Not all lands are as amiable as Ionia.

This hostility, some might say, depends on a belief that one rotten apple spoils the barrel; others might differ, maintaining that it is part of the morality, "If I have to suffer, why shouldn't you?" Is there a better estimate to be made from the side of the state?

The philosopher's independence of the *polis* is dubious. He may wish to forget home and country and deny that they have ever given him anything good, but the claim can be disputed and a respectable invoice from them presented instead. Put just two things onto the balance—nurture and language—the contemplative life has already a heavy debt to pay to family and country. Man is ever in duty bound to the *polis*. His very ideas about the contemplative life, even what he sees atop Mount Fuji, is influenced by the *polis*, no matter how far away it may be in miles. Awake, asleep or a-dreaming, his freedom is of the *koinonia*. Should he but stay physically alone too long, he becomes spiritually alone, which signifies losing his human faculties. Plato makes an argument much like this when he portrays the philosopher who must tear himself away from the supreme good of contemplation in order to take on the onus of office. All the philosopher is he owes to the *polis;* and he pays it back by guiding the state as it once guided him. Aristotle would remind us that the state is a sign of man's humanity. Whoever can live without it is either subhuman or divine. In this case there is no doubt which.

VII

The debt of genesis aside, is the contemplative philosopher a citizen? The fragments that remain to us of Epicurus's words and writings contain no definite word. To be consistent the contemplative life cannot honestly admit of citizenship. Anaxagoras, accused of neglecting kinsfolk and country, points to the sky. "There is my country." Any place in the world or out of it is the wise man's abode. This answer approaches the stoic's cosmopolitanism, without having its political connotations. Another answer, though, would take its start from the reply given to those who ask, if the wise man stays away from politics, who will govern? If all men were wise, each would govern himself so well that political power could be dispensed with. But all men are not wise, nor are they wise in equal measure. Those truly wise will pay no attention to the state; those with a lesser philosophic gift and a weakness for politics will live near kings and frequent them. (It would seem that Epicurus would transfer his not-quite-so-bright scholars over to Socrates.) Since only a few ever approach true wisdom, there will never be a shortage of persons to take over the helm of state. Thus, a man may remain a citizen if the contemplative life is not his true calling and though participating in politics may still learn something from philosophy; but the wise man lets the state founder without lifting a hand, if doing so would disturb his calm.

In the *Apology* Socrates warned of the dangers of the political life. Far from being so gentle as to disturb one's calm, it could cut a man down in short order. With Plato and Socrates ringing in his ears, the reader of Epicurus might feel that somewhere there is a fearful shrinking from the right path. It is the just act of a virtuous man, the philosopher's giving up his life of contemplation to go down to the depths to help his former fellow-prisoners. The contemplative man, as Epicurus saw it, is not interested in fighting for justice. (Perhaps for this reason he preferred his pleasures oft-misunderstood, indeed easy to misunderstand that they were, to the Socratic virtues.) The *polis* and justice, virtue and the common life run together. The wise man cares not for the social good. He is an individual, like the gods if gods there be, unmoved and unmoving, self-contained, indifferent.

Again it seems, the sage admits of no debt to the *polis;* he seeks no favors from it, nor does he help it; he transcends it. Without rights or duties, it would be difficult to talk of citizenship. As Seneca remarked, this philosophy puts the citizen outside the state.

One might ask what in this context would be the best state. First of all, it would have to appear by itself. The contemplative man does not work for any change in the state. Take revolution, for example. In the practical sense it is disturbing, in the theoretical sense it is ridiculous. Revolutionaries fight for things that the regime wants to retain. Each side fights the other for possession of something both parties value. The contemplative life is more revolutionary than that. It strives for radically different possessions; but no one else wants them and the state does not have them in stock. It is a have-not, but neither contending party is a have.

Presumably that state would be best that would make possible the contemplative life of those who are called. The state could have no higher purpose, its truth being only temporary and erroneous. Witness its providing employment for second-rate intelligences along with security and diversions for the masses. Theoretically speaking, the environment or situation in which the wise man finds himself is not important. Perhaps so, yet also in theory, the flight from the city is almost necessary. Moreover, one of Epicurus's much-debated statements hold that "the wise man pays no attention to the state, unless he is forced to by some circumstance." The aversion is not absolute; the situation can force his hand. One can point out further that if a man fall into the hands of bandits, he may save himself and add to his memories of human affairs, but at the moment that he is fighting them off, he is not contemplating. Like that lover of peace who was ready everyday to fight for it, he may never find peace. The difficulties in the way of contemplating may be greater or less and, it seems, some of them may depend on the state.

With this as background, perhaps one can reason about the good state. The desire for tranquility in the contemplative life leads toward a politics of peace both internally and externally. The convenience of tolerance leads toward a program of politics without crisis or great national efforts, perhaps a form of conservatism. The propriety of a dependable wherewithal leads to a preference for aristocracy. The choice of stability as a criterion for truth and pleasure leads also to a preference for hereditary forms in government and property-holding.

In short, a state of peace and quiet, yet not completely indifferent. The concordance of inner and outer states, however, should be taken not as necessary but only as desirable. Riots and disorder may prevent contemplation and a state without them is desirable enough; still no land has riots every day in the week and no country is bandit-infested for every half-acre.

VIII

Physical violence may be less dangerous to the contemplative life than moral violence. The sage in China has always outlived physical violence. Can he outlive a government bent on instilling activism throughout the land? Perhaps the life of contemplation could be made easier everywhere if only the modern state could see something positive in it. Seneca in *De Otio* said, "In brief, this is what we can expect of a man: that he be useful to other men; to many of them if he can; to a few, if he can but little; and if he can but still less, to those nearest him; and if he cannot to others, to himself." Today this being useful by being useful only to oneself cannot be widely understood because the wise man is not a model, nor does heaven smile upon his protection. Otherwise his usefulness could be seen in his living his daily life. In the West for several centuries now the contemplative life in religious orders, too, has met with lack of comprehension.

A possible justification for allowing the contemplative life to exist is to keep opinion free in the state. Anyone can think, write and speak as he wishes, even if one has nothing but bad to say. The state witholds its interference from any but illegal acts, and to think, write and speak are not such acts. The question yet arises, is inactivity illegal? If a man does not want to work, but to contemplate, is he a madman? If to be free from the Lilliputian threads of society, he wants to beg for his bread, should there be a law against it? If he leaves his wife, is he a deserter? By refusing to join the armed forces, is he a criminal? Should there be laws refusing him entrance to certain parts of the country because he has no visible means of support? What do the laws of vagrancy aim at? Omission can be more of a sin than commission. Opinion may be free, yet the laws conspire against a way of life.

There is another defense of the contemplative life that seems to have a special attractiveness today. It has recently become commonplace to look for benefits from those whom the shoe of society habitually pinches, in particular, artists and scientists. Perhaps the devotee of the contemplative life can be tolerated or even appreciated for the benefit he brings to society in the long run through his creativeness in science, literature or art. This argument is by no means absurd. It may follow from it, though, that the contemplative life should somehow be worked into workaday life so that everybody might be creative. An alternation of work and leisure is the usual proposal. The Romans expressed it in the duality of *otium-negotium*. Another proposal is that the *otium* come after the *negotium*, thus reversing its etymological sequence. This too the Romans thought of, in the sense of retiring after an active life. It should not be confused with the Platonic idea that because of their experience and excellence, men over fifty are the most fit for contemplation. The Roman and modern idea is that the old retire to rusticate, not to contemplate. For the *kepos* or the country, there is suburbia, the daily and weekendly retreat to *otium* from the on-the-go of *negotium*. But this is not *otium* or *scholē* or *theoria* or *sophia* for its own sake. It is rest for work's sake, repose earned by work, a retreat better to fill the front line. Cicero, Loyola, Thoreau all seem to have conceived of retreat as preparing one better to cope with the city. The contemplative life may allow compromises—the exile banished from the *polis*, the tramp working only enough to eat, the thinker imprisoned for his teachings—they all can lead a contemplative life, but not the one who goes for a rest in the country, who needs a change of pace, whose aim has to be a return to work and the city. Not that a change of scenery does no good for the city-dwelling worker. Not that the contemplative life can be isolated from the everyday world—it cannot—but it can only see this and any other world plainly if it is not enslaved to the everyday world.

IX

To justify the contemplative life in the eyes of the state is a formidable task. The liver of the contemplative life seeks the truth, but he cannot say when or if he finds it, or some of it, that it will be good for the state today, or next year, or in five hundred. Besides, the state may appreciate it never. Furthermore, if he finds it, who knows whether he will communicate it. Epicurus wrote three hundred works of which forty-one were said to be excellent; but he might just have decided to write none. Someone less concerned than he to save a few good souls might not have written them. Nothing says that whatever one learns by contemplation must be communicated to others.

Perhaps the contemplative life cannot be justified to the state and perhaps also it has exaggerated its independence of the state. It still makes little difference. If one could justify it in terms of the state, then one could speak of its function. If one can do this, the contemplative life would no longer be free. It would have a determined relation to the state. It would become a state functionary. The same subservience would stain the contemplative life, were it to be justified in terms of any other society. Besides, the followers of the contemplative life are not interested in justifying themselves, and why should we press them? Truth is their only justification. There is, they say, something beyond the state that comes to a man in a contemplative life, that can come in no other way. The detachment we have already spoken of, and also the perspective that a man gains from being able to pull back into himself. But the contemplative life may lead to still greater rewards. These rewards even in the west alone go by various names—inspiration, revelation, salvation, a vision of truth, the blending of subject with object. Not all receive such gifts, and some receive not great ones but small ones and but briefly; some gifts are complete in themselves while others must be re-won by thought and study. The latter kind perhaps can be imparted to others by words, but often words are not enough; whereas some other medium like the Buddhist master's stick or Aristotle's music may penetrate more deeply. There is a rare kind that is not communicable at all. Bonaventura in speaking of the last step of the *Itinerary of the Mind in God* says, "It is indubitable truth: man cannot see Me and live."

We have reached a point where the trail leads back to Plato and then goes off through Plotinus and into Christianity and monasticism. The contemplative life asks and answers new questions. They are important and interesting but would take us too far along into the subject.

X

With its withdrawal into monasteries the contemplative life did not quit the secular garden. Though practice is excluded, though appeal to the masses is anathema, though much of what it learns cannot be communicated, the school and its theory has had and still has an enormous influence. One current runs through the stoics, for they lived as though they were epicureans, and from them into Cicero and Seneca who later pass northward, penetrating as far as the English schools to put a stamp on the English and part of the American character as well. Another current took part in developing the idea of the liberal arts out of that of the general culture. Much of the tenacity of the liberal arts (they survived the barbarian invasions) and their strange attraction (they won over Theodoric who was illiterate) comes from their freedom, the liberality of having their end in themselves. In the technical world of today, in the great bureaucracies of government, industry and science, continuous bloodless warfare goes on between the expert or the specialist and the man of liberal education. Whoever has worked for government, business or the university has felt its tremors underground.

It is difficult not to conclude that the contemplative life is the ideal life of the philosopher. Many of the great ones, though seldom attaining it, have throughout their lives given signs of their desire for it. One can see in their biographies an attempt to get more free air than the surrounding atmosphere held. For that matter, though none of us may have ever been able to live this way, most of us too perhaps have had moments when we felt close enough to get glimpses of a truth, that could we have more of the way of life we would also have more of the truth.

Many writers on Epicurus speak of his philosophy as a way of life, as indeed it is. Perhaps if more were left of his writings we could see a clearer connection between his contemplative life and that of Plato and Aristotle. Had he been interested solely in an *ars vitae,* he might have better called his doctrine the tranquil life. Instead he chose the theoretical life, thus partaking of the meaning given it by Plato and Aristotle and placing himself in the classical Greek tradition. On the way to truth, Epicurus said, there is no room for the *polis;* and his views become a theory that forbids political practice.

Perhaps what I have tried to do is now clear. I took what Epicurus prescribed primarily as balm for the soul and I laid it onto Plato and Aristotle's tablets just over their next to last stand, the *polis.* It thus becomes a more formidable epistemological theory against political practice. I was less interested in criticizing it than in presenting it. For us a theory that holds that politics is not necessary is a political theory. It deserves the fullest consideration. If a life without politics is possible, we should be the first to know about it. If that life is the contemplative life, we may also be the first to rejoice. At the moment a breeze wafts us the sounds of a converation taking place somewhere near yet far away. "Is this what you are saying then, Epicurus, that here is the witness that I tell a lie—my love for the *polis*?" From that question we start off on a new theory of objectivity that can no longer be equated with detachment alone.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND POETRY

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Sigurd Burckhardt has rendered a service in providing the occasion for a thematic presentation of the principles underlying the interpretations of Shakespearean drama by Jaffa and me, to which he has taken such exception.[1] The issue does not primarily concern literary criticism but rather has to do with the relation of art to political philosophy and, in turn, with their relation to life. Burckhardt, however, has not joined the debate on the level of the issues. He does not argue against the substance of our interpretations, and does not say wherein and why they are in error. Characteristic of his method is his offer of three statements "admittedly out of context" from my article for which he then proposes the following test: "Choose," he says, "a jury of widely read, intelligent men, show them these statements (with the information that they are meant to describe two main characters in a play known to all of them), and then make them guess who is being talked about." Burckhardt thinks he is "safe in claiming that there will not be a single correct identification." The moment seems somewhat inappropriately chosen for suggesting the method of a quiz program for deciding a matter of validity. But seriously, does any scholar, however he may wish for public acceptance, make this his standard? Agreement may produce peace, but it can never by itself be a criterion of truth. In presenting *my* conclusions, I have a right to ask that they be tested in the light of *my* evidence and *my* arguments. In the court of scholarly judgment it is a weak argument that rests on the number of witnesses who can be summoned to support an opinion. The public opinion poll, or the consumer's panel, may have their functions in politics and business; but in the republic of letters one man may be right against the world. Burckhardt's entire position rests upon the proposition that what is paradoxical, in literature or in morality, is false; and he has constantly appealed over the heads of my argument, and Jaffa's, to a public whose preconceptions he feels confident will be against us. This is an appeal to authority, and he who makes it has not strengthened his own credentials, even as a witness.

I

In effect he charges us with practicing literary criticism without a license, with not coming from the "belletristic side of the quad"; we do not "accept and retail" what he, as a specialist, certifies to be the standard for the appropriate sentiments to be produced by the Shakespearean drama. But the understanding of Shakespeare, according to our approach, cannot be an affair of specialists. No one of the traditional divisions of a university is adequate to comprehend the complexity of the Shakespearean phenomena. Our attempts at interpretation carried with them the implication that a purely literary approach is not sufficient for the interpreter who wishes to respond adequately to Shakespeare's heroes. An understanding of the moral and political problems must be a part of the interpreter's equipment, for Shakespeare presented men who faced such problems.

Burckhardt does not enter into the knotty discussion of whose presuppositions are more appropriate to the object of our common interest. He cuts the Gordian knot by asserting that Jaffa and I "do not have nor even know [we] lack, an adequate concept of the specificity of literature as a mode of discourse different from other modes." We take abstract philosophic principles and impose them on the author, distorting the matter to make it fit our mold. We cannot understand the text because we do not know what it is. He supports this view with two fundamental canons of interpretation. One is that a dramatic poem is "first of all a structure of words rather than of ideas." The critic must pay attention to what the author "says," not what he "means." The second canon is that there must be "an almost mindless surrender to the poem's verbal substance." It is our contention that to follow the first rule is impossible and that an interpretation based on the second would be itself mindless—which is to say conventional and drawn from the interpreter's perhaps very limited experience. Burckhardt's own article illustrates the truth of these contentions.

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[1] The articles in question are: Harry V. Jaffa, "The Limits of Politics: An Interpretation of *King Lear*, Act I, Scene i, this REVIEW, Vol. 51 (June 1957), pp. 405–427; Allan Bloom, "Cosmopolitan Man and the Political Community," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (March 1960), pp. 130–157; Sigurd Burckhardt, "English Bards and APSR Reviewers," *ibid.*, pp. 158–166. Although the responsibility for this article is my own, I have attempted to answer the criticism directed against Jaffa as well as that directed against what is common to our approaches to Shakespeare. He has seen this response and has expressed his agreement with it.

For example, he wants to use the word "nothing" as a mere counter; if Jaffa were to follow it through *King Lear,* he would find a "figured interweaving" which Burckhardt claims is lost in Jaffa's interpretation. In the first place, it is not true that Jaffa is unaware of the subplot (*cf.* Burckhardt, p. 164) or that his attempt to clarify the sense of the word "nothing" causes one to lose sight of it (*cf.* Jaffa's note 34). Burckhardt might, indeed, have noticed that Jaffa's article was limited, as the title itself indicated, to Act I, scene 1, where the subplot has not yet been introduced. But this inaccuracy is not what is important in Burckhardt's statement: what is striking is the "through the looking glass" character of the world constituted by trying to separate words from meanings so that we can avoid talking about things. One does not become aware of the fact that Lear and Goucester both have troubles with their children by observing the word "nothing." Its use does not even serve to point up the similarity of the difficulties of the two fathers; its use for this purpose is not necessary because the similarity is clear enough to anyone who refuses to banish his common sense in order to play a professional game of acrostics. The word "nothing" occurs in the context of the difficulties that both Lear and Gloucester have with their children, and "nothing" appears to have something to do with those difficulties. Jaffa attempted to explain precisely, in at least one episode, the nature of the connection between the word and the difficulties. Shakespeare did not write the play for the sake of the patterns in it; the patterns are for the sake of the play. On the basis of what Burckhardt says, any word in the English language, or any other language for that matter, would do. Why should it be "nothing"? Only a discussion of the meaning of the word can answer this question. Undeniably, the repetition of "nothing" is important, but the reason for it only emerges when one knows what the problems of the play are. A reader must bring a certain experience and learning to the play which he tests by the poet's teaching; if he does not do so, he will miss the point no matter how much attention he pays to the words, because he will not know to what Shakespeare is referring. Burckhardt constantly supports his arguments with his own experience and his own notions of morality. He has not sufficiently worked out what is meant by close textual analysis, and fills the gap with idle rules which he is repeatedly constrained to break.

Encouraged by his desire to oppose Jaffa's insistence that only great men capable of great deeds can undergo great sufferings, Burckhardt confides his own understanding of what makes Lear great. "He is great because he does not cheaply and feebly strike bargains with his disillusionment, because he wills and lives his terrifying fall into truth so uncompromisingly and vastly that he is transfigured." This statement is not drawn from the words of the play nor is it formally different from the kinds of things Jaffa said. The only difference is that it is shallow and pretentious; the terms are woefully imprecise. It could be applied to almost any tragic hero. At best it gives one the warming sensation of being deep in being able to feel such things. The quarrel between Jaffa and Burckhardt is not between one who prescribes an arbitrary framework to the poet and one who lets the poet teach him. It is rather between one who reflects on the dramatic phenomena and attempts to make distinctions which will account for the differences among men and one who does not. Shakespeare presents men to us who have different characters and who pursue different objects. They face problems, and unless those problems are defined we cannot understand their responses. Perhaps a genius such as Shakespeare can see and feel the problems at a glance. But the rest of us must reason them out or risk total misunderstanding. Our emotions are not enough because they need training to reach Shakespeare's level. The real basis of Burckhardt's position is an emotionalism, a belief that the most important things are grasped by feeling. All this leads to is an impoverishment of our feelings. He professes great admiration for two of Jaffa's formulations. I do not know what he thought was meant by them; but, if he understood them at all, he has thereby accepted Jaffa's argument. For all Jaffa was trying to do was to give some clear and distinct notion of what such words as "self-knowledge" and "justice" mean within the universe of *King Lear.*

II

Burckhardt's devotion to words causes him to set a homework assignment for me. He suggests that I make a collection of all the occurrences of the word "Christian" in *Othello.* He has himself found that it does not occur very often and hence feels justified in rejecting my thesis that Othello's Christianity is an important element in his relation to Venice. He might have told me exactly how many times it must occur in order for my thesis to be true; otherwise my collection will be of little use to me. I was under the impression that a just sense of the important words in a great literary work might on occasion give crucial importance to a word that occurred only once, or even that the absence of a word that common sense or reflection would lead one to expect could give a hint as to the author's intention.

I think, for example, of the fact that Thucydides himself (as distinct from his characters) is, with a single exception, completely silent about the gods. This almost complete silence does not mean that the subject of the gods is not an important one for him, nor that for many of the men about whom he wrote the gods were not all-important. His taciturnity is his way of expressing his opinion about a central theme of politics. But to notice this one must have some prior awareness of the context in which his book has its life and being.

I did not go to *Othello* with the notion that Christianity was important to it, nor did I go to it excluding that possibility. I certainly did not feel justified in assuming, *a priori*, that the only interesting subject in the play would be the private and personal story of the hero's suffering. The first thing that struck me was that the hero is a Moor and that Shakespeare devotes much art to making us aware of how shocking to many people is the marriage of a black Moor, not a citizen, to the fair daughter of a senator. This led naturally to wondering about what a Moor meant to Shakespeare's audience and also what foreignness means in general. The latter question is not a gratuitous addition to the play's obvious plot, for the problem is raised several times in it. Unless a man's actions occur in a vacuum, the circumstances in which his actions take place will affect that action, as well as the sentiments that will accompany the action. Coriolanus in Rome has to make no arguments to others or to himself to prove his equality with the other citizens.

The consequence of my reflection was the recognition that a Moor was as such a symbol of something loathsome, dangerous, and pagan; that it had to be a very special Moor to overcome this prejudice in the audience, a prejudice also present in several of the other characters. Brabantio, in order to emphasize Othello's alienness, includes him in the class of "bond-slaves and pagans," although we soon learn that he is really a Christian. Brabantio identifies him with other Moors, but we learn that at least in respect of his Christianity Othello differs from other Moors, and is not alien to Venice. Could one imagine a Moor who was not a Christian being received in the house of a Senator as Othello was? The injustice of Brabantio's remarks causes us to become aware both of Othello's Christianity and of its problematic character as a kind of naturalization.

If, as I believe is undeniably the case, Othello's foreignness has something to do with the problems he faces in his marriage, then his Christianity has something to do with the very possibility of his marrying Desdemona. Any spectator with a lively awareness of the meaning of being a Moor cannot fail also to be aware of his religion. Now, in this context Brabantio's use of the word "pagan" guided my thought; Burckhardt's homework assignment would have helped me very little. The recurrence of the same idea is not evidenced always by the repetition of the same words. Can one ignore the fact that Othello is fighting the Turks, who are infidels, and profess the religion he would ordinarily be expected to profess? He makes an appeal to his men for good behavior and harmony on the explicit grounds that they are Christians whom he contrasts with the Turks. And, in his final pitiful plea, he bases his last claim to good repute on a service done for the city at the expense of an infidel. Here only the word "circumcized" occurs.

Venice is important to Othello and his deeds on behalf of Venice during the play are performed against the non-Christian enemies of the city. His recognition by and attachment to the city is on one of the few possible grounds of recognition and attachment for one not born into it, the religious ground. These few instances, and they are not the only ones, are sufficient to establish the central importance of Othello's Christianity as a pre-condition to his assimilation into Venetian life. I did not say that Othello was a "devout" Christian; but I did say that his Christianity is part of his self-awareness. On the face of it, a neglect of these details in Shakespeare's picture would be arbitrary. The only basis for doing so is an anti-political bias that has captured and held possession of much Shakespearean criticism for over a century. But this bias does not do justice to the text; it denies the fact that for Shakespeare, as well as for almost every other writer who made use of political themes within what we call the western tradition, until the nineteenth century, man is a political animal and his actions and passions are developed in relation to civil society and its problems. Shakespeare in every single play is careful to define his heroes in relation to a set of political responsibilities and problems. A non-political psychological interpretation leads us into a meaningless morass of unintelligible passions while ignoring Shakespeare's words.

My use of the word "cosmopolitanism" also offends Burckhardt. He thinks it is an importation from philosophy, a discipline which in his view has little to do with literature or life. Othello is not, he says, a political philosopher and does not speak of cosmopolitanism or of man's goodness or badness. This is as much as to say that a man who does not know the word tuberculosis cannot contract the disease. I readily admit that the word "cosmopolitan" does not occur in *Othello* and I do not insist that the word be used. I attempted to give a clear meaning to it which Burckhardt's singular mode of citation obscures. The problem of cosmopolitanism became explicit in one form in the eighteenth century, but who doubts that, in one form or another, it has been a profound question for every serious man since Odysseus saw many cities and learned the difference of the different minds of the men within them? In the eighteenth century, men came, perhaps for the first time, to believe in the possibility of a political community that comprised men of all nations, races, and creeds. But the older tradition gave greater weight to the power of the passions that attached men to their individual differences. It did not, therefore, share all the hopes of the eighteenth century that these differences could be overcome and men's common nature could thereby fulfil itself. For this reason the approaches to this problem are different in the older tradition from what they are in the one with which Burckhardt is familiar. But to wonder about the extent to which men naturally have anything in common amidst the diversity of their national ways of life, and in particular amidst the diversity of what those different ways hold to be most important in human life, is itself a permanent and timeless feature of the human condition. The term "cosmopolitan" appears to be of Cynic origin; Diogenes is supposed to have used it to describe himself. What he seems to have meant by it was that he had found that within himself which would make him a man, independent of any accidents of birth or place. Shakespeare does not use the word cosmopolitan, but has any man done more to make us aware of the meaning of the experience that the word was invented to describe?

I do not argue that Othello reflected on this problem; all to the contrary, I hold him to be the kind of man who, if he were tempted to reflect on it, would suppress his impulse to do so. Yet the problem is there, and increasingly dominates his life. The poet reveals the dimensions of the problem in the struggles of an unreflecting man of action. He chooses Othello for this purpose because he is an alien, and aliens have ambiguous roles in established civil societies. Othello is very anxious to be part of Venice and to be treated as a citizen. To do this he must suppress any awareness of his fundamental difference. Shakespeare thus portrays him as a man who wishes to forget the exclusiveness of civil societies. Again, I do not believe I imposed this question on the play; rather it is Burckhardt's unwillingness to let the text take him beyond what is familiar to him that prevents him from seeing what the text demands. The entire first act deals with the difficulties created by the marriage, and these difficulties stem from one source alone: that Othello is what he is, a Moor in Venice. Shakespeare examines the difficulties in all respects, and one who does not follow him will not understand the consequences. Othello is "an extravagant and wheeling stranger of here and everywhere," and his life is fundamentally determined by that fact.

Burckhardt also takes me to task for saying that Othello thought men were good, and he sees shades of Rousseau in such a formulation. Actually, I was referring to one of the oldest maxims of common sense. A decent, good-natured man usually has a relatively high opinion of his fellows; a man who is of the opinion that men are mostly disposed to rascality will be highly suspicious.

> The Moor is of a free and open nature
> That thinks men honest that but seem to be so.

If Burckhardt wants to see the same thought expressed prior to Rousseau he might look at Machiavelli, *The Prince*, chapter xviii, and Hobbes *Leviathan*, Introduction (*ad finem*). The Bible also says that man was created in the image of God; there was a large and respectable body of thought within Christianity which understood man to be fundamentally good and believed that his intellectual and moral faculties were not destroyed by the Fall. Now, I argued that Othello was of a trusting nature and that his jealousy changes all that; his jealousy causes him to look at those around him as schemers, full of dishonest passions. In response to this, there seem to be two common ways of reacting: either to become indifferent to human beings, and even to make use of them and their vices, as does Iago, or else to try to punish them and compel them to be good. The very notion of justifiable punishment implies such a goal whether Othello explicitly says it or not. Consider, for example, one instance which supports my contention that the jealous Othello wishes to transform human beings. When he feels the hand of Desdemona in Act III, he says

> This argues fruitfulness and liberal heart
> Hot, hot, and moist. This hand of yours requires
> A sequester from liberty: fasting, and prayer,
> Much castigation, exercise devout,
> For here's a young, and sweating devil here
> That commonly rebels. . . .

Previously, her hand was just another part of her sweet nature which he thought was devoted entirely to him; now that he doubts, he sees in it evidence of the passions which lead her to be faithless; only a severe course of religious training can purge the hand of its devil. This is what I interpreted to be an attempt of the jealous Othello to transform what he understood Desdemona's nature to be. Othello does not say what it is that he is doing, but the critic who wishes to characterize it must do so.

Burckhardt seems to be ignorant of the nature both of political philosophy and of the drama. The drama portrays human actions, and political philosophy tries to give an account of what those actions mean. Political philosophy attempts to make articulate and clear what is already implied in the variety of sentiments evoked in us by the actions. The drama is particularly apt for philosophic analysis because it, as opposed to history, can show the typical or the crucially important, stripped of meaningless accident. Burckhardt's citing Rousseau is characteristic of his understanding of political philosophy. The way in which he sees Rousseau is as a man living in the eighteenth century who had the preposterous notion that men are good—a notion contrary to experience—a sort of ideology which his followers tried to prescribe to reality and to poetry. In the first place, Rousseau did not say men are good; he said they are born good. In the second place, the goodness of man as Rousseau presents it, has strictly nothing to do with the questions I was raising. In the third place, Rousseau's understanding of man in this respect goes back to Lucretius. If my formulation had certain overtones of Robespierre's policy, they were intentional: not because it was Robespierre's, but because policies which attempt so drastically to change men to fit an idea or a desire had occurred long before Robespierre. Shakespeare was aware of the eternal possibility of such action when he produced Othello—the man whose jealousy demands the mortification of those who do not love him or might not love him—as an example of it.[2]

III

I have offered a reasoned justification for the use of the terms in the three statements, "admittedly out of context," that Burckhardt wished to submit to the judgment of a panel of consumers of literary criticism. I now address myself to some general considerations involved in the interpretation of Shakespearean drama, particularly as it bears upon the problems of political philosophy. Shakespeare presupposed an audience to which his plays would appeal; their concerns and their experience are ways into his meaning. A man in love appears very differently to a group of school-boys and to a group of priests. We must try to know what Shakespeare expected in a typical reader or spectator. Certainly Shakespeare did not have in mind a typical twentieth century professor of literature. A typical Elizabethan audience itself possessed several levels, and on the highest of these I believe Shakespeare addressed himself to a man with the orientation of a statesman or citizen, who professed the religion of Queen Elizabeth I, and who had a classical education. He had a family and a purely private life, but if he had only these he would be cut off from the higher reaches of Shakespeare's meaning. Only a man who can conceive of what it means to be a king and imagine it as the object of his own ambition can be moved as Shakespeare wanted him to be moved by *Macbeth*. Only a man who knows the charm of empire and is capable of passionate love can feel with Anthony. Only the man who knows what a republic is and can experience the fires of devotion to it can understand Brutus. Now these awarenesses, which the spectator must bring to the drama if it is to have its full meaning for him, are themselves the consequences of human passions or desires. And it is one of the paramount tasks of political philosophy to state discursively what is implied in human desires. If Shakespeare presents us with the powerful portrait of a tyrant—as he does in *Macbeth*—it can only be because, somehow or other, he had grasped something profoundly true concerning the nature of tyrants. For no matter how beautiful Shakespeare's words, if the portrait rang false, the man who knew something about tyrants would be repelled by it. As then the spectator must have an awareness of the problems to respond to the play, the interpreter must have some knowledge concerning them. Scholarly interpretation requires the study of political philosophy; in particular it requires the study of the history of political philosophy, because today we must recover Shakespeare's frame of reference, and that of his public, a frame of reference no longer entirely our own.

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[2] Two further points should be answered, although they find no natural place within the body of my response.

(1) Burckhardt accuses Jaffa of contradicting himself, as follows: "It is important for him to prove that Lear had already chosen the Duke of Burgundy to be Cordelia's husband; the textual evidence for this being non-existent, he makes what he can of the fact that, after Cordelia's disgrace, Burgundy is the first to be asked if he will still marry her. . . . The same fact—the sequences of asking—is used to buttress two hypotheses in such a way that one use invalidates the other; for if the offer of Cordelia's hand has now become an insult (as indeed it has), what are we to conclude from her being offered to Burgundy first?" But Burckhardt does not report Jaffa's article accurately: Burgundy's reply to Lear, that he "crave(s) no more than hath your Highness offered," certainly is textual evidence, and Jaffa presents it to show that overtures have been made to Burgundy which we have no reason to think have been made to France. Even so, Jaffa was careful to point out that this statement is itself ambiguous, that Burgundy's knowledge of what the dowry would be does not itself mean that he would be the bridegroom. But suppose that only the one fact—the sequence of asking—had been used to buttress two hypotheses, does the one use invalidate the other? Jaffa maintained that Burgundy had been chosen originally because he was the smaller power, and that he was offered the disgraced Cordelia also because he was the smaller power. The fact that in the first instance her hand was an honor, and in the second a dishonor, does not constitute a contradiction.

(2) Burckhardt says I cited only two articles written since 1900. This is true. In my defense, I think I might require of Burckhardt, if he is not merely being pedantic, to show precisely what errors I have made because I did not cite the books which he has read. I would add that, had I undertaken to explain why I had not been content to "accept and retail" what all literary critics have produced and marketed concerning *Othello* since 1900, I would have required much more space than an entire issue of this REVIEW provides. But is it not a bit curious that someone who pleads for a "mindless surrender" to the text should insist that I rely on an enormous mass of secondary literature?

Burckhardt's misunderstanding of political philosophy leads him to reject Jaffa's arguments about friendship which are at the core of his interpretation of the first scene of *King Lear*. Burckhardt refers to experience to liberate himself from the shackles of logic. But some logic is necessary to speak of experience as well as to know what is relevant in it. He cites Montaigne, who he evidently does not think is a philosopher, to indicate that Plato and Aristotle do not understand what friendship really is. I do not know what passage in Montaigne he has in mind, nor am I aware that Montaigne disagrees with the views of Plato and Aristotle on friendship. Burckhardt does not believe that friends must be alike in the fundamental respect if they are to be friends, or that a man likes to see himself in his friends. He thinks Jaffa uses Aristotle as an authority; actually Jaffa cited Aristotle because Aristotle had described with what seemed to be perfect adequacy what Jaffa had himself observed in life.

Now, disregarding false friendships or superficial acquaintances, which are today often called friendships, friends must have something in common. Otherwise they could not enjoy the continued companionship which is the soul of friendship. The obvious differences between friends may be external to their relationship; or, they may be complementary aspects of an invisible, but underlying identity, which forms them, when they are together, into a greater unity. When they are together they share some interests or they are not friends. A man who loves rational discourse cannot spend his life pleasantly with someone who despises it. A friend of such a man must respect this activity, and a friend in the full sense must join in it and share in it. This itself implies a basic similarity.

So, the salient traits of each may differ, and it may be that it is only when they are together that each finds the fulfilment of his own intellectual powers. Who does not know from experience that such a relationship is possible, and that in it the differences of individuals become causes of a unity, and the unity of an identity, in which each in turn shares? And is it contrary to experience to say that this identity is, in a deep sense, the truer self of each of the individuals who are friends? Of course it sometimes happens that men change, or that they find out that they were not what they thought they were. Upon such a change, friendship dies, although good feeling may remain. To take what is most massive and important for reasonable men, it is usually observed that good men choose good men as their friends. The instances Burckhardt has drawn from Shakespeare illustrate Jaffa's point, not his own. The difficulties which occur in these friendships are variations upon the rule. What draws Brutus to Cassius? Not his envy of Caesar, but his opposition to tyranny and love of the republic. Their association is grounded on Brutus's belief that what is most important to him is also most important to Cassius. Their difficulties begin when Brutus questions the single-minded devotion of Cassius. And it is because Lear forgets himself that he forgets what had united him with Kent and Cordelia. No references to Goneril's and Regan's opinions of Lear will, I think, efface the impression that the man who commanded the love of such a one as Kent was of a frank and open character.

Burckhardt's rejection of political philosophy has as its consequence that he rigidly applies his own conventional morality to the plays in the face of all evidence to the contrary. And conventional morality is really convention and not morality. It does not take into consideration the real meaning of human actions. He accuses me of moral obtuseness for the favorable tone in which in certain places I speak about Iago. In this accusation one can see why it is that Burckhardt can separate words from their meanings: he does not need Shakespeare's help in discovering the meanings needed to assign the words their values. Iago is a bad man, and Othello is a good man, and nothing more need (or may) be said. I read the play somewhat differently. It is undeniable to me that Iago is base, but the quality of his baseness, what makes him different from other villains, remains for the critic and interpreter to specify. There is no question that, in a profound though not necessarily exhaustive sense, he understands the other figures in the play better than anyone within it. His critiques of other characters are frequently proved to be true by their subsequent actions. No open-minded reader of the text can fail to observe that Iago has a certain portion of the truth, and that the truth in his possession serves to illuminate the shortcomings of others. Shakespeare meant this to be seen; perhaps he even meant us to see the problem represented by such a combination of acuteness and unalloyed wickedness as is found in Iago, a combination whose possibility ordinary morality might close our eyes to.

I quote from another writer who shares my moral obtuseness:

> "The conduct of Iago they [a fifteenth century Italian audience] would assuredly have condemned; but they would have condemned it as we condemn that of his victim. Something of interest and respect would have mingled with their disapprobation. The readiness of his wit, the clearness of his judgment, the skill with which he penetrates the dispositions of others and conceals his own, would have ensured him a certain portion of their esteem."

The writer is Macaulay, and the question he discusses is whether Shakespeare's own moral judgments are in complete accord with those accepted by Macaulay's age or any other. I do not propose to restate my case here about Iago or Desdemona; it is sufficiently developed in my article. But it can easily be shown that Shakespeare often subjects a nobler figure to the criticism of a baser one, bringing to light weaknesses in the hero that make it impossible to identify Shakespeare's own point of view with that of the hero.

This is what Burckhardt calls "brinksmanship"; a noble character is tested and, in the extreme test, his greatness *and* his limitations stand revealed. Is this not the very essence of tragedy? Shakespeare always maintains a distance from his tragic heroes, even while living their situations completely. His tragedies always point beyond themselves—to a virtue which, while remaining noble, is not susceptible to the disasters of the tragic heroes. A blindness to the defects of the heroes is a blindness to the highest forms of humanity.

For example, Cassius is by far a less noble figure than Brutus; but there are at least four instances in *Julius Caesar* where Cassius sees something to be vital to the conspiracy which Brutus rejects. If we reason out these incidents, we will see that it is not accidental that Brutus does so, but that his rejection of Cassius's advice follows from his understanding of political morality. Yet notwithstanding his moral superiority to Cassius, his political understanding is inferior and his judgment is wrong. Shakespeare makes it clear not only that Brutus does not entirely grasp political reality, but also that his morality depends in a way upon the vices of others: he needs and uses the money Cassius obtains by means that he cannot approve. There is a certain rashness and hypocrisy mixed with Brutus's virtue that cannot be overlooked by one who wishes to understand, although undiscerning eyes may be dazzled by his professions and his reputation. Notwithstanding his moral inferiority, Cassius possesses qualities indispensable to complete virtue, and only a man who combined the virtues of Brutus and Cassius could have successfuly opposed Caesar and re-established the Roman republic. The things that prompt these thoughts are in the play, and an interpreter would do well to study them, instead of issuing manifestoes proclaiming "the specificity of literature as a mode of discourse different from other modes," a specificity so unique that it issues in nothing more than such an empty truism as that the tragic hero "wills and lives his terrifying fall into truth." One must rather be open to the possibility that Shakespeare had a broader and more responsible view of morality than we are accustomed to conceive. The text must be taken with full seriousness; so seriously that when, for example, we come upon the explicit—amazingly explicit—discussion of the merits of conjugal fidelity between Emilia and Desdemona, we must think through the meaning of that discussion in all its ramifications. We must not assume that we know beforehand what Shakespeare thought of the subject. Burckhardt is full of indignation at the doubts he supposes I entertained as to the value of fidelity. His indignation is not part of the verbal structure of the play; but the doubts *are* parts of its structure, no matter how they may ultimately be resolved.

Burckhardt's point of view, as he has stated it, cannot provide an account of Shakespearean drama. He starts with a formalism divorced from the orientation of the spectator and poet, and ends with reading his own prejudices into Shakespeare. The interpreter cannot avoid discussing the poem's relation to moral and political reality; and to do so he must have some knowledge of it. Political philosophy is indispensable to this end; and Burckhardt's neglect of this study is the source of all his errors. Every man must have a frame of reference within which to think and perceive; and when this frame of reference is not itself examined, it is necessarily unclear and self-contradictory.

Schiller pointed out that modern times are characterized by abstract science on the one hand and unrefined passions on the other, and that the two have no relation. A free man and a good citizen must have a natural harmony between his passions and his knowledge; this is what is meant by a man of taste, and it is he whom we today seem unable to form. The unity is lost from life. We are aware that a political science which does not grasp the moral phenomena as presented by art is crude, and that an art uninspired by the passion for justice is trivial. Shakespeare wrote before the time of the separation of these things, and we sense that he unites the vigor of the sentiments with the clarity of reason. If we live with him awhile perhaps we can recapture the fullness of life and rediscover the way to its lost unity. He, like those great German writers who admired him so much, was trying to educate a nation. If political science neglects his presentation of the human issues it is likely to conceive automatons, not men; and if the literary critics were entirely to forget that his concerns were also the concerns of men in civil societies, striving for justice and encountering injustice, they would render him meaningless for life. For Shakespeare created images of political men in order to train men whose nature is political. For him, we may paraphrase Lessing on the role of the sculptor: "A noble man made noble poems, and the state had noble poems to thank for having noble citizens."

ON READING ORDINARY PROSE: A REPLY TO ALLAN BLOOM

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There is no help for it: after taking Allan Bloom to task for reading Shakespeare badly and tyrannically, I must now charge him with doing no better by me. I cannot join the debate at the elevated level he prefers—the level where one can talk about art, life and political philosophy. Since the original issue was the validity or invalidity of his and Harry Jaffa's *Shakespeare interpretations*—and since his rebuttal raises questions about what I did and did not say—he must forgive me for staying closer to the text than he will like. Perhaps, in return for the lesson he has given me in political philosophy, he will accept one in the much humbler discipline of reading.

But first I must try to mollify him over the injustice he feels I did him when I empaneled my imaginary jury. He writes: "In presenting *my* conclusions, I have a right to ask that they be tested in the light of *my* evidence and *my* arguments" [*his* italics]. If I had known that he was writing syllogisms rather than an *Othello* interpretation, I would have been more careful; I thought that he, like any other interpreter, was to be judged by *the* evidence and by *the* ordinary rules of inference. As I see it, only the conclusion of a syllogism can be adequately tested as Bloom demands that his be tested. In an interpretation the interpreter's own evidence may be insufficient or distorted; the argument may neglect contrary evidence, or it may impose constructions which the evidence is not strong enough to bear. Moreover—and more directly to Mr. Bloom's point—since the conclusions are in fact descriptions (however refined) of the object of interpretation, their unrecognisability creates a strong presumption that the interpretation which brought them forth is invalid. As for the jury, I submit that merely by the act of publication Bloom presented his case to just such a jury as I assumed; that he does so again now; and that I am doing the same. If I committed an error in dramatising this simple fact, it was at most that of laboring the obvious. I prefer to pass over the various characterisations by which Bloom sees fit to insult this jury. *My* description of it was simple and clear: "widely read, intelligent men." I should be glad to know what canons of debate he subscribes to, when he willfully distorts the character of a jury which he then attacks *me* for having summoned. The jury *he* complains about is quite of his own selection.

But to the work Bloom has cut out for me. He says sternly: "In the first place, it is not true that Jaffa is unaware that there is a subplot [in *Lear*]." (p. 458) This, I suppose, would be called a "leading assertion": if I agree to it, I am damned; if I disagree, I am demonstrably in the wrong. The only answer I have is that I never said anything of the sort; I am just as positive as Bloom is that Jaffa knew of the subplot's *existence*. On the page Bloom cites, I use the words "this unawareness," but the antecedent sentence, to which they unambiguously refer, reads as follows: "It does not occur to [Jaffa] that his whole elaborate edifice is undermined by no more than the simple fact that it renders the patterned interweaving of the two plots meaningless."

This is a puny matter; I mention it only because it is symptomatic of Bloom's mode of reading texts. In a final note, he requires me, if I am "not merely being pedantic," to show him what error he has made by not citing what recent *Othello* critics "have produced and marketed" (the phrasing casts a revealing light on his mode of argumentation). I will oblige him, not by showing him an error now, but simply by quoting what I wrote in this context and what he therefore had in front of him when he made this demand. After citing his original article to the effect that *Othello* criticism "has tended to forget" the problem of how the hero falls so readily into Iago's snares, I continue: "Had Bloom consulted—to name only one—Robert Heilman's full-length study . . . he would have discovered a very careful treatment of this problem. Indeed, *Othello* criticism has lately been almost obsessed with [it]." Does he require any further information about the error he has made? It was *he* who charged critics with having "tended to forget" a problem which *he* claims to have confronted and solved. My very simple point was that the charge was untrue and the claim correspondingly doubtful.

But I find it hard to remain calm about more important matters. He imputes to me (p. 463) a "conventional morality" so primitive that it leads me to believe that "Iago is a bad man, and Othello is a good man, and nothing more need (or may) be said." Has he any warrant to ascribe to me this absurdly simple-minded belief—a belief which he then makes it his equally simple task to demolish? I did not impute opinions to him; I quoted him, and the quote speaks for itself. I said, and I repeat, that the disparity between his description of Iago as having "no real purpose in life" and the man's monstrous purposefulness is ludicrous. That evil men can be complex, superbly gifted with the insight of malice and able to bring to light the weaknesses of nobler men—does Bloom imagine I would deny this or did not know it? Or has he any reason to suppose that I, after calling to his attention the minute analysis of Robert Heilman, would maintain that nothing more is to be said of Iago than that he is "bad"? I think I can say that I addressed my criticism to what he actually wrote; I do not find that he has returned this elementary courtesy.

My space is limited; I must confine myself to merely listing a few more of his unwarranted imputations and to challenging him to show what evidence he had for making them. He makes me say (p. 458) that Jaffa's "attempt to clarify the sense of the word 'nothing' causes one to lose sight of [the subplot]." He has me (p. 460) believing that the word "cosmopolitanism" is "an importation from philosophy, a discipline which has little to do with literature or life." He saddles me (p. 461) with the conviction that Rousseau "had the preposterous notion that men are good—a notion contrary to experience." He claims (p. 462) that I do not think Montaigne a philosopher; on the same page he asserts that I do not believe "that friends must be alike in the fundamental respect if they are to be friends, or that a man likes to see himself in his friends." There are others, but these, being the easiest for him to check and, if he can, to substantiate, will do.

But enough of this; Bloom makes other points which, though no more valid, are not quite so simple to deal with. He thinks it improper for me to have brought the subplot of *Lear* into my argument against Jaffa, since Jaffa's article was limited to *Lear* I.i., while the subplot sets in only with the following scene. Even if it were true (which it is not) that the article is in fact so limited: what does Bloom think a play is—a link sausage? A play, I should have thought it unnecessary to explain, is an organic whole, so that whatever is said about one part of it (except by way of purely philological explanation) is said under correction of the whole or any related part.

To be sure, he has little respect for patterns; "Shakespeare," he informs us, "did not write the play for the sake of the patterns, the patterns are for the sake of the play." (To translate slightly: "Beethoven did not write the first movement of Opus 132 for the sake of the themes, the themes are for the sake of the movement." If my attempt to define Lear's greatness was an "empty truism," surely Bloom at this point outdoes me.) As a consequence he feels free to ignore my argument about the interweaving of the plots. But rather than repeat this argument, which I think was clear enough the first time, I will spell out a little my point about the patterned use of "nothing." Bloom credits Jaffa with trying "to explain precisely, *in at least one episode*, the nature of the connection between the word and [the fathers'] difficulties" [italics mine]. My point was, and remains, that—the occurrence of the word being, as he admits, patterned—it *cannot* be explained "precisely" in one episode, any more than the motif of the deceived fathers. Any surmise of what it means in any *one* instance must remain tentative. It is most unlikely that Gloster, when he uses "nothing" in the following scene under analogous circumstances, is thinking of "the axiom upon which all understanding of causality is founded" (Jaffa); it is, therefore, equally unlikely that this is its meaning in the first scene, or at least that its import for the meaning of the play as a whole is to be found in this explication of it. Unfortunately, a full interpretation of the word—Bloom will scoff at this—would involve a full interpretation of *Lear*, which obviously I cannot undertake here. But what he calls a "professional game of acrostics" is in truth the very basis of the interpretation of poetry; the tracing and elucidation of patterns—and with Shakespeare these are as often as not *verbal* patterns—is the first step we must take if we want to go (as both Jaffa and Bloom manifestly do) beyond the common-sense apprehension of the play's meaning.

But since it was Bloom who wrote the rebuttal, it is time I addressed myself to his defense of his *Othello* interpretation. He tries to buttress at some length the sentences I cited (proof enough, I think, that what he calls my "singular mode of citation" did in fact single out crucial aspects of his thesis). His defense of the first culminates in the assertion that his arguments have established "the central importance of Othello's Christianity as a precondition of his assimilation into Venetian life" and that this "Christianity is part of his self-awareness." He could have saved himself the effort; I would not think of denying this. The question was whether and how the precondition and self-awareness lead Othello to murder Desdemona. Bloom is too modest; in the sentence I objected to he claimed a good deal more than now: namely, that Othello "believes that the unity of true Christians is a kind of brotherhood of such overpowering influence that local differences pass into insignificance." That is something very different from saying that Othello's being a Christian is part of his self-awareness, or even that he is proud and happy to be a Christian. The *political* meaning which he supposedly attaches to his Christian faith is at the core of Bloom's interpretation, and for this the textual evidence is still lacking.

Next he addresses himself to the word "cosmopolitanism" and argues that it denotes "a permanent and timeless feature of the human condition." Here I will concede him a point. Insofar as I made it appear that to apply the concept of cosmopolitanism to Shakespeare is necessarily an anachronism, I was wrong. But the concession will do nothing for his argument, which is that "Othello is very anxious . . . to be treated as a citizen," and that "he wishes to forget the exclusiveness of civil societies." What is his evidence for this? If Othello is "an unreflective man of action," so that we cannot expect him to *talk* about all this, then presumably he *does* things which cannot be understood except as expressions of this anxiety. What are these actions? (I trust that Bloom will not answer: "the murder of Desdemona," since that, being the action which he claims by this argument among others to explain, would involve him in a rank *petitio principii*—not to mention the fact that it can be explained on more common-sense grounds). In the first act, confronted with the fierce prejudice of Brabantio and perhaps of other men, Othello is a model of calm self-assurance and poise; it would require some very telling evidence to the contrary to support Bloom's assertions here. Where is it?

In defense of his third assertion—that Othello seeks tyrannically to transform men to fit them for his dream cosmopolis—Bloom cites a passage in which Othello speaks ominously to Desdemona, and to Desdemona alone. (As to Othello's earlier belief in man's goodness, it would not have occurred to me to dispute what Bloom tries to show: that Othello is of a free and trusting nature. It was only in the coupling of this belief with the later "tyranny" that the specifically *political* point of the agrument lay; and it was only this political aspect of it that I attacked.) To be sure, he writes that Othello's jealousy "causes him to look at those around him as schemers, full of dishonest passions." But just who *are* "those around him"? Men in general, his soldiers, the citizens of Cyprus? Not at all; they are, to be precise, Desdemona, Emilia and Cassio—which is to say, the three people directly and necessarily implicated in the supposed adultery. By what evidence, then, can this suspicion be made to yield the *political* interpretation Bloom wants to draw from it? Is there a single word, a single act properly called political, which justifies this vast extension of a man's jealousy into a political program?

Bloom has a reply of a sort: "It is one of the paramount tasks of political philosophy to state discursively what is implied in human desires." (For "human desires" we must read, in this case: a man's desire that his wife should be faithful to him.) Political philosophy, it turns out, is the modern theology, to which all the other humanistic and social disciplines are, at best, handmaidens. "To state discursively what is implied in human desires"—the majestic sweep of it! Bloom accuses me of many things, among them that I am "ignorant of the nature both of political philosophy and of the drama" and that I "refer to experience to liberate [myself] from the shackles of logic." I give in; his logic has vanquished and shackled me! I *was* ignorant of the imperial claims of this awesome master-science; and being so, how could I help being ignorant also of the nature of the drama, indeed of all poetry, all psychology, all religion, all things human? In my innocent empiricism, I thought that it might be possible to talk "discursively" about love and jealousy, truth and beauty, friendship, enmity and revenge without being a political philosopher; I am silenced.

But I am learning: "The drama portrays human actions, and political philosophy tries to give an account of what those actions mean." What would Shakespeare, Sophocles, Seneca have done without this all-encompassing discipline?! Incapable as they were of giving a meaning of their own to the actions they portray, their portraits would be like the bare drawings of comic strips, meaningless until the political philosophers have supplied the text. A man murders his wife, but political philosophy makes it clear that really he meant to make mankind fit for an ideal superstate. A man kills his father and marries his mother, but political philosophy will tell me, perhaps, that he really meant to institute a more wholesome family system. A man gives a father his own children to eat, cooked up in a stew, and political philosophy may explain to me that justice consists in giving every man what is his. If the instances from Sophocles and Seneca sound preposterous, I plead that I have had only the most elementary instruction so far; I am waiting for Bloom's *Poetics*, for his *True Meaning* *of Shakespeare* and his *History of the Drama from Aeschylos to Tennessee Williams.*

Besides knowing, as a political philosopher, the meaning of human actions and the implications of human desires, Bloom also knows exactly what was in Shakespeare's mind when he wrote *Othello*. "Shakespeare," he says, "was aware of the eternal possibility of [drastically changing men to fit an idea] when he produced *Othello* . . . as an example of it." (He calls Desdemona's murder and the attempt to murder Cassio "the mortification" of those who do not love Othello. The euphemism is breathtaking; *this* is his word to describe the deeds of a man who says: "I would have him nine years a-killing" and "Ay, let her rot, and perish, and be damned tonight.") His argument that Othello's intentions are pedagogical is iron-clad: "The very notion of justifiable punishment implies such a goal, whether Othello explicitly says so or not." Has Bloom heard of vengeance, or even retribution? In his most moderate (and self-deceiving) speech about the murder, Othello calls it a "sacrifice," not an educational measure; but for the most part he speaks more truly and directly: "Damn her, lewd minx! O, damn her! damn her!"; "I'll tear her all to pieces."; "Arise, black vengeance, from the hollow hell!" I could go on.

This is only one more instance of what I have called Bloom's and Jaffa's main source of error: the reasoning from the "very notion." The very notion may imply all kinds of things in political philosophy; in poetry it implies only what the poet *makes* it imply. To read a play like *Othello*, a play reverberating with cries of vengeance, and then to come up with Bloom's theorems and deductions about justifiable punishment betokens an insensibility so impregnable that it makes me despair of showing him the falsity of his "approach." He will retort—in fact he has already— that I am the victim of "emotionalism," that I think "the most important things are grasped by feeling," that my "psychological" interpretation leads me "into a meaningless morass of unintelligible passions while ignoring Shakespeare's words." He will tell me, almost in the same breath, that Shakespeare did not write for "20th-century professors of literature," that he can be fully understood only by men presumably like himself, men who vibrate to the Elizabethan frequency, who "can conceive of what it means to be a king," "know the charms of empire and are capable of passionate love" and "can experience the fires of devotion to [a republic]." I assume that Bloom is a 20th-century professor of political philosophy; may one ask whom, in this pompous claim to empathy, he is addressing? And is *he* in the position to charge me with emotionalism and too great a reliance on feeling?

No, the issue between him and me is not at all the relation of art and political philosophy to life nor even the various possible approaches to literature. It is the simple one of proper and improper ways to read and to reason. Coming once more to Jaffa's defense, Bloom argues at great length to convince me of something I am quite willing to grant him without argument: that friends usually have something in common. Had he read carefully, he would have discovered at least three things: (1) I nowhere say that Plato and Aristotle "do not understand what friendship really is"; I was not arguing for, or against, any particular notion of friendship. (2) I do say—and this is the only point at issue—that in a *Shakespeare interpretation* no outside description of friendship, whether it is Jaffa's or mine or Plato's or Freud's, has any *probative* force whatever. (Whether the cases of Cassius and Brutus, Hamlet and Horatio, and Romeo and Mercutio do or do not fit the Jaffa-Bloom description, I see no sense in arguing, since my point was that I thought it odd of Jaffa to be citing Plato and Aristotle where the nature of his argument and enterprise clearly demanded supporting evidence from Shakespeare himself.) (3) Even if Jaffa's conception of friendship agrees with Shakespeare's, it will not bear the construction he puts on it: namely, that any man who had Kent for a friend could not possibly have been taken in by Goneril and Regan. Even if I grant the claim that, *before the play's opening,* Kent must have been Lear's friend—there is no evidence for it in the text; on the contrary, Lear treats no one as a friend, not even Kent disguised as Caius—the evidence, *in the play,* that Lear can be and has been flattered is conclusive.

At this point I find it difficult not to charge Bloom with something rather worse than merely the inability to read. He writes: "No references to Goneril's and Regan's opinions of Lear will, I think, efface the impression that the man who commanded the love of such a one as Kent was of a frank and open character." Three comments must, and will, do. (1) Neither Jaffa nor I was talking about Lear's "frank and open character"; the question was whether Lear was susceptible to *flattery.* (2) As Bloom well knew when he wrote this sentence, I quoted, *directly* before my references to Goneril and Regan, a long speech by Lear himself, in which he bitterly admits having been flattered. (3) Bloom's conscientiousness in examining my charges and arguments in the light of the text may be measured by the fact that in Act I, scene i, Kent *himself*, protesting against Lear's mad decision to disinherit and disown Cordelia, says:

> Thinkst thou that duty shall have dread to speak
> When power to flattery bows?

In retrospect, I see that in my critique I made one grievous error: that of raising questions of methodology. Those who know me know that I am only too ready to argue what Bloom calls my "two fundamental canons of interpretation," which are indeed highly arguable and with which some people whose judgment I respect would sharply disagree. But I see no profit in arguing them with him. From his rebuttal I learn what perhaps I should have suspected from his article: that in a controversy with him over what a poem does or does not say, one will have done well if in the end the ordinary prose meaning has been adequately construed. When I talked about "modes of discourse" and "mindless surrender to words," I had assumed that a reasonably full and concrete common-sense understanding of the play had preceded Bloom's attempt at interpretation, as it must every such attempt. I find that I was wrong, and for this reason withdraw my "canons" from the argument.

But lest he should feel that I am unfair in thus withdrawing the few assertions I am positively committed to, while holding him responsible for the many things to which he has committed himself, I will conclude by coming to the defense of my statement about Lear's greatness. ("He is great because he does not cheaply and feebly strike bargains with his disillusionment, because he wills and lives his terrifying fall into truth so uncompromisingly and vastly that he is transfigured.") I do so, not because it is important to my critique, but to show Bloom how he might have defended his own assertions, if they are defensible. He says of my statement that it is "shallow and pretentious," that its terms are "woefully imprecise" and are not drawn from the play, and that it is an "empty truism" which "could be applied to almost any tragic hero." Except for a purely personal slur upon me, I think this is a full catalogue of his charges, without omissions or imputations.

Whether what I say is shallow and pretentious, I cannot argue; Bloom thinks it is, I think it isn't; the matter must be left to the jury. Are the terms woefully imprecise? The terms are: disillusionment, strike bargains, will, live, fall, truth, transfigure. (I have omitted adjectives and adverbs.) Of these, I trust that Bloom, who talks about "life" and "art" and the "very essence of tragedy," will grant me at least "will" and "live" without argument. "Strike bargains" refers, precisely, to the scene in which Goneril and Regan try to bargain Lear out of his claim to retainers. "Disillusionment" is painfully clear and concrete for, at least, any reader of *Lear*. "Fall," precise enough in itself, is made even more so in *Lear*, where Lear's counterpart, Gloster, literally and before our eyes falls (not into truth, but into a pious fraud), while Lear himself falls from his high station into the abject misery of the "bare forked animal." "Truth" is, I admit, a vague word; but since both Shakespeare and Jaffa use it frequently and crucially, I don't see how I can be censured for it. "Transfigure," finally, has a reasonably precise meaning in Christian tradition; and though the word does not occur in Lear, the fact does occur very concretely: when Lear emerges from his insanity, he speaks of himself as dead and surrounded by "souls in bliss" and therewith enters, briefly, upon what is called a transfigured existence. I think that in answering the charge of imprecision, I have also answered the charge that the statement is not drawn from *Lear*; the two charges are, in fact, one and the same.

Is the statement an empty truism applicable to almost any tragic hero? Is it applicable—to name the first that come to mind—to Orestes, to Oedipus, to Brutus, to Hamlet, to Othello, to Macbeth, to Anthony, to Coriolanus? In case Bloom thought that I was talking about the flash of self-knowledge at the moment of final disaster—the final insight, *e.g.*, of Oedipus and Othello, which is of a kind fairly common in tragedy—I beg him once again to *read*; he will find that I wrote, and meant, the words "wills and lives."

If Bloom had condescended to defend his statements against my charges at this level instead of rising to the "higher" one which he finds more congenial, who knows but something tangible might have come of our dispute. As it is, I am afraid that very little has. I have no peroration, no quotes from Lessing and Schiller. I know that in this reply[1] I have been indignant and at times sharper than is customary in scholarly disputes; but I do not find it in me to apologize, since I think the provocation more than ample. All the same, I am sorry for the necessity. I conclude with no sense of satisfaction, only with the timid hope that the issues are a little clearer. And so I leave my case to the jury.

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[1] Of many more points that should be answered, a sample must suffice:

(a) Bloom makes it appear that my allusion to "brinkmanship" refers to the testing of Lear the *man*, which, he says (and I would not object) is "the very essence of tragedy." The fact is that both Jaffa and I are talking, in this context, about the political *scheme* which Jaffa imputes to Lear. The distinction between scheme and schemer is vital. If Secretary Dulles's policies had issued in a

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nuclear war, that failure by itself would still have been a far cry from making a tragic hero of him; only the quality of his response could have done so. Anthony Eden failed at Suez; from his memoirs I should judge that the experience fell somewhat short of making a Lear of him.

(b) Though Bloom charges me with carelessness for going, in my critique, beyond the confines of *Lear* I.i. (*cf.* above), he himself, within two pages of making this charge, writes: "All Jaffa was trying to do was to give some clear and distinct notion of what such words as 'self-knowledge' and 'justice' mean *within the universe of King Lear*" [italics mine]. And not even that is correct.

(c) Throughout his rebuttal, Bloom tries to create the impression that I considered his and Jaffa's articles a trespass upon the preserves of professional Shakespeareans. A reading of the first paragraph of my critique will show that, on the contrary, I should welcome contributions from political theorists to the understanding of Shakespeare. But I cannot fairly be expected to welcome, for the sake of interdisciplinary exchange, gifts of such doubtful value as I hold these articles to have.

A RESTATEMENT

ALLAN BLOOM

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The REVIEW has been open-minded enough to publish two interpretations of Shakespeare. In these interpretations Jaffa and I argued that Shakespeare has a significant contribution to make to the understanding of political problems, and that part of Shakespeare's intention was political. Our critic has seen fit to challenge our competence to interpret Shakespeare and hence to call in question our entire enterprise.

Jaffa and I contended that Shakespeare's plays give evidence of a comprehensive reflection about man's nature, and that their significance can only be fully elucidated by a philosophic analysis of the actions and passions represented in them; their greatest depth and beauty, we believe, is a consequence of the fact that they incarnate fundamental human problems; the only interpretation that might do justice to all the details of a Shakespearean play is one which can make these problems as explicit as possible. We hold that there are a number of authors in the history of literature who used their art to educate men in their political responsibilities. In each instance there is, we believe, underlying their art, a developed view of human nature. From their works one can reproduce their teaching. Burckhardt denies all of this; this was and is the issue between us. Jaffa and I tried in two instances to show the necessity and advantage of such an approach. Burckhardt wanted to bring us before the tribunal of specialized literary criticism; we do not accept the jurisdiction of that tribunal; we can no more be expected to recognize an authority whose principles we reject than Galileo could rightly have been expected to submit his conclusions to the judgment of the scholastic physics, which he argued could not understand the phenomena. The principles of judgment must first themselves be discussed. Burckhardt neither gave our arguments serious consideration nor did he refute the possibility that an author's intention may be philosophic although he wrote dramas rather than treatises. The possibility persists that the distinction between literature and philosophy is not so simple as he assumes. His argument merely asserts that the interpretations seem improbable.[1]

I responded that he began with an anti-philosophic prejudice and that he shows himself, moreover, completely innocent of any knowledge of philosophy. His response justifies me completely. He parodies my statements and ridicules the notion that political philosophy might be the queen of the human sciences. It may indeed turn out upon examination to be true that political philosophy cannot make good such a claim, but the claim cannot be dismissed without such an examination. Within the tradition in which Shakespeare lived and worked, the sovereignty of the philosophic discipline was almost universally accepted. From Socrates until the eighteenth century, politics was understood to be the "architectonic science." In virtue of civil society, it was believed, man attains his fulfillment and happiness; all pursuits, all education, all art take their place within it and can be judged only in relation to this comprehensive order. Political philosophy is the only discipline that considers the whole man in relation to the order of the whole. The Renaissance renewed the vitality of this understanding of political philosophy, an understanding which is at the root of what came to be known as humanism. I do not here attempt to prove Shakespeare accepted that understanding of political philosophy but I believe I am justified in attempting to discover whether he did. In attempting to interpret an author, we must try to discover the implicit principles of his art and beware of applying principles peculiar to our own time. Burckhardt has been led to reject a classic position without giving it a hearing. Eminent critics who were closer to Shakespeare's own time and who still knew the classic authors are in accord with Jaffa's and my understanding of the relation of political philosophy to literature; I need only mention Shaftesbury, Fenelon, and Lessing.

This is the real point of difference between Burckhardt and us. It is, without doubt, a question worthy of and requiring debate. It cannot be disposed of with levity and sarcasm.

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[1] This is what I objected to in Burckhardt's jury. He presented my conclusions without my arguments. Argumentation proceeds from known facts to unknown ones. Burckhardt took the unknown facts and presented them to the jury without those which would have made them intelligible. I never objected to presenting my *whole* case to just such a jury, although I should never have thought of taking a vote.

Even if the ancient dignity of political philosophy were not grounded in natural right, the possibility would still exist that Shakespeare paid homage at her throne. But Burckhardt writes as though I have simply invented the whole tradition with respect to the scope of political philosophy. He implies that Sophocles, Seneca and Shakespeare managed perfectly without political philosophy, and that with it I distort and torture their meaning, arbitrarily. But both Plato and Aristotle treated Sophocles as though he too had reflected on the philosophic issues. No one can doubt that Seneca understood himself to be both philosopher and educator. Is it impossible that Shakespeare did so too? This is not the place for interpretation; I am only trying to show that Jaffa and I should not be denounced for considering that it is possible.

Burckhardt has in his response made certain clarifications and concessions which show that he admits much more of what we have done than his first article would have led readers to believe.

1. He now admits that he did not quarrel with Plato's and Aristotle's notions about friendship, as he certainly appeared to do in his article. He now only denies that they can be used as authorities. So do we. We say that, since they are accepted by Plato, Aristotle, Burckhardt and most thoughtful men, it is possible Shakespeare accepted them too. If, as hypotheses, they explain certain occurrences in the play, then we are justified in saying Shakespeare may have shared these notions and was illustrating them. I cannot however accept Burckhardt's assertion that as an outside source Plato is no more authoritative than Freud. Would he say that Aristotle offers no more help than Karl Marx in interpreting Dante? But that returns us to our previous discussion.

In this context Burckhardt feels constrained to do what he so rarely does, namely, to conduct the argument with reference to specific texts. He tries to show that Jaffa is wrong in citing Plato because the text does not support Plato's view. He quotes Kent's refusal to stand silently by and allow Lear to be governed by flattery. Burckhardt neglects, however, to mention that Kent is immediately banished for his pains. And he neglects these further considerations. Does it seem probable that Kent's standing at court should be due to his preferring the king's favor to the king's interest? Is it not much more probable that Kent is reacting in a characteristic way, but that it is uncharacteristic for Lear to permit himself to be flattered in such a massively mistaken way? That, at least, is the basis of Jaffa's argument and the reason for his careful search for those properties in the first scene of *King Lear*, that led to such improbable behavior by the king. That Burckhardt is wrong should not blind us to the fact that he has taken a step in the right direction.

2. In Burckhardt's article it appeared as though I were being condemned for having attributed certain strengths and virtues to Iago, and that I lacked the moral sensitivity to recognize the depth of Iago's wickedness. Any reader of section IV of my article would have seen that Burckhardt had taken a few phrases out of context and distorted their sense. But now the question appears to be whether I have committed a factual error. I said Iago was purposeless; is he really purposeful? Everything depends upon the meaning we are to attach to the word "purpose." What I meant by purposeless, in this context, was that Iago lacked a visible and intelligible end for his actions. It is evident why Richard III murders; he wants a crown. Most of us would not murder for a crown, but we can understand why a man would want a crown. Why does Iago want to destroy Othello? To avenge a supposed adultery? To become the lieutenant? None of these is adequate to explain the motive of Iago's villainy.

3. Burckhardt mentioned my interpretation of Othello's Christianity three times in his article. At first he did not appear to regard Othello's Christianity as worth mentioning. Now he "would not think of denying" the "importance of Othello's Christianity as a precondition of his assimilation into Venetian life." Is a belief which permits a man to enter a state from which he would otherwise be excluded not of political significance?

4. Burckhardt now admits that Shakespeare might have been aware of what is implied by the word "cosmopolitanism." This suggests how his jury system might miscarry. The unfamiliarity of terms does not mean that they are erroneously used. Burckhardt now contends only that *Othello* does not deal with the problem of cosmopolitanism. He says there is no evidence. But if what Burckhardt has admitted about Christianity and Venice in relation to Othello is correct, then the problem must be in the play. This is a good beginning for the analysis I have made.

5. Burckhardt now admits that Othello believed men to be good and hence also that his jealousy changed that belief. He also admits that Othello tried to transform Desdemona.

The only thing that still escapes Burckhardt s the political ground and consequences of such an attempt.

6. Burckhardt presents me with a model of literary interpretation based on a sentence of his own. In so doing he interprets the word "transfigures." He recognizes that the word does not occur in the play; but, in his view, it helps to interpret words that do occur in the play. The word comes from the "Christian tradition" within which, Burckhardt knows, Shakespeare lived. This is permissible for Burckhardt; why is it not for us? Burckhardt does not, because he cannot, consistently deny the interpretive principles we have employed. He only rejects them when they result in something strange to him. The Christian tradition is familiar to Burckhardt, therefore it may be used to interpret Shakespeare; the tradition of political philosophy is unfamiliar to him, therefore it may not be used.

Burckhardt's concessions bring him closer to our understanding of the relevance of the tradition of political philosophy for the interpretation of Shakespeare. Can anyone doubt that if this tradition helps us to understand Shakespeare, then Shakespeare will help us to understand political philosophy? Whether this enterprise will prove successful may be open to question. That it is worthy of the most sustained and intense intellectual effort cannot be doubted.

[At this stage the REVIEW closes its pages to this exchange. —MAN. ED.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 1958–1959: II

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II. QUESTIONS OF STATE POWER

1. *Due Process of Law*

Censorship of Motion Pictures. A recent amendment to the New York statute dealing with the licensing of motion pictures defines as "immoral" a picture "the dominant purpose or effect of which is erotic or pornographic; or which portrays acts of sexual immorality, perversity, or lewdness, or which expressly or impliedly presents such acts as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior." The Education Department denied a license to the distributor of "Lady Chatterley's Lover" on the finding that three scenes were "immoral." On appeal, the Regents of the University of New York upheld the denial of the license on the broader ground that "the whole theme of this motion picture is immoral under said law, for that theme is the presentation of adultery as a desirable, acceptable and proper pattern of behavior." In affirming the denial, the Court of Appeals unanimously and explicitly rejected any notion that the film was obscene, but found rather that the picture as a whole "alluringly portrays adultery as proper behavior," and that the only part of the statute applicable here was that which bars films which portray "acts of sexual immorality . . . as desirable." Though there was no agreement on a single opinion, the Justices were unanimous in reversing the Court of Appeals.[88] In behalf of a bare majority, Justice Stewart argued that since the state construction took the case outside the scope of such concepts as "obscenity" or "pornography," and did not even suggest that the film would incite to illegal action, the state has in effect prohibited the exhibition of a motion picture because it advocates an idea, that under certain circumstances adultery may be proper behavior. This runs contrary to the basic guarantee of the First Amendment, which is the "freedom to advocate ideas," and thus the state has quite simply "struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty." For the state misconceives what the Constitution protects. "Its guarantee," wrote Justice Stewart, "is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax. And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing." Free speech, he went on to argue, cannot be denied where advocacy falls short of incitement, and where there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy will be acted on immediately. Justice Stewart thought this was no occasion to decide whether the state has any power to license films before exhibition or whether controls in this situation are the same as those applicable to newspapers, books and individual speech, because the inflexible command of the state "cuts so close to the core of constitutional freedom." He thought it was sufficient to affirm that motion pictures are within the basic protection of due process.

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[88] Kingsley Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). See Note, "The Law of Obscenity: New Significance of the Receiving Group," *Indiana Law Journal*, Vol. 35, pp. 426–441 (Spring, 1959); Elmer E. Smead, *Freedom of Speech by Radio and Television* (Washington, 1959); Marjorie Fiske, *Book Selection and Censorship* (Berkeley, 1959); Eberhard and Phyllis Kronhausen, *Pornography and the Law* (New York, 1959).

In a concurring opinion, Justice Black maintained that since the Supreme Court lacked special expertise, it was most inappropriate for it to sit as a supreme board of censors; for if the Justices decide after viewing each film, then they are merely applying their own purely personal standards of what is immoral. Since there are no agreed-upon standards, this would tend to breed uncertainty, contrary to the rule of law which the Constitution contemplates. He preferred to say flatly that prior censorship of movies, like prior censorship of newspapers and books, violates due process. Justice Frankfurter, having seen the picture, expressed surprise that anyone should regard it as immoral. But he thought that the Court's opinion was too broad. The problem, he argued, is to formulate constitutionally allowable safeguards without impinging upon the necessary dependence of a free society upon the fullest scope of free expression. Asserting that it is not for the Court to draft legislation, he then proceeded to outline some essential qualities of such laws: they must not be too vague, or give the administrators too wide a discretion; they must be "responsive to the common understanding of men"; and the Court must be alert to invalidate laws which "lead to timidity and inertia and thereby discourage the boldness of expression indispensable for a progressive society." Once more Justice Douglas asserted that the terms of the First Amendment are absolute, and that it was not proper to read the word "reasonable" into it. Justice Clark contented himself with the argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, with the censors possessing a "roving commission in which individual impressions become the yardstick of action." Justice Harlan argued that the statute was constitutional, but that it had been applied in an unconstitutional manner in this case. He said that he had seen the film and could not regard it as anything more than a somewhat unusual and rather pathetic "love triangle." He also insisted that as in other due process fields, the Court cannot hope to spare itself the necessity for individualized adjudication.

Legislative Investigations. The power of state loyalty investigating committees to punish witnesses for refusing to answer questions was reviewed in several important decisions. One involved the power of the Attorney General of New Hampshire, sitting as a one-man legislative investigating committee, to require Uphaus, the Executive Director of World Fellowship, Inc., a voluntary corporation organized under state law, to supply the names of all persons who had been guests at a summer camp maintained by the organization during two seasons.[89] Dividing 5–4, the Supreme Court held, first of all, that the field of subversion had not been preempted by the Smith Act, since the *Nelson* case[90] did not strip the states of the right to protect themselves. Since a state may proceed with prosecutions for sedition against itself, it follows, *a fortiori*, that it may legitimately investigate in this area. The state has full power to deal with internal civil disturbances, and therefore has an unimpaired right to require the production of papers on the part of a state-chartered corporation in an inquiry to determine whether corporate activity is violative of state policy. Secondly, the majority held that there was no due process violation in this case. It concluded that since the World Fellowship was neither a university nor a political party, the academic and political freedoms discussed in the *Sweezy* case[91] were not involved here in the same measure. But the main federal question was whether the public interests of the state overbalanced the private interest in associational privacy. On this point Justice Clark noted that there were subversives in the state, that only about 300 names were involved, and that the Attorney General had reason to believe that some of the guests might have been subversive persons, since at least 19 speakers at the camp had Communist connections. The investigative power of the state need not be limited until sufficient evidence is gathered to justify the institution of criminal proceedings for subversion. Justice Clark pointed out that the state regards the Communist Party as posing a serious threat to its security, and thus this investigation was undertaken in the interest of self-preservation, the ultimate value in any society. "This governmental interest," he wrote, "outweighs individual rights in an associational privacy which, however real in other circumstances, . . . were here tenuous at best," since the camp was public and operated under a state law requiring the maintenance of a register open to police inspection.

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[89] Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). See Roger C. Cramton, "The Supreme Court and State Power to Deal with Subversion and Loyalty," *Minnesota Law Review*, Vol. 43, pp. 1025–1082 (May, 1959). For the impact of federal power upon state action in this field, see: Roger Paul Peters, "Civil Rights and State Non-Action," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, Vol. 34, pp. 303–334 (May, 1959); Francis D. Wormuth, "The Present Status of the Civil Rights Act of 1875," *Utah Law Review*, Vol. 6, pp. 153–168 (Fall, 1958).

[90] Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).

Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas registered concurrence. He insisted that exposure purely for the sake of exposure is not a valid state purpose justifying subordination of constitutionally protected rights of speech and assembly. He thought that this investigation was clearly outside the wide limits of power which must be conceded to the state, even though it be attended by some exposure, since there was in his judgment no evidence that constitutionally punishable conduct went on at the camp. There was discussion at the camp of political and other public matters by private citizens, within the scope of the constitutional guaranty of free speech. Thus he insisted that the investigation lacked any rational connection with a discernible legislative purpose, and was merely a roving inquiry into behavior in a constitutionally protected area. Justices Black and Douglas filed a brief statement to stress that the opinion of Justice Brennan made it clear that New Hampshire had violated the Bill of Attainder Clause of the Constitution.

A second case dealt with the conviction of four persons for refusal to answer, on grounds of self-incrimination, certain questions put to them by the Un-American Activities Commission of Ohio.[92] Although they had been informed by the Commission that they had a right to rely upon the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Ohio Constitution, the state supreme court held that all persons are presumed to know the law of Ohio, and that a state immunity statute deprives witnesses of the protection of the privilege whenever they decline to answer a question on the basis of the privilege. At the hearing the witnesses were not directed by the chairman to answer. All the Justices agreed that the judgments of the Ohio Supreme Court affirming the convictions of three of the four defendants violated due process, for to hold the other way "would be to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State." These men were convicted for exercising a privilege which the state clearly had told them was available to them. The force of criminal sanctions cannot be given, said Justice Brennan, to "inexplicably contradictory commands in statutes ordaining criminal penalties." In fact, the state's command in this case was more than simply vague or contradictory; it was actively misleading. The Justices divided evenly, however, thus affirming the conviction below, as to the fourth witness, who had been convicted for declining to answer the question, "Where do you reside?" The Chairman had refused to accept the plea of self-incrimination and twice directed the witness to answer. In this instance four Justices thought that there had been no entrapment, since it was made clear to the witness, even without reference to the Ohio immunity statute, that for that question the privilege was not available. The other four members of the Court argued that since the state supreme court had made no finding that the Commission was right in saying that no response to the question could possibly incriminate, this conviction too had been affirmed by reason of the immunity statute, and hence this witness had been as much entrapped as the others.

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[91] Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).

[92] Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).

In a third case the Court unanimously reversed the conviction for contempt of a witness who had refused to answer certain questions put to him by the Virginia Committee on Law Reform and Racial Activities (Thomson Committee), which had been established by the Virginia Assembly as part of its "massive resistance" to school integration.[93] The defendant, a printer, was an advocate of racial integration in the schools, and helped to organize a group which published newsletters on the subject. At the hearing the witness had asked what the specific subject of the inquiry was, and the chairman replied that it dealt with the tax status of racial organizations, the effect of integration on the schools and welfare of the state, and the violation of the laws against champerty, barratry and maintenance. But he also told the witness that several of these subjects did not apply primarily to him. Without further clarification, and over the witness' objection that he had not been properly informed of the subject of the inquiry, the Committee proceeded to put some 31 questions to him, all of which he declined to answer. At the circuit court hearing on the contempt charge which followed, the chairman ruled out as inapplicable to the witness each of the subjects which the legislature had authorized the Committee to investigate; and the judge who ordered him to answer the questions made no clearer statement of their pertinence. Without reaching any constitutional due process issue relating to speech, press and association, the Court was content to hold that on the face of this unclear and conflicting record, the witness had not had an opportunity to understand the basis for the questions or any justification on the part of the Committee for seeking the information he refused to give. "To sustain his conviction for contempt under these circumstances," said Justice Black, "would be to send him to jail for a crime he could not with reasonable certainty know he was committing." Fundamental fairness, the Court has often held, requires reasonable certainty in such matters, and especially where "vagueness might induce individuals to forego their rights of speech, press, and association for fear of violating an unclear law."

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[93] Scull v. Com. of Virginia ex rel. Committee on Law Reform and Racial Activities, 359 U.S. 344 (1959).

State Jurisdiction over Fugitive Witnesses. New York v. *O'Neill*[94] brought to the Court a series of constitutional questions in interstate relations. O'Neill, a citizen of Illinois, had travelled to Florida to attend a convention. Pursuant to a Florida statute, the Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within and Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, the Circuit Court of Dade County responded to a certificate executed by a New York trial court judge by summoning O'Neill before it to determine whether he should be given into the custody of New York authorities for transportation to New York to testify in a grand jury proceeding there. Both the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court of Florida held that the statute violated the United States Constitution. This statute, now in force in 42 states and in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, was formulated in its present form in 1936 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It is a reciprocal act, operative only between the states which have adopted it. That they are satisfied with it is reflected in the fact that Puerto Rico and 40 of these states joined in an *amicus* brief in its support. The act extends to any witness wanted in a criminal prosecution or grand jury investigation. Under its provisions, the Florida court would determine that the witness was material and necessary, that the trip will not involve undue hardship for the witness, that he will be immune from arrest and from civil and criminal process in the requesting state and in the states through which he will have to travel, and that he will be given specified travel expenses.

Dividing 7–2, the Supreme Court held the Uniform Act constitutional on the basis of considerations of policy and necessity. Justice Frankfurter asserted that to argue that the Rendition Clause of the Constitution denies to the states the right to fashion other cooperative arrangements for the effective administration of justice "is to reduce the Constitution to a rigid, detailed and niggardly code." The decisive question is not whether the Constitution specifically sanctions this sort of state action, but only whether the Constitution clearly forbids it, since the range of state power is not defined in an enumeration of legislative powers. He went on to say: "The Constitution did not purport to exhaust imagination and resourcefulness in devising fruitful interstate relationships. It is not to be construed to limit the variety of arrangements which are possible through the voluntary and cooperative actions of individual States with a view to increasing harmony within the federalism created by the Constitution. Far from being divisive, this legislation is a catalyst of cohesion." Furthermore, the Court held that the Act did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause (Art. 4, §2), since this clause merely proscribes discrimination by a state against citizens of other states, whereas the Florida statute applies to all persons within its boundaries. In addition, the Court could find no violation of the national privilege of ingress and egress which is guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Florida could undoubtedly have held O'Neill if he had been a material witness in a criminal proceeding within that state, and this would not have been a lesser limitation on his claim of the right of ingress and egress. In short, the obligation to give testimony was held to be a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the claimed constitutional right. What was involved, the Court ruled, was not the freedom to travel in its essential sense, but at most a temporary interference with voluntary travel. Finally, the Court sustained the Uniform Act against a number of objections founded in due process. The absence of any provision for bail was regarded as presenting only a hypothetical question, since the sole issue was whether the statute was valid on its face. Since the Florida courts have constitutional jurisdiction over persons within the state, they have jurisdiction to order an act even though that act is to be performed outside the state. The Act is not merely an altruistic, disinterested statute, but serves a self-protective function for each of the enacting states. There is, finally, no constitutional rule that it is beyond the power of a state to benefit other states; they may practice and increase comity among themselves. We have a large number of cooperative federal arrangements, and while they are not formulated in the Constitution, they are not offensive to any of its provisions or prohibitions.

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[94] 359 U.S. 1 (1959).

Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Black concurred, filed a dissenting opinion to argue that the right of free ingress and egress within the country was absolutely basic, protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. The only constitutional qualification on this right of national citizenship, he insisted, is the Rendition Clause; and since O'Neill was not a fugitive from justice he was beyond extradition since the Constitution does not provide for the extradition of witnesses by the states. Justice Douglas argued that Congress may, but the states may not, regulate the incidents of national citizenship, and that Congress has done so with the Fugitive Witness Act. A state, he insisted, may not increase its sovereign powers by making an agreement with another state. And to say that O'Neill can be compelled to testify in Florida, he declared, is no ground for compelling him to leave the state to testify in some other state. He said that he did not favor a niggardly construction of the Constitution, but that he did want a liberal construction which will respect the civil rights of the citizen.

Fair Trial and Knowing Use of False Testimony by the Prosecution. As usual, several cases in the 1958 Term dealt with the rights of defendants in criminal cases. In an Illinois murder trial, the principal state witness, then serving a 199-year sentence for the same murder on a plea of guilty, gave crucially important testimony and said, in response to a question by the prosecutor, that he had received no promise of consideration in return for his testimony. The prosecutor had in fact promised him consideration, but did nothing to correct the witness' false testimony. In a post-conviction proceeding, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that while it was clear that the prosecutor knew that the witness had lied in denying that he had been promised consideration, the defendant was not entitled to relief because the jury *had* been told that someone in the Public Defender's office had promised that he would do what he could for the witness. By unanimous vote the Supreme Court reversed, holding that it is now well established that a conviction obtained through the use of false testimony known to be such by the representatives of the state must fall under the Fourteenth

Amendment, and that the same result obtains when the state, although not soliciting the false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.[95] The Chief Justice added that the rule does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness, for the jury's estimate of the reliability of a witness may be decisive. The fact that the jury was told of other grounds for believing that the witness may have had an interest in testifying against the defendant, he argued, does not make a fair trial out of a tainted one, since the jury could have believed that an offer of help from the Public Defender's office would not have influenced the witness.

Right to Counsel. It is now a familiar rule of law[96] that a state denies due process of law if it permits a defendant to be tried for a noncapital offense without representation by counsel where the absence of counsel resulted in injustice. By unanimous vote, the Court applied this rule to a Florida burglary case where the defendant was a young and uneducated farm boy, and the case was a complicated one involving a serious offense and issues which uneducated laymen are not likely to understand.[97]

But in another case the Justices split 5–4.[98] Two licensed private detectives were convicted of contempt for refusing to answer pertinent questions put to them as witnesses summoned in a state judicial inquiry into "ambulance chasing" in the local bar. The judge in charge of the inquiry required counsel retained by these men to remain outside the hearing room while they were being interrogated, though he said he was ready to suspend the questioning whenever they wished to consult with their lawyer. Under New York practice a Justice of the Supreme Court, sitting at Special Term, makes a preliminary investigation and then reports to the Appellate Division; his duties are purely investigatory and advisory; he holds a preliminary inquisition without adversary parties and without making a decree or establishing any right. Judge Cardozo once explained that the proceedings at Special Term are conducted in private in order to protect the reputations of lawyers who might be involved, and that this was not a sitting of a court, but more like a grand jury inquiry into the discovery of crime. In addition, these practices have been approved by the legislature and constitute a well-established state policy, not the procedural innovation of a particular court or judge. A bare majority of the Court sustained the conviction below, holding that while a defendant has an unqualified right to counsel in state criminal proceedings, it has not extended that right to the investigation stages of such proceedings. The recent *Groban* case,[99] which held that a witness who is being examined in private by the state fire marshal in an investigation of the causes of a fire is not constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel while being interrogated, was held to be controlling. As in *Groban*, the protection of the witness lies in the privilege against self-incrimination. The four Justices who had dissented in *Groban* again insisted that *Groban* had been wrongly decided, arguing that secretly compelled testimony does not lose its highly dangerous character and potentialities merely because it is given in a preliminary investigation.

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[95] Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). For other aspects of the problem of fair trial in criminal cases see: Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, *Equal Justice for the Accused* (Garden City, N. Y., 1959); Hans Zeisel *et al.*, *Delay in Court* (Boston, 1959); Robinson O. Everett, "New Procedures of Scientific Investigation and the Protection of the Accused's Rights," *Duke Law Journal*, Vol. 1959, pp. 32–77 (Winter, 1959); Comment, "Fair Trial vs. Free Press in Criminal Trials," *California Law Review*, Vol. 47, pp. 366–373 (May, 1959).

[96] See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

[97] Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959). See Felix Rackow, "The Right to Counsel—Time for Recognition under the Due Process Clause," *Western Reserve Law Review*, Vol. 10, pp. 216–233 (March, 1959).

[98] Anonymous No. 6 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959).

[99] In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).

Double Jeopardy. An important double jeopardy issue, left unresolved in 1958, was finally settled, though only by a 5–4 vote, in 1959. It was in the case of Alfonse Bartkus, who was first acquitted by a federal jury on a charge of robbing a federally insured bank in Illinois. He was then convicted on the same evidence by a state jury of the crime of robbing the bank and given a life sentence under the state's habitual offender statute. The state court considered and rejected the defendant's plea of *autrefois acquit.* In January, 1958, the Supreme Court affirmed the state court's verdict by a 4–4 vote,[100] but a rehearing was granted in May and the case was restored for reargument.[101] A bare majority of the Court again affirmed the state court, holding that to rule that due process bars a second trial "would be disregard of a long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive adjudication."[102] Previous federal and state decisions over a century of time, Justice Frankfurter pointed out, indicate support for the belief that to permit successive state and federal prosecutions for different crimes arising from the same acts is not repugnant to those standards of outlawry which offend the concept of due process.[103] Thus, of the 28 states which have considered this question, 27 have refused to rule that the second prosecution was barred. There was also a practical reason for taking this view. If the defendant is first convicted in a federal court and given a light sentence, then the state would be barred from prosecuting for a more serious offense, the result being "a shocking and untoward deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the States to maintain peace and order within their confines." Thus, Justice Frankfurter maintained that his position was supported by precedent, experience and reason. In addition, and in a preliminary way, the Court also concluded that the state and federal prosecutions were actually conducted separately, and while, as is conventional, the federal and state authorities had cooperated, the state was not merely acting as a tool of the federal authorities in order to circumvent the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Speaking in dissent, Justice Black argued that this decision weakened the constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy, and that this was the first time in history that this Court has upheld a state conviction of a defendant who had previously been acquitted of the same offense in a federal court. Looking back into history, he stressed that the rule against double prosecutions was an ancient and deeply rooted rule, consistent with the spirit of our free country. If double jeopardy is bad, he maintained, then it is equally bad where two sovereigns inflict the punishment rather than one. As for the practical argument, Justice Black said that the assumption that state and nation will seek to subvert each other's laws is wholly unwarranted (a wholly naive view, as any faithful newspaper reader these days will readily attest), and that in any event Congress can in its area of power retain exclusive control or give the states concurrent power on its own terms. The main point developed in the separate dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan was that the state prosecution was so dominated by federal officers that it was in fact a second federal prosecution. Consider these facts: the federal officers solicited the state indictment; they arranged to secure the key witnesses; at the state trial they unearthed additional evidence not previously available; they prepared and guided the state trial; the federal judge postponed the sentencing of two previously convicted accomplices until they had testified in the state trial. Justice Brennan declared that he was all for cooperative federalism, but that cooperation to harass the accused is not a legitimate requirement of federalism. "What happened here," he concluded, "was simply that the federal effort which failed in the federal courthouse was renewed a second time in the state courthouse across the street."

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[100] Bartkus v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 281 (1958).

[101] Bartkus v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 969 (1958).

[102] Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). See Milton G. Gershenson, "Res Judicata in Successive Criminal Prosecutions: *Hoag v. State of New Jersey* and a Proposal," *Brooklyn Law Review*, Vol. 25, pp. 33–38 (December, 1958).

[103] It had been established in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), that while at some point the cruelty of harassment by multiple prosecutions by a state would offend due process, the specific limitation imposed upon the federal government by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not bind the states.

Williams v. *Oklahoma*[104] presented a different sort of double jeopardy problem. After robbing a filling station, Williams forced his way into an automobile, compelled the driver at gunpoint to drive him out of the city, and then killed him. Charged with the crime of murder, Williams entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment. A month later he was charged in the trial court of another Oklahoma county with the crime of kidnapping, and following a plea of guilty he was sentenced to death. After this second plea was made, the district attorney in his summation referred to the murder, over objection, but the judge held that it was proper that he be advised of all the facts, and said in imposing sentence that he had taken into consideration the murder as well as the kidnapping. On the due process issue arising from the consideration which was given to the murder conviction, the Court noted that it had been established in previous decisions[105] that once the guilt of a defendant has been properly established, the sentencing judge, in determining punishment, is not restricted to evidence derived from the examination and cross-examination of witnesses in open court, but may consider responsible, unsworn, out-of-court information as well. And in taking the murder into consideration when imposing sentence on the kidnapping charge, the Court held, the trial judge did not punish Williams a second time for the same offense. Murder and kidnapping are separate and distinct offenses under Oklahoma law, and in this instance neither charge mentioned the other. The judge has a sound discretion in imposing sentence, and is free to consider all the circumstances of the crime, including all mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The Court could not say that it was improper for the judge to consider the fact that Williams had shot and killed the victim in the course of the kidnapping. Justice Douglas dissented alone, protesting that in his opinion Williams was in substance tried twice for murder, in violation of due process.

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[104] 358 U.S. 576 (1959).

[105] The leading precedent was Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).

Confessions. Following arrest on suspicion of murder, Spano was interrogated continuously by a group of officers from 7 P.M. until 4 A.M. During this time a rookie policeman who was a friend of his was called in to work on his sympathy for his pregnant wife and three children. From 4 A.M. to 6 A.M. Spano was driven around the city by the police, during which time he made some oral statements. Court opened at 10 A.M. and Spano was arraigned at 10:15. On these facts a unanimous Court found that the admission of the confession was a violation of due process.[106] Chief Justice Warren explained that society abhors the use of involuntary confessions because they are inherently untrustworthy and because there is a deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law. The following facts supported the conclusion that the confession was not voluntary: Spano was 25 years old and foreign born, with no history of law violation; he had only a half year of high school and a history of emotional instability; the questioning by many policemen was a "massive official interrogation"; he had been questioned for eight straight hours during the night, thus facing mounting fatigue; the police refused to permit him to talk to his lawyer; a police friend was used to play on his sympathy, and this friend made false statements to him. The Court concluded that Spano's will had been overborne "by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused." The Court also ruled that if this confession was bad, it was immaterial that there was other evidence in the record from which the jury might have found the defendant guilty. In two concurring opinions four Justices indicated that since Spano was more than a suspect at the time of his interrogation, having already been indicted before he surrendered to the authorities, the denial of counsel alone was enough to render the confession inadmissible.

Searches and Seizures. Acting on the complaint of a nearby resident, an inspector of the Baltimore City Health Department began an inspection of the neighborhood looking for rats. Frank's house was in an extreme state of decay, and the inspector found evidence of rats outside the house. Frank refused the inspector's request to inspect the basement of his house. At no time did the inspector have a warrant. Frank was then convicted of violating a section of the Baltimore code which provides that if the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any dwelling, he may demand entry in the day time, and if the owner refuses to permit the examination, he shall forfeit $20 for each refusal. Dividing 5–4, the Supreme Court affirmed.[107] Justice Frankfurter said in the majority opinion that the Court is committed to the proposition that one's privacy as against arbitrary intrusion by the police is fundamental to a free society, and is therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, he found several good reasons for holding that the protection of the right to privacy could not prevail in this case. First, this was not a search for evidence for a criminal prosecution; all Frank had been asked to do was to act in a manner consistent with the maintenance of minimum community standards of health and well-being. Secondly, Frank's resistance was not based on any admissible self-protection, but on the denial of any official justification for seeking to enter his home. Thirdly, the power of inspection granted by the Baltimore code was strictly limited: there had to be valid grounds for suspicion of the existence of a nuisance, as there was in this case; the inspection had to be made in the day time, as was done here; officials were not authorized to break in, and this inspector had made no effort at forceful entry. Finally, Justice Frankfurter argued, inspection without warrant as part of a regulatory scheme for the general welfare, and not as a means of enforcing the criminal law, has deep historical antecedents. Maryland authorities have had this sort of authority for over two centuries, and since 1801, when the present ordinance was adopted, many thousands of inspections have been made. The problems which gave rise to this sort of ordinance have greatly multiplied with the growth of urbanism, now a major concern of the American people. Thus, he concluded, considering the long history and even greater modern need for this kind of inspection, the carefully circumscribed demand which Maryland has made does not deny due process. Justice Whittaker filed a concurring statement to emphasize that he understood the majority opinion to be committed to the proposition that the core of the Fourth Amendment applies to the states by way of the Fourteenth.

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[106] Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). See: O. John Rogge, *Why Men Confess* (New York, 1959); Theodore Reik, *The Compulsion to Confess* (New York, 1959); James E. Hogan and Joseph M. Snee, "The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue," *Georgetown Law Review*, Vol. 47, pp. 1–46 (Fall, 1958); M. C. Slough, "Confessions and Admissions," *Fordham Law Review*, Vol. 28, pp. 96–114 (Spring, 1959); American Civil Liberties Union, *Secret Detention by the Chicago Police* (Glencoe, Ill., 1959).

[107] Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). For related problems see: Samuel Dash, Robert E. Knowlton and Richard F. Schwartz, *The Eavesdroppers* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1959); Yale Kamisar, "*Wolf* and *Lustig* Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts," *Minnesota Law Review*, Vol. 43, pp. 1083–1198 (May, 1959); Alan C. Kohn, "Admissibility in Federal Court of Evidence Illegally Seized by State Officers," *Washington University Law Quarterly*, Vol. 1959, pp. 229–260 (June, 1959).

Speaking for the four dissenters, Justice Douglas protested that this decision "greatly dilutes the right of privacy." In fact, he said this was "an inquest over a substantial part of the Fourth Amendment." He insisted that this Amendment does not distinguish between civil and criminal cases, and pointed out that the health inspection could lay the groundwork for a criminal prosecution. He thought there was no excuse in this case for the inspector's failure to get a warrant, since he had plenty of time and abundant evidence to support a request to a magistrate. For this sort of decision ought to be made by judges. "History shows," he asserted, "that all officers tend to be officious; and health inspectors . . . are no exception."

2. *Equal Protection of the Laws*

School Segregation. While there was a great deal of activity in the field of school segregation during the period under review, and much writing on the subject,[108] the Court made it clear that at least for the present the problem rests with the lower federal courts. In one case the Court unanimously affirmed, without opinion, the decision of a three-judge district court which held that the Alabama School Placement Law was not invalid on its face, in view of the presumption that it will be administered in a constitutional manner by the admission of qualified pupils upon a basis of individual merit without regard to race or color.[109] The Supreme Court affirmed on the limited ground on which the district court rested its decision. The door was thus left open for the admission of evidence in a future action bearing upon the actual administration of the statute. In two other cases the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the orders of federal district courts which held invalid a Louisiana statute forbidding the participation of Negroes and white people in the same athletic contests,[110] and which ordered New Orleans to refrain from excluding Negroes from a municipal park.[111]

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[108] See: Southern Education Reporting Service, *Southern Schools: Progress and Problems* (Nashville, 1959); Southern Regional Council, *Intimidation, Reprisal and Violence in the South's Racial Crisis* (Atlanta, 1959); Virgil T. Blossom, *It Has Happened Here* (New York, 1959); Jack Greenberg, *Race Relations and American Law* (New York, 1959); Clement E. Vose, *Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases* (Berkeley, 1959); Carl A. Auerbach, "How Congress Can Speed School Integration," *The New Leader*, Vol. 41, pp. 8–17 (December 22, 1958); Arthur Garfield Hays Memorial Fund, "Racial Integration and Academic Freedom," *New York University*

The Right to Vote. A Negro woman citizen of North Carolina was denied registration as a voter because she refused to take a literacy test as required by a 1957 statute, which reads as follows: "Every person presenting himself for registration shall be able to read and write any section of the Constitution of North Carolina in the English language. It shall be the duty of each registrar to administer the provisions of this section." On appeal, the County Board of Elections denied registration, on a *de novo* hearing, because she again refused to take the literacy test. The North Carolina courts affirmed, as did the Supreme Court by unanimous vote.[112] Justice Douglas made it clear that whether the law has been administered in a discriminatory way was not in the case, and nothing said now prejudices the plaintiff from raising this issue in another proceeding. The states, he pointed out, have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised, so long as discrimination condemned by the Constitution is absent. While it was not suggested that the states are free to adopt any standards they choose, they do have wide scope, and like residence and age, literacy has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent voting. Furthermore, "literacy and illiteracy are neutral on race, creed, color, and sex," and while Justice Douglas noted that literacy and intelligence are obviously not synonymous (a truism for every college teacher), it is not unreasonable in an age of printed

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Law Review, Vol. 34, pp. 725–752 (April, 1959), pp. 899–938 (May, 1959); Samuel Krislov, "Constituency versus Constitutionalism: The Desegregation Issue and Tensions and Aspirations of Southern Attorneys General," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3, pp. 75–92 (February, 1959); Walter F. Murphy, "Private Education with Public Funds?" *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 20, pp. 635–654 (November, 1958); Mark De Wolfe Howe, "Religion and Race in Public Education," *Buffalo Law Review*, Vol. 8, pp. 242–250 (Winter, 1959); Herbert Garfinkel, "Social Science Evidence and the School Segregation Cases," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 21, pp. 37–59 (February, 1959); Symposium, "The Supreme Court Decision: Five Years Later," *Saturday Review*, May 23, 1959, pp. 12–19.

[109] Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education, 358 U.S. 101 (1958). See Daniel J. Meador, "The Constitution and the Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools," *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 45, pp. 517–571 (May, 1959).

[110] State Athletic Commission v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959).

[111] New Orleans City Park Improvement Assoc. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).

[112] Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). See: Margaret Price, *The Negro and the Ballot in the South* (Atlanta, 1959); Frederic D. Ogden, *The Poll Tax in the South* (University, Alabama, 1958); Eleanor Flexner, *Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States* (Cambridge, 1959).

mass communications for the state to conclude that only the literate should be permitted to vote. Whether the North Carolina policy is a wise one, said Justice Douglas, is not for the Court to decide.

The Trial of Indigents. Standing by its recent decision in the *Griffin* case,[113] which was regarded as controlling, the Supreme Court held that a state supreme court denies the equal protection of the laws if it refuses to grant leave to appeal to an indigent defendant merely because he could not afford to pay the filing fee.[114] The fact that in *Griffin* the defendant had only one review available to him, whereas in this case the defendant had already had one review *in forma pauperis* was held to be irrelevant, since the whole point of the *Griffin* decision is that "once the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." For the same reason it was regarded as irrelevant that in *Griffin* review in the state's highest court was a matter of right, whereas here it was in the discretion of the court. There is no rational basis for assuming, the Chief Justice pointed out, that the indigent's motion for leave to appeal will be less meritorious than those of other defendants. In short, "the imposition by the State of financial barriers restricting the availability of appellate review for indigent criminal defendants has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law."

Taxation. An Ohio statute exempts from *ad valorem* taxation merchandise or agricultural products belonging to a nonresident if held in a warehouse for storage only. The Court ruled unanimously that this did not deny a resident with merchandise stored in warehouses in the state the equal protection of the laws.[115] Justice Whittaker called attention to the familiar rule that states have very wide discretion in laying their taxes, and that the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose an iron rule of equality and does not prohibit flexibility and variety which are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. But of course the classification must be reasonable and not palpably arbitrary. The Court noted that the statute is designed to locate needed and useful industries within the state by exempting them, but not others, from certain taxes. Apparently the legislature was trying to encourage the construction or leasing and operation of warehouses in Ohio by nonresidents with attendant benefits to the state's economy, or to stimulate the market for Ohio products by enabling nonresidents to purchase and store them in the state.[116]

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[113] Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

[114] Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). Two Justices dissented in part on the ground that the Court did not have before it for review the final judgment of the state's highest court. The majority treated the letter which the Clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court wrote to the prisoner as in effect a judgment of that court, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1257.

[115] Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959).

[116] The taxpayer relied heavily upon Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949). The Court pointed out that in *Glander* the Ohio statute exempted from taxation certain accounts receivable owned by residents of the state, but taxed those owned by nonresidents. This was clearly a discrimination against nonresidents. But here the discrimination does not rest merely on the difference in the residence of the owners, but upon a state of facts which can reasonably be conceived to constitute a distinction or difference in state policy. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Brennan pointed out that in *Glander* the distinction burdened the property of nonresidents in favor of Ohio residents, whereas in the instant case the classification based on residence operated *against* Ohio

Regulation of Business. The Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act forbids the sale of any merchandise, either by retailers or wholesalers, at less than cost where the intent is to induce the purchase of other merchandise or to divert trade from a competitor or injure competition. The act allows sales at a price made in good faith to meet the price of a competitor who is selling a comparable product at cost to him. The Court unanimously upheld the statute over several constitutional objections.[117] It rejected the argument that the act deprived the appellant of the constitutional right to compete because it forbids meeting the prices of competitors who are selling below cost. "There is no constitutional right," Justice Frankfurter declared, "to employ retaliation against action outlawed by a State." As the state court had pointed out, the appellant had ample means under state law to enjoin the illegal methods of its competitors; but it has no constitutional right to embark on the very kind of destructive price war which the act was designed to prevent. The Court also rejected the appellant's other main argument, that since competitors giving trading stamps (worth about 2.5 per cent of the price of the goods) with goods sold at or near the statutory minimum resulted in sales below cost, the approval of the act by the state supreme court constituted a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The Oklahoma court had ruled that the use of trading stamps was not a price reduction but rather a cash discount. The Supreme Court was not prepared to say that this was an unreasonable distinction, for it found that there were differences between price-cutting and the giving of stamps. Stamps are given across the board, based on the total cost of the goods purchased. On the other hand, in this case the appellant's price-cutting was selective, on "loss-leaders," designed to lure customers in. The Court also found that stamps and price-cutting have an entirely different impact on the consuming market. In fact, price cuts could result in stamps losing their lure. The Court said that Oklahoma was within its rights in preferring a cash discount to price-cutting.

3. *State Power and the Commerce Clause*

Taxation. In the understatement of the century, Justice Clark declared in 1959 that the issue of state taxation of interstate commerce was a confused one.[118] Notwithstanding the fact that the Court has had some 300 full-dress opinions on the subject, the Court split 6–3 in two cases involving the constitutionality of state net income tax laws which levied taxes on that portion of a foreign corporation's net income which had been earned from and fairly apportioned to business activities within the taxing state. As in all these cases, the factual situation must first be described. In the Minnesota case, the taxpayer was an Iowa corporation which manufactured cement at its plant in Mason City, Iowa, and sold to dealers. It regularly solicited orders for the sale of its products in Minnesota, and 48 per cent of all its sales were made to Minnesota dealers in Minnesota. It maintained a sales office in Minneapolis under the control of a district manager. It employed salesmen in Minnesota who called on potential customers there. But the taxpayer had no bank ac-

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residents, thus presenting no action, as in the earlier case, which is disruptive of the federal pattern.

[117] Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Assoc., 360 U.S. 334 (1959).

[118] Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).

count, owned no real estate, and warehoused no merchandise in Minnesota; all orders were filled directly from Iowa. The Georgia case involved a Delaware corporation which had its principal office and plant in Birmingham, Alabama, and manufactured and sold valves and pipe fittings through established local wholesalers and jobbers. While it maintained no warehouse or storage facilities in Georgia, its salesmen solicited business in Georgia, sending the orders to Alabama. The taxpayer maintained no warehouse or storage facilities in Georgia, had no property or bank account in that state, but did maintain a sales-service office in Atlanta run by a salesman and a secretary. In both cases the taxes were levied on net income and both were apportioned to business carried on within the state. Neither formula of apportionment was questioned.

Six Justices agreed that these taxes, on these facts, did not run afoul of the negative cutting edge of the Commerce Clause. While the precedents are not entirely clear or consistent, Justice Clark asserted that the following principles are now well established: that a state may not impose a direct restriction on interstate commerce; that a state may not tax persons passing through a state or coming into it merely for a temporary purpose, such as itinerant drummers; that a state may not tax the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce; and that a state may not discriminate against interstate commerce by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business by subjecting interstate commerce to the burden of multiple taxation. But it was first established in 1918, in *Peck* v. *Lowe*,[119] which dealt with export taxes, and *U.S. Glue Co.* v. *Oak Creek*,[120] which dealt with interstate commerce, that a state may tax the net income derived from interstate commerce. It is now well established, Justice Clark pointed out, that the entire net income of a corporation, generated by interstate as well as intrastate activities, may be fairly apportioned among the states for tax purposes by formulas utilizing in-state aspects of interstate affairs. In the cases at hand, he declared, the taxes were not regulations of commerce in any sense of the term, and did not discriminate or unduly burden either corporation. Since the tax was apportioned, he could see no possible danger of multiple burdens. Logically, he said, if the tax is fairly apportioned, it is impossible to have the same income taxed twice. Finally, the Court sustained these taxes against due process objections, holding that the taxes were levied only on that portion of the taxpayer's net income which arose from its activities within the taxing state. The Court found that these activities formed a sufficient nexus between the tax and the transactions within the state for which the tax was an exaction.

Justice Whittaker, writing in behalf of the three dissenters, said that the holding of the Court in these cases was in effect a declaration that the states are now free to tax exclusively interstate commerce directly. He maintained that in both cases the tax was levied on income derived exclusively from interstate commerce, and was laid directly on interstate commerce. Of course it is permissible for a state to tax the intrastate commerce of an interstate commerce operator, but never before, Justice Whittaker declared, has the Court sustained a state tax laid on exclusively interstate commerce. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter argued that this decision did not, as claimed, rest on the precedents, but broke new ground. Every case relied on by the Court, he said, involved severable local business conjoined with interstate commerce. He declared that if the Court is to break new ground, it must be justified as such and it must not be pretended that it is old ground. He would not establish a new policy because he thought that the advantages of making the United States a free-trade area were greater than the disadvantages that may accrue to the states. While he conceded that the problem was a real one, he thought that Congress, and not the Court, should deal with it. At best the Court can only act negatively and piecemeal, while Congress alone can formulate a positive national policy.

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[119] 247 U.S. 165.
[120] 247 U.S. 321.

The other tax case of the Term brought to the Court the latest chapter in the seemingly endless constitutional litigation between the Railway Express Agency and the Commonwealth of Virginia, though this time the state won.[121] Since so much tax law turns on the correct choice of words, and since the available stock of words is pretty large, the legislature is well advised to try and try again. It will be recalled that the Railway Express Agency, a Delaware corporation, does both interstate and intrastate business throughout the nation except in Virginia, where a constitutional provision bars foreign corporations from operating as public service corporations in the state. Thus in the state the Company has a wholly owned subsidiary, a Virginia corporation, to carry on its intrastate functions there. Virginia's problem has been to devise some way of taxing the Virginia business of the Railway Express Agency. In 1954 the Court held unconstitutional a state tax on the Company which was labeled a "privilege" tax.[122] Then the legislature changed it to a "franchise" tax, measured by the gross receipts from its operations within the state, in lieu of other property taxes on intangibles and rolling stock. Through exclusive contract arrangements with 177 railroads, Railway Express pays all its net income to the railroads and thus has no net taxable income. The gross receipts tax in question is levied on all business beginning and ending within the state, and upon all receipts derived from the transportation within Virginia of express transported through, into or out of the state. In upholding the tax, the Court held that it was not a license tax on the privilege of doing business, nor was it an addition to the property tax, nor a condition precedent to engaging in interstate commerce. The Legislature made it clear that this was a franchise tax laid on the intangible property of Railway Express, and was levied in lieu of taxes on all other intangibles and movables. The tax was measured by gross receipts, fairly apportioned in terms of a percentage of total mileage in the country. The Court held that while gross receipts may not be the best measure of going concern value of property used in the state, it was too late to question its constitutionality. Justices Harlan and Brennan concurred, but they thought that it was not proper to describe this tax as a property tax. Two Justices dissented on the theory that this was a tax on good will which did not consist of anything localized in Virginia but inhering solely in exclusively interstate business, which is beyond the state's taxing power.

Police Power. In *Bibb* v. *Navajo Freight Lines*,[123] the Court held unconstitutional an Illinois statute which required the use of a certain type of rear fender contour mudguard on trucks and trailers, whether operating in interstate or intrastate traffic. While the Supreme Court noted that the state's power to regulate the use of its highways is "broad and pervasive," and that safety measures, absent federal entry in the field, carry a strong presumption of validity, what is controlling is whether the total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is enough to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from serious impediments. The following factors were regarded as dispositive of the issue: substantial installation and maintenance costs, incompatibility with the standards of almost all other states, lack of advantages for the contour mudguard over the conventional straight type, inability of a truck equipped with contour mudguards to operate in Arkansas, and, particularly, serious interference with the interchange of trailers in interline operations of motor carriers. The Court said that this amounted to a "rather massive showing of burden on interstate commerce."

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[121] Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959).

[122] Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954).

[123] 359 U.S. 520 (1959).

State Taxation of Imports. A joinder of two cases coming up from the highest courts of Ohio and Wisconsin required the Court to examine once more the question of when an import loses its character as such within the meaning of the Export-Import Clause of the Constitution.[124] The facts were as follows. An Ohio corporation, engaged in manufacturing iron and steel at a plant in Youngstown, uses iron ores imported from five countries. The ores arrive in shiploads "in bulk," and are unloaded at the ports of entry into railroad cars and transported to the plant. The plant is enclosed by a wire fence, and within the enclosure the ores are put into ore yards, and as daily manufacturing needs dictate the ores are conveyed to stock bins holding two days' supply and located near the furnaces. As ore from the ore yard is used up, like ore is imported and unloaded on top of the remainder of the particular pile. The company keeps a supply of ore in the yards to meet requirements of about three months. The ores are not imported for resale, but only for use at the manufacturer's plant. Query: may Ohio constitutionally impose its personal property tax based on the average value of the iron ores in the yards during the year? In the other case, a manufacturer of veneered wood products operating an industrial plant at Algoma, Wisconsin, uses imported lumber and veneers in its operations. The imported lumber is shipped in railroad cars directly from Canada to the plant; the lumber is unfinished, and is received in bulk or as loose, individual pieces or boards. It is also green when received and must be dried before it can be used. On arrival, the lumber is unloaded and carted to the storage yard, adjacent to the plant, where it is stacked in the open in such a way as to allow the air to circulate freely for the main purpose of air-drying it. While this method does not dry the wood completely, it does reduce the time and expense involved in the kiln-drying process. From time to time batches of lumber are taken from the stacks and placed in a kiln. The veneers are received in bundles, from three countries, and kept in that form in piles, in the plant, for use as needed in the day-to-day operations. Query: may Wisconsin assess a tax based on the value of one-half of the lumber and veneers on hand?

Dividing 6–2, the Supreme Court concluded that neither tax was an imposition upon imports within the prohibition of the Export-Import Clause. It is well established, as Justice Whittaker pointed out, that an import loses its distinctive character as an import when (1) the importer sells it, or (2) breaks up the original package in which it came, or when (3) the goods are used for the purpose for which they were imported. In these two cases the Court held that the manufacturers had so acted upon the imported materials as to cause them to lose their distinctive character as imports by irrevocably committing them, after the importation journeys, to use in manufacturing at the plant, and by using them in manufacturing. The *Hooven* case[125] was distinguished on the ground that it involved mere storage in a warehouse of imported materials intended for eventual use in manufacturing but not found to have been essential to current operational needs. In these cases the state courts found that the imported materials were so essential to current manufacturing requirements that they must be regarded as having entered the process of manufacturing. A state tax which is imposed when all phases of importation have definitely ended does not frustrate the purpose of the constitutional immunity that prevents importing states from taxing in transit imported property ultimately destined for non-importing states. Thus in the Ohio case the Court found the ores were not only irrevocably committed to supply the daily requirements of the plant, but were actually being used in this way. In the other case, the Court felt that the facts supported the same inference, and went on to say that even if the veneers were still in the original and unopened "bundles" the goods were not imports if they have been put to the use for which they were imported. It follows that breaking the original package is only one of the ways by which packaged goods which have been imported for use in manufacturing may lose their distinctive character as imports. Another is to put them to the use for which they were imported. Thus the decision came to this, to quote from Justice Whittaker's opinion: "The materials here in question were imported to supply, and were essential to supply, the manufacturer's current operating needs. When, after all phases of their importation had ended, they were put to that use and indiscriminate portions of the whole were actually being used to supply daily operating needs, they stood in the same relation to the State as like piles of domestic materials at the same place that were kept for use and used in the same way."

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[124] Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534 (1959). See Melvin G. Dakin, "The Protective Cloak of the Export-Import Clause: Immunity for the Goods or Immunity for the Process," *Louisiana Law Review*, Vol. 19, pp. 747–776 (June, 1959).

Justice Frankfurter, with whom Justice Harlan expressed agreement, dissented at great length. He argued that this decision was contrary to the precedents of the Court since *Brown* v. *Maryland*,[126] and contrary to the intent of the Constitution to vest in the national government exclusive control over foreign commerce. He agreed that the imported lumber which was stacked for drying had become subject to the taxing power of the state, but he insisted that neither the imported ores nor the foreign veneers had been subject to manufacturing on the tax date, but were still in their original form and shape awaiting initial processing. He declared that what the Court has in effect decided is that if imported goods are needed, they are taxable.

4. *Intergovernmental Relations*

Federal Preemption. In three cases decided in 1957,[127] the Supreme Court held that a refusal of the National Labor Relations Board to take jurisdiction over an aspect of interstate commerce involving a charge of an unfair labor practice did not leave with the states power over activities which they otherwise would be prevented from regulating, since Congress had preempted the field. The argument was rejected that where federal power lies dormant and unexercised, the state's power to act with regard to matters of local concern was not necessarily superseded. The Court held that the statute inescapably supported the inference that exclusive federal control was the intent of Congress, and also ruled that this applied to action by state courts as well as by administrative agencies. In *San Diego Building Trades Council* v. *Garmon*[128] the Court went on to hold that the California court did not have jurisdiction to award damages arising out of peaceful union activity which it could not enjoin. Just how far there has been federal preemption in this area is a difficult question. "But the unifying consideration of our decisions," Justice Frankfurter declared, "has been regard to the fact that Congress has entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience." He went on to say: "Our concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must be free from state regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered. Such regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy." It is true that the Court has permitted the states to grant compensation for the consequences, as defined by the law of torts, of conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to public order, but state jurisdiction in such cases rests upon the proposition that "the compelling state interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed Congressional direction." Four Justices concurred separately on the narrow ground that the union's activities for which the state awarded damages could fairly be protected under Taft-Hartley, and therefore state action is precluded until NLRB has made a contrary determination respecting such activities. But if it were clear that union conduct was not so protected, the state would be barred only from enjoining, but not from awarding damages, respecting the activity, even if the activity might be deemed to be federally prohibited.

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[125] Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).

[126] 12 Wheat. 419 (1827).

[127] Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957). See this REVIEW, Vol. 52, pp. 188–189 (March, 1958).

Federal Supremacy. The embattled State Auditor of West Virginia was back in the Supreme Court again, and once more his peculiar ideas about state sovereignty yielded to the constitutional principle of federal supremacy. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed an income tax deficiency against each of three residents of West Virginia who were employed by the state. After the prescribed time for payment lapsed, pursuant to §6331 of the Internal Revenue Code the Commissioner served notices of levy on the State Auditor for the seizure of the accrued salaries of the three delinquent taxpayers. The

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[128] 359 U.S. 236 (1959). On various aspects of intergovernmental relations see: Richard H. Leach and R. S. Sugg, Jr., *The Administration of Interstate Compacts* (Baton Rouge, 1959); Symposium, "State Responsibility in a Federal System," *New York University Law Review*, Vol. 34, pp. 991–1104 (June, 1959); Symposium, "Tax Immunities on Federal Property," Vol. 1959, *Wisconsin Law Review*, pp. 167–222 (March, 1959); Comment, "The Full Faith and Credit Clause Reanalyzed," *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 54, pp. 211–243 (May–June, 1959); Russell J. Weintraub, "Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law," *Iowa Law Review*, Vol. 44, pp. 449–491 (Spring, 1959).

Auditor refused to honor the levies, and instead delivered payroll warrants to the taxpayers. Thereupon the government brought suit in a federal district court under §6332 to recover from the Auditor personally the amount of money he had paid to the taxpayers in defeat of the government's levies. The Supreme Court held unanimously that under the law the Auditor was personally liable to the United States.[129] Said Justice Whittaker: "Nothing in the Constitution requires that the salaries of state employees be treated any differently, for federal tax purposes, than the salaries of others, . . . and it is quite clear, generally, that accrued salaries are property and rights to property subject to levy." Since the statute was phrased in "all-inclusive terms of general application," the Court held that a state was a "person" within its meaning, which is the customary construction of internal revenue statutes.

Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that a state court is without power to review the discretion exercised by the Attorney General of the United States under federal law.[130] What was involved was the distribution by an Indiana state court of assets in the hands of a testamentary trustee in disregard of a vesting order issued by the Attorney General pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act. Both the Indiana trial court and the state's appellate court had ruled that the Attorney General had improperly exercised his discretion in making the vesting order. This they are not privileged to do.

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[129] Edgar B. Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108 (1959).

[130] Rogers v. Calumet National Bank of Hammond, 358 U.S. 331 (1959).

COMMUNICATIONS

ON THE INVENTION OF "SYSTEMS"

After reading Stanley Rothman's attack on *The Governmental Process*, in the March issue of this REVIEW, I see no useful purpose to be served by accepting the Managing Editor's invitation to reply in kind. Although the book is nearly ten years old and thus does not reflect either alterations in the author's views or research contributions of others during the intervening decade, it can, I think, speak for itself, if it is permitted to do so. Rothman, whether through carelessness or design, does not allow the book to do this. For the sake of accuracy, therefore, the author should call attention to a few of the more serious misrepresentations in Rothman's statement.

He asserts that the book presents a system consisting of three concepts and three "supernumerary" propositions. The former he selected from among the concepts in the book. The latter are, of course, entirely his formulations.

1. Rothman's second "supernumerary" proposition—" . . . group interaction is the primary source of individual attitudes"—causes him particular trouble. As initially stated, this is only a moderately inaccurate paraphrase of the argument, although the consequences of his using "interaction" rather than "affiliation" (*The Governmental Process*, p. 505, hereafter cited as *G. P.*) or "interaction within groups" are not entirely happy, as noted below. But when he discusses this "proposition" in section II he no longer keeps to the book's use of "largely" and "primarily" and he avoids quoting passages such as " . . . the group experiences and affiliations of an individual are the primary, though not the exclusive, means by which the individual knows, interprets, and reacts to the society in which he exists." (*G. P.*, p. 21); rather he represents the book as saying that "all attitudes" have this source, a point that he then treats as an "error of fact," which presumably it is, but one the book did not make. In the next paragraph the modifier agains becomes "primarily" or "most,' but in section III, where he wishes to charge an "abandonment" of his "proposition," the language once more becomes absolute. Finally, although he acknowledges in note 22 that the book states that " . . . attitudes are not simply the product of . . . current affiliations, but are the result of a genetic process that includes the whole . . . life experience" (*G.P.*, p. 22), he attaches this disclaimer to an assertion th " . . . the argument is that the political scie tist has effectively located the sources of i dividual political attitudes when he has u covered the group affiliations of the individual. Whose argument? Clearly not the book's. An if Rothman means current affiliations, ce tainly not the argument of any compete student of interest groups, since it has lon been obvious that any such simplistic ascri tion on the basis of current memberships erroneous.

2. The consequences of this "argument, which is exclusively Rothman's, are eviden from the use he makes of his first "supernume ary proposition," part of which states " . . that society should be conceived of simply a a plurality of groups interacting with eac other . . . ." The book makes no such statemen without referring to the effects upon interna cohesion arising from overlapping member ships, past as well as contemporary. Mor seriously, especially in his comments on th concept of overlapping membership, it is evi dent that in this portion of his proposition h means interaction between formally organize groups in which membership is merely lega and not broadly psychological. Else he coul not attribute to the book the misleading banality that "Americans are joiners." It contain no such statement, nor does it confine overlapping membership to "voluntary associa tions," as Rothman implies. Consequently when he says that "The whole thrust of th analysis is that political action can be examine in terms of conflicts among interest groups,' the thrust, if any, of the analysis is Rothman's not the book's.

3. Rothman is also the source of his ow confusions when he denounces the book fo what it does not pretend to be, namely, *a* o *the general* theory of politics. It is *a specia* theory, concerned primarily with America politics, and its chief task, as the book repeatedly states, is " . . . to examine interest group and their role in the formal institutions o government in order to provide an adequat basis for evaluating their significance in th American political process." (*G. P.*, p. 505 (That some readers have found portions of i useful in other settings and for additional purposes does not alter its declared objective.) When, therefore, he arrives at the conclusion

hat " . . . the study of groups is only one part f the study of politics and not the whole of ," he is saying nothing startling, but he is alsely imputing to the book an opposite view. Having wrongly attributed to the book—on he basis of his second "supernumerary" proposition—the view that current, formal, group memberships are the source of all attitudes, he ompounds his misrepresentations. This he does when he states that "To admit that individuals oin together on the basis of perceived interests . . completely destroys the scientific status of group theory as *the* theory of politics." (Rothman's italics)

One would think that Rothman's sophistication would permit him to realize that no theory, and certainly no special theory, can provide answers to all the questions that any observer may desire to ask. *If*, therefore, the book does not explain " . . . why trade unionism takes such different forms in different countries," *if* t does not say why the Negro does not " . . . wish to form a separate social group with participating[1] privileges . . . ," *if* through it " . . . one can not fully analyse the behavior of Congressmen . . . ," and *if* it does not help us to know " . . . why the content of the political culture that these groups transmit assumes certain forms at certain times and not at others"—these conditions being granted here only for purposes of discussion—the only proper inference is that some additional theory is needed to deal with these questions. To condemn a book for not doing what it does not not claim to do is at best ridiculous.

4. Rothman's displeasure with what he chooses to regard as the book's interpretations of American trade unionism produces at least two major misrepresentations. First, nowhere does the book state or imply an " . . . assumption. . . that the normal reaction of workers to 'disturbances' of this kind [changes in economic institutions] is the formation of 'business' unions." Discussion of this type of union policy is explicitly tied to the A. F. of L. at a particular point in its development. Second, in presenting his interpretation of the book's analysis of why the A. F. of L. succeeded where the Knights of Labor failed, Rothman omits from the middle of the passage that he quotes slightly more than three full sentences without indicating that the elision has been made. The full passage, with the omitted portions italicized, is as follows (*G. P.*, pp. 68–69):

> The American Federation of Labor, before which the Knights rapidly declined, was in tune with reality in that it was based on a firmer foundation of common interest *than that of belonging to the "plain people." This foundation for continuing interaction was the skilled craft. Skilled workers, especially those having the same skill, could interact, not just as workers, but as workers with a particular specialty that they desired to protect from wage-cutting and overcrowding. Although the development of the new type of union had the effect of distinguishing skilled from unskilled workers, it also necessarily helped to create attitudes accepting a more or less continuing wage earner status.* Individualism was de-emphasized by being harnessed firmly to the objective of controlling skilled jobs.

If Rothman wished to avoid the suspicion that the omitted sentences fit awkwardly, at best, with the interpretation he placed on the remainder, the conventional marks of elision would seem to have been in order.

A number of less substantial errors of exposition are scattered through Rothman's statement. They need not be specified here. Taken by themselves, they could be dismissed as accidents of interpretation and communication. In combination with the more serious misrepresentations discussed in these paragraphs, however, they make an attempt to reply to his analysis virtually pointless, since the object of his concern is largely of his own making.

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[1] This word was "particular" in Rothman's original manuscript. It is correctly quoted here as misprinted in Rothman's published article.—Man. Ed.

METHODOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY

In the December 1959 issue of the REVIEW (pp. 1117–1119), Oliver Garceau wrote what most observors would surely admit was a fair and judicious review of Benard Crick's recent *The American Science of Politics*.[1] Virtues in due number were matched to faults, also in due number, and, considering especially certain qualities of Crick's style, very little umbrage was taken, not even at his narrow appreciation of the great diversity of interest and technique exhibited by our profession in this country.[2] In his Preface, Crick insists he is concerned with only a segment of the whole range of American political science but, by the time he establishes that segment as dominant and relates it to the totality of American history and environment, the result, as Garceau notes, is an indictment without visible qualification. It is also absurd.

But absurd or not, Crick has a thesis and it would be unfortunate if, for looseness of argument and other inadequacies of presentation, it were lost from sight, or if the very justness of Garceau's review of the book brought about something considerably less than justice being accorded the thesis.

The thesis is an obvious enough application of the general principles of the sociology of knowledge: it claims that careful analysis will show *American* political *science* to possess many qualities which, however justifiably scientific, are nevertheless surely identifiable as characteristically American. Crick's primary effort is "to explain the *special* plausibility" of "the idea of a science of politics" to American students.[3] In developing this effort, he is at his best in stating his thesis, in suggesting the general context within which it might be established, and (something which should logically have been treated as a quite separate matter) in evaluating from his own point of view the consequences which have flowed from the wide popularity in America of the idea of a scientific study of politics. He is weakest where unfortunately he should have been strongest, in proving particular instances of the general connection he is attempting to establish. When Garceau suggests that Crick, in his discussion of A. F. Bentley "misses the Protean character of the notion of 'group'" (p. 1118), he himself is missing the fact that on this subject if nowhere else Crick had a genuine opportunity to make his case—and flubbed it miserably. Crick could have and, if his logic had held, certainly should have argued and explained at length that a (perhaps *they*) most important single feature of the group theory of politics is that its originator was an American through and through. Instead, he distracts both himself and his reader from the requirements of his central purpose with an embroiling attack, delivered largely in abstract terms, on Bentley's materialism. The closest he comes to doing the job he set out to do is in a single reference at the very end of the chapter in question:

> Bentley's belief in the total dominance of society and of social groups over all ideas of intrinsic worth is not a prelude to totalitarianism, but merely a symptom of or prelude to a growing intellectual confusion within American liberalism. (p. 130)

The connection between Bentley's views on political studies and the generality of the American liberal environment is, however, a great deal more significant and intimate than that. The somewhat bumptious materialism is only one part of the relationship. Crick's failure to examine that relationship in detail and with a coldly clinical eye thwarts the development of the thesis of his book. Worse, it leaves the rest of us still in the position of attempting to assess, even simply to understand, the group theory of politics solely on the narrow basis of its scientific applicability.

Crick in fact lets us down pretty much all along the line. He no more develops satisfyingly the cultural conditions—and therefore the cultural limitations—of Dewey's and Merriam's thought than he does Bentley's. He seems to have been able to acquire only a superficial understanding of that general American Liberalism which nearly everywhere encases and endlessly modifies American political science. Mostly he equates it with the pardonable but, from the English point of view, rather silly American enthusiasm for "true" mass democracy, and with Progressive addictions for such things as referendums and recall elections. He

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[1] Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959.

[2] A similarly narrow appreciation is often found among Americans. It is at least conceivable that Crick acquired his myopia from such natives as Andrew Hacker who, when reviewing D. E. Butler's *The Study of Political Behaviour* for a British audience reported that Butler's two chapters entitled 'The Quantitative Approach' and 'The Sociological and Psychological Approach,' were, "in essence, a succinct report of what has been going on in American political science since 1945," *Political Studies*, Vol. 7 (Feb. 1959), p. 33.

[3] *Op cit.*, p. v, italics added.

s not grasped that pervasive Liberalism
hich, rooted in protestant-bourgeois assump-
ons, has haunted the American spirit from the
ginning. Nowhere does he attempt frontally
make the case that there is a deep and abid-
g connection between on the one hand, the
adition of Sumner, Bentley, Merriam, and
asswell, and, on the other hand, the tradition
ringing from Madison, Franklin, and Cal-
oun. Much less does he set the generality of
oth these traditions in the overall context of
e Western capitalist ethic which, while al-
ost exclusively controlling in America, goes
ack on its political side, through the Marxian
nalysis of bourgeois society, to the English
tilitarians and Adam Smith, to Locke, and
bove all to Hobbes, the first of the "moderns."
rick, in short, fails almost wholly to give us
hat he promises, a cultural understanding of
merican political science.

But that promise is inescapably important in itself. Even while he distracts us with his endless charges against the viability of the scientism of our political science, Crick is challenging us to greater cultural self-awareness. There *is* a connection between our methodologies and our ideology, between our science and our philosophy, however resolutely unspoken the latter remains in most instances. That connection is very nearly as unexamined by us as it is important to us. Crick's book may certainly be judged by how far short it falls from dealing effectively—even comprehendingly—with the genuine issues raised by its thesis. But it also should be said that this book should be read because of what it attempts. On that basis, it deserves to be read widely and with sympathy and care.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Politics of National Party Conventions. By Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, Richard C. Bain. The Brookings Institution, 1960. Pp. xv, 591. Double column. $10.

This book is an outgrowth of the five-volume study of *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952* carried on under the auspices of the American Political Science Association and edited by Paul David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph Goldman. Although the present authors make extensive use of that earlier study, they have pushed their own research far beyond those materials and have produced what is by all odds the most thoughtful, comprehensive, and compact (in spite of its bulk) analysis of *The Politics of National Party Conventions.*

Against an extensive historical account of the origin and development of national conventions and the changing pattern of party politics from 1832 to 1960, the authors offer a systematic analysis of the presidential nominating process. Leadership centers of both the party in power and the opposition are examined and critically appraised; the main patterns by which presidential leadership is discovered, confirmed or rejected are described; demographic and political factors affecting the character and training of convention delegates and candidates are examined in detail; the technical aspects of apportionment, delegate selection, organization and behavior, as well as the organization, procedure and voting structure of the convention are described at length; so, too, are the presidential primary and the influence of the mass media. An ingenious analysis of convention action and election results should be of particular interest to students of voting behavior. There is a final chapter on the Nominating Process and the Future of the Party System that not only poses some basic questions concerning methods of top leadership recruitment in the U. S. but suggests ways and means by which the authors believe they may be improved.

The text throughout is fortified and illustrated by tables, graphs, diagrams, and charts adding greatly to the clarity of exposition and the force of the argument being made. And not the least valuable of the materials included are an index and eight appendices containing statistical and analytical data of enduring value to serious students of American politics.

No other available work has so successfully described and analyzed the complex factors that enter into the process of top leadership recruitment in the U.S. The various leadership centers are recognized as clustering about (1) the incumbent President and Vice President and the out-party's titular leaders, (2) the cabinet and other major administrative officers, (3) the Congressional leaders of both "ins" and "outs," (4) the governors, from whom so many candidates have come, (5) party committees, especially at the national level, (6) outstanding individuals with a variety of public service backgrounds, and (7) the major pressure groups—business, labor and agriculture—whose influence in recruiting leadership from these other centers is more important than their own contribution to the over-all supply.

Although the authors do not join in the general outcry against the direct primary, they argue strongly for a more active participation in leadership recruitment by regular party organizations. They take a dim view of proposals for a national presidential primary, but suggest the value of state systems here and there, especially those modeled on New Hampshire and Florida. They would like to see the office of governor reorganized to give putative Presidents the kind of training and experience they will need if and when they move into the White House. And they urge the Governors' Conference to become a more or less formal adjunct to the convention as part of the nominating process. They recognize also the increasing importance of the U.S. Senate as a training center for future Presidents, even though no Democratic candidate and only one Republican (Harding) has come from the Senate in a hundred years.

The process by which the major parties solve the problem of apostolic succession is discussed at length. Its major patterns are those of (a) *confirmation* of existing leadership, *i.e.,* incumbent President, Vice President, or "titular" leader; (b) *inheritance* by some acolyte of the incumbent leadership; (c) selection by or from an *inner group, i.e.,* selection by oligarchy; (d) selection of a *factional* leader, either one friendly to incumbent leadership or an insurgent. Presidential candidates since 1832 are classified according to whether they fall into one or another of these categories. Van Buren for the Democrats and Taft for the Republicans are prototypes of leaders selected by *inheritance,* as Cleveland and Alf Landon illustrate "inner group" selection. Friendly *factional* or compromise leaders would include Polk and J. W. Davis for the Democrats and Garfield and Harding for the Republicans. Insurgent *factional* leaders would be F.D.R. and Adlai

Stevenson among Democrats, and Willkie, Dewey, and Eisenhower for the Republicans. Republican *insurgent factional* nominees since 1832 have outnumbered those of any other category by more than two to one. They are also the most numerous among Democratic nominees. As one might expect, the factional candidate is more likely to emerge in an "out" party convention than in a convention of the party in power. Moreover, factional in-fighting over the nomination, if kept within bounds, may be a source of strength "as a demonstration of party vitality." By the same token, the compromise or "dark horse" candidate is more likely to be a sign and a source of weakness. Fortunately, the "dark horse" variety of candidate "seems to be a vanishing type."

I am intrigued by this analysis, but not wholly persuaded. Other formal *schemata* are developed in an analysis of "the road to consensus," and the relation between "convention action and election results." I regret that space forbids more than a mere mention of them here. I regret, too, that the authors have neglected any serious analysis of the influence of the economic and social environment, or of political events, on the nominating process.

No one, however, can quarrel with the general conclusion that the "contributions made by the conventions to the survival and stability of the American political order are unique, indispensable, and, granted our form of Constitution, probably irreplaceable." Moreover, the "record in making the party nominations has been good" and has improved in recent decades. If the convention system gave us Buchanan, Grant and Harding, it also gave us Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt and F.D.R.

For all practical purposes, the exclusive concern of this volume is with the nominating process. Admittedly, only the most cursory attention is given to other important functions of the national convention, *i.e.*, its use as a campaign rally, its determination of party policy on major issues, and its function as the highest governing body of the party. But unless I am greatly mistaken, *The Politics of National Party Conventions* will stand for a long time not only as a monument to scholarship, but also as a stimulus to other studies which will revise and extend our knowledge of the processes by which top political leadership is recruited in a democratic state.

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The Conservative Illusion. By M. MORTON AUERBACH. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1959. Pp. 359. $6.75)

Like Seurat, Professor Auerbach likes a b canvas (Plato to the present day). Like Va Gogh, he prefers bright colors, especially pu ple. Like Gauguin, he has a sharp eye (n "contradiction" escapes it), and concerns hin self little about the sensibilities of his les emancipated fellows. Like Toulouse-Lautre he seems to mix a little venom with his oils—no doubt to correct against any possible "slip in the direction of kindliness or understandin "*Patience, mon coeur; doucement, doucement,* the critical reader must keep saying to himse as the argument unfolds. If he is a Conservative in some intelligible sense of that term h must do more than that, namely, see to it tha Auerbach doesn't get his goat, and get it without any proper right to it. The Almighty doe temper the wind to the shorn lamb, whic according to Auerbach is what the Conservative always is; in this case He has done so b sending the perpetual sufferer an avowedly anti Conservative book that can only redound t the benefit of Conservatism. First, Auerbac helps it dissociate itself from the Rossiters, th Viereck and Druckers, and the Agars (the "adjusted" Conservatives), who write books tha tell how to be Conservative and yet agree wit the Liberals about everything not demonstrably unimportant. Second, he says wha needs to be said, from the Conservative poin of view as well as from his own, about thos "rhetorical" Conservatives who, instead o going on and on about "unbought grace," etc. ought to come out and say what they mean, s we can find out whose side they are on. Third, he reminds Conservatives of what goes on in the heads and hearts of their opponents, including the adjusted Conservatives, which should confirm them in their determination to keep on being Conservatives, and perhaps even get them some converts. And fourth, he forces on Conservatives the distinction between political debate and political philosophy, thus sending them back to the latter—that being, though they sometimes forget it, where they belong.

In political debate we seek to discomfit, to refute, with an eye always to the presumed audience; in political philosophy, we seek to understand, to arrive at truth, to teach and at the same time learn. In political debate we seize upon the *weakness* of the positions of those with whom we disagree, thus *need* a sharp eye for "contradictions," for "dilemmas" that we can force them into; in political philosophy we are concerned primarily with the *strengths* of those positions, because our hope is to clarify the problems and drive them to ever-deeper levels. Now on such a showing, any similarity between Professor Auerbach's book and political philosophy, for all that the names of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, etc. do turn up in it, is purely coincidental. His procedure (I do *not* say his intention) is to set up a definition of Conservatism as a doctrine which places a supreme value on "harmony" as opposed to "freedom"; which asserts that the central fact of history is that of moral degeneration; which seeks to "minimize" human desires, and when all else fails is prepared to hand "the problem" over to God, which makes it sound silly to begin with. He then takes up one by one political writers whom he regards—now with reason, now without it—as having asserted such nonsense, and with nails fashioned out of contradictions proceeds to crucify them on an old rugged cross made up of the two questions, "What's your program for achieving the harmony you desiderate?", and "What, really now, are your chances of bringing your program off?" This, of course, is political debate, in which the question "What succeeds?" replaces political philosophy's question "What is true?" All this is the more regrettable because of the truly vast literature Auerbach has put himself through in order to write the book (some writers have done better home-work about the so-called "New Conservatives," but none has done more home-work), and because he lets us see seven pages (238–245) in which he shows that the fates intended him for better things. It is also the easiest kind of political debate, which Auerbach always wins hands down (and winning, as he is at great pains to point out, is what counts in this business, besides which nothing wins like winning). As for political philosophy, the author, burdened by the "findings" and ideology of contemporary social science, knows the answers to too many questions that political philosophy continues to treat as problems because they are problems, and too little about the few obvious things in it, *e.g.*, the difference in "rank," as Strauss puts it, between philosophers to give political philosophy the time of day. Auerbach can write "Plato and Drucker" without batting an eyelash.

The Conservative Illusion is not, however, an unscrupulous book. For one thing (dead Conservatives apart, since with them anything goes), the author holds himself rigorously to the maxim of justice that forbids us to pick on people who aren't our size: only the small-fry among contemporary exponents of views differing from his own turn up in his pages. One seeks in vain names like Jaspers, Löwith, Strauss, Voegelin, Guardini, as also any recognition of the major issues—positivism, historicism, the authority of the Bible and of classical political philosophy—that they have drawn with the age they live in. For another thing, one sees by the end of the book that Auerbach's attributing to the Conservatives a patently absurd position is a matter of honest intellectual error. On the main point, certainly, whether the Conservative seeks harmony *tout court* or harmony *on certain terms* which, whether religious or philosophical, become the essence of the Conservative position, the truth finally flies up and hits him in the face. He does, *e.g.*, though too late to do anything about it, see that while Burke might go along a while with the forces Auerbach glorifies, he would at some point have had to draw a line (*i.e.*, quit being "adjusted"). Not, I hasten to add, that I regard the *term* "Conservative" as worth fighting over: Auerbach can have it, to apply to anything he likes, since he and this reviewer agree whole-heartedly on something far more important than the meaning of "Conservative," namely: who the *anti*-Conservatives are and what *their* supreme values are. Had he gone on from there to recognize that the Conservatives in the modern period are simply those who resist the revolutionary program Burke identified and opposed in the *Reflections*, that the question is not whether they have a program and can carry it out but whether they can continue to frustrate the program of the Machiavellians (remember: the program Burke identified hasn't been carried out anywhere yet), he would have written a very different book, and might even have done a little hurt, as surely he wished to do, to the Conservative cause.

Auerbach is supremely confident that he and his *copains* are riding the crest of the wave of History, and that the Conservatives always represent and always will represent History's "tail-end" (can't, as we used to say, "win for losing"). Here this reviewer contents himself with three observations: Nobody knows how the story is going to end. Pride goeth before a fall. The fortunes of Liberalism may begin to worsen even in the short term if many of its spokesmen throw its mind and heart open to inspection as Auerbach does.

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World Legal Order: Possible Contributions by the People of the United States. BY WALLACE MCCLURE. (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1960. Pp. xvi, 366. $7.50.).

In this well printed and well documented book, Dr. McClure, speaking from long service in the Department of State and present service with the World Rule of Law Center at Duke University, considers how the world legal order can be strengthened. He assumes it to be "inherent in the concept of law" that the rules of international law are "superior to and, in case of conflict, overrule legal norms of national origin or merely national applicability." The whole, he thinks, must be superior to the parts, but this conclusion "is denied *de facto* and even *de jure*." Seldom have national courts enforced international law when in conflict with a clear rule of national law. "Thus power superseated in national government, overrides the logic of human law." (p. vii)

Perhaps in his universal condemnation "of the inferiority of the law of a larger group to that of a smaller group within it" Dr. McClure goes too far. Self-determining colonies, including the United States and the Dominions, have not been willing to accept the dominance of imperial law over the law of the included nations, and federations recognize that the law of the whole cannot over-ride the laws of the component parts within the reserved domains of the latter. There can be too much as well as too little centralization of law. Local self-government and national autonomy are valuable if not pushed too far. These observations, however, hardly apply to international law because its rules are binding only insofar as states have directly or indirectly consented to them. There is, therefore, no danger that international law will unduly encroach upon the sovereignty of states, and Dr. McClure properly emphasizes the opposite danger that states will not abide by the rules of the larger community, to which they have consented, expressly by treaty, tacitly by custom, or presumptively by deduction from the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.

Dr. McClure is, therefore, on solid ground when he suggests that in the interdependent world of today the disposition of national courts to put national statutes ahead of international obligations is "ominous." He might, however, have emphasized that universal acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court would, in some measure, remedy this situation. That court necessarily applies international law; consequently, if foreign litigants can regularly induce their governments to initiate action in the World Court against any state whose courts have neglected international law, such a state would be likely to require its courts to give priority to international law in the future.

The book is divided into three parts, the first of which deals with the relation of treaties to statute law in the United States. While, under the supremacy clause, treaties over-ride state constitutions and statutes, the Supreme Court has held that treaties and acts of Congress are on a parity and that the most recent expression of the national will must be applied. Dr. McClure examines the cases in historical sequence. The logical superiority of treaties was given some support in the early period, but, with the prevailing isolationism of American opinion in the later 19th century, the doctrine of equality was so firmly established that it has been difficult to shake it in the more recent period of enlarged international responsibility. The Court has, however, generally applied a treaty when it has been convinced that Congress did not intend a later conflicting statute to nullify it. However, the "wordy and noisy movement" initiated by Senator Bricker threatened to eliminate the legal character of treaties in the domestic forum altogether. In McClure's opinion the considerable support for this movement "signified a need for the people of the United States to about face and get in step with their progressive fellow peoples" (p. 203), some of whom were amending their constitutions to assure respect for treaties in domestic law. Assurance of the "higher level of treaties over statutes," he considers, "the first contribution" the American people could make "toward strengthening the World Legal Order." (p. 134)

In the second part of the book the author discusses the utilization of customary international law by American courts and finds that such utilization is common but it is subordinated to other sources of national law, particularly to statutes. He observes that "when the supremacy of treaties over statutes is accepted, acceptance of the supremacy of the whole of the law of nations over the whole of the national law would seem to follow as of course." (p. 208)

In the third section of the book attention is given to the legal structure of the world community with special emphasis on the prevention of aggression, "the great crime against international law," and the extension of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. With reference to the first, the activity of the Nuremberg and other war crimes tribunals is reviewed, and also the action of the Security Council in the Korean and other "collective security" operations, with the conclusion that they contributed to "the World Legal Order." (p. 230, 247) With reference to the World Court's jurisdiction, the author criticizes the self-judging (Connally) reservation made by the United States in accepting compulsory jurisdiction and hopes for its repeal. (pp. 272–274). He also discusses the Interhandel case in which he considers the Department of State's "rationalization" as "the very tissue of reactionism" (p. 281), and hopes that further statements by the President, favoring "a genuine rule of law among nations," may force a salutary "reaction to reactionism." (pp. 281–282)

The author discusses other situations in which the United States has put what it deems immediate interest ahead of allegiance to international law, and suggests specific steps to avoid such action in the future. In the nuclear age a sound appraisal of national interest, he thinks, requires a strengthening of the international legal order, though he appreciates the importance of negotiation, conciliation, and cultural exchanges to provide an atmosphere in which law can flourish. He has "hope and faith . . . that civilized men will see that civilization is safeguarded" and, paraphrasing Woodrow Wilson, declares that "the world must be made safe for *law*-sovereignty." (p. 326)

The volume is valuable both as a guide to practical thinking about American jurisprudence and foreign policy in the increasingly interdependent world, and as an up-to-date analysis of American precedents on the relations of national to international law. While not always easy reading, it ought to be widely read, particularly by lawyers interested in the efforts of the American Bar Association to promote the World Rule of Law.

QUINCY WRIGHT.

University of Virginia.

Law in Diplomacy. By PERCY E. CORBETT. (Princeton; Princeton University Press. pp. xii, 290; $6.00).

In the words of the author, "this book proposes to study and in some degree measure the influence of legal notions on foreign policy without assuming or elaborating a system of international law. Its focus is the use of legal language, categories, and procedures in British, American, and Soviet diplomacy." (p. vii) He attempts to answer the questions "to what purpose, with what implications, within what limits, and with what results the governments of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union," on the assumption that the international sphere is not in principle a realm of law, "invoke legal rules and employ legal procedures."

Professor Corbett devotes his first chapter to "Britain and its Law of Nations" and in subsequent chapters considers United States attitudes (which he finds intimately related historically to the British), "the Soviet dilemma" (whether to view international law as a tool or as an objective system of control), "*mare liberum* and *mare clausum*," "the diplomacy of arbitration," international organization as a focus of diplomacy, and "human rights and the world community." From his review of these areas of international practice, he finds no slackening in the tendency of governments to formulate their mutual relations in terms of law, considerable progress in the regulation of details of these relations, and some advances towards acceptance and improvement of peaceful methods of settling disputes. But Professor Corbett does not feel we are yet in sight of an effective world community with its general submission to law and the collective monopoly of force.

It is not mainly the mechanisms of an international legal order that Professor Corbett finds lacking. Rather it is a measure of agreement as to "supreme common values, the sense of community, loyalty, and mutual tolerance which within the State make compulsory institutions bearable" (p. 273). With rare exceptions, he finds that governments habitually assert the existence of a legal order and the entire conformity of their official behavior with it. However, systematic study also reveals "an intimate connection between the statement of the rule and the interest of the moment" and the resulting frequency of direct contradiction in positions taken by the same State.

Professor Corbett's general conclusion with respect to the relation of diplomacy to law can best be stated in his own words:

> If one approaches diplomacy not as the interaction of entities living in a society governed by law, but as the political interaction of groups denying subordination to any collective authority, yet fortifying their claims with legal argument, one has the advantage of seeing temporary patterns grow, recognizing their scope, observing their strength and weakness under strain, and witnessing their demise. Seen from this uncommitted point of view, they take on the appearance less of the stabilized institutions of a legal order than of highly adjustable *modi vivendi.* (pp. 275–276).

Professor Corbett's study is an important contribution to an understanding of the role of legal concepts in diplomacy and of diplomacy in the development of law. It proceeds from the realistic view, so well expressed and developed by Judge de Visscher, that "international law cannot gather strength by isolating itself from the political realities with which international relations are everywhere impregnated" (Preface to *Theory and Reality in Public International Law*). Some may feel that in his search for the realities, Professor Corbett has perhaps been excessively disillusioning regarding the role of law and the judicial process. For example, he goes rather far when, after asserting that there is little substance to the distinction between arbitration and judicial settlement, he concludes that the distinction between mediation and conciliation on the one hand and arbitration on the other, on the basis of the extent of application of international law, is "hardly more than skin deep." While the examination of arbitration cases may give considerable support to this conclusion, it is possible that a comparable study of cases submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice would have provided much less support. Notwithstanding some slight exaggeration in the development of his thesis, Professor Corbett has, however, made a most valuable contribution to placing our appreciation of the role of law in international relations on the level of reality where solid progress is possible in building for the future.

LELAND M. GOODRICH.
Columbia University.

European Organisations. By P.E.P. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1959. pp. xvi, 372. $5.40)

It does this book scant justice to say that it is a report by a research group on eight principal European organizations: ECE (a subsidiary of the UN), OEEC, the Council of Europe, NATO, WEU, ECSC, the Common Market, and Euratom. The statement is true, but it is misleading, for it may frighten away most readers except students subject to coercion by instructors who think it salutary to inflict a dull but comprehensive volume upon the young. The instructors themselves are likely to place it on the shelf reserved for "useful reference books" and let it gather the appropriate film of dust.

This should not happen to *European Organisations*. This book is contrived to stimulate, not stuff, minds. It is a thinking man's book. The collective anonymity of a study group has in this case produced not "a competent survey" but a thoughtful analysis of "the origins, structure, techniques of co-operation, methods of work and principal activities" of the various European institutions. Only in the cases of the fledgling organizations, Euratom and the Common Market, is the discussion focused primarily upon formal constitutional and structural arrangements; the older organizations are treated as agencies whose functional record is of more interest than their skeletal structure. This reviewer has not encountered another volume encompassing the whole range of European organizations which has so much intellectual bite.

If it is marvelous to find a committee which avoids the peril of recounting intellectually sterilized facts, it is also encouraging to find a book which achieves sophistication devoid of pretension. The authors indulge in no ostentatious sharpening of methodological tools or inflating of conceptual balloons; they do not even provide introductory notice that the reader is about to be treated to a notable demonstration of scientific technique. They simply buckle down to the study of the record and the development of interpretations and insights. They provide an impressive demonstration of the fact that there is no necessary correlation between the sort of self-conscious sophistication which insists upon describing old-fashioned "factors" as neo-scientific "variables," and the attainment of theoretically significant results.

European Organisations is remarkably free of the tendency to measure the real importance of postwar institutions by holding up the yardstick of supranationality. The authors are duly impressed by the institutional innovations associated with the ECSC and its kin, but they are refreshingly realistic in their refusal to assume the inherent superiority of such agencies to the "merely" inter-governmental organizations which lack the formal trappings of supranational capacity. Stressing the effectiveness of the techniques for inducing collaboration among governments which have been evolved by organizations of the OEEC type, the writers buttress their proposition that the flourishing of international institutions depends primarily upon the importance of the responsibilities assigned to them and the clarity of the governments' understanding of their stake in coordination and collaboration. The essential point is that "there must be a real purpose to be served, and not merely a vague desire for co-operation." Given this situation, the P.E.P. group sees hope for effective common action by European states, and advises a pragmatic choice between the techniques of supranational and of inter-governmental organization.

The authors exhibit a hypercritical attitude toward the Council of Europe, which is reflected in their contention that the Consultative Assembly is doomed to insignificance because its members are parliamentarians who "have no mandate and represent no electorate—they are technically irresponsible and speak only for themselves. . . ." The same could be said of the members of the parliamentary bodies associated—officially and unofficially—with some of the other European organizations, but those bodies are evaluated more favorably. A more convincing explanation of the weakness of the Consultative Assembly is to be found in the point which the authors make elsewhere in the study, that the Council of Europe has no clearly defined role and commands little governmental interest.

Other readers will discover other points for particular criticism and disagreement. The merit of the book lies in the fact that it contains a generous quantity of ideas and interpretations which are susceptible of agreement or disagreement.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
The University of Michigan.

War in the Modern World. BY THEODORE ROPP. (Durham: Duke University Press. 1959. Pp. xv, 400. $10.00.)

Professor Ropp's *War in the Modern World* is far and away the best of the histories of military affairs. And while this is not a great compliment in itself—inasmuch as historians have paid as little attention to war and its problems as have students of government—the fact is that this is a remarkably fine piece of work. Briefly, it traces warfare from Condottieri through the Korean War. The *Epilogue* on new means of war could and should, I believe, have been omitted.

War at sea, on land, and in the air is developed in a balanced and thoughtful pattern. Balance is indeed the distinguishing feature of the book. While there are all sorts of subjects which one might wish were developed in greater detail—civil-military relations, for example, or the role and self-image of the officer corps among nations and at different times in history, or the relationship between changing national values and acceptable strategic concepts, or comparative troop usage in the colonies—yet this is a one volume work. Within this compass one could scarcely ask for a more discerning weighing of military theory and military technology, with enough of the history of military action to give the narrative pace and interest.

Of course, one can "nitpick." I would argue that the French railways did *not* do "well enough" (p. 153) in the war of 1870. Ropp's assumption that Congress has had much to do with military appropriations since 1921 is an irritating and interesting intellectual hangover. And, if Professor Ropp has learned anything about the background of the authorship of General Bradley's war memoirs since the publication of his own book, he must be particularly embarrassed by this sentence: "One reviewer compared Omar Bradley's sober *A Soldier's Story* . . . with Caesar's *Gallic Wars*, without realizing that the latter was a superb bit of propaganda." But the scholarship is sound, and although there may occasionally be a few too many dates, statistics, and other mathematical paraphernalia on a page, the scholarship is not tedious.

In this connection I have never enjoyed any footnotes so much as these. In fact, I found myself so intrigued with them that I looked through them before I read the text. In doing so, I read, incidently, an eighth or more of the book. Some of the footnotes are discursive. But for the most part these footnotes constitute a bibliographical essay on the history of war. Furthermore, this essay is genuinely distinguished. To be sure, there were favorites omitted, and something should have been said about bibliographical aids, including a deserved bow to the bibliographies in the quarterly, *Military Affairs.* Yet certainly, there is nothing comparable to these footnote bibliographies in modern literature and all of us should be most grateful for this publication. Of themselves they make this a book the scholar must own. The library is now much too clumsy for preliminary research—and the chances are Professor Ropp's book will always be "on loan"!

In short, Professor Ropp has made a great contribution to an understanding of the phenomenon of war. One might even hope that this book would persuade more historians that war is something more than a parenthesis in time with "causes" at one end and "results" at the other. Difficult as it is to believe in this tenuous nuclear age, war is, after all, a social phenomenon. As such it deserves a larger, if not a better, place in history.

EDWARD L. KATZENBACH, JR.
Brandeis University.

Strategy in the Missile Age. BY BERNARD BRODIE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1959. Pp. vii, 423. $6.50.)

Bernard Brodie has been a leader among civilian social scientists in exploring the esoteric realms of military strategy and technology. His principal previous works dealt with naval problems. The present volume is concerned primarily with airpower. Its first third briefly describes the state of strategic thinking at the beginning of the airpower era, presents in some detail the views of the Italian philosopher of airpower, Brig. Gen. Giulio Douhet, and succinctly analyzes the role of strategic airpower in World War II. The remainder of the volume is an informed, balanced, and often highly original discussion of the current issues of a strategy of deterrence: the probable nature of nuclear war, the possibility of defense against thermonuclear weapons, the rationale for "total solutions" such as preventive war and massive retaliation, the force requirements of deterrence, the nature of limited war, and the economic implications of strategy. The connection between the two parts of the book is more than tenuous but less than necessary. As Brodie himself acknowledges, those readers who feel so inclined "can plunge directly into Part II" without missing any essential elements of his argument.

In this age, strategic potentialities reflect rapidly changing technological and economic feasibilities. The writer on strategic problems thus faces a dilemma. He can focus primarily upon the issues of the day, given the existing state of weapons research and economic capacity, and produce an analysis grounded in the hard facts of the situation, but whose applicability through time is limited because within a few years those hard facts will be replaced by a different set of hard facts. Alternatively, he can attempt to develop a broad philosophical framework by which to approach specific problems or to analyse continuing political issues (which change often in form but rarely in substance). Thereby, he produces an analysis of greater continuing value if of less immediate relevance. In the second part of his volume, Brodie has opted for the first horn of the dilemma. As a result, his book has a practical, down-to-earth quality, which is quite refreshing. He has little truck with grand abstractions. His aim, he says, is "to be objective, but not impartial," to state the opposing views but to argue his own convictions. He carries out this intention admirably. Indeed, perhaps a primary value of the book is the picture it gives of the complexities, ambiguities, and unknowns which confront the strategic planner. Other writers on strategy have argued that our greatest need is to develop a comprehensive, coherent doctrine, such as the Soviets allegedly possess, to enable us to regain the initiative and to guide us in the bewildering choices which must be made. Brodie, on the other hand, tends to be skeptical of doctrines. The historical analysis of the first part of his book is one long case study in the dangers of doctrinal absolutism, and the strategic analysis of the second part is a pragmatic and empirical discussion of specific policy problems.

Given this approach, the only major limitation upon Brodie's analysis is the temporal one. In the first part of his book, he points out that for Douhet the principal goal in war was "command of the air," which could only be achieved by the destruction of the enemy's air force, air bases, and aircraft industry. Once command of the air was won, victory was certain. But Douhet was somewhat ahead of his time. In the 1930's and 1940's, the most debated issue was not how to win command of the air, but rather whether, given command of the air, it would be possible decisively to defeat the enemy through "strategic air bombardment" of his cities, economy, and population. Today, however, Douhet's vision has become reality. With thermonuclear weapons, the country whose strategic air power survives the initial exchange of blows unquestionably will be able to destroy its opponent. The struggle for command of the air has become *the* struggle; each strategic air force is the other's prime target. A nation must either strike first, which Brodie suggests is beyond us both morally and practically, or be prepared to absorb a first-strike from the enemy and still have sufficient retaliatory forces to strike back. He stresses again and again the prime necessity of adequate defenses for the Strategic Air Command. "*Known ability,*" he says in italics, "*to defend our retaliatory force constitutes the only unilaterally attainable situation that provides potentially a perfect defense of our home land. Conversely, a conspicuous inability or unreadiness to defend our retaliatory force must tend to provoke the opponent to destroy it; in other words, it tempts him to an aggression he might not otherwise contemplate.*" The development and maintenance of this second-strike capability is, as he points out, neither cheap nor easy.

Brodie's analysis is thus directed primarily to the current situation in which strategic air forces are the principal targets. It is not difficult to foresee in the reasonably near future, however, a new phase in which the retaliatory forces of both powers become virtually invulnerable to attack. Brodie emphasizes the need to protect *now* the presently vulnerable air-atomic forces. He does not to the same extent emphasize the need to develop future strategic forces with high built-in invulnerabilities from mobility and concealment, such as ballistic missile submarines (whose present limitations he very properly stresses). Once such relatively invulnerable strategic forces are achieved, however, neither side will be able to deny the other "command of the air" through offensive measures. The great premium will be on defense, active and passive, to protect the cities and population, which will again become the prime targets of strategic attack. The side which first develops a reasonably effective defense will then have all the advantages which would now go to the side which developed a sure-fire counterforce capability. Brodie recognizes the tendencies in this direction and deplores our neglect of civil defense measures. Despite its title, however, his book is really about strategy in the age of aircraft, and he emphasizes that planes are going to be important for a long while to come. The full implications of the missile age will only be felt with the emergence of mutually invulnerable retaliatory forces. What will a strategy of deterrence require then? Hopefully Brodie has another volume in the works.

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON.

Columbia University

Central Intelligence and National Security. By HARRY HOWE RANSOM (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1958. Pp. xiv, 287. $4.75.)

Of the half dozen books now available that deal with the intelligence system of the U.S. government, in its modern form of the last fourteen years, this book is the one most convenient for the political scientist to use. The book was developed in the environment of the Harvard Defense Studies Program and of the Graduate School of Public Administration there. The author states in his preface that the previous lack of a description of the "community" of intelligence agencies in Washington today is the "uncharted ground" which he seeks to survey. He, therefore, deals with the subject from an angle of attack familiar to political scientists, describing the agencies and the organizational relationships among them individually, as well as between them and the rest of the government. It also gives a considerable amount of analytic comment and critical analysis and a tentative though cautious assessment of the state of intelligence affairs as far as can be judged from outside.

In several ways the book marks a stage which none of its predecessors had reached. It takes the existence of a major intelligence system in Washington as a simple and familiar fact rather than as a disturbing innovation or as an alarming new necessity. It is also the first to be written by an outsider from outside sources, and the first to carry a large and useful bibliography of entirely public and unclassified sources.

As a book by an outsider, an important dimension to measure is its degree of success in establishing a reasonably correct representation of the facts. One of the points of severe anxiety at the time when the U.S. intelligence system was being built was in relation to the danger that a necessarily secret activity on a necessarily large scale would be very difficult to make compatible with the former "goldfish bowl" exposure of democratic government to public scrutiny. If a scholar, on the other hand, can as a matter of fact write a book which gives at least a true impression, barring inaccuracy or inadequacy of precise detail, this fear can be largely set at rest. In the judgment of this reviewer Ransom has proved to a great degree that the world of knowledge can and does have sufficient access to accomplish a normally workmanlike task in this previously dubious area.

The deficiencies in the treatment are implied already in the comment on the strengths. There is no very great effort to discuss the processes of collection, collation, analysis, and formulation of estimates. A reader eager for such will find more in the works of Hilsman or Platt. Neither is there any effort to follow up the proposition posed by Hilsman, that the problems of intelligence method are basically of philosophical character, and that U.S. intelligence suffers from the national disdain for philosophy and methodology. Not that this is a void in the book; the treatment is sensible if elementary.

Nor would it be fair to expect such a book to solve problems in this area. It is well known that the intelligence staffs have to grapple with social and political phenomena and with technological phenomena of the most complex and advanced character, and that therefore, if one but think, all of the intellectual difficulties that confront a college faculty are confronted also in intelligence work. The intelligence community, by the same token, is not free of frictions, and communication of ideas as to the import of things is not easy. To one who knows the cleavages among American intellectuals (for the intelligence workers are intellectuals) it is to be marked as an achievement that the intelligence community is producing as good results as it is doing, and as the author notes.

As a matter of fact, it may be doubted if any book will ever give a really satisfactory treatment to the problems of intelligence method. The intellectual and scientific and logical problems involved in seeing the significant and calculating its significance are not only very complex and technical, they are in rapid evolution. A satisfactory estimate demands realism, and also brilliant interpretation, very abstract thinking, and very technical methods. When achieved it probably demonstrates that a genius was at work on the substance of the problem, and also that there was some genius in the organization of the work to permit the results of genius to be attained.

One weakness of the intelligence function that is noted in the book is the tendency of the government to act upon other opinions or preconceptions in some cases when apparently the intelligence judgment was correct. Ransom quoted in this connection a statement by Winston Churchill which was made in 1939 (at page 194). He does not, however, note this as the very focus of the problem of philosophy and method. Only a degree or modicum of agreement in the government, and therefore in the nation, on what makes an estimate valid, and on how and when to distrust preconceptions, and how and when to distrust experts, can really serve to tighten the linkage of good intelligence to policy. Such things have been, historically, matters of quite slow growth. The trouble today is that time is so short. Five years could be wasted a century ago, or even two decades ago, without losing the chance to recoup mistakes and negligence. The acceleration of technology has made the pace much too swift for such leisurely trial and error.

The long term cycles have their values also, however, and if more of today's students are exposed to such a book by their teachers, then more of tomorrow's staffs and rulers will come to leadership with minds attuned to the need for objective knowledge and judgment and to the difficulties of finding truth and of getting it accepted.

GEORGE S. PETTEE.
The Johns Hopkins University.

The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare. BY MURRAY DYER. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959, Pp. xxi, 269. $6.00.)

The Weapon on the Wall is political communication, one of the necessary instruments of foreign policy, which, the author holds, is not being effectively employed by the U. S. government because it is inadequately understood, not taken seriously enough, and improperly organized.

While his criticisms may be overstated and sometimes lack a sufficient bill of particulars, the author provides a broad and penetrating reassessment of the nature of political communication, its basic premises, operating principles, and the requirements and problems to be overcome if the United States is to employ this instrument more effectively. For this task he is well equipped by virtue of practical experience in this field and years of research and reflection as a member of the Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, which sponsored the study. Dyer's treatment of this difficult subject is informed and sophisticated. He draws extensively upon the experience of practitioners, a large body of classified reports and writings of recognized specialists, and the "logic" of political communication itself.

Dyer is convinced that the United States must deal with the present world conflict at the level of *ideas* as well as by diplomacy, economic action, and military preparedness. He is hopeful that the values inherent in our political philosophy are potentially attractive to peoples of other cultures in the world and, further, that skilled political communication can help us toward the long-range goal of attracting other peoples to these values. But he recognizes and quite properly emphasizes that, ultimately, effective communication is rooted in effective action and policy: it can neither substitute for them nor long mask unwise actions and policies.

Assuming a policy framework which, in fact, affords some latitude for effective political communication, there remain difficult problems concerning direction, control and administration of a communication program. Workable solutions, the author believes, cannot emerge until those concerned better understand, and agree upon, what political communication is all about. Dyer argues persuasively that while many departments and agencies must and do contribute to the stream of political communication, it remains a national instrument and can never be the creature of a single department. Direction, control and vigorous leadership is needed at the level of the White House. This requires Presidential appointment of a man of high caliber, status and prestige to the post of coordinator of political communication. To be successful, the coordinator would have to have immediate access to the President and to enjoy the Chief Executive's support when difficulties involving various government departments arise; and he would have to be a member of the policy-making elite of the executive branch in order to secure proper consideration of the implications for political communication of alternative policies before the final choice is made. The author also revives earlier proposals for a national college of political communication and for a permament joint congressional committee to monitor all communication activities.

The Weapon on the Wall is important, timely and in some respects inevitably controversial. Appreciation is due the U.S. Army which, the author tells us, finally approved publication of this book on its own initiative, after the manuscript had been under review within the government for sixteen months, though it did not entirely agree with its contents and accepts no responsibility. The publication of this book, coinciding with the comprehensive review of national security policy-making machinery being made by Senator Henry Jackson's subcommittee, should stimulate a revival of interest in the closely related question of the workings of our machinery for political communication.

ALEXANDER L. GEORGE.
Santa Monica, California.

The Prophet Unarmed. By ISAAC DEUTSCHER. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 490. $9.50.)

It will be a long time before the scholar's interest in the first ten years of the Russian revolution will be sated. Every work dealing with hitherto neglected facets of this turbulent period is a welcome addition to the rapidly growing literature in the field of Soviet history and politics. What makes this period so fascinating to political scientists? Why do so many writers dealing with sundry topics seem to get stuck in the 1920s? The reason is not only that source materials for the early years of the revolution are more abundant or at least more accessible than for the subsequent decades. Much rather, I suspect, it is because Soviet society in those years was more heterogeneous; and for this reason there was more debate, there were more issues, there was more politics. The vast corporate structure facing us today had not even begun to form itself. All was flux and uncertainty and creative destruction. Because of this, finally, the main actors appear far more interesting, alive, or human to us than the businesslike organization men of the present-day Soviet power elite; and one of the most fascinating personalities of all the men and women who helped make the Russian revolution was L. D. Trotsky, the hero of Isaac Deutscher's trilogy, of which the present volume relating Trotsky's life between 1921 and 1929, is the second. The third and last one is to cover Trotsky's life in exile.

Deutscher's book is a brilliant and perceptive history of the Russian Communist Party during the period of the great discussions and bitter power struggles raging from the end of the Civil War to the triumph of Stalin over the Left Oppositions. To be sure, it is party history told from the point of view of one who deliberately sets out to set the record straight about Trotsky's contributions to the history of the Russian revolution, about his brilliant leadership and prophetic foresight, and about his loyalty to the movement which ignominiously cast him out. About the need for such a history there can be no doubt. Trotsky, the popular hero of 1905 and the mastermind of the October uprising, the organizer and chief strategist of the Red Army and, in the eyes of many, the then heir-presumptive to the position of party leader, has been much maligned, not only by the Stalinists who eliminated him from their party, but also by almost everyone outside the bolshevik party whom he himself had previously helped to eliminate from the Russian political scene. A full account of his life and his contributions to the history of Soviet Russia has been long overdue.

One might disagree with Deutscher over some of his emphases. For instance, he makes too much of Trotsky's prophetic insight; even though some phrases jotted down thirty-odd years ago ring amazingly true today, they were tossed off incidentally in journalistic, albeit brilliant fashion. We should take them no more seriously than their author did. Nor was Trotsky one of the outstanding literary critics of Soviet society in his time, or as brilliant an economist as Deutscher makes him out to be. Deutscher is not blind to some of his hero's shortcomings, but he nonetheless magnifies his stature and thereby also tends to diminish those of his remarkable entourage, however interesting the sketches may be which he makes of some of the outstanding Soviet politicians.

The mood with which Deutscher has approached his theme is that of tragedy, as befits his sympathetic involvement with the hero. Greater detachment on the author's part would probably have changed the tragic note to one of irony. Even the present work shows clearly that Trotsky had to blame none so much for his downfall as himself. Not only was he inexplicably blind and helpless in party politics—a helplessness which Deutscher describes but does not really explain. Trotsky dug his own grave by helping build up the party machine and the party traditions which spelled his doom. Trotsky was Stalin's major antagonist; but he was also in many respects Stalin's precursor. He was one of the chief champions of strict centralization and discipline; advocate of rapid industrialization by drastic means; inspirer of the emasculation of the trade unions. Sharing Lenin's puritan disdain for aesthetic pursuits to some degree, he must be considered one of the fathers of Socialist Realism, even though he would have despised its products. Irony of ironies, he is also the precursor of Andrei Vyshinsky, Stalin's chief prosecutor in the great purge trials; for he, Trotsky, acted in Vyshinsky's role in the purge trials of the early 1920s, including the first trial of bolshevik oppositionists. Trotsky not only coined the slippery concept of "political guilt," Vyshinsky's principal ground for denouncing the fallen leaders, but he used other phrases of condemnation that were to be hurled at his own head so few years later. Whether we apply our sense of irony or tragedy here is largely a matter of taste and sympathy, just as it remains the reader's choice whether he wants to interpret Trotsky's behavior in defeat as heroic defiance or as childish stubbornness. In Trotsky, the line between the sublime and the ridiculous becomes thinner, the more closely we examine him.

Deutscher's work is very much more than a biography. His hero's life was so intimately interwoven with the fate of the Communist party and the Soviet state that his biography turns into that of the party, and particularly into a history of the opposition movements within it. This story of debates, maneuvers and intrigues is written with rare empathy and sensitivity for problems and issues; and in general, also, Deutscher excels all other writers in this field by his ability to depict the environment within which the party operated—the mood of the masses and of the party membership, the international atmosphere, the hopes and disappointments of the party leaders. More than anyone else he has the ability, without using any stiff and esoteric jargon, to put us in their shoes and help us see reality as they really perceived and reacted to it. For this reason, anything he writes, especially on the periods when he himself was an active communist, is bound to be of great value.

ALFRED G. MEYER.

Michigan State University.

The Adams-Jefferson Letters. BY LESTER J. CAPPON, editor. 2 Volumes. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1959. Pp. li, 282, Vol. I; vii, 283–638; Vol. II. $12.50.)

In rendering easily accessible the letters exchanged by these two great argonauts of American Independence along with those between Jefferson and Abigail Adams, Mr. Cappon has provided a historical and political feast for students of the American heritage. The correspondence between Adams and Jefferson began in 1777 and continued with an interruption between 1801 and 1812 until a few months before their deaths in 1826. The bulk of the correspondence during the period preceding their estrangement came between 1787 and 1789 (pp. 18–238) during most of which time Adams was Minister to England and Jefferson was Minister to France. This portion of the correspondence is very important from the standpoint of diplomatic history and the development of the close relationship between the Jefferson and Adams families. Here we find the two diplomats engaged in seeking trade outlets for the infant republic to offset those closed to it by the British at home and in their colonies, negotiating with the Barbary Pirates, seeking loans and the like. Adams envisaged the lighting of French cathedrals with New England whale oil; Jefferson preferred fighting the Bey of Tripoli to the paying of tribute; and Adams successfully negotiated a loan with the Dutch. Here, too, we see the warmth of the friendship between the two families, particularly in the letters between Jefferson and Abigail Adams who performed reciprocal shopping errands for each other in London and Paris respectively.

Important as this correspondence is, it can hardly compare with the letters exchanged by the old Patriots after their reconciliation. At a time when many of their countrymen were in a deep coma from the sleep induced by the Great Awakening and its aftermath, Adams and Jefferson represented what remained of the Enlightenment in America. Accordingly, in their efforts to explain themselves to each other before they died, they exchanged in confidence their views upon religion, political history, and philosophy, with Jefferson occasionally following his penchant for science, but for the most part confining himself to the things which interested Adams. As Deists, Adams and Jefferson were religious men, but they mutually distrusted what they called priestcraft, the superstitions regarding miracles, sectarian intolerance, and the corruption of Christianity. In this regard Adams almost reached the conclusion that this would be the best of all possible worlds if there were no religion in it, but he modified his generalization by remarking that he was thinking of the abuses of organized religion rather than true beliefs. Jefferson in turn demonstrated that Calvin was an atheist in that he made God "a daemon of malignant spirit" (II, 591). Adams believed in a life after death and thought he could overcome his objections to meeting Alexander Hamilton and Timothy Pickering again if he could perceive sincere penitence in either (II, 526).

With respect to philosophy, neither Jefferson nor Adams cared to go beyond the finite. Hence, each had something of a contempt for Plato (II, 432–433, 437). Adams apparently learned more from Plato than Jefferson. He discovered (1) that Franklin derived his proposal to exempt mariners and husbandmen from the depredations of war from Plato, and (2) "that sneezing is a cure for Hickups." Much of their philosophical reading and speculation centered upon the nature of man and the organization of government. Although he had no illusions concerning man's frailties, Jefferson was the more optimistic concerning human improvement and the triumph of liberty over arbitrary power. Each in his own way believed in an aristocracy and approved of one, but Jefferson emphasized an aristocracy of virtue and talents, whereas Adams, without advocating their intrinsic goodness, stressed birth, beauty, wealth, and power as factors conducive to aristocracy. Hence, he reiterated his desire to create a Senate or second chamber so as to provide a hole into which to throw the aristocrats and thereby to enable them to be more easily watched than controlled.

Among frequently recurring references to the organization and mechanics of government, one item is of particular interest. Writing to Jefferson in 1813, Adams protested against Jefferson's characterization of the Alien and Sedition Act as "that libel on legislation." Because Jefferson had signed the law as Vice President and he as President, Adams argued that Jefferson was equally responsible for the law (II, p. 329). That John Adams, who had spent much thought on the veto and on merging the executive with a number of other phases of the legislative function, could equate the routine signature of a presiding officer of a legislative body certifying the passage of a bill and the discretionary approval of the Chief Executive armed with the power of veto is inexplicable upon any basis. It is a serious lapse in Adams's usual talent for clear and realistic analysis.

Althought this re-publication of Adams-Jefferson letters produces nothing new, students of American history and political theory will find the compilation of all the correspondence between two of the greater figures of the Revolution and the early Republic most useful. The utility of the volumes is enhanced by extended notes and an adequate index.

Robert J. Harris.

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Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research. Edited by John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1959. Pp. ix, 413, $7.50.)

We are indebted to Messrs. Wahlke and Eulau for their enterprise in collecting this discerning medley of articles on the legislative process. Like Henry Thoreau, who travelled far in Concord, the editors have traversed a wide field within the boundaries of their subject. In addition to the prefatory comments of the editors, there are some 41 essays in this volume, drawn from a score of sources. A few of the essays are old favorites, now conveniently brought together in one book, but the editors have been most resolute in their search for suitable material. Some of the essays here will be unfamiliar even to the most intrepid reader of journals, and four articles make their public appearance for the first time.

Reading a series of articles of such high caliber is both a pleasurable and disconcerting experience. Intellectually, it is pleasurable to read the concise and thoughtful observations of a group of scholars on a subject of singular political importance. But the very richness of the fare is mildly disconcerting. One is enveloped in a flood of ideas, some of them controversial, and one is sympathetic with the response of Mgr. Ronald Knox, who once said he was tempted to write a definitive answer to every letter appearing in *The Times*.

The principle followed by the editors in selecting the material is that "behavioral analysis and institutional analysis are not mutually exclusive categories, nor alternative fields of study, but rather are mutually interdependent approaches to central problems of political inquiry." The first section, "The Historical and Institutional Context of Legislative Behavior," includes several essays concerned with some of the major problems of legislatures, and this section sets the stage for the remaining part of the book, where there is greater emphasis on empirical research. The other three sections are entitled "The Political Basis of Legislative Behavior," "The Social and Psychological Bases of Legislative Behavior," and "Research Orientations and Techniques." The term legislature is used in a restricted sense, referring "only to those elected bodies in political systems of the Western culture that engage in the functions of proposing, deliberating, and deciding about public policy." Even with these restrictions, the contributions extend from an analysis of legal concepts, primarily Roman in terminology, to adroit manipulations of Greek and Arabic symbols; in terms of institutions, space, and time, they extend from the Spanish Cortes in the Middle Ages to the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales.

The selections have been chosen to illuminate the legislative process and to show some of the varied techniques by which legislatures can be studied. No attempt is made to develop a general framework for legislative analysis. The book is suggestive, not definitive. There are, indeed, additional areas of the legislative process which merit further study, and for convenience they may be labelled Functions and Comparability, Transferability, and Distortions. Having spent the last year or more sedulously observing the operations of Parliament, and attempting to put my observations into some sensible order, I have become highly sensitized to the problem of what specific functions a "legislature" actually performs. By some definitions, Parliament would be ruled out of consideration as a proper legislature: the development of the law-making function was, in a way, a historical accident, and law-making, as such, is only one of the several functions performed by Parliament. Some Members and Noble Lords would be amused to learn that they were considered by foreigners to be "lawmakers" and they would be puzzled and perhaps annoyed by the denigrating label "decision-maker." The making-of-decisions is something other people do for them! But enough of this small talk. Even with its truncated legislative functions, its atrophied powers of making decisions, and its variegated membership, not all of which is elected (but is nevertheless representative), Parliament impresses one as a vigorous and influential assembly whose Members know which buttons to press to get results. More than that, within the broader political design, one can see the comparative configurations of Parliament and Congress as they perform their similar functions; useful comparisons are not impossible.

The question of the transferability of legislative institutions to alien cultures is, in modern times, a pressing political question. The new centralizing institutions in the former colonies may have tenuous roots within the old culture, but by definition they will not be indigenous and will be Western in design. Sometimes the transfer appears to work successfully, as in India, but there are also examples where the transferred parliamentary system and the congressional system have been perverted into dictatorships. The volume under review should provide stimulation for further research on the legislative process, and it is not too much to hope that some of this research will be directed toward the newer legislatures (by whatever name they are called) toward the end that they will become useful instruments for providing stable government, with democratic controls.

ROLAND YOUNG.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Community. Edited By C. J. Friedrich. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press. 1959. Pp. viii, 293.)

This volume, consisting of 16 individual contributions, grew out of the discussions and papers presented at the 1957 meeting of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. The Society, which meets once a year, devotes its entire meeting to a previously chosen topic which, in this instance, was the concept of community. Some of the contributions in this volume were actually presented and debated at the meeting; the others were written later especially for this volume. As is to be expected in any composite work, this volume is necessarily uneven. Nevertheless, reading it is a stimulating intellectual adventure because of the wealth of viewpoints and the diversity of specialized backgrounds and techniques which are brought to bear on this single and vital topic of community.

In several instances, conflicting viewpoints are clearly joined and thus force the reader to think them through and take a position of his own. Perhaps none of these is sharper than the papers by Huntington Cairns and Stuart M. Brown. Cairns criticizes formalist jurisprudence and makes a brilliant case for the relevance of human ends to positive law. He argues that "the validity of law is to be found in the nature of the community and nowhere else." This leads him, of course, to attack the jurisprudence of Hobbes and Austin. Brown, on the other hand, defends Hobbes and Austin on the ground that the "American dream" is pluralistic and must remain so if individual liberty is to be preserved in a society in which moral and cultural diversity precludes any single "extralegal principle of social order."

Other papers are of interest not because of any joining of issues but because they contain new relationships which are brought out and highlighted. Thus, persons who are familiar with W. Y. Elliott's concept of co-organism will be interested to note the relevance and effectiveness of that concept in international problems such as the revision of the U. N. Charter, World Federalism, and the Iron Curtain which have arisen since Elliott first formulated his concept many years ago. Margaret Spahr's paper is likewise significant in that the relationship of the Supreme Court to the United States conceived as a community is ably analyzed. A note of warning concerning the dangers of excessive community or of community embodying bad principles is sounded by George Catlin. Warren Roberts contributes a thought-provoking analysis of community in terms of responsiveness, Lon Fuller of the extent and limits of secrecy in a given social order, and Taubes of the light which eschatological thinking sheds on community.

The least significant paper is by Talcott Parsons whose thesis is that community is residence (*i.e.*, where you eat, sleep, work, play, etc.). The facts it refers to are obvious, the exposition is dull, and the contribution is nil. Thomas A. Cowan does a valiant job of trying to rescue Parsons' paper from meaninglessness by pointing to the persistence of "space-determined political forms," the use of residence as a concept of jurisprudence, and other problems which Parsons should have raised but ignored. What Cowan does, however, is to make an original contribution of his own by suggesting new lines of inquiry.

The chief value of the volume, aside from particular contributions in it which are significant in their own right, is to show how rich and fruitful the convergence of intellects trained in diverse disciplines on a single subject can be. It is group research without regimentation and scholarship without the stifling burden of "team"-controlled thinking.—René de Visme Williamson, *Louisiana State University*

Modern Organization Theory. Edited by Mason Haire. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1959. Pp. x, 324. $7.75.)

This excellent symposium of ten original papers on a variety of organizational theories is introduced with a brave synthesis by Mason Haire, who finds the recurring themes to be the conflict between personality and organization, the relation of structure to behavior, the theory of decision, the external environment of organizations, their durability, and the interdisciplinary approach. E. Wight Bakke writes on the concept of the social organization, R. M. Cyert and J. G. March on organizational objectives, A. Rapoport on the use of a logically defined task as a research tool into organization, C. Argyris on a model of the social system of work groups, and W. F. Whyte on a model of organizational behavior emphasizing the interaction concept and subordinating sentiments and attitudes. Rensis Likert ties many empirical studies into a revised set of concepts on making effective the structure, atmosphere, leader traits, communication, and intelligence (G2) function. He prescribes full-flowing communication and influence processes through an overlapping-group and decentralized structure. Robert Dubin presents concepts of linkage-systems and unit-stability; Dorwin Cartwright describes the uses of graph theory in organization theory; Mason Haire reenters the lists with a sharp appraisal and contribution to organization historiography; and Jacob Marshak presents some strict formal criteria for calculating group activity under rules.

The book is not for dilettantes, young students, or casual readers. It holds many diagrams, didactic formulae, and special languages. It presumes that the reader has had a prolonged and self-conscious experience in work-groups. Even so, the profuse flowering of terms is disturbing. There is here (as in learning theory in psychology, in political behavior studies, and in other fields of social science) a regrettable coinage of terms to stand for simple fact categories, resulting in a second language (or as many languages as there are authors writing thus in partial isolation). Several of the writers might try to maintain the principle that, where their facts are not too dissimilar from other people's facts, they should repress the urge to call their facts by a different name, and should reserve their coined terms for the critical phases of theoretical construction. The men who write in this book are in the very top rank of administrative theory. They have had much the same experiences in organizations and intellectual training. They probably see facts with the same eyes. There are no generals, practical primitives, psychologists, Catholic theorists, or political scientists among them. Yet when even their editor tries to put them together in theory, he has to, at times, fall back upon mere tonal similarities. We criticize the medieval philosophers for saying so many different things using the same words, but today our communication suffers because we use constantly different words in order to achieve precise meanings. Our theory is no better off. Our superiority is entirely practical. We know that we are not speaking to an audience very well, but given a practical work situation, we can manipulate it successfully, using a logico-empirical technique that still cannot be raised to the height of a general theory.—Alfred de Grazia, *New York University*.

Ethics and the Social Sciences. Edited by Leo R. Ward. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 1959. Pp. xi, 127. $3.25.)

Value In Social Theory. Essays by Gunnar Myrdal, selected and edited by Paul Streeten. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1959. Pp. xlvi, 269. $5.00.)

Despite their titles, which suggest a certain proximity of subjects, the books under review have little in common. Father Ward's volume is a collection of six papers presented at a University of Notre Dame conference in the fall of 1957. The conference was interdisciplinary in the sense that it involved a variety of disciplines, and perhaps also in the sense that Protestant as well as Catholic social scientists participated. The interdisciplinary *motif*, academic and religious, may partly explain why the papers have only a marginal relationship to each other. Topics treated range from Francis G. Wilson's analysis of the value positions of social scientists (which I shall discuss presently), to Kenneth E. Boulding's elaboration of his *Image* thesis, to James R. Brown's exploration of the rôle of theological convictions in public policy formation. Many of the papers are provocative—frequently in ways that the authors did not intend—but they do not constitute an integrated and unified approach to the discussion of ethics in the social sciences.

Wilson's essay, "The Social Scientist and His Values," merits special attention since it is written by a political science colleague and purports to present a taxonomic view of the values held by social scientists. The essay is governed, "in rather general terms," by what Wilson refers to as a "Thomistic theory of state and society." Although the theory is never explicitly stated, Wilson implies that it serves as a kind of magnifying lens, enabling him to identify, in sharp detail, basic developments in the social sciences. For example, "With a Catholic perspective, the social scientist can see readily the newer trends in subject-matter and method. . . . "

I am not certain what this statement means; the least that can be said is that certain "trends" loom much larger in Wilson's magnifying glass than they do in the lens that I use. He has every right, of course, to raise questions about the rôle in the social sciences of liberals, atheists and those with a "jelly-fish religious affiliation," "behavioral intellectuals," "scientific intellectuals," and foundations. But it is another matter whether he is entitled to state, as fact, that an "élite" of behavioral scientists is attempting to claim "a monopoly of social intelligence . . . by denying it to others, such as those holding religious beliefs, or who (*sic*) are conservatives." Should the new "élite of social science intellectuals," he told the Notre Dame conference,

> who in the universities, in government, and in the foundations, already have such great power, be successful in their claims, it would be a catastrophe and a disaster for Catholic and Thomist intellectuals. It would not merely exclude them from their inherent rights as citizens to be consulted in a pluralistic society, but it would exclude from the calculations of policy the whole corpus of ideas associated with natural law and Christian morality.

This statement strikes me—not to put too fine a point on it—as downright silly. I am not aware of the "claims" referred to, or any imminent "catastrophe" and "disaster," or any conspiracy to deprive Catholic and Thomist intellectuals of their rights. I know of one university—very Protestant and very behavioral—and I should imagine there are others, whose political science faculty this year includes a Catholic priest serving as Visiting Professor of Political Theory. Offhand I do not think of any individual, in or out of the "élite," who desires to exclude "the whole corpus of ideas . . ." Certainly a case can be made against certain trends in the social sciences, but the questions involved—it should not be necessary to say this—concern us all, whether we be Protestants, Catholics, Jews, atheists, agnostics, or whatever. I regret very much that Wilson chose to argue the case from narrow, partisan, and, on the whole, unrealistic premises.

Value in Social Theory, edited by Paul Streeten, contains a collection of Gunnar Myrdal's essays, most of them previously published. Those of us who regard *An American Dilemma* as something of a classic will not need to be persuaded that the Streeten collection is worthy of attention. Portions of *An American Dilemma* and the influential *An International Economy, Problems and Prospects* are reprinted in the present volume. A "Postscript," largely in the form of an intellectual autobiography, concludes the book.

The common theme of the essays is the relationship between values, means, and ends in the social sciences. Myrdal's basic thesis is that there "is no way of studying social reality other than from the viewpoint of human ideals." Reminding us that the social sciences at the start "received their impetus much more from the urge to improve society than from simple curiosity about its working," he suggests it would be a serious loss if, in the urge to become scientific, we "became shy in dealing with the broader issues." Although he welcomes the developing unity of knowledge and application of scientific method, he insists on the crucial rôle of the "value connotation" in shaping our interests, directing our thoughts, and giving significance to our inferences. Value premises, he argues, should be made explicit, and "must meet the criteria of relevance and significance to the society in which we live." Myrdal, in effect, would like the social sciences to function as the policy sciences of democracy.

I confess that I find this emphasis congenial to my own notions about the nature of our commitment and responsibility, and I therefore regard *Value in Social Theory* as urgent reading. But whatever one's own position may be on the rôle of values, the various essays can be read with a good deal of profit. No matter what he is writing about—methodological problems, social theory, the Negro in America, or Swedish economists—Myrdal, like Emerson (in Holmes' words), has an extraordinary ability "to impart a ferment."—Arnold A. Rogow, *Stanford University*.

Our Public Life. By Paul Weiss. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1959. Pp. 256. $4.50.)

Professor Paul Weiss, of Yale, is the author of *Man's Freedom* and of several other books which have commanded general respect, and which have provided original and valuable *aperçus* in thought. The present volume, being an elaboration of his Mahlon Powell Lectures, in Indiana University, follows a precise logical schematism, almost scholastic in form, which certainly carries us far from the pragmatism and case instances to which American law schools are addicted. Its dialectic is reminiscent of that of the late Professor R. G. Collingwood, in his *New Leviathan*. Occasionally one comes across such a sentence as "usually the public law expresses the will of a dominant or representative prestigious class," and one finds oneself wondering to precisely what experience this corresponds and of what this class is 'representative.' I do not know how far it profits to provide a presumably exhaustive list of 'Man's Native Rights,' which includes his right *to* 'believe,' 'enjoy,' 'exist' and 'travel' ('enjoy what?') and the right '*of* his body,' 'consumption,' 'kinship' and 'rebellion,' together with a right of freedom '*from* want.' This seems to leave most of the serious existential dilemmas untouched. Does it profit one to go to any tourist agency and say that one has a right to travel? We all know the rhetoric about freedom from want. But from what want? The defect of the whole philosophy of Natural Rights is that it is a pepper-potting round of arbitrary preferences. As Professor Weiss sagely comments, "it is necessary to distinguish the essential features characteristic of every man." We learn that no native rights, however inalienable, are unlimited. They must be taken in the perspective of a public world, in which they will yet receive legitimate satisfaction. There are no rights for the production of evil. But who decides what is evil? Are free rights in Press and Television often evil? Apparently the criterion lies in the objective harming of the prior rights, not in the opinion of the majority. To maintain this, compulsion is justifiable.

It is to be expected that Professor Weiss, as against some modern critics, will develop a doctrine of Natural Law. This he does in terms of a rational ideal, as social norm in particular situations—indeed, Professor Weiss somewhat oddly adds, "in a State." The difficulty here lies in a criterion which rises from one particular but yet judges another particular. Professor Weiss accordingly introduces, as *deus ex machina*, something quite novel: a Law of Civilisation. With sensitivity, however, he notes that this will be judged by 'the aesthetic man.' It is shaped as a mythos. Professor Weiss here connects with the thought of Cassirer and of W. T. Stace. With this conclusion the present reviewer, at least, finds himself in deep sympathy.—GEORGE E. GORDON CATLIN.

Politics and Evangelism. By Philippe Maury. (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1959. Pp. 120. $2.95.)

This little volume admirably depicts the inescapable connection of politics and evangelism, and, more broadly, of politics and theology.

The author feels that the Church today has evaded its political, and therefore a part of its Christian, responsibility by falling prey to two opposing "temptations." The pietist temptation to withdraw the Church from the world is in error because "the normal relationship between the Church and the world is that of dialogue." On the other hand, the catholic temptation, equally pernicious, is to absorb the world into the Church. The author's thesis is that surrender to either temptation is un-Christian because each misunderstands the proper *rapport* of the religious and the political as decreed by the Biblical criterion. Yet "people in the twentieth century live in a political context that marks their entire existence. Their temptations and their sins are, to a large extent, political. Politics is a matter of daily concern, the cause of the most intense devotion as well as of the deepest disillusion." Politics has become religion. What, then, is the task of the Church?

Four basic themes, the author asserts, abound in "all recent thinking by the Church about politics": *the order of God*, which rules out anarchy as the worst political perversion but condemns totalitarianism for denying freedom of conscience; *love for the neighbor*, which at the present time demands engagement in politics and approval of social services performed by the state, since individual and Church charity are no longer sufficient; *freedom of the Church*, which means freedom to preach the gospel, for only the Church knows how and whether this is done correctly; and *politics and the Kingdom of God*, which necessitates that the Church recognize that the "justice" dispensed by the state should be of such a nature that it is analogous, as a parable, to the Kingdom of God.

Accordingly, the task of the Church is to proclaim and to interpret—to evangelize—these four basic themes. That is, the task of the Church is to proclaim and to interpret, so far as politics is concerned, what God may have to say about current political events. The Church, also partially a human institution, is readily acknowledged as fallible. Because, however, it knows the Biblical message best, it may even go to the extreme of instructing its members to disobey the state whenever the state unduly infringes the fundamentally theological prerogatives of conscience. Hence the Church must never remain neutral in political affairs. "Political neutrality amounts to political conservatism," support of the *status quo*, frequently making the Church a "conspirator with evil."

Nevertheless it is not the business of the Church, in its commitment to Christian principles, to constitute itself a pressure group or a political party. Any "Christian" political party is impossible because of theological ambiguities. Correlatively, Christian eschatology does not permit the assumption of a "Christian" civilization. The individual Christian, of course, quite significantly does part of his Christian duty by his involvement in politics and his membership in a political party. And the Church must always witness and profess what it considers Biblically prescribed about political problems. In the recent "theological rediscovery of politics," the mandate of ecumenical unity, though not uniformity, has become clear. Christianity and the Church as its Body must be made politically as well as spiritually meaningful for all times and all places. Christianity, the author is thereby arguing, must no longer so decisively reflect the influence of the Western world.

Theological disagreements with the author ought not to occasion any depreciation of what he has so competently attempted. To confess his great debt to the teachings of Karl Barth is his scholarly privilege. The vital contribution of the book is its lucid portrayal of the indispensable conjunction of the religious and the political in this era.—RONALD F. HOWELL, *Emory University*.

Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy. BY KENNETH W. THOMPSON. (Durham: Duke University Press. 1959. Pp. 148. $3.50.)

Based on three lectures delivered at Duke University under the auspices of the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics, this study explores the relevance of Christian Ethics to the conduct of foreign affairs in general and to American foreign policy in particular. In this context it examines some dilemmas confronting the United States today in the areas of disarmament, colonialism, and diplomacy.

The author's position is that of "Christian realism" as opposed to both political idealism and political realism in the ordinary sense. Idealists tend to be hypocritical or, if sincere, addicted to self-righteous moralizing which is bound to antagonize allies even more than foes. Ordinary realism easily leads to cynical nihilism and to the ruthless policies of the dictators. However, Thompson's Christian realism is strongly influenced by the writings, not only of Niebuhr, but also of Churchill, Kennan, Acheson, and Morgenthau. This book belongs then to the realist school —a doctrine well worth reemphasizing even in our post-Dulles era. Thompson denies that Christianity can supply rules of action to foreign policy makers; the Christian precepts of turning the other cheek or recompensing evil with good are meant to apply to individuals, not to nations. "Hence the importing of religious precepts into the political arena may be more mischievous than constructive" (p. 124), and the author's criticism is effectively directed against religious advocates of "positive thinking." For the conduct of foreign affairs the Christian outlook recommends not rules but attitudes: patience, humility, and a willingness to compromise with ethical principles, one's own as well as those of other nations.

A short and stimulating essay on a timely subject of this kind is bound to raise more questions than it can answer. The author believes "that morality . . . can be discovered and analyzed in international affairs" (p. 4), but does not explain by what method this is to be done. He does not base the validity of the rules of international morality on Christian revelation, nor does he provide any other support for his ethical cognitivism. He limits himself to the empirical observation that "all nations are strongly disposed to endow their particular national ethical systems with universal validity" (p. 101). The question remains whether their own ethical systems are wrong or whether there exists no demonstrably valid ethical system at all. We are not told what it is that the supposedly objective norms enjoin all nations or some particular country to do, or which of two conflicting policies (*e.g.*, promoting democracy abroad or not interfering with domestic matters of other countries) they direct us to apply. When it comes to specific dilemmas of foreign policy, the author adduces political, not ethical, considerations. His discussion of these problems is consistent with the view that there are not only no Christian principles of foreign policy, but no objectively valid norms at all, and that ethics is a matter of subjective commitment rather than of objective discovery.—FELIX E. OPPENHEIM, *Princeton University.*

The American Theory of Church and State. BY LOREN P. BETH. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 1958. Pp. vii, 183. $4.50.)

The important and timely purpose of this book is to review the Anglo-American literature on the relation of church and state in search of an adequate theory of church-state relations.

Appropriately the research begins with the English Reformation and proceeds through Puritan America, the Federal period, and on to the present. It is emphasized that the early founders of democratic theory were erastian (supporting the general principle of having some designated monopolistic state religion), theocratic, or had no theory of religious liberty. (Toleration implies a gratuity rather than a right.) With Jefferson the "wall of separation" between church and state gets its first explicit statement. And although several recent Supreme Court rulings adopted this position, the author shows that the principle was never given a sound theoretical foundation. He desires to do so.

The problem has become acute recently because for the first time in her existence America is ceasing to be a Protestant nation. Previously it was possible to ignore the problem chiefly because an overwhelming majority of Americans and their leaders were basically at one on religious matters and basically agreed that the state should be entirely secular.

With the twentieth century growth of Catholic power this has changed and there is needed either a new theory of church-state relations or a demonstration that the old way fits these new developments. Professor Beth's defense of the theory of separation is a pluralist one, following earlier doctrines of Figgis, Lindsay, Barker and MacIver. In effect he asks Catholics to realize that Protestantism 'builded wiser' than either it or Catholicism knew, and that the Catholic Church is stronger under a Protestant theory of the state than under its own. In any case, only separation is alleged to be consistent with democratic theory.

But this leaves much to be desired. There is no discussion of the possible need for a unified national ethic, as distinguished from religious unity. The closing discussion of democratic theory ignores the many democracies which have functioned with officially established churches. The constitutionality of authoritarian groups in a constitutional regime is not touched on. Moreover, the crucial American problem which may shortly require novel judicial determination is the problem of the freedom to behave religiously. Is there such a freedom in the First Amendment? Does it apply to Catholics as well as to Jehovah's Witnesses? Is it distinct from the more general protections of freedom of speech, association and assembly? If such a freedom exists and must be protected by the state what does this do to the "wall of separation" theory? How far may religious behavior be upheld? If the majority of a state's citizens want to give general public support or protection to various aspects of religious behavior what are the Constitutional limits which might restrain them? The "free exercise" of religion is an explicitly protected and even especially favored constitutional protection. The "wall of separation" is not. Should the "wall" become more religiously permissive than in the past? Though the book leans rather heavily on constitutional materials, it avoids these direct issues for a more general defense of the principle of separation.

And yet, as the author states, he has not looked into the philosophical, theological, or sociological aspects of his problem. There are no comparative data on the Catholic Church in other countries. There is no consideration of how the church-state problem might appear on a supra-national scale. Despite these limitations the study is a valuable one and especially useful as a source wherein students may acquire a brief and accurate presentation of the foundations of the church-state problem prior to the twentieth century—Harvey Wheeler, *Washington and Lee University.*

Three Against the Third Republic. By Michael Curtis. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1959. Pp. 313. $6.00.)

This is a study of the political thinking of three critics of liberal democracy under the Third Republic, Maurice Barrès, Charles Maurras, and Georges Sorel, about each of whom much research and writing has been completed in the last two decades. Curtis has chosen to make this a comparative study and to show how these men attacked the Republic and the values on which it was based, and developed a number of concepts at the heart of later totalitarian regimes.

All three of these critics of democratic institutions were extraordinarily ignorant of the economic and social conditions in which most of their countrymen lived. All were parochial and isolationist. All were over-rated by their contemporaries and by historians as well, for, in spite of the brilliance with which Barrès and Maurras wrote, they failed to understand their own times, and they had precious little influence—the Dreyfus Affair, after all, was a ghastly disaster for them, especially Barrès and Maurras.

Three Against the Republic is a difficult book for the non-specialist. Curtis has been led by his immersion in French political writing to excessive use of allusions, and sometimes striking quotations serve as a substitute for analysis. Some groups, such as the Possibilists, are not described clearly and accurately, and the summary of the Dreyfus Affair, surely one of the most difficult political conflicts to explain, is not clear. However, aside from some slips, such as misunderstanding or mis-stating the reasons for the position of the Catholic Church towards Maurras, this is a creditable book.—Robert F. Byrnes, *Indiana University.*

The Human Condition. By Hannah Arendt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1958 Pp. 325. $4.75.)

The human condition, the conduct of man's lif on earth, the activities necessary for survival, an the organization and attitudes needful for th good life, is a rather large theme. A serious tackling thereof is of necessity worthy of serious attention by political scientists—and not by th theorists among them only. As anyone who know of her and her work would anticipate, Hannah Arendt's treatment is serious, since it rests on her profound concern about the condition, the direction, and the possible fate of contemporary man To the formulation and analysis of the issues involved, Dr. Arendt brings historical perspective and great and precise learning in the Western tradition, imaginative insight, analytical acumen, and a capacity for broad historical and philosophical generalization. Her ultimate concerns are with modern activity and activities. and their implications; their relations to, and interdependency with, work and labor respectively; and the way in which all these relate to life as public and life as private, and to the scope and terms of each area. To state her overall theses in a few words would necessitate dangerous and misleading half-truths. Indeed, the mere exposition of her argument without major falsification would require several pages. My own doubts and dissents concerning her construction of our time, of how it has come about and whither it may lead, would require a full article. Let it therefore suffice to say that, while her theses concerning modern civilization do not constitute an utterly new viewpoint, her reasons for holding them involve considerable originality, and force the reader to serious and profitable reflection. Here I can urge only that this book, no easy reading, will well repay careful reading; and that the reader, even though he end in fundamental dissent from Dr. Arendt's position, will gain some insights from analyses which, in newly illuminating ancient issues, often command assent and carry conviction.—Thomas I. Cook, *The Johns Hopkins University.*

Law in a Changing Society. By W. Friedmann. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1959. Pp. xxvi, 522. $8.50.)

"Change," John Dewey tells us, "is the primary social fact. . . . " Keeping up with it is a basic problem of every legal system. The law must be stable—for men must know what it requires of them before they act. Yet society cannot risk stagnation in its ground rules. The orthodox Anglo-American answer is that legislation—operating prospectively—shall keep the rules abreast of social need, while adjudication, resting on the principle of *stare decisis*, promises that reliance upon existing precepts will be respected. By this division of authority and technique we seek to reconcile the claims of stability and change. The difficulty is that legislators necessarily deal in "historical futures." They cannot fully anticipate all the eventualities of circumstance. The common language in which they must express their conclusions is imprecise. Moreover, ambiguity is an almost inevitable vehicle for the process of legislative compromise. It follows that adjudication cannot escape an element of discretion, or more crudely, policy-determination. But judicial decisions are for the most part retroactive. Thus the inescapable creativity of the judicial process raises serious problems in the Rule of Law. All this is writ large in the "segregation" controversy. In one form or another, we now learn, such difficulties are common to the major legal systems of the West.

Professor Friedmann's *Law in a Changing Society* is a study of legislative and judicial lawmaking—and legal thinking—in response to shifting community needs. His domain is largely the common-law world, but he has drawn also upon the experience of France, Germany and the U.S.S.R. His era is the twentieth century—our era of constant revolution that seems to have put as much strain upon law as any other in the history of western culture. He considers first the impact of shifting social pressures upon basic legal institutions—property, contract, tort, family and criminal law. Sometimes the concept itself is altered; sometimes its form remains unchanged, but is put to unaccustomed uses. Another section of the book considers the effect upon the individual of that modern trinity: business corporation, labor union and the demands of state security. Plainly "rugged individualism" has not come out unscathed. The trend in each field of law within each country parallels the trend from nation to nation. The power of the individual recedes, his liability grows in response to the demands of social accountability. The wave of the present is away from Benthamism. Of course law is not the only agent of the change. "Either the direct thought control of the totalitarian state—Communist or Fascist—or the deadening glare of commercial television, with its subtle undermining of individual judgment, may lead mankind toward 1984." Finally a major section of this vast volume considers the repercussions of our "instability" upon international law and international relations. All this leads to a concluding chapter that explores the modern meaning of the Rule of Law.

Professor Friedmann was trained in the German and English legal traditions. Since 1938 he has taught successively at the Universities of London, Melbourne and Toronto and is now at Columbia. He modestly observes that his main purpose in this book is merely to outline problems. By this warning he may avert the obvious criticism that his effort, if very broad, is thin. In fact he does not stop with problems, but provides at least some answers. Whatever their merits, they leave the impression of fragility because the data to support them are so sketchily provided. It could hardly be otherwise in a single volume that covers so much. —WALLACE MENDELSON, *The University of Texas.*

On Law and Justice. BY ALF ROSS. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1959. Pp. xi, 383. $6.00.)

Alf Ross, Professor of Law at the University of Copenhagen, devotes most of the first half of the volume under review to the problems covered in such standard works on jurisprudence as those by Paton and by Dias and Hughes. In the second half, moving into areas generally more familiar to political theorists, he wrestles with the notion of Natural Law, the idea of justice, Utilitarianism, and with the problem of a science of politics and, especially, of legislation. Throughout, Ross reveals himself as a faithful student of Hägerström and of Kelsen, although in certain respects he is critical of the latter.

The ideas about the nature and definition of law set forth in this book are in agreement with those developed at greater length in the author's earlier work, *Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence* (1946). "A system of norms is 'valid,'" he holds, "if it is able to serve as a scheme of interpretation for a corresponding set of social actions in such a way that it becomes possible for us to comprehend this set of actions as a coherent whole of meaning and motivation, and within certain limits to predict them." (Page 34.) Right and might are not opposites, for all power must have "an ideological authoritative basis" (page 57) and rules of right must be backed up by some force to gain acceptance as valid law. "Fear and respect, the two motive components which are characteristic of the experience of the law, are reciprocally related to each other." (Page 56.)

In adhering to what he calls an "analytical-descriptive" theory of law, the author contributes to the discussion of such topics as "the sources of law," judicial interpretation, and the concept of rights. Hohfeld's system of legal terminology is modified, improved , and explained in terms of its legal functions. The ambiguous term "right" is omitted entirely from this basic system, which is composed of eight "modalities," all of which can by reduced to terms of "duty."

The second half of the volume, dealing with justice and the possibility of a science of "legal politics," is, in the reviewer's opinion, less satisfactory. The attack on all natural law theory as based on magic, religion, and metaphysics rather than science contains little that is new or particularly profound. Justice is seen as having two aspects, or as making two claims. One has to do with regularity; it is purely formal, demanding that the rules of the particular system in question be observed. This important aspect is dismissed rather lightly—too lightly—as being already implied by the concept of law itself. The other aspect of justice is purportedly contentual; but this contentual or material aspect of justice, we are told, is in reality empty, meaningless. Justice tells the judge how to apply the rules (with regularity, that is) but it provides no guide for the legislator, and therefore not for the judge either in so far as he legislates. To invoke justice in any sense beyond the claim for regularity "is the same thing as banging on the table. . . . It is impossible to have a rational discussion with a man who mobilizes 'justice,' because he says nothing that can be argued for or against." (Page 274.)

Surely Ross here confuses a lack of content with a lack of precision. Examination of ordinary discourse can easily be made to reveal that the word "justice" is used to convey material meaning. Indeed Ross himself seems inadvertently to say as much at one point. Examining the idea of justice as a demand for equality, he says "it ought to be obvious . . . that such an absolute uniformity cannot be what is generally meant by justice." (Page 269.) He goes on to say that "it cannot be regarded as unjust, but must, on the contrary, be one of the demands of justice that a distinction be made in such a way that advantages and burdens, rights and duties are distributed with due consideration of conditioning circumstances." (*Ibid.*) This statement appears to go a long way toward substantiating the position Ross is attacking! The notion that terms are meaningless if their meaning cannot be rendered precise has passed from favor among philosophers. It would be a pity if at this late date it gained currency among students of political theory and jurisprudence. Things that cannot be measured can frequently be ranked. Moreover, although large areas of justice are vague, others appear to be quite clear.

Attention should be drawn to the author's treatment of the proper role of the legal consciousness ("a disinterested attitude of approval or disapproval toward a social norm"—page 369) in any law-creating activity. First, Ross declares, it should never be taken as a measure of the "rightness" of a rule of law. That is to say a judge's sense of right (or "gut-reaction") as to what constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" should not influence his decision. So much for Learned Hand and Edmond Cahn! The legal consciousness of the ruling circles, Ross continues, may be accepted as *prima facie* indication of social needs, but that which prevails among the population is to be taken into account only as it bears on feasibility. So much for Mr. Justice Frankfurter! In other words, even if there is an ascertainable popular sense of right as to what "fairness" entails, it should play no part in the interpretation of "due process of law," except as it relates to the feasibility of a certain statute or judicial decision. Yet at the same time Ross maintains that "fundamental legal institutions do not seem to permit of rational argument" (page 375) and the policy-maker must adjust the law to ideological conditions, "with the legal consciousness as the lodestar" (page 377). Surely, further clarification as to how these positions are to be harmonized is called for.

Professor Ross' point of view, as applied both to jurisprudence and "legal politics," provides much stimulating material for discussion and argument.—J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College.*

Political Freedom. By ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN. Foreword by Malcolm Sharp. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1960. Pp. xxv, 166. $3.50.)

This remarkable publicist for constitutional freedoms has reached an age when most others have retired to the sidelines. But with all of the old enthusiasm for his favorite theme, defense of intellectual freedom, Professor Meiklejohn undertakes to present his ripest thought on the principle to which he remains passionately devoted.

Political Freedom brings together the author's earlier Walgreen lectures on the First Amendment (published in 1948 as *Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government*) and more recent papers that extend its thesis to specific Congressional activities.

Professor Meiklejohn's reflections on constitutional intent still revolve around the political and legal principle that individual freedoms are powers inherent in the public office of citizenship. *Public* interests of national self-preservation are best to be secured by granting fully the *private* interests protected by the First Amendment. Suspicion that the people may be led astray by alien and even subversive opinions is not sufficient ground for "intolerable" suppression of the free interchange of ideas.

As a teacher Professor Meiklejohn's first enemy is "enslavement of the mind." *Any* interference with public enlightenment is "false in theory" because destructive of self-government.

Political Freedom is a fervent apology. Its convictions are set forth clearly. But it is not apt to convince one who suspects that there are further issues beyond individual rights. The author admits that since the "paradox of freedom" forces men "to win one value by sacrificing another," "mistakes" must be expected. One only wonders who is making the greater mistake: Professor Meiklejohn and others who share Justice Holmes' preoccupation with legal issues or those who look for higher political truths.

But the issue of freedom and authority is as old as Socrates, and, adds the author, "No argument about principles is, I suppose, ever finished." Perhaps as long as intellectual freedom allows the endless reconsideration of "the American experiment" to result in books like *Political Freedom* that experiment has not failed.—JOHN A. GUEGUEN, *University of Notre Dame.*

Facets of the Renaissance. EDITED BY WILLIAM H. WERKMEISTER. (Los Angeles: The University of Southern California. 1959. Pp. viii, 112. $3.95.)

Few learned essays have the polish and vitality of these five "Arensberg Lectures on the Renaissance" delivered in 1956 at the University of Southern California. The authors—four historians and a historian of philosophy—have created an admirable introduction to political and philosophical thought in the sixteenth century. W. K. Ferguson surveys past ways of thinking about the "Renaissance" and argues explicitly for viewing it as a general period from 1300 to 1600 in European history. Garrett Mattingly discusses the origins of modern attitudes towards the state. He believes that the word "state," which originally meant "status," got its modern sense from questions like *Come mantenere lo stato?* meaning "How to continue in control of the government?" He regards Machiavelli as a turning-point not because he neglected ethical principles but because he had a new norm: "He looked to the state for salvation." But E. H. Harbison, who compares the realism of *The Prince* with the idealism of More's *Utopia*, accuses Machiavelli of missing "the third dimension of power, the moral dimension." Harbison attributes the differences between *The Prince* and *Utopia* largely to contrasting conditions in Italy and England. M. P. Gilmore traces the growing opposition between the humanist desire to view the past in true historical perspective and efforts like Machiavelli's to base systems of political science or of law upon historical study. P. O. Kristeller clearly outlines the leading ideas associated with Florentine Platonism. These essays are written in language intelligible to the layman, and they are valuable both for information and for penetrating insights.—DAYTON PHILLIPS, *Vanderbilt University.*

Principles of Public Debt: A Defense and Restatement. BY JAMES M. BUCHANAN. (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1958. Pp. x, 223.)

Professor Buchanan, a University of Virginia economist, asks whether the "vulgar" view of the average citizen or politician about the public debt may be valid, and the concept held by most economists since the 1930's may be erroneous.

Buchanan spells out the three basic propositions of "the new orthodoxy of the public debt": (1) public debt financing does not shift the real burden to future generations; (2) the analogy between private debt and public debt is fallacious; (3) external debt is fundamentally different from internal debt. Buchanan examines each of these concepts, finds them fallacious, and attempts to prove that each is true in reverse. He traces the historical development of public debt theory, showing that the new orthodoxy was popular with Ricardo and others more than a century ago but was later discarded.

This book is stimulating, controversial, and important. Buchanan's presentation is valuable in forcing a re-examination of current theory and policy. If Buchanan is correct, textbooks and governmental decisions would be changed significantly.

This reviewer believes that Buchanan emphasizes the financial burden of the public debt. His emphasis shifts the focus from the more important problem of the real burden in terms of resource use and thus fails to disprove the newly orthodox theory of public debt.—WILLIAM F. HELLMUTH, *Oberlin College.*

The Freudian Ethic. By RICHARD LAPIERE. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1959. Pp. x, 299. $5.00.)

In *The Freudian Ethic*, part of a projected attempt to formulate a general theory of social change, sociologist Richard LaPiere emphasizes not Freudianism *per se* but rather its relationship to, and the implications of, recent social, cultural and political trends in the United States. His major concern is that the Protestant Ethic—which he considers principally responsible for Western progress, technological and otherwise, because it encouraged self-reliance and enterprise—is succumbing to the Freudian Ethic, a "doctrine of despair" which regards man as inherently weak, incompetent and insecure.

In the Freudian view, man's instincts conflict with and are repressed by social conventions; society, therefore, should pamper the individual to prevent him from becoming frustrated if not mentally aberrant. The correlation between the emergent Freudian Ethic and the contemporary American "liberality toward self-indulgence and irresponsibility" (p. viii) is evidenced by the spread of progressive education, parental permissiveness, and so on. Such developments, claims LaPiere, are evolving people who are the antithesis of the rugged individualists produced under the influence of the Protestant Ethic, a stern but in the long run beneficent taskmaster.

Politically, this "subversion of American character" has resulted in the rise of "maternalistic government," which endeavors to maximize security for everyone without asking anything in return (such as obedience), whereas ideally government action should reflect "the will of . . . our legislators or political administrators" (p. 248). Harking back nostalgically to the Golden Age of the Protestant Ethic, LaPiere maintains that this ideal actually prevailed during much of the nineteenth century, when "our governments tended to . . . operate in considerable measure upon principle" (p. 250). Apparently American politicians, like Mannheim's socially unattached intelligentsia, not only ought to but can function—indeed, have functioned—independently of, and unhampered by, the dynamics of the political process. But this felicitous state of affairs has deteriorated into today's "government of, by, and for . . . vested-interest groups" (p. 251).

The author's antipathy to group activity does not, however, encompass Big Business, the repository and virtually the last stronghold of the capitalist heritage. Understandably, therefore, his prescription for our ailments is restricted to the hope that Americans somehow will manage to withstand creeping Freudianism and revive the Protestant Ethic, thus assuring the continued vitality of the calitalistic system (preferably operating under classical *laissez faire* conditions). This approach tends to obscure Professor LaPiere's at times provocative diagnosis of current social trends in America.—MARTIN MEADOWS, *University of Maryland.*

Georg Simmel: 1858–1918. EDITED BY KURT H. WOLFF. (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press. 1959. Pp. xv, 396. $7.50.)

After keeping fairly steady company with research technology for much of the past two decades, sociology has rediscovered the attractions (and necessity) of an old mistress—theory. There has been a rejuvenation of interest in the old masters, punctuated with collections of readings, symposia, commemorative journal issues, and new translations.

The present volume is a case in point. It contains thirteen essays, seven translations, a previously unpublished letter, an excellent bibliography and an unflattering portrait. Its aim is to give a picture of the depth and breadth of Simmel's interests. In so doing, it has less value for social scientists than philosophers. Wolff's translation, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel,* remains a much better English source for those interested in Simmel's social theory.

The essays by Levine, Weingartner, Tenbruck, and Duncan, and Wolff's translation of "The Problem of Sociology," together provide a good statement of Simmel's central thesis that the concern of pure sociology is with the form rather than content of social relations. Also of interest to political scientists is E. V. Walter's essay on the sociology of power. Here we see Simmel concerned with the inevitable conflict between the demands of individuality and the demands of collective existence. The forms of attempted resolution of this conflict are multi-fold. Presumably the task of political science is to analyze its content.

There were sociologists of Simmel's day (notably Durkheim) along with many of the contemporary brethren who take exception to Simmel's divorcement of content from sociology, or by implication, the pre-emption of concern with form from other social sciences. It is interesting to note that the main thrust of Simmel's concern with form, categorization of the forms of interaction (social process analysis) appears to have wound up in a taxonomic blind alley. Yet, when Simmel dipped into content to illustrate his formal propositions, he came up with many brilliant insights. Theory in such divergent areas as group dynamics, social perception, and urban sociology have been enriched by them.—EUGENE WEINSTEIN, *Vanderbilt University.*

Great Political Thinkers. BY WILLIAM EBENSTEIN. (New York: Rinehart, 1960. Pp. xiii, 978. $8.50.)

The third edition of this widely-used collection of prefaced readings features the addition of selections from Luther and Calvin, plus revision of the bibliographical notes.

The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi and Sarvodaya. BY VISHWANATH PRASAD VARMA. (Agra, India: Lakshimi Narain Agarwal. 1959. Pp. ii, 308. Rs. 12.00.)

This is an emotional polemic rather than a systematic analysis of Gandhism and Sarvodaya.

Indian Nationalist Movement and Thought. BY V. P. S. RAGHUVANSHI. (Agra, India: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal. 1959. Pp. 335. Rs. 10.00.)

This historical survey of Indian nationalism may serve as an undergraduate textbook, though the treatment of non-Congress elements in Indian nationalism is inadequate. There are a few factual errors and numerous printing mistakes.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Conservatives in Power: A Study in Frustration. BY EDWIN L. DALE, JR. (New York: Double- and Company. 1960. Pp. 214. $3.95.)

Nothing is more certain than debt and taxes. This definite accompaniment of modern government and society is made clear to the reader and to the Eisenhower administration by Mr. Dale, who writes with the understanding of an economics specialist for the Washington Bureau of the New York *Times*. With analytical clarity and moderation he supports the observation that more or better homework by the conservative Republicans before their taking power in 1953 would have given them a more realistic perspective and a less extravagant expectation concerning the inevitable and unpredictable economic weather, which favors no group or government, whether liberal or conservative. Our government at Washington has to function in the context of an exploding population, a mixed economy of fluctuating growth and variety, and an international process with no roadside seat available for an isolationist to see the rest of the world go by. Hence, the "outs" by becoming the "ins" take on a measure of guilt by assimilation, since a condition, not their own theory, confronts them. They can not abolish the welfare state in our federal system; they can not keep farm problems and farm spokesmen out of Washington; they can not dismiss the Russian challenge and its significance for the uncommitted peoples.

The author looks briefly and sharply at the questions of bounding budgets, debt management, and the ramifying impacts of a stubborn inflation on public and private finance. He marks up a credit for the conservatives, who did forthrightly "try, try again." But he matches this credit with the verdict that they faced an "economy after six years nearly as unsound, in their terms, as they found it, and had a couple of slumps and an intervening inflation to boot." By implication he leaves an opening for the conservatives to console themselves with a feeling that, but for their noble efforts, the growing magnitude of inflation and concomitant problems would have become greater. He praises them for their worthy objectives, which "probably were achieved in part" and which, "with a better knowledge of the realities . . . may be even more closely approached in the future." Obstacles as well as objectives must be comprehended if public finance, the Federal Reserve System, monetary policy, and the far-flung private economy of America are to be coordinated for the maximum good.

Meticulous experts can find gaps or faults in this small book on a large subject. It is not written for that clan; it clarifies the complex for the general serious reader who is interested in the workings of our political economy, with attention to the interlinkage of politics and economics.—H. C. NIXON, *Vanderbilt University Emeritus.*

Decisions for a Better America. BY THE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE ON PROGRAM AND PROGRESS. (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1960. Pp. 190. $.95.)

The report of the Percy Committee appointed last year by then Chairman Meade Alcorn is here made handily available in paperback for interested citizens, campaign workers, speakers, researchers and the gentlemen of the mass media. Following the official exchange of letters between Party Chairman Thruston Morton and Mr. Percy is a summary preface purporting to state the Republican Party's conception of the world in which it seeks the responsibility for another four years' conduct of the national administration, and sets forth its program in response to this challenge. Four "task forces" on (I) Human Rights and Needs, (II) The Impact of Science and Technology, (III) Economic Opportunity and Progress, (IV) National Security and Peace, provide the verbal ammunition. It is interesting to speculate as to whether this experiment in long-range publicity more than nine months before the convention will differ significantly from the official platform and the campaign speeches of the nominee.

With respect to content, the Report is far more a pragmatic platform of policy positions and recommendations than a consistent, unified body of beliefs constituting a political doctrine or creed. The preface asserts that the Republican program rests upon "the great human principle: 'faith in the individual,'" which underlies the party's determination to guard against "the heedless growth of the central government in Washington . . . to keep the basic control of government in the hands of the people . . . to exercise due care in public spending to avoid eating away the right of the people to save or invest in their own way . . . to resist government's intrusion into the affairs of men in every walk of life." At the same time, "Republicans believe in a central government vigilantly alert to the needs of the people, strong enough to defend the people, to help keep the economy in balance, and to make certain that a life of dignity is within the reach of every American" (p. 19). *Noticeably absent is any reference to States' Rights.*

Two political scientists, Cornelius Cotter of Stanford and Malcolm Moos of Johns Hopkins, were associated with the project, the former as Executive Director, the latter as member of Task Force IV on National Security and Peace.

The Question of National Defense. By OSKAR MORGENSTERN. (New York: Random House. 1959. Pp. xii, 308. $3.95.)

The formidable contemporary literature on American military policy is remarkably uniform in at least one respect: it is almost wholly lacking in a moral-political perspective concerning the use of force. Whether a current study is produced by a research center, a committee, or a single author it inevitably succumbs to the techno-science of our time. To borrow from Leo Strauss there is much retail sanity in this literature (in this respect the present work is one of the best), but it rests by and large on a foundation of wholesale madness (there is evidence of this in the present work as well).

The author is a well known economist and mathematician who has held positions that have enabled him, at least in some degree, to shape American military thought and policy. That his influence has not been as great as he should have liked will be manifest to the reader. Taking them one by one this reviewer finds it difficult to quarrel with the great majority of Professor Morgenstern's theses. Thus removing much of the strategic striking power of the United States from the "Zone of the Interior" to the ocean wastes, initiating a major fallout shelter program, putting a miniature replica of the economy underground, curbing the giveaway of information to the enemy—all of these, in themselves, are excellent proposals. However, it is the author's basic image of wa circumscribing these suggestions that arrests attention. The image is one dominated by a strategic thermonuclear exchange of short duratio on the part of two "players." Almost all of th problems of war are but ramifications of an all-ou exchange. War is a "game" controlled by a "optimal strategy" which, presumably, is littl short of self-evident; likewise, particular comba situations have their most obvious strategy. Wa reduces itself to a manageable enterprise to th extent that information (preferably complete can be quantified through the more or les sophisticated procedures of game theory an linear programming. Again, this reviewer is persuaded (largely by persons more knowledgeable that these mathematical tools are invaluable i the realm of logistics and for certain tactical problems. The enthusiasm of the author for the Offic of Naval Research—the *Naval Research Logistic Quarterly*, edited by Morgenstern, is one aspect o its work—is widely shared. On the other hand, t permit mathematicians to reconstruct "war" a an abstract reality is to indulge a fundamental intellectual error. The point can not be argued her other than to point up one barbarous effect of the error. Professor Morgenstern argues (59–60) that it is conceivable, if not probable, that the American "retaliatory" force—he distinguishes between "retaliation" and "counterattack" in such a way as to make the former a measure of insanity—must obliterate population centers rather than bases. He confesses that under the circumstances he poses such attacks would not have military significance, they would only have moral and political significance! Frankly, this writer labors under the impression that the American public will tolerate no such "optimal strategy," but concedes that the people are hardly aware of the thinking that goes on within the military establishment.

Morgenstern is less than enthusiastic about "limited war" and, consequently, does not explore the possibilities this concept offers for American military planning and technology. For example, he stresses the impact of nuclear propulsion systems on submarine warfare (*i.e.*, with respect to the "Polaris" as a general war, strategic weapon system), but fails to point out that nuclear reactors are apt to revolutionize naval surface warfare to an equal extent. His epitaph for the attack carrier is premature. It is coupled with a brief for the nuclear powered seaplane as a strategic weapon system. The latter, essentially a British idea, loses much of its force—as do most British ideas—when removed from its native habitat. There are some parthian shots for political scientists that reveal much about the author. This is work that needs to be read as we enter the new ecade.—JAMES M. ROHERTY, *Mount Mary 'ollege.*

'ension Funds and Economic Power. BY PAUL P. HARBRECHT, S. J. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1959. Pp. 328. $5.00.)

The subject of this study is "the effect of ension trusts upon the ownership and control of roductive property in the United States." The uthor pursues the subject by combining fact and peculation.

If the assortment of facts is offered in a way hat sometimes makes it difficult to tell whether hey are designed to support a next step in the nalysis or simply to remake a former point with ifferent data, the book nevertheless is a comendium of useful information bearing on such atters as the size and composition of pension und investments; number of employees covered, y size of employee group; administration of unds; terms and provisions of pension plans, laws elating to them, and so on.

The author's principal argument is that pension unds, along with insurance companies and investent funds, have been coagulating dispersed cororate ownership into new centers of power. The ature of that power is not yet clearly understood, s inadequately regulated, and is not appropritely rooted in responsibility. But one thing clear, ccording to the author, is that the result has been o change (or help change) the nature of our ecoomic society into something which is analogous o medieval society, with the great corporations aking the place of the great domains. He names his the "paraproprietal society"—beyond proprty, since property concepts relate less to things hemselves than to devices for transferring control.

Perhaps the author's most interesting point is hat the pension funds are a locus of anomalies. hey are set up in the interest of employees, in ne view constituting deferred wages, but except or ultimate receipt of benefits (and not always hen) the employees have no control over them; lthough for tax purposes irrevocably separated rom the employer, they remain under his control. any employers have preferred to cede actual ontrol of the accumulating funds to bank trusees, but bank trustees, in a circumspect effort to void any measure of control over the companies hose securities they have purchased with penion funds, refrain from exercising any voting ights inhering in them, thereby short-circuiting he stockholder responsibilities of the corporate ystem.

But it is this very reluctance of the fund anagers to exercise the economic power which und investments might bring them which makes the author's argument speculative. He writes as though potential control had been made actual. Yet the attempt to exercise more actively whatever economic power the fund accumulations carry with them could just as well elicit legislative regulation or restriction, nullifying or modifying the power potential.

A good example of the author's alarmist reasoning occurs on pp. 197–199, where he finds that the total pension fund holdings of all New York banks give them a 2 per cent interest in the common stocks of 50 of the largest corporations. He then concludes: "These are combined holdings of all the banks, so we do not know what concentration might have existed in individual banks. However, given the rapid rate of increase of pension fund stockholdings and the fact that fewer than thirteen large banks hold nearly all of these assets, we must conclude that corporate control is one possible result of the increase in pension trust capital."

Again, on p. 226, he writes, "The practice of turning investment authority over to corporate trustees has brought about a situation in which a single trustee—usually a large bank—may have financial control over many pension funds." This sounds sinister, until one realizes that in this context "control" can mean only "discretion to invest funds," which can be revoked at any time by the several employers from whom the funds derive. And that, moreover, there are a variety of institutional limitations on how such discretion can be exercised. Certainly there is little scholarly ground for concluding (p. 249) that "with their large equity holdings the bankers could make a plaything of stock prices."

There is much in the pension picture which does indeed invite sober analysis, and Father Harbrecht has performed a useful service in compiling the record. But I found myself repelled by what appeared to be an intent to "make a case" that the funds had profoundly altered property concepts, even to the extent of suggesting the approach of a neomedievalist socio-economic system.—NEIL CHAMBERLAIN, *Yale University.*

The Price Discrimination Law: A Review of Experience. BY CORWIN D. EDWARDS. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1959. Pp. xxii, 698. $10.00.)

In no area of business-government interaction are the subtle complexities of goals and means, theory and practice, thrown into sharper focus than in the field of price regulation. During the past twenty years, the principal instrument through which this activity has been projected has been the Robinson-Patman Act. As the record of administrative and judicial functioning has accumulated, and as business has adapted to the new pricing environment, the need has grown for a comprehensive assessment that would objectively interpret the past and prepare recommendations for the future. This need has now been well supplied, by a uniquely qualified author, in Professor Edwards' study, undertaken with the financial support of the Ford Foundation and the organizational backing of The Brookings Institution.

The book studies the record of experience under the Act with emphasis on the litigation of economic issues and the consequent modifications in business practices. Beginning with legal concepts and the general administrative framework, it comes to grips in its central portion with the operational meaning acquired by legal concepts in cases decided by the Federal Trade Commission. The analysis is specific and detailed. It leads to a sequence of chapters that summarize the developing significance of the statute's three main concepts: the nature of injury to competition, meeting competition as a defense to price discrimination charges, and the cost justification for discriminatory practices. The book concludes with an appraisal of the legislation as an expression of price discrimination policy and tentative suggestions for modification of the statute and its underlying policy.

This is a landmark study: comprehensive, scholarly, and notably sophisticated in its treatment of the contrasting and interwoven political, economic, and managerial issues. It denies the parochial specialist the easy and unrealistic assumptions that permit him to glide past the hard problems of ends and means in a dynamic enterprise society. It lays bare, for the selected arena of conflict, the conceptual and verbal differences that separate legal and economic thinking. It documents the tough facts of administrative potential and frustration that accompany the implementation of broadly-defined legislation in a complex economy. In the years ahead, it will be impossible to study price competition within legal, economic, and administrative contexts without heavy reliance on Edwards' notably fine work.—Melvin Anshen, *Carnegie Institute of Technology.*

To Try Men's Souls. By Harold M. Hyman. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1959. Pp. 406. $6.00.)

The history of loyalty tests in the United States constitutes the subject of this well-named work.

Hyman begins with the seventeenth century background in British politics and law and examines the problem within a very broad historical context down to the present day. He points ou the role which test oaths played in America colonial experience, giving a particularly vivi account of the Bacon Rebellion in Virginia During the Revolutionary War, too, as he demonstrates, there was on both sides an extraordinaril naive confidence in loyalty affirmations. Washington, for example, sang their praises: "From th first institution of civil government, it has bee the national policy of every precedent State t . . . engage its members to the discharge of thei duty by the obligation of some oath. Its force an happy influence have been felt in too many instances to need any arguments to support th policy or prove its utility. . . ."

With such support from heroes, it is surprisin that there was any opposition. Yet there wer some during the Revolution who disagreed wit Washington. Peter van Schaack, for example argued that men who swore easily were the one to be distrusted and not those who weighed carefully all the moral and juridical implications o the oath: "Have you never been deceived by persons who have taken the oath of allegiance?" h asked. "Why then do you impose it?"

There is a good account of loyalty tests in th Civil War, and, incidentally, of the low regard i which fundamental civil liberties as a whole wer held by the government. Government agents defined "disloyalty" in ways which remind one o the late Senator McCarthy. Oaths, as is wel known, played a significant role in Lincoln' scheme of reconstruction; and the Civil Wa President, like Washington, had a curious confidence in formal tests of allegiance, making willingness to subscribe to them the criterion o whether political prisoners should be released.

Two chapters—"Amateur Spycatchers o World War I" and "Timber and Treason"—examine the issue as it developed during War World I when government-encouraged unofficial spies belied Wilson's professions of liberality. In the fina chapter, which sketches the history of oaths fro 1918 to the present day Hyman provides an analysis of the contemporary American loyalty-security program and a criticism of Eisenhower' reorganization.

Throughout the work, we are never left i doubt as to Hyman's own position on loyalty tests and he frequently offers acrid comments on the uselessness of oaths in attaining their ostensible objectives. Thus he observes that "with almost all English colonials swearing royal loyalty oaths, the Empire should have been secure, and the problems concerning loyalty tests which had so long bedeviled imperial administration should have ended. The problems did not end. Men . . . continued to twist words of loyalty to their own uses" (p. 57). And referring to the use of oaths during the Revolution, he rightly maintains: "Records fail to tell . . . that the security of New York or the cause of American independence were rendered a whit stronger by all the oaths taken or refused" (p. 94).

Commenting on the recent loyalty testing schemes of the national government, he correctly points out that "At no time have any of the federal agencies supplied the primary need of a valid loyalty program—a definition, a standard, a viable agreement on what loyalty is" (p. 343). The critical reader will wonder, of course, whether "loyalty" can ever be adequately defined for purposes of law and administration. Are we not pursuing a will-o-the-wisp in seeking to do so?

In a day when legislatures and political leaders continue to be enamored of oaths, this well-organized and well-documented book serves to remind us forcefully that loyalty tests have always been stupid and ineffective. While patriotism may be the last refuge of the scoundrel, loyalty oaths are the first refuge of the thoughtless and the magic-ridden. That so many Americans should still accept them is a sad commentary on the state of our culture. —MULFORD Q. SIBLEY, *University of Minnesota.*

Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP and the Restrictive Covenant Cases. BY CLEMENT E. VOSE. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1959. Pp. xi, 296. $6.00.)

This book does an excellent job of demonstrating the importance of socio-psychological, economic, and political contextual factors to an adequate comprehension of both the substance of Supreme Court policy decisions and the processes by which they are determined. Professor Vose has taken a single issue of constitutional policy, one which has involved primarily and directly the processes of judicial legislation, and traced the manifold ramifications of policy-making through four decades of political activity. Although he has in no way neglected to consider the formally critical role of decision-making by the United States Supreme Court in the shaping and re-shaping of one important facet—the legal aspect—of the public policy issue which he chose to study, his work has the great merit of focussing primarily upon political behaviors *off* the Court both antecedent and consequent to the decisions by the Justices in the Restrictive Covenant Cases.

The legal problem was whether it was desirable for courts to function as enforcement agencies to support a widespread system of private zoning whereby access to residential housing was denied to the non-Caucasian members of racial minority groups. In more technical terms, did state court enforcement, either in law or in equity, of restrictive racial covenants constitute a form of "state action" prohibited by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

The author's basic concern, however, is with the decision-making process *within* the minority groups whose conflicting interests were at stake. The Caucasians—the "neighborhood improvement associations" and realtors' organizations fought to hold the color line in residential housing against the encroachments and infiltration of Negroes, "orientals," and other "undesirables." One important means of preserving white neighborhoods was to bring legal action in court against Negroes who purchased houses protected by covenants. The formal parties to such cases were individuals, and Vose deals with them as such; but he also demonstrates, with exhaustive documentation, that "in the process of what appeared to be private litigation . . . a great struggle between two interest groups with contrary objectives was carried on" (p. 250).

Both of the combatant constellations of groups behaved, though with varying skill and success, as political realists. Both conceived "the law" to be a political instrument; both did their best to control both the shaping and the application of the law by attempting to influence the decisions of various courts, municipal, state, and federal. Vose points out that at the end of World War II, segregationists had the law on their side, and had become accustomed to having it enforced in the local courts to support their interest. At that time, the counsel for the Caucasians were great advocates of *stare decisis* in particular, legalism generally, and the democratic principle of law-making by legislatures (as distinguished from judicial legislation). Since the legal precedents were against them, the NAACP and cooperating counsel sought justification for their position in the other social sciences, and particularly in sociology and economics. Lacking a favorable climate of opinion in the reports of the courts, they created one in the law journals, which could then be cited in briefs. Counsel for the racial minority groups were better organized, better financed, engaged in much more careful planning (including the mock trial of the very cases pending before the Court), and were successful in attracting the support of a much more diversified range of interests than became associated with the Caucasians. Indeed, one of the latter-day (and unresolved) problems for the NAACP counsel who were "in charge" of the litigation was the coordination of *amicus* briefs filed by counsel for supporting groups—whose primary responsibility was to express the points of view of their own organizations, rather than to maximize the contribution they might make to an NAACP victory in the instant cases (pp. 166–167). The individual lawyers who signed the briefs presented to the Supreme Court were in no position to make sudden and sweeping changes in the policy content of such documents; the briefs of both the NAACP (for the parties) and of the organizations who volunteered to become "friends of the court" were also products of intricate processes of group decision-making, as Vose details. And in the short space of five years, as the litigation before the Supreme Court drew to a close, the segregationists were quite prepared to eschew their faith in *stare decisis*, since "precedent now favored the Negro position while the Caucasians were making sociological arguments" (p. 246).

The author's principal objective in undertaking this research was not so much to study race relations law as it was "to learn something of the role of interest groups in the judicial process," a purpose for which these data seemed appropriate for analysis. Assuming that "the study of any number of other Supreme Court cases in diverse fields, and at different times, would reveal similar patterns of organizational activity," it is his "hope in studying other court cases to refine an approach to the problem and to develop generalizations on the theme" of group pressures on the Supreme Court (pp. ix–x). This case study constitutes a major stride in the projected direction. It should be of interest to all political scientists who are concerned with political behavior, and not only to those persons who specialize in the activities of the Supreme Court. The book pioneers in a field where there is a need for many more careful empirical investigations such as this, if the analysis of judicial decision-making is to come out of the law library and join up with the rest of political science.—GLENDON SCHUBERT, *Michigan State University*

The People and the Court. BY CHARLES L. BLACK, JR. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1960. $5.00.)

In this provocative work, Professor Black tries to reconcile judicial review with democratic government and thereby both explain and justify the role of the Supreme Court. He adopts the traditional view: the Framers established a government limited by law; the Constitution is *law;* therefore, since courts are the customary final interpreters of law, it must have been understood that the Supreme Court would interpret the Constitution. But Black adds that the concept of limited government inevitably engenders questions about the legitimacy of many political actions. Therefore a legitimizing agency had to be established, and this role as legitimizer—since it could not be performed by any other body or group in our system—had to be played by the Court. This is the primary function of the Court *vis-à-vis* other branches of the Federal Government. But, if the Court is to bestow a meaningful halo of legitimacy, it must also have authority to declare some actions illegitimate. Thus judicial review is a necessary attribute of the Court, not a matter for apology.

Black has many perceptive insights into the judicial function. His emphasis on the Court's legitimizing role is, on the whole, well placed. His discussion of judicial restraint is a needed systematic development of the preferred position theory. Yet the book also has several serious weaknesses. The argument is too legalistic in the narrowest sense of the term. The Constitution is *law;* but it is immeasurably more. The Court does exercise a legitimizing function; but it is not, as Black claims, the sole—or perhaps even the most important—agency which plays this part in American Government. To mention only the most obvious other means, we accept majority rule not simply because we must but also because we think we should. The Court itself has recognized the legitimizing function of the ballot box. Most fundamentally "legitimization" is a quasi-religious operation, one—like the Constitution itself—that cannot be understood merely in terms of law. Congressmen, Black also asserts, cannot be as adept at constitutional interpretation as judges because they have not been selected for their legal expertise. This implies that legal craftsmanship is equivalent to statesmanship. One might also ask how often expertise is the basis for judicial appointments.

Perhaps the cause of the book's shortcomings is that Black has a double target: Learned Hand and those who query judicial review from the sophisticated perch of legal realism, and Jenner, Eastland, *et al.*, whose anti-Court cant seldom rises above diatribe. The two foes have so little in common that an answer to Hand soars above Jenner, while a retort to Jenner falls short of an intellectual reply to Hand. To bridge this chasm Black is forced to spin a new mythology for the Court: Courts do make policy, but not very much policy, and this does not offend democratic theory because the people want it this way; besides, constitutional interpretation is really a job for trained lawyers rather than politicians.—WALTER F. MURPHY, *Princeton University*.

Invasion of Privacy. BY WILLIAM ZELERMYER. (Syracuse: Syracuse Univesity Press. 1959. Pp. vii, 161. $4.00.)

This is the type of work that tends to give writing on law a bad name. The book is not without a certain charm. The author has a nice eye for the colorful detail that can usually be abstracted from the human drama that lies behind legal controversy; the semi-Victorian primness of expression throughout the book contributes a feeling almost of raciness, as the author moves deftly from one case to another. What is lacking, unfortunately, is not some small touch of grace, but the "essential qualities."

The title promises a great deal more than is offered. Basically this is a monograph by a Professor of Business Law on the rights and liabilities of media when utilizing an individual's name or identity. As such it is a run-of-the-mill product. But in an effort to impute greater importance to it two rather disparate—perhaps even desperate—introductions are affixed to the work. One is a discussion of the famous Warren-Brandeis article on privacy. Though that article had rather broader social implications than suggested here, there is at least an effort made to utilize it as a framework for continuous discussion. The first two chapters of the book, though—on the *Watkins* case and the legal process generally—have no organic relation to what follows, and the legal analysis is on the level of newspaper headlines. These false starts, as well as the lack of any attempt at conclusions, suggest that the author himself was aware of the pointlessness of the core of the book.

The work of political scientists in public law does not usually descend to this level. But a moribund approach in weak intellectual form can serve as a stark object lesson. Political scientists in the first half of this century, by creative revolt from established modes of analysis, seized the initiative of scholarship in public law, and in this area made what was probably the most durable and intellectually sound contribution that our profession has so far achieved. In the last decade not only sociologists, but even the lawyers, have proven more responsive to new tools of analysis; timidity threatens to reduce us to the type of pedestrian case-hopping that characterizes this book.—SAMUEL KRISLOV, *Michigan State U.*

As Others See Us. EDITED BY FRANZ M. JOSEPH. (Princeton University Press. 1959. Pp. viii, 360. $6.00.)

Twenty foreign writers with personal knowledge of America develop their "images" of this country in a volume dedicated to furthering world understanding. The editor's belief that "each nation has its individual character" is not entirely substantiated in that "the" American character is never really found. Nevertheless, the work abounds in images that are both complimentary and critically perceptive.

The most impressive essays are by Julian Marias (Spain), Pura Santillan Castrence (Philippines), Peter von Zahn (Germany), and Daniel Cosio Villegas (Mexico). Marias points to the physical and sociological vastness and diversity of this nation as the source of its frequent provincialism in world affairs, its tendency to confuse itself with the outside world. He views the U. S. as "an immense ambit, a colossal interiority such as never existed before in history," that "acts in the world *from that interiority*" (p. 43). Raymond Aron (France) voices the same criticism of American provincialism by pointing out the deep-seated American tendency to confuse technical with political thinking, to view international problems as mere objects of technical adjustment. All of the writers ride hard on racial discrimination, McCarthyism, anti-intellectualism and cultural insensitivity. The antidote to these ills seemingly lies in the realm of "serenity," or spiritual values. Great compliments are paid to American friendliness, technical and material achievements, and gradual improvement in world outlook and comprehension.

There are several direct accusations in the book. One is made by Amanda Labarca (Chile) who, after a most delightful and sympathetic interpretation, warns that "the reigning impression in enlightened Chilean circles is that two governments coexist in the U. S.: a visible one, whose seat is in Washington; and one that is invisible," whose members "give orders to those operating in our lands south of the Rio Grande" (p. 322). She is pessimistic on policy questions that effect Latin America "because of the basic discrepancy between what Washington says and what Wall Street does" (p. 262).

Virtually all the writers sum up by stating that the positive qualities of the U. S. outweigh the negative. This does not detract, however, from their belief that "almost every phenomenon has a false bottom" (p. 99) and that trying to "fit America into any single category is like trying to pin a blanket on the sea" (p. 262).

The reader of this volume will be impressed by what he has learned of other countries as he follows various reactions to his own nation.—GILBERT ABCARIAN, *Humboldt State College.*

Massive Retaliation. BY PAUL PEETERS. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1959. Pp. xii, 304. $5.00.)

This study of the Dulles doctrine of massive retaliation and the "public" reaction to it was undertaken, says the author, "only as a medium of [national] self-analysis." In his painstaking analysis of the debate, mainly as it took place between Administration spokesmen and leading Democratic leaders, Mr. Peeters defends at every turn the Administration's foreign policy, which he believes was eminently praiseworthy. In his indiscriminate broadside against all dissent, he hits some soft spots in the critics' arguments, but this seems incidental to his main task of discrediting the views and motives of those who saw weaknesses in the policy of massive retaliation. Since the author is concerned primarily with national self-analysis, this review confines itself to his views on this subject.

Mr. Peeters concludes that America is in serious danger, primarily because "the liberal intelligentsia" has failed to comprehend the threat of Communist ideology (as opposed to Soviet imperialism) and has failed to support the policies of the late Mr. Dulles, the epitome of which was his brilliant doctrine of massive retaliation. Among the prime targets of his barbed shafts are Adlai Stevenson; Senators Humphrey, Kennedy, Mansfield and Fulbright; Walter Lippmann; James Reston; Averell Harriman and the Democratic Advisory Council. There are no true Republicans among his roster of "bad guys" and no Democrats among the "good guys."

In his tidy black-white world Mr. Peeters charges critics of massive retaliation with merely playing with words," "intellectual bad faith," "turning realities upside down" and dangerous "partisanship," and accuses them of "scandalous" views and "a neurotic attitude of national self-incrimination." The author indicates almost no acquaintance with the rapidly growing arsenal of scholarly literature on military strategy and foreign policy. He charges the one scholar he does mention, W. W. Kaufmann, with "corrosive intellectualism" which "endangers the security of the United States" (p. 81).

Let Mr. Peeters speak for himself: "In its passionate defense of its own emptiness [during the 'McCarthy episode'], the American intelligentsia drove itself into utter ridicule. After having made itself the laughingstock of humanity, it accused the people of anti-intellectualism. . . . No intellectual worthy of his name could have departed from the anti-McCarthy line. There was, indeed, a pyromania, an anti-McCarthy fear on the campus, a fear of simple humor and common sense . . . McCarthyism, Little Rock, the vagrant talk of Krishna Menon, massive retaliation, the Rosenberg affair, the brink of war—all were godsends to the liberal intelligentsia, which would have had little to talk about otherwise" (p. 247).

The author distrusts public debate on public issues. The "follies of partisanship" are "the evil self of America" and "partisanship is neither honest nor constructive." He adds, "foreign policy *naturally* tends to disintegrate in democratic countries." The American public, he says, delights in anti-American criticism from abroad from whatever source. Further, our "partisan debates" at home generate "fantastic exaggeration or sheer fantasy", which are the sources of much anti-Americanism abroad. We must "break away from divisive partisanship while there is still time."

Political discussion and public policy in America today would benefit by voices representing an intelligent and responsible conservatism. This book is not such a voice.—ERNEST W. LEFEVER *The American University.*

From Main Street to the Left Bank; Students and Scholars Abroad. BY JOHN A. GARRATY AND WALTER ADAMS. (East Lansing, Michigan: The Michigan State University Press. 1959. Pp. x 216. $4.00.)

The authors' purpose "was to discover what sort of activities the visiting Americans were engaged in and to evaluate, as accurately as possible, the effectiveness of these activities". The book is based on observations during nine months in Europe and on interviews with about 400 persons, American and European. It is styled for the growing audience in the American university population, especially the American undergraduate and his sponsors, who want information about the pro's and con's of an academic year in Europe. Largely anecdotal in form, it inquires Why study abroad, compares American and European higher education, reviews the characteristics of organized programs and appraises the impact of Europe on the student and American education on Europe. The experience of the American professor in Eupore is also examined.

The authors conclude that such foreign study is generally "a good thing" both for the participants and for the university systems involved. However, the "average-to-good" undergraduate needs the guidance of a well-organized program. Graduate study abroad by the numerous Fulbrighters and others is less adequately treated.

Yet to be answered definitively is the question of whether transposition of education programs abroad (to Europe) substantially helps or hinders in the formidable task of developing a less parochial liberal education for the American student.—ALBERT G. SIMS, *Institute of International Education.*

Politics in Wisconsin. BY LEON D. EPSTEIN. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1958. Pp. xiv, 218. $3.50.)

New England State Politics. BY DUANE LOCKARD. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1959. Pp. xi, 347. $6.00.)

These are two rather different books although both deal with state politics. Epstein tests a number of hypotheses by reference to the Wisconsin experience and also provides a partial description of the setting. Lockard describes the principal features of politics in each of the New England states and from his description draws some conclusions concerning politics in New England.

Epstein's book is, as its nature would suggest, a series of studies. One deals with the development of the party system in Wisconsin since the turn of the century. The stated purpose of this discussion is to "illuminate some of the problems involved in the establishment of a full-blown two-party system in a state with a strong one-party background" (p. 35). In support of Key's thesis, Epstein shows that the ascending Democratic Party has done better in national elections than in state; and makes the further observation that the Wisconsin Democrats have done better in state contests than in local. Some of Epstein's other observations concerning the development of the party system are interesting although they do not relate particularly to the problem he sets out to explore. For instance, he shows that the bi-factionalism in the Republican Party from 1900 to 1934 was imperfectly developed despite the sustained conflict between the LaFollettes and their opponents. He argues that with the Progressive Party in the field from 1934 to 1944 the state never had an actual three-party system, and later in the book Epstein says that the collapse of the Progressive Party in Wisconsin was due to the impact of national politics on the state political system. Verification of this hypothesis would be a nice problem.

One of the most elaborate of the several studies in Epstein's book is the study of "size of place and the two-party vote" (ch. 4). Returns from the four gubernatorial elections of 1948–1954 and the special senatorial election of 1957 were examined. The labor involved was obviously considerable. Epstein concludes that the Democrats do significantly better in cities over 50,000 population than in cities with 10 to 25,000 population and worst in urban places with less than 10,000 population. Rural townships, which are most changeable in their voting, give a higher percentage of their vote to the Democrats than any other place except cities over 50,000. Epstein offers some hypotheses to explain these relationships between size of place and voting preference. Several are tested by reference to the Wisconsin data. Others belong to other studies, and get no real test here. The rest of the book is devoted principally to three studies dealing with party organization, legislative membership, and legislative elections. The hypotheses used are, with few exceptions, old familiar fellows. I would not lay this problem at Epstein's door if it were not that his study suggests some which are possibly more interesting than the ones he considers. I hasten to say that the approach taken by Epstein, the effort made, and the results achieved make this a study which merits serious attention.

Lockard in his study of New England considers the following points in regard to each of the six states in the region: development and level of state-wide party competition; the voting habits of important demographic groups; party organization and factional patterns; the kind of leaders selected by the competing parties; party and interest group influences in the legislature. Reliance is placed on statistical analysis supplemented by interviews with over 1,000 politicans and political observers. Lockard's own experience as a state senator in Connecticut undoubtedly assisted the project.

Differences and similarities between the politics of the various New England states are intriguing. Lockard considers them in two concluding chapters, the first of which deals with ethnic elements and the second with "policy-making and political parties." In Lockard's opinion ethnic groups, unusually important in New England, have opened the way to irrational appeals to nationality groups which have served to "depress the issue content of politics" (p. 311). They both help and hinder the Democrats. Ethnic groups provide the big battalions for the Democratic army, but their conflicts with each other sometimes have a devastating effect upon Democratic chances for victory. And in "both parties there is a tendency for the formal leadership to lose its control over nominations to the leaders of the ethnic groups" (p. 315). Lockard also notes that ethnic candidates rarely run ahead of their ticket or show a different pattern of support than do other candidates from the same party. In the concluding chapter on political parties one of the most interesting arguments is that the existence of two-party competition results in more progressive government measured in terms of tax structure and level of welfare payments. New England practice supports the thesis although it can hardly be taken as proved. The crucial test for this study is whether or not the reader gets a clear view of the main features of politics in each of the New England states. The answer is an unqualified yes.—THOMAS A. FLINN, *Oberlin College.*

Cumulative Voting. BY GEORGE S. BLAIR. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1960. Pp. xi, 145.)

For those of the fraternity who are interested in electoral forms (and who may be sated with the debate over proportional representation), *Cumulative Voting* will offer fresh excitement. In it the author examines the Illinois experience in electing the members of its lower legislative house by cumulative voting from 1872 to 1954.

A word about cumulative voting in Illinois may, perhaps, be in order. The state is divided into 51 districts of approximately equal population, each of which elect three representatives. Before the primary, a special party committee in each district decides whether the party will nominate one, two or three men at the primary. Then at the general election the voter may cast his three votes for one candidate, split them equally between two, give two votes to one candidate and one to another, or cast single votes for three candidates. The purpose of the system is to encourage the election of a minority party candidate through the accumulation of these multiple votes.

The bulk of the book deals with an evaluation of the electoral consequences of this plan. Supported by a vast array of tables and charts, the author finds that it has produced minority representation in almost all districts and that it has apparently encouraged a longer tenure in office than legislators of the nearby states enjoy. It has, however, resulted in a sharp increase in uncontested elections, although the number of primary candidacies and contests has risen. In all of this analysis—to which these few words scarcely do justice—the author is thorough in his research and careful in his conclusions. His findings are set down in the sober, unadorned prose of the scholarly monograph.

A lesser but considerable part of the study is devoted to a rather academic legal history of cumulative voting and the attempts to abolish it. These paragraphs would have seemed more real and vivid to this reader had there been discussion of the politics of cumulative voting, of the interests favoring and opposing it, and of the political oxen gored by changing it.

Since political science is replete with theories concerning the power of electoral systems to shape parties and political choice, the reader may regret that such issues remain outside the range of this book. Left unexplored is the impact of cumulative voting (and minority representation) on the party system, the selection of candidates, the "minority" representatives, and the party's problem in planning for and controlling so complex an electoral system. At the risk of criticizing a book the author never intended to write, one might say it lacks the range of outlook from which cumulative voting experience might have illuminated some related issues in politics.

What we have, then, is an immensely substantial and competent survey of some of the effects of a cumulative voting system. Scholars who pursue the impacts of cumulative voting on the parties and candidates will be indebted to Blair for the guidance of his initial study.—FRANK J. SORAUF, *Pennsylvania State University.*

Index Digest of State Constitutions (2d ed.) EDITED BY RICHARD A. EDWARDS. (New York: Legislative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University, 1959. Pp. xx, 1132. $20.00.)

This is the first revision of a reference volume originally prepared in 1915. It is a massive opus of a kind that cannot be "read" but the value of which only continued use will reveal. This reviewer happens to be a member of his state's Commission on Constitutional Revision and in this connection has already found repeated occasions to consult the *Index Digest.* If his experience is at all typical, then the researchers in the field of state constitutional law will, for some time to come, remain indebted to all those who made possible this new edition.

Of course, one of the problems with any compilation of this order is how to keep it up-to-date. The editor's preface advises that, with the exception of Hawaii (the constitutional provisions of which were added in the galley proof stage), the state constitutions were indexed as of September 1, 1958. This meant, of course, that by the time of publication an entire spate of amendments had gone unrecorded. Law publishers have developed the use of the pocket supplement as a means of supplying the reader with information about the latest developments and changes. Presumably, the person using the *Index Digest* would have available such recurrent publications as the *Book of the States* and other material prepared by the Council of State Governments; but the need to extend one's search from one reference work to another (or others) inevitably reduces whatever value the former has. The Legislative Drafting Research Fund would place many a scholar and citizen in its debt if it would undertake to distribute annual or biennial cumulative supplements.

In arrangement and typography the *Index Digest* leaves little to be desired. Perhaps the introduction of running heads at the top of each page to indicate the subjects covered might have aided the user but this is probably no more than a matter of personal preference.

The meticulous care and thoroughness with which this volume has been prepared makes it doubly deplorable that the able editor should, in the meantime, have chosen to enter the practice of law: as his performance here once again bespeaks, the academic profession can ill afford to lose men of his caliber and promise.—FRANCIS H. HELLER, *University of Kansas.*

Science and State Government. BY FREDERIC N. CLEAVELAND. (Chapel Hill: University of N. C. Press. 1959. Pp. xvi, 161. $3.50.)

This is a study of the scientific research activities of State government agencies in six States: California, Connecticut, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. Although—as the author points out—these States were selected to insure diversity in size, population, economic characteristics, political environment, geographical location, there is no assumption that these six are more representative of the fifty States than another six might be. State directors were appointed and research teams organized in each State in 1954, in a project financed under a contract with the National Science Foundation which issued its own report based upon this survey in 1958. The chapters of this volume were based upon the individual State reports, later to be published.

The first chapter is devoted to a brief characterization of the six States selected, defining the socio-economic, political and cultural context within which scientific research is carried on. The second presents basic data for the comparative analysis of state scientific programs, while the third examines the distribution of scientific expenditures in each State among four major areas of governmental activity: (1) agriculture; (2) resource development and public works; (3) health, education, and welfare; and (4) higher education. The fourth and fifth chapters consider program administration of scientific activities according to several criteria by which they may be evaluated, and intergovernmental relations, describing how State and Federal agencies work together in carrying out State scientific activities. The sixth considers State government as a place for research scientists to work, while the final one restates major findings and the implications of the study.

This is a significant book, the product of a tremendous amount of investigation and study. The material has been ably and competently handled. To those who can recall how very recent is any real concern on the part of government at any level for matters relating to science, it is remarkable that there existed enough material to make such a book possible. That it could be written about the States is the more remarkable, for two reasons. It shows that, in spite of all the mournful cries one hears about the lack of scientists, engineers and technically trained personnel, there are substantial numbers of scientists in the State service—many more than most reasonably well informed people realized.

The second point is that all this is being done, and can only be done, through intergovernmental cooperation; Federal grants provide from one-fourth to one-third of the amounts expended. John M. Gaus, who is quoted here, expressed this idea of cooperation with great clarity more than a decade ago: "No problem of any consequence which affects our local communities or national strength can be solved, or seriously attacked, in this country unless the resources of every level of government operating in a given area are mobilized to supplement (not supplant) each other."—W. BROOKE GRAVES, *Legislative Reference Service, The Library of Congress.*

Nicholas Biddle: Nationalist and Public Banker, 1786–1844. BY THOMAS PAYNE GOVAN. (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 429. $7.50.)

Mr. Govan, in his reexamination of the now familiar story of Nicholas Biddle and the Second Bank of the United States, acknowledges that he has written "an apologia, a defense." His Biddle is a man whose brilliant and supremely useful career was brought to defeat, not through any fault or weakness of his own, but through the fateful operation of destiny. Destiny, in this instance, could be a synonym for democracy.

Superbly educated, enthusiastically nationalistic, and yearning to devote his immense talents to public service, Biddle's ambitions were realized when he assumed the presidency of the Bank in 1823. It was his purpose to give the United States "a system of currency and exchanges . . . better than any that existed in any other country," and he succeeded in realizing this goal. Reigning omnipotent over the Bank and its branches, he placed the national welfare (as he envisioned it) above the interests of any class, or even the institution's stockholders. His broad vision and genius for innovation gave the nation a genuine central bank that was so far in advance of the times as to arouse the suspicions of conservative American bankers, the hostility of the Bank of England, and the ignorant and demagogic hatred of Andrew Jackson and his cohorts.

Assailed by political furies, Biddle nevertheless brought his Bank through the storm in sound condition. Continuing to operate after 1836 under a Pennsylvania charter, Biddle made valiant efforts to function as a public banker, and his daring ventures into the cotton and securities markets achieved the desired objective of preventing the further collapse of the American economy. When the Bank collapsed in 1841, its demise was due to the stupidity of Biddle's successor in the presidency, to the discreditable activities of the Bank's directors, to the combined efforts of the Bank of England and Wall Street, and to fate.

Many other scholars—notably C. H. Catterall, Fritz Redlich, Walter B. Smith, and Bray Hammond—have recorded favorable evaluations of the Bank and, with reservations, of Biddle. But

Govan's portrait stands alone. It differs widely in important details as well as in total impact from previous delineations. After more than a century the controversy continues to rage, and Govan, I fear, will not have the final word.—RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, *Rutgers University.*

LaGuardia in Congress: BY HOWARD ZINN. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press for The American Historical Association. 1959. Pp. 288. $5.50.)

"In a time of conformity and irresponsibility, when so many minds are imprisoned by rigid loyalties and so many others luxuriating in the freedom of indecision, the recollection of LaGuardia's untamed but conscience-stricken spirit seems a precious gift to those in our generation who will receive it." This appraisal may well account for the current interest in Fiorello LaGuardia, whether expressed by several recently published books like the Beveridge award-winning one under review or Arthur Mann's *LaGuardia: A Fighter Against His Times, 1882–1933*, which recently ran serially in a prominent New York newspaper, or by the musical comedy *Fiorello* now playing to capacity audiences on Broadway.

Howard Zinn's *LaGuardia in Congress* is an exceedingly well written and highly readable study of a man and his times—the times preceding the New Deal (1917–1933). It describes the career of an extraordinary human being who was a link between the Progressive and New Deal eras—whose background and ideology presaged the New Deal and whose specific legislative program foreshadowed and even went beyond the New Deal. Unlike the middle-class reformism of the Progressive movement, LaGuardia was closely identified with the trade union movement, with the urban-immigrant groups of the East (LaGuardia almost alone among Congressional Progressives opposing restrictive quotas) at the same time that he eloquently championed the farmers and boldly opposed isolationism in foreign affairs.

While LaGuardia's program on public power, unemployment insurance, labor legislation, securities regulation and on other issues was an "astonishingly accurate preview of the New Deal," the author shows that LaGuardia's plans were even bolder. For example, he did not hesitate to urge the scrapping of free enterprise where it proved inefficient and to declare for the nationalizing of industries in such cases. And though his return to Congress depended upon a single-member constituency normally Republican, he displayed great political independence.

Professor Zinn's volume is well documented. He has drawn heavily from the personal papers of LaGuardia and his contemporaries as well as from the interpretative studies of the period. These are found in the extensive footnotes on every page and the bibliography at the end of the volume.—BELLE ZELLER, *Brooklyn College.*

The Roosevelt Revolution. BY MARIO EINAUDI. (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959.)

The Roosevelt Revolution provides a bird's-eye view of the accomplishments of the New Deal and offers a number of suggestive insights. The material on the New Deal is well ordered and well organized.

The central weakness of the volume derives from its strength—it over-organizes the New Deal. Professor Einaudi finds that the theory and practice of the New Deal were integrated, that it fulfilled its objectives in an orderly way, and that it was characterized by continuity, coherence, and a clear vision of what ought to be done. The New Deal was big and important, to be sure, but neat and orderly it was not.

Because it is now possible to see the significance of the changes that took place during this period, it is tempting to assume that the events of the time reflected purposefulness and a sense of direction and that the leading figures of the New Deal desired certain results from the outset and consciously worked toward them. A methodological difficulty is involved. One must be slow to impute motives to people simply by examining the outcome of the events in which they participated. Professor Einaudi seems to feel that since the New Deal had many accomplishments it *must* have had wise and foresighted leadership. Franklin Roosevelt is defended as a "theorist" who had a body of doctrine at his disposal and knew what he wanted. His papers and speeches are analyzed for ideological content but with no concession, be it noted, to the manner in which some of them were prepared. The product of a team of speech writers is equated with the considered expression by Roosevelt of his own deeply held views. Franklin Roosevelt was a remarkable man and a remarkable leader but no amount of stretching here and trimming there will fit him into the image of the leader as a philosopher/theorist. The New Deal left the record it did not because of doctrinal acuity and clarity of purpose but because its leaders were ready to tackle pressing practical problems.

In a number of other respects the volume seems to move on the surface of things and the author appears not to have drawn upon the vast amount of informal historical data available. None of the confusion, blundering, excitement, brilliant improvisation, dynamism, and bitter personal, philosophical and jurisdictional disputes of the New Deal appear. Omissions of this kind do not prevent the author from perceiving the overall historical significance of the New Deal but they do prevent him from speaking with authority about its drives and inner processes.

One may also wish that Professor Einaudi had devoted some space to the historical antecedents of the New Deal. By failing to make more than a passing reference to the thought and accomplishments of the Progressive Era, the impression tends to be left that the New Deal should be given credit for all the worthwhile changes in American life since the turn of the century. —ANDREW M. SCOTT, *University of North Carolina.*

Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal Community Program. BY PAUL K. CONKIN. (Ithaca, New York: American Historical Association. Cornell University Press. 1959. 350 pp. $6.00.)

The title proves to be ironic, since the story of New Deal Communities "is a fascinating adventure in idealism and disillusionment." The subtitle is quite accurate. The book is a comprehensive account of the initiation, vicissitudes, and final liquidation of 100 communities within the years 1933–1938. The data are sufficiently clear, adequate, and free from value judgments that readers may analyze and interpret the process and results for themselves.

A speculative search for technological, sociological, and ideological roots of political reform is made in Part I. Agrarian myths, utopian schemes and sporadic social movements are reviewed as premises of the New Deal. But it is admitted in the last chapter of the book that "the term 'New Deal' defies analysis in terms of one dominant philosophy," and reveals no one widely accepted pattern of reform. In the second part, each major type of community program is traced from its conception and initial building phase through the critical attacks, confused management, alterations of purpose, transfer to succeeding administrative operations, to utter abandonment. Since each type of program was in a real sense the creation of a strong leader, the personal characteristics and driving philosophy of each is sketched as a part of the essential data. A close and detailed view of selected communities, as cases under each type of program, forms the third part.

The paucity of any research on which to set up community programs, constant pressure for hasty accomplishment and reforms, the lack of economic opportunities for the settlers in each community, administrative confusion, and the attempt to force rather than encourage change in attitudes and behavior of people, are themes which run through the entire work. Although identification of trial and error as experimentation is another frequent note, nothing was done which could serve as an experiment. It is doubtful indeed whether any program received a fair trial.

Those who believe lessons can be learned from history, who are about to launch programs for social betterment or to draft plans for the future should read this award-winning book.—WAYLAND HAYES, *Vanderbilt University.*

The Decision to Aid Russia: 1941. BY RAYMOND H. DAWSON. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1959. Pp. 315. $6.00.)

This solidly written, competent study examines the developments that led to the historic decision of the U. S. government to extend aid to the Soviet Union following the German onslaught of 1941. The period covered extends from the beginning of that year when the debate on Lend-Lease was getting under way down to November 7, 1941, when President Roosevelt announced that he had found the defense of the USSR vital to the defense of the U. S.

As the title perhaps suggests, the organization of the work is constructed on the now-conventional, but nonetheless useful model of the decision-making process. In carrying out his task, the author skilfully integrates a considerable range of material. Although most of this is familiar, it is focussed here on the specific issue involved in such a way as to provide fresh and valuable perspective. The inter-action among elite and attentive publics, military and diplomatic developments, and Congressional and administrative actors is lucidly portrayed.

Read in the context of the present, this story of a period that already seems remote stimulates some long reflections about the nature of both U. S. and international politics, the significance of the moralist-realist controversy, and the prescience of prophets who were right or wrong for varying combinations of right or wrong reasons. It also naturally provokes thoughts about the nature of the present relationship between the two protagonists now contending for power. Whatever his beliefs about this relationship, one must of necessity agree with the author's conclusion that the decision of November 7, 1941, "was deeply rooted in the whole complex of American politics and American public opinion in 1941."—JOHN A. HOUSTON, *Knox College.*

The Last Man In. BY SCOTT GREER. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 1959. Pp. 189. $4.00.)

The public stance taken by unions on civil rights questions and the formally specified provisions of contracts and constitutions tell us little about the actual roles of ethnic minorities in unions. For the Mexican and the Negro, groups intrinsically without power in our society, unions are among the most powerful organizations to which they have access. The route of access and the resulting influence at the local level is the subject of this study.

Field work was conducted in 1950. Twenty-one locals, both AFL and CIO affiliates in the Los Angeles area, were selected for intensive analysis. These locals include craft, customer service and clerical, and manufacturing, as well as laborers, longshoremen and other occupations characterized by low skills and low statuses. The comparative case findings are presented primarily in qualitative terms, supported by appropriate statistics when required.

The major conclusion may be stated as follows: no matter what the formal prescription for treatment of minorities, their actual role is determined by organizational needs—survival and growth. Rather than being chosen for leadership abilities, the ethnic leader is a minority representative and serves a special function for the white union leadership and the ethnic membership. As the ethnic representative, the leader's job is to gain and keep the confidence of his special power base and, thus, to strengthen the local organization. His utility for the union stems from his channeling of protest *within* it rather than *against* it. He must control the indigenous resentment of his constituents and he can do this only by expressing it. Yet, his position as a union leader forces him to bargain for small advantages rather than move for outright equality. He has little power to make decisions affecting his source of power and he will tend to identify with the organization and come to see his responsibilities to his power base in terms of the problems of the organization. The conflicts between his organizational commitments and race or ethnic loyalties produce a perennially unstable condition.

Professor Greer has done a craftsman-like piece of work in an area notably devoid of previous study. The work is imaginatively conceived and presented in a scholarly fashion. An index and the specifics of data gathering would have been useful. Nonetheless, the author has mined his data and produced an array of challenging conclusions and provocative implications, at some points less well organized than at others.—BERNARD KARSH, *University of Illinois.*

The Supreme Court in a Free Society. BY ALPHEUS T. MASON AND WILLIAM M. BEANEY. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1959. Pp. iv, 346. $4.90.)

This work should be particularly useful as a text in Constitutional Law courses, especially where a casebook is also used or the course is for one semester only. Considering the difficulties of compressing 170 years of constitutional history into 350 pages, the authors have done magnificently, and readers can only profit from the endeavor.

The authors' familiarity with the subject has enabled them to give concisely an inside view, and readers will get a realistic picture of the Court at work. Brevity has its penalties—the doctrine of political questions must be treated in two sentences—and while compliments are due them for laudable efforts at neutrality, some sections are so neutral that students may be confused rather than enlightened. Chapter One and some other parts suffer in readability from over-use of quotations. And unfortunately there are signs of hasty writing or careless editing, for instance speaking of a "third case" when the previous two have not been identified. Apparent contradictions are sometimes confusing: at one point "from now on the burden of proof was thrown on those who contested regulatory action," but in the next sentence "such liberalism was short-lived." "In 1887" a change in judicial personnel was significant, but the changes referred to cover the whole period from 1877 to 1890. Again, the impression is left that Justice Brown was ironic in his *Plessy* opinion: but the shocking thing is that he was in earnest. And speaking of the tax power limitations imposed in the *Butler* case as being "fully established" is misleading if not false.

These are, however, minor matters which will no doubt be corrected in future editions of what will probably become the standard short text in the field.—LOREN P. BETH, *University of Massachusetts.*

Public Policies Toward Business. BY CLAIR WILCOX. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1960. Pp. xiv, 907. $8.00.)

The revised edition of this standard undergraduate text adds new chapters on promotion and subsidization, labor, public power projects, but its basic orientation remains unchanged: to analyze the economic impact of American public policies toward business as they tend to (1) maintain, (2) moderate, (3) superimpose regulation upon, or (4) substitute public enterprise for, competition and the free price system. In his preface, the author says he seeks "to give equal emphasis to the economic and political aspects of the policies examined" (sic), but he asserts that his criterion of evaluation is "consumer welfare, measured by the quantity, quality and variety of goods and services that are made available." In his text, Wilcox makes extensive use of judicial, administrative and political materials. On non-economic grounds, he indicates approval of deviations from the competitive norm in the cases of labor, farm policy, natural resource and river development, the rule of reason in anti-trust enforcement, and comprehensive controls in wartime. Nonetheless, he maintains that his orientation toward American policies of regulating business enterprise is economic rather than political.

American State Government and Administration. Sixth Edition. By Austin F. Macdonald. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1960. Pp. xiii, 702. $7.00.)

Faithful to his schedule of revision every five years since 1934, Professor Macdonald has brought this hardy textbook up to date in the sixth edition, preserving its original approach and style. A chapter on pressure groups has been added and the traditional two-part division—*Government* and *Administration* "has been abandoned in favor of a more realistic nine-part arrangement." Brief additions are made concerning labor union corruption, public employee pensions, highway aid, recent health developments and fair trade laws. Previously strong language on boss control, the underworld, and the necessity for a strong governor has been toned down, and the chapter on state reorganization is cut down and merged with the chapter on executives. Although thorough statistical and legal revisions have been made, the revisions have not reflected some of the more recent research on state legislatures, or on urban and metropolitan politics.

Political and Civil Rights in the United States. Edited by Thomas I. Emerson and David Haber. (Buffalo: Dennis & Co., Inc. 1958. 2d ed. Pp. xxii, 757, Vol. I; vi, 759–1536, Vol. II. $36.00.)

The proliferation of works on our individual rights is reflected in the six years between the first and second editions of this useful compendium on civil and political rights. Although a greater portion of the collection consists of cases, statutes, and other legal materials, there are also useful selections of writings from the classical theory of individual rights and contemporary social sciences. Accompanying these selections are elaborate notes and extensive bibliographies of specialized books and articles. Although the authors have reluctantly deleted materials on protection of persons in criminal proceedings from the second edition and have again omitted a full section on the rights of aliens, everything else is included—security of person, the basic freedoms of the First Amendment, the suffrage, loyalty and national security, and equality before the law. With such extensive selecting of materials and bibliographic aides the second edition should prove even more valuable to all serious students of civil rights, be they lawyers, social scientists, or dedicated citizens in the cause of liberty and equality.

Politics 1960. Edited by F. M. Carney and H. F. Way, Jr. (San Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1960. Pp. xi, 266.)

This misnamed volume is a choice selection of current readings on the American national parties, the nomination and election of the President, the Presidential office, and five broad areas of public policy: budget and social welfare, labor, civil rights, foreign affairs, and military security. Such voters as may be attracted by the title should certainly gain a better understanding of the nature of our top political position, the process of recruiting for it, and the benefit of some well informed and intelligent views by which to guide their appraisal of the candidates.

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FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

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THE EAGLETON FOUNDATION STUDIES IN PRACTICAL POLITICS

The Wells Phillips and Florence Peshine Eagleton Foundation, established in 1954 at Douglass College of Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey . . . in collaboration with Henry Holt and Company, Publishers, has sponsored a program of case studies in practical politics. Cases thus far published include:

Carney, F., *The Rise of the Democratic Clubs in California* (N. Y.: Holt, 1958).

Donovan, J. C., *Congressional Campaign: Maine Elects a Democrat* (N. Y.: Holt, 1958).

Hapgood, D., *The Purge That Failed: Tammany v. Powell* (N. Y.: Holt, 1959).

Harder, D., *Nonpartisan Election: A Political Illusion?* (N. Y.: Holt, 1958).

Lockard, D., *Connecticut's Challenge Primary: A Study in Legislative Politics* (N. Y.: Holt, 1959).

Lyford, J. P., *Candidate* (N. Y.: Holt, 1959).

Robinson, J. A., *The Monroney Resolution: Congressional Initiative in Foreign Policy Making* (N. Y.: Holt, 1959).

Rosenau, J. N., *The Nomination of "Chip" Bohlen* (N. Y.: Holt, 1958).

Smith, R. A. and Hein, C. J., *Republican Primary Fight* (N. Y.: Holt, 1958).

Tyler, G., *A Legislative Campaign for a Federal Minimum Wage* (N. Y.: Holt, 1959).

Vines, K. N., *Two Parties for Shreveport* (N. Y.: Holt, 1959).

Wilder, P. S., *Meade Alcorn and the 1958 Election* (N. Y.: Holt, 1959).

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

La collectivisation de l'agriculture: U.S.S.R., Chine et Democraties populaires. By Charles Bouvier. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1958. Pp. 242. No price given.)

Collective Farming in Russia. By Roy D. Laird. (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 1958, pp. 176. $2.50 paper; $3.25 cloth.)

Collectivization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe. Edited by Irwin T. Sanders. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1958. Pp. x, 214. $5.00.)

Land Reform and Democracy. By Clarence Senior. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 1959. Pp. xiii, 269. $6.75.)

Farmer and Farm Labor in the Soviet Zone of Germany. By Frieda Wunderlich. (New York: Twayne Publishers. 1958. Pp. 162. $4.00.)

Our generation and its heirs will be bored by no lack of problems. Populations are exploding, man-resource ratios worsening, and demands rising everywhere for better living. In understanding these dynamic and dangerous trends and in trying to meet the threats they pose, we find that one focus of great and growing importance is agriculture. A recent report on *India's Food Crisis and the Steps to Meet It* (New Delhi, 1959), tells us that 480 million Indians in 1966 will need 110 million tons of food grains—a target which requires *tripling of the present rate of increase of agricultural production.* If only the present rate is maintained India will fall short 28 million tons of food in 1965–66. No programs of rationing-plus-imports can fill this gap. The problem in Pakistan is similar.

The magnitude of the food production problem in the world requires nothing less than the full application of science to agriculture. Potential yield increases are tremendous: from 25 to 110 bushels of corn per acre on widely typical Indian soils, for example—but only if the best known materials and cultural practices are properly combined. Farmers must learn how to farm much better and then they must have the necessary incentives and material and organizational assistance. This means tremendous institutionalization—founding enough experiment stations to meet the major variations in indigenous agricultural problems; staffing them with well trained men who have tenure and working conditions sufficient to exploit the fantastic potentials of research; creating agricultural extension services (closely backstopped by researchers) that reach cultivators directly with a continuously refined stream of the best technical advice, adapted to local situations; providing materials: better machinery (*not* necessarily tractors and combines!), tools, seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides; developing cheaper and more adequate farm credit, especially credit joined with technical advice and directly geared to farm plans; improving markets, which may mean passable roads, available storage, uniform weights and measures, honest grading, *and will almost certainly mean a government price support program;* and, finally, very often establishing public programs to improve tenurial relationships, to consolidate holdings, to provide (and control) agricultural water supplies, and to control erosion and soil depletion.

This staggering list poses numerous problems of governmental policy, the major ones being: (1) an elucidation of the ideal goals for agriculture of the community in question, *e.g.*, preservation of family farms or of a peasant culture, or socialization of the means of production, including farm land; (2) an examination of the validity and viability of these goals, directly if religious sanctions permit, discreetly if they do not; (3) review of the priority and importance attached to increasing agricultural production as compared to other economic developmental goals (this will involve appraising taxation as well as budgetary and commercial policies); (4) an analysis of the adequacy of the present institutions in agricultural tenure, marketing, credit, and servicing (this will involve appraising present and potential roles of government as well as the division of labor between government, cooperatives, and proprietary firms in providing the optimum organization for agricultural production); and (5) an inquiry into the use of coercion, persuasion, and education in improving farm production.

Against this outline of the problem, the books under review may be noted. Four deal with agriculture under communism. Bouvier's is the most sweeping, comprising a history of agricultural collectivization in the USSR, the Cominform countries, Yugoslavia, and Red China (the only treatment in the reviewed volumes; but since Bouvier's cut-off date is late 1956, little experience of the communes was available). The author then analyzes Marxist theory and practice, dilating on several problems communist agriculture encounters, including reconciling the peasantry, providing sufficient economic returns to agriculture, and decentralizing managerial decisions. Granting the difficulties, Bouvier thinks that the future of collective agriculture seems assured, without any sacrifice of Marxist fundamentals or ultimate objectives, although the tempo, the methods, and the conception of the transition from capitalism to communism may change considerably (p. 241). "It is quite possible that collectivism like that of the USSR since 1930—with all its violence and errors—will appear one day as only an episode or, rather, as a costly apprenticeship."

Laird, who concentrates on Russia, has a harsher judgment. Soviet agricultural policy, despite apparent vacillations, has revealed "great consistency and lack of fundamental change in administrative practice" (p. 157). Central control has increased, at the presumed expense of more effective and productive farming that might be obtained if the important decisions were devolved upon people who know farming and who were close enough to the land to meet the problems in all their localized variety. The Communist party, however, has successfully used farm policy and administration as a means of consolidating its power.

Sanders has edited a volume based on conferences at the University of Kentucky in 1955. Three general essays by Enno S. Krahe, "Eastern Europe and World Affairs," Irwin T. Sanders, "The Peasantries of Eastern Europe," and Philip E. Mosely, "Collectivization of Agriculture in Soviet Strategy," are followed by analyses of agricultural collectivization in Bulgaria (Edmund O. Stillman), Poland (Ernest Koenig), Rumania (Nicolas Spulber), and Yugoslavia (Jozo Tomasevich). Seminars, with discussions presented by *rapporteurs*, were held on each country's paper. The conclusion is that the communists have not merely flubbed the farm problem of eastern Europe, but have failed to such an extent that Red China becomes the hope of the believers in collectivism as "the answer to rural problems." (p. 6).

Omission of East Germany in the Sanders volume is well made up by Wunderlich who details what Alvin Johnson calls "the ruin of East German agriculture." "The larger farms were cut into small plots, for agricultural workers, with no decent provision for housing or farm equipment. The Commissar told the small farmer what to produce, himself knowing nothing about what the soil would yield. If the result was poor, the farmer was supposed to be guilty of sabotage. . . . What wonder that a steady stream of fleeing farmers set in. . . . And the food self-sufficiency of Eastern Germany was at an end." (p. 12).

The fifth book changes the locale and the focus to report on La Laguna where 30,000 families were given land in 300 ejidos in 1937, in the greatest single move of the Mexican agrarian revolution. As Dr. Senior shows, the comparisons of relative developments in La Laguna and other Mexican areas are inconclusive (*e.g.*, p. 193); but, informed by twenty-one visits (some lengthy ones) to La Laguna, he affords us a vivid account of an experiment significant far beyond Mexico and even the hemisphere.—CHARLES M. HARDIN, *University of Chicago.*

Free Elections: An Elementary Textbook. By W. J. M. MACKENZIE. (New York: Rinehart and Co. 1958. Pp. 184. $3.50.)

This monograph by a British professor fills an important need in the literature of political science. Arguments over the meaning of free elections in Eastern Europe played an important role in the origins of the Cold War. Since then the rapid achievement of independence by European colonies has raised many problems concerning the feasibility of transferring the democratic institutions of the North Atlantic world to societies which lack some or all of the conditions for them. Professor Mackenzie has written a guidebook describing the pitfalls the new leaders of Africa and Asia must avoid and the choices they must make in adopting European electoral systems.

Mackenzie interprets the electoral system broadly to include not only the actual mechanics of voting but also the qualifications of voters and candidates, various methods of representation and districting, and the problems of corruption and intimidation of voters. The conditions he sets for democracy are an independent judiciary, impartial administration, organized political parties, acceptance of the limiting rules of the game, civil liberties, and individual decision by voters.

With regard to the franchise, the author is pessimistic about the chances of limiting suffrage even where mass illiteracy seems to justify it. He recognizes but does not resolve the dilemma of what to do about violent, anti-democratic parties. Is it inconsistent to use electoral "engineering" to defend democracy against them? He concludes that "absolute purity of democratic logic is impossible because it would destroy democracy." (p. 95)

Mackenzie's discussion and evaluation of proportional representation is notably lucid and fair, although regrettably he ignores the experience of New York City with PR during the LaGuardia era.

His description of election administration may strike American political scientists as a bit naive. It is difficult for us to believe that the British parties have actually taken the redistricting problem out of politics, given our long history of gerrymandering and rural overrepresentation. Also, he overlooks the possibilities of fraud with permanent registration and the abuse of literacy tests to exclude racial minorities so familiar in our South. His rather optimistic conclusions about the lack of significant influence of money on elections through mass communications would require qualification on the American scene.

The chief criticism of the book, to this reviewer, lies in the evidence for his generalizations. A survey which purports to be making empirical statements of general validity needs more than logical analysis, a highly selective bibliography and occasional references to British, Continental and colonial experience for support. Especially striking is the complete neglect of the twenty Latin American republics, which have been struggling for a century and a half to operate a system of free elections. Their experience must throw grave doubts on the adaptability of Western political practices to the newer states of Africa. But when all this has been said, Mackenzie's work is a good beginning to the systematic study of the necessary conditions for free elections.—THEODORE P. WRIGHT, JR., *Bates College.*

Modern Forms of Government. A Comparative Report. By Michael Stewart. (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1960. Pp. vii, 284. $4.00.)

The author, a member of the British Parliament since 1945, has produced a readable, if often superficial, survey, of the comparative aspects of the governments of Great Britain, the Commonwealth countries, the United States, Germany, Switzerland, France, Scandinavia, Italy, and the communist countries. Using mostly the legalistic approach, he features the fundamental similarities and differences of the constitutions, the legislative, executive and judicial branches; here and there he discusses the actual operation of these governments by stressing the ideologies involved.

Stewart is at his own best when dealing with Britain and the British Commonwealth. Satisfactory also are the chapters covering the democratic governments, as, for instance, the section showing the very different concepts of democratic government held by such "democracies" as South Africa and Denmark. But the two chapters assigned the Communist regimes (Chapter XIV, "The Communist Approach," pp. 229–240, and XV, "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," pp. 241–263) suffer from frequently confusing generalizations. Read, for instance, in regard to the USSR: "The Republics have the 'residual power': but the residue does not appear to be large. Yugoslavia is also, and perhaps more genuinely, a federation." (p. 245) Would it not be safer to state flatly that "the residue is not large at all," and that Yugoslavia is "a perhaps federation" only in constitutional theory. We would also be interested to learn of the application of Stewart's statement that "Rumania expressly permits education for the training of priests . . ." (p. 245).

There are no footnotes, no references, no bibliography. In spite of its deficiencies, Stewart presents his point of view interestingly. It is also to his credit that he makes no claim to any profundity of thought and scholarship.—Joseph S. Roucek, *University of Bridgeport.*

Latin American Politics. By William S. Stokes. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1959. Pp. xiii, 538. $6.75.)

This introduction to Latin American politics is designed as a text book. Initially, Stokes discusses the effect upon Latin American political institutions of social classes, the family, education, the church, and the army. Following chapters describe the prevailing economic systems and the political and economic theories most frequently found in the 20 countries. The uses of violence and the peaceful mobilization of power are analyzed. Concluding chapters treat the "omnipotent executive power," the "subservient legislature," the Cuban semi-parliamentary system, constitutions, law, the courts, and federal and unitary structures of government.

Stokes maintains throughout that "political freedom can exist only in a capitalistic economic system" (p. 143). He defines "capitalistic economic system" in terms made famous by Adam Smith in 1776, argues that the culture of Latin America prevents the development of such "capitalism," and concludes that political freedom based on democracy does not flourish in the area. All of the material in this book is marshalled to defend this thesis. Whatever would negate it seems to have been omitted.

Although this is an interesting book, it is not an accurate description of the nature of power, nor of contemporary political and economic institutions in Latin America. The classified bibliography of 100 pages, listing about 2000 references dealing with the various subjects discussed, although it has serious omissions, is the most valuable part of this book.—Harry Kantor, *University of Florida.*

Budgeting In Public Authorities. By A Study Group of the Royal Institute of Public Administration, R. S. Edwards, *Chairman* and J. S. Hines, *Research Officer.* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959. Pp. 299, $6.50.)

United States students of the financial aspect of government have long been familiar with the main outlines of the British financial system, and there has been a copious, frequently refreshed, supply of literature about it by both English and American scholars. Indeed, there is little question that our budget reformers, like the civil service reformers before them, looked to London for their model, insofar as the presidential (or gubernatorial, or mayoral) structure would permit. Most of our information and most of our interest have concerned only certain aspects of the British national system—the principle of executive preparation and control, the role and the machinery of Parliament, the dominance of the Treasury and its methods. There has been little literature—almost none—generally available in the United States about how budgets actually work as instruments of administration other than as a device for Treasury control.

This volume is doubly useful in that it so abundantly fills this void in our knowledge. It was prepared under the guidance of a thirteen-man Study Group of the Royal Institute of Public Administration, most of whom are high public officials representative of British national and local government. The study was based upon a broad program of research through personal visits and interviews, conducted by Miss J. S. Hines, who also drafted the report.* The goals of the study were, in the words of its preface, "to examine the different kinds of budgets used in the public services, the purposes they serve, and the way by which they are constructed and finally settled. From this analysis it was hoped to reveal the method conducive to good administration, and to draw attention to any prevailing practices which might be capable of improvement."

The product is a well organized and comprehensive description of the administrative use of the budget in Great Britain. There is some analytical treatment of problem areas and a few paragraphs offer somewhat reserved suggestions for improvement—as that for greater use of long-range capital programs—but the bulk of the volume is a factual presentation of the situation as it is today. The expression "public authorities" is construed herein to include central government departments, local authorities, the hospital service, and the nationalized industries. The defense departments were excluded for security reasons. Current practices for each of these are examined in separate sections under the following main headings:

revenue budgets—defined to cover what we would call current expenditures and current revenues;
capital expenditure budgets—covering acquisitions and disposals of fixed assets;
finance budgets—budgets of the resources for the acquisition of fixed assets or for working capital;
cash budgets—used, where necessary, to plan and control cash receipts and disbursements.

Of these, the most important by far are the revenue budgets, the treatment of which occupies about half of the book.

Both scholars and practitioners in this important field of public activity will find this volume enormously informative.—FREDERICK C. MOSHER, *University of California (Berkeley).*

Communism and British Intellectuals. BY NEAL WOOD. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1959. Pp. 256. $4.00.)

On one matter ordinary Britons and ordinary Communists always agree. They distrust intellectuals. It comes as no surprise that the the Communist Party of Great Britain periodically revitalizes this attitude. Yet, as Wood here has amply shown, the ideas of Marx, the "front" organizations and—to a lesser extent—the Communist Party itself, exerted a powerful attraction for "a dazzling array of intellectual virtuosi" in the inter-war years and for some time afterward. In this careful and perceptive work Wood also goes a long way toward explaining the paradox.

Communist leaders were able to satisfy deep cravings in the "mild-mannered desperadoes" of the post-war generation. For feelings of inferiority the Communists profferred the balm of exaltation through international contacts and nation-wide, co-operative efforts. For feelings of desperation the Communists offered not so much ideological refuge as merely the opportunity to *do* something. "Action became a value in itself." The aftermath of war saw intellectuals withdraw from politics, to resume their "natural" apathetic role. But the physical decay of the 1930s succeeded the cultural disintegration of the 1920s. Once isolated, now trapped by a repugnant and futile society, many intellectuals lost themselves in a furious effort to salvage civilization. (Communism's positive characteristics outweighed the nihilistic appeal it shared with fascism.) "The political sophisticates of the Thirties were the political illiterates of the Twenties."

The paths leading to association with Communists, the pattern of organization activity and the inevitable conflict with bureaucratic values are admirably documented. Of lasting interest are the particular "breaking points"—their timing and their precipitants—for intellectuals and the party. Four occasions are noted: one in each decade from 1920. In view of the great provocation to defection in each case—the Moscow treason trials, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin—one wonders how intellectuals distinguish among the various affronts to their intelligence. While the author provides clues, but no answer to this question, his analysis makes clear that intellectuals and Communists cannot co-operate forever. The party line somewhere must stifle creativity, for "the *raison d'etre* of the C.P.G.B. is the search for the breaking point of every intellectual in its midst."—HARVEY GLICKMAN, *Princeton University.*

Nationalisation in Britain: The End of a Dogma. BY R. KELF-COHEN. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1959. Pp. viii, 310. $5.50.)

In the recent general election the Labour party suffered, we are told, because it seemed still to stand for nationalization of industry. As far as one can tell, renationalization of iron and steel and of certain areas of public transportation is still part of the Labour program. But nothing in recent Labour party programs suggests that further nationalization is planned for England. This present moment of Conservative prosperity is therefore perhaps a good time for Mr. Kelf-Cohen to examine nationalization in the period 1945–1951 and to decide that its results have been unsatisfactory. He deals with five selected industries—coal, transport, electricity, gas, and iron and steel. He has not written a history of nationalized industry in England, but a set of comments. The writer is a retired official of the Ministry of Supply, where he had to face the sort of problems which he writes about: finance, staffing, the relationship of industries to ministers, the special patterns of the public corporation, and the other peculiarities of the system. Within these limits the book is excellent.

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* Miss Hines died tragically following a road accident in March, 1959.

There are perhaps two signs of prejudice in the book. One is its limitation to a few important specimens of nationalization, with the implication that the whole story is thereby told. The fairly successful nationalization of central banking, of overseas aviation and overseas communication, and the impressive development of an almost newly created telephone system might be cited on the other side.

The other unfairness is in the respect of doctrine. Mr. Kelf-Cohen seems to imply that Labour party socialists are usually believers in state socialism by means of the nationalized public corporation. He further seems to believe that when the nationalized public corporation has been shown to be ineffective, socialists, and particularly Labour party theorists, have been shown to be wrong. He makes great play of Herbert Morrison, whose pattern of the nationalized corporation was followed so generally. But he leaves us unaware that the Morrison type of institution was not in conformity with the policies of such conspicuous and influential theorists as Sir Stafford Cripps and Professor G. D. H. Cole. (Indeed Cripps felt free to argue that Morrison was not a socialist at all.) Reasonably dispassionate observers would perhaps feel that the examples of nationalization which Mr. Kelf-Cohen condemns were not very successful. They might also feel that they were likewise not very socialistic. Such rather definite socialists as Cripps justified them as social expedients, suited to the conditions of the moment.

The book is not as Tory as it sounds. It is a useful part of the re-examination of institutions which is needed if English government is to continue to meet the needs of the country—especially when, as here, the analyst is a man of experience, learning and penetration. The theoretical part of the book is not the least interesting, though it reveals the English impatience of theory characteristic of Conservatives and Labour alike.—EUGENE P. CHASE, *Lafayette College.*

Government and Parliament. BY HERBERT MORRISON. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1959. 2d ed. Pp. xiii, 386. 30s. net.)

In this second edition of his book Mr. (now Lord) Morrison writes that "a few footnotes and minor revisions have been made, largely to bring the book up to date factually." He has also added an "Epilogue" of twenty-two pages, commenting on certain developments since the date of the first edition. These include observations upon "shadow" Minsters and Cabinets; M.P.s' delegatory position, free votes, and privilege; the socialized industries; and, relations between Ministers and civil servants. In dealing with these matters, Lord Morrison does not draw upon any particularly special knowledge of them, so that the modest total of changes and additions seem a rather slender basis for justifying a new volume. His work was originally well described in this REVIEW as "A book of great and varied usefulness, . . . a book of explanation and appreciation, not of criticism." Its value lies, of course, in its description of parliamentary, ministerial, and party procedures drawn from the intimate experience of several decades by an amiable and ebullient politician. It tells much about British government machinery which other politicians have not bothered to explain and academic writers were not permitted to know, thus filling many small gaps in the literature of the subject. As an introduction to British government, it is much like a visitor's tour through a fire station, conducted by a hearty and veteran smoke-eater, who has a friendly and knowing pat for each bit of apparatus, from the oldest engine to the newest hook-and-ladder, and even the loyal Dalmatian.—DELL G. HITCHNER, *University of Washington.*

France, Troubled Ally. BY EDGAR S. FURNISS, JR. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1960. Pp. xvi, 512. $5.75.)

The general interest which the subject matter of this book holds for the American reading public can be attributed to a deep concern for the political welfare of the weakest link in the anti-Soviet defense system, as well as a need for sober evaluation of the legendary figure of de Gaulle and the political evolution of his regime. The author, in his endeavor to explain the factors determining French foreign policy and to provide a workable formula for American policy-makers, has succeeded admirably in illuminating the international conduct of that country through a careful analysis of its internal problems. The first two parts of the book explain the return of de Gaulle in psychological and social-political terms. On the psychological plane, the inability of the French nation and its governments to accept the reduction of France's international status to that of a secondary power has produced delusions of grandeur issuing ultimately in indecision and procrastination. In the social and political sphere the Fourth Republic destroyed itself through "immoblisme," which paralyzed French ability to act in domestic politics as well as in foreign policy. By far the most useful part is the third, which is devoted to an analysis of the constitution and politics of the Fifth Republic. His analysis leads the author to conclude that de Gaulle will be no more successful than his predecessors in restoring France to her previous glory. Like other mortals de Gaulle lacks the power to cast off the shackles of historical necessity, which at this point is not favorable to French ambitions. But even within the modest scope left to human volition the present regime is found wanting because of the disproportionate favors it has extended to the privileged classes and its insensitivity to legitimate social and economic aspirations of the masses.

The book is valuable because of the sympathetic understanding with which the failings of our traditional friend and ally are examined. The author's thoroughness and painstaking documentation are admirable. The book is marred, however, by the unnecessary length of the first two parts, which review in great detail situations and events covered abundantly in the literature on contemporary France. Irritating, too, is the author's apparent compulsion to justify his historical work in terms of a need to substantiate such commonplace generalizations as the close interdependence of domestic and foreign policy and the continuity of foreign policy between the Fourth and Fifth Republics. Nevertheless, students of France will find this volume a useful reference work.—PETER J. FLIESS, *Louisiana State University*.

France the New Republic. BY RAYMOND ARON. (New York. Oceana Publications, 1960. Pp. 114. $2.95.)

This publication contains the text of the 1958 Constitution for the French Fifth Republic, prefaced with two penetrating commentaries by Raymond Aron and D. W. Brogan, and by parts of a stenotyped discussion in October 1958 between M. Aron and the Consultants on the Basic Issues for the Fund for the Republic. Political scientists will find most entertaining: (1) the manner in which the French sociologist finds it necessary to instruct his American interlocutors on the meaning and priority of politics over economics, (2) his prophetic analysis of the Algerian question more than a year prior to the crisis of January 1960, (3) his pointing to the central structural question in the new Constitution as the extent to which its only directly elected organ, the Assembly, has been not only legally limited but constitutionally discredited. One is disappointed only by the failure of the discussion to press the question as to whether the opinion base of the French Republic has been narrowed to the Army and the reverence of the people for a personal leader rather than for the regime.

Scandinavian Democracy: Development of Democratic Thought and Institutions in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. EDITED BY J. A. LAUWERYS. (Copenhagen. The American-Scandinavian Foundation. 1958. Pp. 437. $6.00.)

The present work is a collection of two dozen essays on major aspects of social, economic, and political life in the three Scandinavian countries. The contributors—nine Norwegians, seven Danes, and seven Swedes—include an impressive array of educators and public officials who write with competence and, on the whole, with remarkable lucidity on such topics as political parties and voluntary organizations, the legal and administrative systems, the government's role in the economy, education, and the media of communications. The book thus provides a useful introduction to Scandinavia for the beginning student and the general reader. Unfortunately, however, no single subject is pursued in sufficient depth to add to the specialists' knowledge, and there are no references whatever to the growing body of serious studies in English on various aspects of Scandinavian politics and economics.

Roughly two-thirds of the material represents a translation and adaptation from a similar work published for the Scandinavian reader a decade earlier (Hal Koch and Alf Ross, editors, *Nordisk Demokrati*, Oslo, Stockholm, and København, 1948), and a comparison of the two versions proves instructive. Among the new material is a background chapter on "Lands and Peoples" by the editor, a professor of comparative education at the University of London, who has also provided short introductions to most of the remaining sections. The last section entitled "Scandinavian Democracy and the World" also is new and is designed to acquaint the English-speaking reader with the international role of the Northern countries. Other changes in content and outline remind us that, while the original work was sponsored by three leading publishing houses in Scandinavia, the present adaptation is published under joint auspices of the three government agencies concerned with international cultural exchange. The second, and larger, section of *Nordisk Demokrati* was entitled "Problems of Democracy"; in the present version any such prominent reference to "problems" has been avoided, and chapters once modestly entitled "The School" and "Defense" reappear under the more pretentious headings "Education for Democracy" and "Defence and Democracy." A valuable subsection entitled "Weaknesses of Democracy," composed of three self-critical essays, has disappeared altogether. The result is candidly characterized in the editor's conclusion: "From one point of view, this book, from beginning to end, is a defence and justification of the way of life found in Northern Europe or even a paean of praise in honor of the Scandinavian democracies." *Scandinavian Democracy,* that is to say, continues a tradition of panegyric writing which has presented the three Northern countries as so many idyllic utopias in which all the New Dealer's fondest hopes come effortlessly true. But unlike the American journalists who inaugurated that tradition, the learned contributors to the present volume cannot adduce ignorance or the need to repay-generous hospitality as extenuating circumstances. Scandinavian achievements in parliamentary government, economic policy, labor relations, education, science, and technology are genuine and impressive enough not to require euphemism or embellishment. Why gild the lily?—DANKWART A. RUSTOW, *Columbia University.*

The Political Press. BY JORGEN WESTERSTAHL AND CARL-GUNNAR JANSON. (Stockholm: University of Gothenburg. 1959. Pp. 127. Kr. 15:50.)

This admirable study of the political role of the daily press in Sweden was based on data concerning distribution of newspapers and voting records for the period 1945–54, supplemented by information obtained from interviews of a sample of newspaper readers taken in 1953, 1954, and 1956.

Careful statistical analysis demonstrated that, while in the country as a whole party vote percentage and share of newspaper circulation did not correspond, within individual newspaper districts there was a positive correlation between percentage of newspaper circulation and party voting. Efforts to test whether this correlation would hold when class and occupation were held constant appear to have been inconclusive, but the author did find that there were important differences between the major political parties in the degree of correlation between distribution of the party newspapers and votes for that party. The authors sought explanation of these differences between parties in terms of both the content and readership of the various newspapers. This analysis indicated to them that a tentative distinction should be made between a "wide-coverage" press (whose reader circulation was considerably broader than corresponding groups of political sympathizers) and a "narrow-coverage" press (distributed primarily among the ranks of party followers or sympathizers).

The hypothesis that there was a difference in the kind of political influence of the wide-coverage and narrow-coverage press was tested by using interview data. This analysis tended to confirm the notion that the differences were not limited to differences in the size of circulation, but were more a matter of the nature of the readership and its relation to the newspaper. Readers of the narrow-coverage press were more politically interested and more committed to their newspapers than were readers of wide-coverage press. This appeared to be one explanation as to why there was a stronger correlation between newspaper circulation and voting in the case of the narrow-coverage Social Democratic and Conservative press than in the case of the wide-coverage Liberal press. The tentative conclusion is drawn that the narrow-coverage press plays a more important role politically than the wide-coverage press. The main text of the volume is in Swedish, but table headings are also given in English, and there is a comprehensive English summary. The latter is, in spots, lacking in lucidity, and it is not entirely clear whether this is due to language difficulty or over-caution on the part of the authors in drawing conclusions from their findings.—LE ROY FERGUSON, *Michigan State University.*

The Press in Pakistan. BY MAJID NIZAMI. (Panjab: University of Panjab. 1958. Pp. vii, 89.)

This descriptive and anecdotal volume suffers considerably in comparison with the sophisticated study reviewed above. A rather detailed account of specific newspapers in each section of Pakistan will probably have limited interest for other than area specialists. A chapter entitled "Characteristics of the Pakistan Press" emphasizes the problems arising from financial instability, and the lack of experienced reporters or news agencies. Additional chapters are devoted to "Working Conditions of Reporters" (bad), and "Freedom of the Press" (lacking). The entire study suffers somewhat from the polemic nature of much of the presentation. The author, who is himself a working newspaperman, appears to have been too close to his material for objective analysis.—LE ROY FERGUSON, *Michigan State University.*

Promises and Performances in Australian Politics. BY RUSSELL H. BARRETT. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1959. Pp. 126. $2.50.)

The purpose of this volume is to evaluate "the promise-performance aspect of responsible party government." A detailed study of party platforms and the policy statements of leaders, 1928 to 1951, is followed by a briefer treatment of subsequent campaigns. The writer concludes that in every election the range of specific differences between the parties has been "substantial," that the record of implementing promises is "remarkably good," and that there is no "significant" difference in the records of the Labor and non-Labor parties. He qualifies the significance of these conclusions by pointing out the vagueness and generality of some promises and the infrequency of proposals for *major* change. In the concluding chapter the reasons for failure to implement promises are discussed and "proposals for improvement" are advanced.

The writer has assembled his data with thoroughness and shows a firm grasp of the intricacies of Australian politics. His appraisal of promises and performances is dispassionate and objective. But many will challenge the feasibility of his proposals for remedying the "inherent weaknesses in the promise-performance concept." A similar study of New Zealand, where responsible government operates without the limiting devices which Mr. Barrett finds often block the implementation of party promises in Australia, might throw further light on some of the points raised in his conclusions. Tables comparing the platforms of the parties, and an Appendix summarizing the policy speech of the leader of the successful party in each election, 1928 through 1958, will be useful to all students of Australian politics.—LOUISE OVERACKER, *Professor Emeritus, Wellesley College.*

The Soviet Union between the 19th and 20th Party Congresses 1952–1956. BY GEORGE D. EMBREE. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. Pp. xii, 365. 22.80 guilders.)

What is the impact of press reportage of world affairs upon the intelligent reader? Through the forty months from the last Party congress dominated by Stalin to the first one directed by Khrushchev, the western press tried to report the flow of events and gossip in and about the USSR, and to offer some measure of hasty interpretation. A young American newspaperman has attempted here to use this material in a sizable book, without touching primary Soviet sources.

At the level of reporting, the book reveals much diligent clipping of stories from western newspapers, interspersed with careful reading of a few American and German magazine articles and an occasional book. Embree has here collected materials (and some translations made by the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*) about Soviet industry, agriculture, foreign affairs and domestic politics, and has been honest enough to provide a thousand footnotes revealing the specific sources, even acknowledging the particular reporter who provided the information and interpretation in most cases. It is a compendium of many stories, knitted together by topics and chronology, with the original analysis retained in many items. Those interested in this period will find many useful materials—the context of an official announcement, the core of an important speech, the account of a Party conference.

At the level of political interpretation, the book suggests what the unseen audience is learning about the Soviet Union from *The New York Times* staff and a few western specialists. The results warrant some careful thought and a few blushes by the Messrs. Salisbury, Baldwin, Schwartz, *et al.* In the area of domestic politics, Embree now tells confidently about what he has learned concerning "the constant interaction of the rivalries, jealousies and hatred of power at its worst." They were only kept in check by Stalin, his death required "the forging of a new power relationship" between competing factions. As he selects items from the *Times* and elsewhere to follow this fearsome struggle apparently waged in public view, Embree occasionally cautions the reader not to think of monolithic units called the police, the army, the Party or the "bureaucracy" (which he does not further define), but he proceeds to ignore his own warning. He sees these elements competing against each other in a struggle for naked power, without rationalization or political significance. Beriya becomes "the police" and the latter is "utterly destroyed" when he dies; the "marshals" have some mutual jealousies but they work sufficiently well as a group to become a major factor in these four years, collaborating with "the Party" to destroy the police and taking a hand in foreign policy, but rather mysteriously refrain from using their power for other ends. Before the spring of 1953, Malenkov "controlled" the Party apparatus, but after that season Khrushchev suddenly becomes "the Party," and moves inexorably to the destruction of competing groups.

In the field of foreign policy, Embree has given a painstaking review of every major step, most strategems and many speeches, largely in terms of the propaganda significance. In almost every case, he confidently explains the aims, methods and results being attained. There would be fewer ulcers in the Foreign Offices and many more doctoral dissertations, if others could see the same simple picture. As an added benefit to his readers Embree also provides a variety of appendices and statistical charts, especially about the secretaries of the Communist Party, a list of typical wages and prices, and a long bibliography. —LOUIS NEMZER, *Ohio State University.*

Politicheskii Slovar. ED. BY B. N. PONOMAREV. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat. 1958. Pp. 680. 17 rubles.)

Among the problems facing the student of Communism few have been as intractable as the search for the real meaning of concepts and slogans in the Soviet world. The relative lack of success in this field has often been caused by the failure to consult certain Soviet publications, whose very object is to guide those party members who interpret day-by-day Marxism-Leninism and the problems arising out the building of Communism. One of the most recent and valuable of these works of reference is the second edition of the *Political Dictionary*, of which a hundred thousand copies were printed in 1958. Its editor, Prof. B. N. Ponomarev, is best known as one of the leading Soviet authorities on matters of ideology and the international Communist movement. As such he has been responsible for the new edition of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union published in 1959.

The *Political Dictionary* is divided into ten sections, each of which contains a large number of entries varying in length and completeness of detail. The sections cover the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R., the rest of the world, the international labour and "democratic" movement, international relations, political economy, philosophy, religion and atheist propaganda, international and constitutional law, and world history.

The interest of the *Political Dictionary* is twofold. First, concepts and slogans embracing every aspect of politics in the broad sense of the term are defined and explained in words that should leave little doubt as to their meaning in Khrushchev's Russia. Secondly, a comparison of the text of the second edition with the first, edited by G. Aleksandrov and published in 1940, throws light on the degree of continuity in the attitudes of the Soviet leadership over a period of almost twenty years. This comparison is all the more interesting in view of the Communists' insistence on the creativeness of Marxism-Leninism, and their claim that Khrushchev is now in the process of enriching it. A study of the text of the two editions shows that in general the contributions made by Stalin's successors are of secondary importance. A cursory examination of the articles dealing, for instance, with the "class struggle," "socialism" and "patriotism" suffice to confirm this.

Even so, several differences are noticeable. To begin with, more attention is paid to the non-European world than in 1940. Secondly, the vocabulary used in 1958 is often less robust. The Stalinist pejoratives "bandits," "agents," "agency," etc., have been replaced more than once by the more anemic "reactionary" or "bourgeois." The references to pacifism and Gandhism, for example, are less hostile than in 1940; Islam, on the other hand, is dealt with more severely than in the heyday of Stalinism. The third major difference lies in the treatment of Stalin. Stripped of many of the eulogies which had surrounded his name and activities in the first edition, he has been reduced to more human proportions, with the result that the biography of the late dictator is closer to reality than most of the other biographies in the *Political Dictionary*.

Finally, the biographical entries are of interest because they throw light on the reputation which various politicians and thinkers enjoy in the Soviet world. Those whom Moscow wants to claim as its precursors, no matter how tenuous the link, and those who have contributed in one way or another to the creation and survival of the U.S.S.R., have been rewarded with a biographical note (among living Frenchmen only three Communists: Duclos, Saillant and Thorez have obtained this privilege). The same treatment has not been accorded to socialist thinkers and labour leaders who have had differences with Communists from Marx to Khrushchev. Only a few of them (Gaitskell, Kautsky, Plekhanov and Jaurès) have been able to find a biographical note in the *Political Dictionary*. The absent include the representatives of the anarchist movement (Bakunin, Kropotkin and Proudhon), as well as moderate marxists (Bauer, Blum) and left-wing socialists (Bevan, Guesde), not to speak of the closest collaborators of Lenin and Stalin (Bukharin, Kaganovich, Kamenev, Malenkov, Molotov, Rykov, Trotsky, Zinoviev, etc.). These gaps force the reader thirsting for biographical data to make do with a S. G. Lazo, a Paul Lafargue, over a dozen Soviet marshals (including Zhukov), and especially the elite of the hierarchy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This emphasis on contemporary party leaders is hardly surprising.—IVAN AVAKUMOVIC, *University of Manitoba.*

Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party. BY ABDURAKHMAN AVTORKHANOV. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1959. pp. 379. $6.00.)

It is always of intense interest for students of Soviet affairs to check their analyses against information and interpretation supplied by those who had the opportunity to observe the Soviet system from the inside. As a student at the Moscow Institute of Red Professors and, for a while, a member of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Party's Central Committee, Mr. Avtorkhanov was certainly in a position to gain valuable insight into the inner-Party operations. While his book does not reveal anything substantially new, it adds interesting details, both descriptive and interpretative, to the well known story of Stalin's victorious struggle against his opponents between 1928 and 1938. They certainly confirm, and throw some additional light on, Stalin's ruthlessness toward his own Party associates. The book concludes with a discussion and evaluation of inner-Party developments in the post-Stalin era.

The main flaw in this otherwise interesting book lies in the admixture of dialogues into several of its chapters. They are not particularly revealing and tend at times to wander away from the basic theme. Moreover, what they aim to convey could have been condensed in each instance, and to better advantage, in a few sentences of indirect prose. Also, the author occasionally registers opinions or hypotheses without fully substantiating them or at least making an all-out effort to do so. In this category fall, for instance, his assertions that the Party machine outgrew Stalin in 1952; that Stalin was not a "confirmed Communist"; and that Stalin would have never reached the summit of power without Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov.—EDWARD TABORSKY, *The University of Texas.*

Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age. BY GEORGE VERNADSKY. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1959. Pp. ix, 347. $7.50.)

Students of Russian history will welcome this fourth installment in the projected ten-volume series, "A History of Russia," by George Vernadsky and Michael Karpovich. One hopes that the latter's recent death will not prevent completion of this monumental set. Vernadsky's fourth volume contains all the scholarly apparatus that is his hallmark. It takes up the transition era when Muscovy, consolidated by Ivan III (1462–1505) and Vassily III (1505–1533), emerged from the Middle Ages and the Tatar yoke. Worthy counterparts of Western statebuilders, these tsars doggedly "gathered in" the ancient "Rus lands" that stretched from Novgorod and Smolensk to the southern Cossack lands and eastward to the Kazan Khanate. Though Russia missed most of the impact of the Renaissance and Reformation, at least Moscow's Kremlin benefited from imported Italian architects, and in the monastic squabble between "Josephans" and "Judaizers" Russia wrote her footnote to some of the issues that stirred Reformation Europe. And Western Russia, whose history is recounted here in detail, became the target of the proselyting Polish Counter Reformation. That clash culminated in the 1596 Council of Brest and the Uniate Church —terminal point for this volume. Vernadsky's next instalment will take up Muscovy under Ivan IV ("the Terrible") and Boris Godunov.—CHARLES F. DELZELL, *Vanderbilt University.*

Overcentralization in Economic Administration: A Critical Analysis Based on Experience in Hungarian Light Industry. BY JÁNOS KORNAI. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. xv, 236. $5.20)

The purpose of this book, a translation from the Hungarian, is to reveal the disadvantages and shortcomings of Hungarian economic practices during 1955 and 1956. Basically, it is a study of Communist bureaucratic rigidity in Hungary under Mátyás Rákosi.

According to the author the initiative of enterprises was severely hampered by the long list of obligatory plan index numbers prescribed for them by higher authorities. Profits were ignored by both the top managements and the other employees of enterprises. Control from below has not been sufficiently developed. Factory workers have not possessed an institutionally guaranteed right to have a say in the affairs of their enterprises. Directors of factories had very little effective power in practice even though they had many rights on paper. The process of democratic decision-making in enterprises was non-existent. The entire Hungarian light industry was overcentralized.

After the Hungarian Revolution, however, a great deal of change has taken place as a result of the measures affecting methods of economic administration which were put into effect in 1957. Now the economists are no longer absolutely dependent on the logic of the dialectical *Weltanschauung* in their work, nor are the *apparatchiki* ready to endanger their power by sticking to the logic of ideology, when they realize that to do so is inadvisable on pragmatic grounds. At present, product-mixes and detailed production programs are, very largely, the outcome of direct contacts between industrial enterprises and the distributive trades. This has made industry far more sensitive to the real requirements of its customers. —PETER A. TOMA, *University of Arizona.*

Middle Eastern Capitalism. BY A. J. MEYER. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1959. Pp. vii, 161. $3.75)

Until very recently, what was said once about Russia—namely, "There is no expert knowledge of Russia, only varying degrees of ignorance"—could have very well been said about the Middle East. The book under review is one of the better recent contributions to a clearer conception of the problems of the area. Mr. Meyer, past professor and economic consultant in the Middle East, and presently Associate Director of the Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, presents a skillfully written first-hand report in the form of nine short essays. The first elucidates the area's major economic and political characteristics; later essays deal dexterously with such highly debatable and dangerous subjects as historical analogies in economic development, the causes and effects of Middle Eastern land reforms, and the role of entrepreneurship in the (past and future) economic growth of the area. In the sixth essay the change in outlook of the major oil companies is analyzed and their new policy of "integration" is evaluated. Another highly debatable topic—economic planning—also receives separate treatment. After a concise but thorough analysis of the different plans proposed and executed in the area, Mr. Meyer reaches the conclusion that "the Middle East today is, . . . despite its plans, in some ways more 'capitalist' than the industrial West it strives to overtake," a conclusion which will undoubtedly astonish many a reader. The final two essays contain the author's advice to the Western nations as to the best policies to be undertaken with regard to the Middle East. Although the book lacks continuity and, to some extent, a central thesis, this deficiency is offset by the skill and thoroughness with which the chosen topics are treated.

British Policy in Changing Africa. By Sir Andrew Cohen. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1959. Pp. x, 116. $4.50.)

Two distinctive features of post-war British policy in Africa have been a conscious pursuit of state building and the acceptance, indeed the promotion, of a comparatively rapid rate of political, economic and social advancement. Pre-war policies of "indirect rule" and the belief that there was "indefinite time ahead" to effect a political and social transformation in Africa have been abandoned in favor of policies far more capable of meeting the demands for rapid progress and growth. Politically, this has resulted in a major preoccupation with the development of modern systems of national and local government within a framework of self-government and parliamentary institutions. Moreover, to provide foundations for these institutions, colonial self sufficiency has given way to the willing use of British public monies in an effort to speed up economic and social development. Problems of political integration, of tensions between tribal and racial groups and between new social groups and traditional ones, have replaced earlier definitions of the colonial problem.

Sir Andrew Cohen, a distinguished British public servant, writes with exceptional authority of these changes in West and East Africa. As head of the African Division in the Colonial Office, he was a main architect of many of these post-war policies which have led to the rapid emergence of Ghana and, this year, of the Federation of Nigeria, as independent states. Later, as Governor of Uganda, he was an imaginative practitioner of policy, and now as the Permanent British Representative in the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, an able defender and interpreter. In this outstanding book, his task has been not merely to document his conviction that training peoples to run their own countries has been the main distinguishing characteristic of British administration in Africa, but also to assay present and future requirements of policy if Africa is to meet the demands of modernization and continue to develop in harmony with the West. In this respect this short book has the added quality of being written by one who is deeply concerned with the welfare of Africans and who regards successful cooperation with African nationalism as "our greatest bulwark against communism in Africa."

In developing the main concerns and practices of British policy in West and East Africa, Sir Andrew Cohen gives abundant evidence of his views: African nationalism and the activities of British colonial servants are seen as the two major dynamic forces which have shaped British African dependencies. Both have played constructive roles and both have been vital for development and progress. While Sir Andrew gives special attention to the tasks of administration and the contributions and work of British officers, it is central to his thinking that cooperative enterprise with African leadership is the most vital requirement of policy. Wise and imaginative colonial governmental policy is required for development, but local pressure of organized African opinion is equally important in bringing about critical adjustments in policy.

Although these lectures were published before recent changes in British policy in Tanganyika and Kenya, one would suspect that Sir Andrew would applaud the acceptance by Britain of African majority rule in these multi-racial territories. The acceptance of independence for West African territories in the early 1950's and now of African self-government in East Africa represent great landmarks of British policy. However, Sir Andrew warns us that the main task remains: that is, to settle with these new countries the right way of helping them to achieve stability and to meet critical development programs.—Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., *University of California (Berkeley).*

Egypt in Transition. By Jean and Simonne Lacoutre. Translated by Francis Scarfe. (New York: Criterion Books. 1958. Pp. 532. $7.50.)

This is one of the most valuable accounts of modern Egypt that have so far appeared. After an historical introduction, it provides an excellent account of the "Free Officers' movement" and the revolution of 1952; analyzes the "condition of Egypt question" as it has existed since that date;

and in addition provides a useful commentary on diplomacy and foreign relations, through the Suez crisis of 1956. The authors make use of published material on Egypt, as well as Egyptian newspapers; to this they add first hand knowledge of the countryside and towns, described with the best qualities of high class journalism. The whole work is written with a just combination of sympathetic understanding and critical awareness.

The Governance of Modern Burma. By J. S. Furnivall. (International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1958. Pp. iv, 132. $2.50)

Any comments about Burma by J. S. Furnivall should command the respectful attention of all students of Asian politics, for this lively and witty man has accumulated in nearly sixty years of Burmese experiences a profound understanding of all aspects of a land he has adopted both intellectually and emotionally. He is the acknowledged master of all who seek to fathom Southeast Asian politics. Furnivall's words also deserve attention because they reveal so vividly the personality and the qualities of mind of a model member of the Indian Civil Service. Like the best of that extraordinary body of men, Furnivall has had an insatiable curiosity about the customs and culture of the people he ruled, a boundless energy in recording his findings, and a delightfully straightforward, but cultivated, prose style. Typical of his class, he always assumed he was atypical; and like so many others, he was constantly at war with what he considered to be the monstrous machinery of colonial administration. His heart was in the district and his bête noire was the Secretariat and the Colonial Office.

In this study, Furnivall presents a precise and lucid description of the formal structure of Burmese government since independence. The initial background chapter is a valuable summary of administrative and political developments during the period of British rule. The concluding chapter is the best published account of the political events leading to the split in the A.F.P.F.L. party and the establishment of an army "caretaker" government. The bulk of the work is a description of the organs of national, local, and regional governments.

Although Furnivall is cautious in advancing personal opinions, his long held—but not so widely shared—point of view emerges clearly from these pages. Furnivall has strong attachments to the memories of the traditional Burmese social order, and an equally strong distaste for a society premised on a rational-legal system of authority. To Furnivall pre-British Burma was a genuine community based on organic and fraternal relationships, while British Burma was on the verge of becoming a world of opportunism and of crass materialistic individualism. Some may wonder whether Furnivall is not in danger of romanticizing the community life among the Burmese kings, and of being hypersensitive to the demanding realities of the more impersonal modern world. Furnivall's fundamental outlook has made him one of the few critics of economic development as a national goal, for it is associated in his mind with commercialism and selfish materialism. On the other hand, he is compassionately concerned with the physical well-being of the Burmese masses; and he deplores the fact that the Burmese need more than they want, while Westerners want more than they need. His answer is the essentially European one of Fabian socialism.

These attitudes tend to strengthen Furnivall's manner of judging harshly British actions while being tolerant and understanding of Burmese failings. In the last analysis, it is this spirit of charity which permeates Furnivall's work and which marks the greatness of the man.—Lucian W. Pye, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem. By Gerald S. Maryanov. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project. 1959. Pp. vii, 118. $1.50.) *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem.* By Robert C. Bone, Jr. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project. 1959. Pp. x, 170. $1.50.)

The departure of the colonial powers from Asia has brought to the fore the many divisive forces within and among Asian states which have been further aggravated by poor economic circumstances. Indonesia's plight of diversity in ethnic, cultural, religious, and economic conditions is worsened by the island-nature of its territory. Here, more than elsewhere, the solution of the problem of unity versus regionalism is almost a matter of survival as a state. Mr. Maryanov's good study has therefore considerable significance as going to the root of Indonesia's vital problem.

The book's first part is devoted to the crucial question of a reconciliation of unitary government with decentralized administration and regional democratic participation in the political process. The major theme of the discussion is the ideological commitment in Indonesia to a unitary form and democratic decentralization with the reality of centrifugal political forces and insistence upon local autonomy. Since in Indonesian eyes federalism was a weapon of the colonial masters to split the country, it is in disrepute and a new governmental form must be developed which can satisfy ideology while respecting reality. In the second part, the book examines how far, in practice, the Indonesian enterprise has been successful. The finding is that progress has been made, but much more remains to be achieved before success can be considered secure.

The characterization of the study as an "Interim Report" presumably protects the author against the criticism that the whole discussion is on a somewhat abstract level. It relies for its attitude examinations primarily on the formalistic expressions of government officials and parliamentarians without going much into the substance of diversification or of the intensity of feeling behind demands for local autonomy and animosity against the central government. This study hardly provides a clue to the upheavals of 1956–58.

It is not surprising, in view of the internal conflicts and tensions, that Dutch possession of West Irian has been turned into a permanent and prominent issue by Indonesian governments. However, Mr. Bone, in his thoroughly documented study of this question, rates the attempt to use West Irian as a factor for uniting the Indonesian people very low among the considerations motivating officials. In fact, he does not go much behind the official claims of either side in evaluating the pros and cons of the case. After an exhaustive examination of these claims, the conclusion emerges that the Dutch position is very weak. But does this make the Indonesian position strong? The author—whose sympathies with the Indonesian cause lead him into bias on a few, rare, occasions—seems to take this for granted. He belittles, without debating, Dutch and Australian arguments that the people of New Guinea might have a right to their own independence. Yet, one should beware of demonstrating his sympathy with anti-colonialism and legitimate aspirations of free Asia by becoming a fellow-traveller of Asian nationalists and, yes, imperialists.

The two studies are valuable additions to the production of Cornell's Modern Indonesia Project. It is to be hoped that the high quality of this production may convince the angel financing the project to add an editor who can devote himself to the aesthetic aspects of these publications.—Werner Levi, *University of Minnesota.*

Die Wirtschaft Chinas: Dogma und Wirklichkeit. By Werner Handke. (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag. 1959. Pp. 337.)

Die Wirtschaftliche Verflechtung der Volksrepublik China mit der Sowjetunion. Bearbeitet im Institut für Asienkunde. (Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin: 1959. Pp. 105.)

Dr. Handke's book is a significant contribution to our understanding of the economy of Communist China. It is the most recent study of the subject; and it uses an approach in depth. Viewing Mao's regime against the background of China's traditional society, it stresses the specific Communist doctrines and goals that dominate the present development.

The book has four major parts. The first identifies the socio-historical position of Communist China; the second surveys the country's demographic and material resources; the third analyzes the key features of Communist planning; and the fourth discusses Peking's international economic relations, in which the USSR figures prominently. Despite the deficiences of the available data, Dr. Handke offers a critical and, in my opinion, realistic appraisal of the decisive aspects of Red China's economy and society.

Take the demographic issue. Dr. Handke rejects the assumption that a population explosion threatens the Peking regime or its relations to the USSR. Given the totalitarian potential for mobilizing labor, restricting consumption, and planning economic growth, he finds that, from the Communist standpoint, the expanding population constitutes no problem.

In the sphere of agriculture, Dr. Handke recognizes the twofold effect of the new order on China's traditional hydraulic economy: gigantic irrigation works increase the productivity of the soil, but collectivization cripples the intensity of farm labor. In his opinion the second factor is likely to outweigh the first.

Dr. Handke believes that the Hungarian revolution, by forcing the USSR to provide more aid to the East European satellites, caused the decrease of Soviet exports to Red China. But he insists that this change did not basically alter the economic relations between Moscow and Peking. Although the Soviet Union after 1956 sent fewer goods to Red China, it increased the export of items essential to Peking's industrialization.

The second study, *Die Wirtschaftliche Verflechtung der Volksrepublik China mit der Sowjetunion,* discusses this development in considerable detail. It shows among other things that after 1954, when Chinese export to the USSR grew, the volume of foodstuffs shrank from 45.7 to 29.1 per cent of the export total. Limitation of space does not permit me to pursue the matter further; but the correlation between the advancing collectivization and the shrinking food export is certainly intriguing.

To repeat: the two studies under review illuminate vital features of Red China's political economy. They speak well for the judgment of the Institut für Asienkunde, Hamburg, under whose auspices they have been published.—Karl A. Wittfogel, *University of Washington.*

Sons of the Shaking Earth. By Eric R. Wolf. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. vii, 302. $5.00).

Professor Wolf's "Shaking Earth" which he also calls "Middle America" consists of present-day Mexico and Guatemala. This area, writes Professor Wolf, a University of Chicago anthropologist, "has been a great meeting ground of men, a laboratory for the production of human varieties." In this laboratory successive waves of settlement produced a distinctive cultural pattern which only now is being disrupted by a newly introduced industrial system.

Skilfully weaving together everything known about the area, Professor Wolf has synthesized the information into a fascinating history, but a history written with a comprehension of the geographic, ethnic, and cultural factors playing upon people, a history which pictures the cultural pattern of the population rather than the history which records events.

This is a valuable book for political scientists, for without describing the political organization in detail Professor Wolf has cast much light upon the forces which determined what that organization was to be. Very well written and beautifully illustrated, this book is recommended as a distinct contribution toward a better understanding of Middle America. The value of the book is further increased by an index and an annotated bibliography.

Political Handbook of the World, 1960. Ed. by Walter H. Mallory. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. Pp. vii, 237. $4.50).

The 33rd edition of the Council on Foreign Relations' source book of useful political information is organized under the usual headings of Executive, Parliament, Party Programs and Leaders, Recent Political Events, and Press. This material is presented for 76 countries (excluding the International Court of Justice, United Nations and Vatican City). For 12 "other countries" the *Handbook* lists the capital city, area, population, form of government and name of ruler.

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc. By George A. Modelski. (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press. 1959. Pp. 226. 30 *s.*)

This is a well-documented study of the industrial nuclear developments in the Communist countries; the author mentions however the military nuclear matters whenever it is impossible to dissociate entirely the two uses of atomic energy. One of the valuable features consists in the ample information on the nuclear developments in Eastern Europe.

The author makes several interesting points.

He proves that the Soviet nuclear research has at no time (except for the war years) lagged behind that of any other leading power since it was launched in 1939. The current research covers most of the fields with much importance attached to the problem of controlled thermonuclear power and that of nuclear propulsion. He notes the wide application of radio-isotopes in Soviet heavy industries. According to his key thesis, a further rapid expansion of Soviet and East-European economies can no longer be attained by a mere increase in the size of industrial manpower but must henceforth rely on greater labor productivity to be assured by an improved technology, including higher energy supply per worker. He points out the prospective shortage of coal supply for the European Soviet Union as well as for Eastern Europe (the Soviet-Asian coal supply involves a heavy loss of energy on the long-haul transportation to Soviet-European industries, while the Polish coal output already falls short of the East-European requirements). Hence the atomic energy looms on the horizon as the best solution. The Soviet weakness in the self-imposed race with the United States for higher industrial production consists in the much lower volume of generated electricity. The figures for 1955 were as follows: total volume for the United States—624.9 billion kwh as against 170.1 billion for the USSR, the per capita output—2.313 kwh for the United States as against 412 kwh for the Soviet Union. Yet the Soviet Union faces for the time being the same difficulty as the United States, namely the much higher commercial cost of nuclear-generated electricity in comparison to the conventionally-generated. This is why the current Seven Year Plan limits, contrarily to the earlier expectations, the role of existing and planned nuclear plants to their performing the experimental function.

Communist sources of nuclear materials such as uranium, rare metals, graphite and heavy water are located in practically all Communist countries. Uranium deposits are situated in all East-European countries, the Soviet Central Asia, and in the Chinese Sinkiang. This fact enhances the importance of East Europe for the Soviet Union. The author thinks that the Soviet quick nuclear progress in the ten post-war years was due to the ample uranium supplies from Czechoslovakia and East Germany which were as vital in that period as the Congolese supplies were for the American program during the last war. While all the communist countries devote serious studies to the development of industrial use of atomic energy, the Soviet Union provides them with power reactors, technical assistance and the opportunity for scientific research at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna.

The author predicts that the USSR might engage in a nuclear trade with the uncommitted nations, bartering her atomic equipment and technical assistance for nuclear raw materials for which the Communist Bloc would find abundant use. His other forcast seems no more improbable, namely that, once the problem of cost is solved, the USSR will at least keep abreast of the United States in the industrial exploitation of atomic energy and East Europe will attain in this respect a position of parity with West Europe.

This book is valuable to people interested either in nuclear problems or in the Communist countries.—W. W. KULSKI, *Syracuse University.*

World Affairs and the College Curriculum. BY RICHARD N. SWIFT. (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education. 1959. Pp. ix, 194. $3.50.)

In 1950 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—whose President, Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, contributes a Foreword to the present volume—inaugurated a series of surveys leading to the publication of eight "Studies in Universities and World Affairs," all under the general editorship of Howard E. Wilson and all issued by the American Council on Education. Seventh among these studies is the current work by Richard N. Swift, Associate Professor of Government at New York University. His objective is well put in his Preface: "In a world so superbly equipped for mass suicide, awesome responsibilities fall upon the institutions man has established to develop culture and preserve ultimate values. . . . In *World Affairs and the College Curriculum*, I have tried to describe the problems colleges have had in attempting to define world affairs. . . . My study has led me to conclude that before American colleges can teach effectively about world affairs throughout the land, we must resolve a number of difficulties inherent in the nation's educational system."

In nine chapters he offers us a searching and highly readable discussion of the multiple meanings of "world affairs"; their relationship to the liberal arts in general and to the humanities, history, the social sciences, the natural sciences, and mathematics in particular; the problems posed by undergraduate courses and majors in the field; supplementary programs; and conclusions. A useful bibliography is appended, followed by an index which is good but would have been better if it had included the bibliographical items and the footnotes as well as the text.

As for the substance of the business here in hand, Dr. Swift covers much familiar ground but with unusual qualities of insight, humor, and erudition. Few have written in more stimulating style of the need for interdisciplinary approaches, for more effective language teaching, for the studies of the cultures of Asia and Africa, and for higher standards of secondary education.

I would quarrel seriously, as would some other members of the profession, with only one of Professor Swift's major points. He has persuaded himself that "the conventional introductory course in international relations" as taught by political scientists is "not best suited for the general student, tomorrow's businessmen, physicians, lawyers, teachers, engineers, nurses, public relations specialists, or housewives." (p. 101) This is "not the most appropriate course for colleges to require." (p. 167). Why not? Dr. Swift offers scant evidence for this judgment and is vague regarding alternatives. Granted that some such courses are poorly conceived and badly taught and that much more remains to be done, such courses, when well planned and conducted, come closer than anything else available or proposed in American college curriculums to achieving the educational goals which Dr. Swift has so ably set forth.

On such matters opinions will continue to differ. From discussion of the differences, most of us hope and believe, will emerge a closer approximation to truth and a more adequate fulfillment of the responsibilities of educators to their students, their fellow-citizens, their nation, and their world. This volume is a most useful and welcome contribution to the common cause.—FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, *Williams College.*

The Power of Small States. By ANNETTE BAKER FOX. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1959. Pp. ix, 212. $5.50.)

This is an inquiry into the capacity of small and militarily weak states to resist the pressure of the great powers. While it has long been widely asserted that the days of the small nations are coming to an end, the author investigates the proposition that it is quite possible for them to resist and to survive, even in the strenuous era of crisis. The study analyzes the behavior and actions of such countries as Turkey ("Neutral Ally"), Finland ("Fighting Neutral"), Norway ("Maritime Neutral"), Sweden ("Armed Neutral"), and Spain ("Unneutral Neutral") during the years of World War II. Dr. Fox concludes that, in spite of their negligible, if not completely passive role, the entire battle could have been of a different kind at certain times, "had not the governments of the small states exerted their efforts to maintain an independent policy." The small countries demonstrated that their nations' diplomats were "frequently wiser than those pressing them to take opposing courses."

At least these five small countries seem to have fared remarkably well. For instance, Finland and Norway, while being forced into the war against their will, emerged from it as completely independent countries. The others did even better for they "survived not only without the devastation of war but with increased military strength." This certainly invites a reader in the year 1960 to some thought-provoking activity, were he inclined to ponder about yesteryear's "unneutral neutral" Spain. In fact, in the case of Spain, all that we have to accept in retrospect is that "the Spaniards through a somewhat paradoxical but successful method of resistance" converted "impotence into power."

The somewhat surprising findings of this study are that, unwelcome great-power demands notwithstanding, the political power of the small nations has turned out "to be much greater than any inventory of [their] internal resources would suggest." Their leaders have often had genuine choices of action, due to the competition among the great powers to gain the good will of the smaller states.

The well-written study makes for good reading and provokes the reader into a comparison of World War II conditions with those of the cold-war era. There is no doubt that the small states in the clash between East and West "have found a greater freedom of maneuverability at the very time their military inequality vastly increased." Much indeed is now promised and given by the great-power suitors to receive slight tokens of favor and sympathy by the little.

Dr. Fox gives us a chronology of highlights of World War II in connection with the small powers surveyed, and a lengthy bibliography, mostly based on publications in English, contains some interesting and useful information on foreign sources.—MANFRED C. VERNON, *University of Alabama.*

Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815: A Study in Small Power Politics. By AMRY VANDENBOSCH. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1959. Pp. x, 318. 25.50 guilders.)

Whatever the subtitle of the work may suggest, power politics are the privilege of great powers, and small powers enter into the system as passive objects. It would be at least as accurate to describe this, therefore, as a study in great power politics. It begins with the reestablishment of the Netherlands and the restitution of its colonies after the Napoleonic wars as part of a system of restraint against France and a balance in Europe; it concludes with the acceptance of a policy of integration in Europe, consequent on the destruction which Holland in the second world war, unlike the first, shared with her neighbours. This criticism in no way detracts, however, from the value of the work as a whole. It is an authoritative account, based on ample documentation and material from the archives; and it provides a valuable assessment not only of successive foreign policies, but of the debate which surrounded them, both in parliament and the electorate.—W. F. KNAPP, *Oxford.*

Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of Church and State on the International Plane. BY ROBERT A. GRAHAM, S.J. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1959. Pp. xii, 442. $7.50.)

Persistently cognizant of the delicate relationship of church and state, this is a carefully prepared and interestingly written account of the development and problems of the diplomacy of the Holy See. The author cautions his reader that he does not deal primarily with substantive foreign policy, the international law aspects of diplomacy, or technical questions of form, procedure, and etiquette. He is concerned rather with diplomacy as an institution—a system by which, through accredited representative agents, the papacy carries on formal reciprocal intercourse with the members of the family of nations.

Following an introductory chapter, the book is divided into four sections pertaining to the origins of modern diplomatic missions, the organs of Vatican diplomacy, the Pope as sovereign in international affairs, and selected tests and challenges, especially during the twentieth century. The author pays particular attention to diplomatic relations with the United States (pp. 82–84, 321–322, and chapter 12), including an interpretation of the missions of Rufus King and Myron C. Taylor, as well as with the Soviet Union (chapter 13). A bibliography, comprising a twenty-page listing of directories, books, essays, and articles, in a variety of languages, is appended.

The principal conclusions of the author, contained in the final chapter, are rather obvious. They are that church and state are not, and never have been, entirely separated from each other in the sense that either wished to ignore the other; that Vatican diplomacy is an accepted and well-established institution even in those circles which are not suspect of partiality to the Holy See; and that it constitutes a clear instance of the confrontation of the two "societies," church and state, dealing with one another through the same instrumentality employed by states among themselves. The author refutes the position that papal diplomacy is founded on the hypothesis that states do not recognize the Pope as a religious head but deem him to be the temporal sovereign of the State of Vatican City. He also seeks to explain the status of the church as a unique agency in international law on the basis of both secular and spiritual sovereignty. In essence, therefore, he appears to be concerned with justifying the thesis that states deal diplomatically with the Vatican because the Pope is a spiritual leader, which is precisely the reason, perhaps, why some of them, like the United States, have not established such regularized diplomatic relations.

Six Allies and a Neutral. BY LLOYD A. FREE. (Glencoe: The Free Press. 1959. Pp. xiii, 210. $5.00.)

This book is a descriptive study of the international outlooks in early 1958 of about 700 representatively sampled members of national legislative bodies—100 from each of seven major countries. As a data-gathering operation, the study exhibits a nice elegance. Its sponsorship by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund is impeccable. The basic data were gathered in private, confidential interviews with each parliamentarian. The interview schedule intermixed fixed-response and open-ended questions. The linguistic and administrative difficulties of international surveying were squarely and, with one exception, successfully met. And the analysis, coding and tabulation of the open-ended responses evidence great care and display great detail.

Substantively, the study portrays, with idiographic richness and statistical precision, striking international and inter-party differences in national aspirations, in foreign policy orientation, and, more specifically, in outlook toward the Cold War. The aspiration data, from open-ended questioning, operationally define several species of national character. The Cold War data warrant the ranking of all the countries but France on a spectrum ranging from the United States at a "non-neutrality, hard policy" pole through the United Kingdom, Italy, West Germany, and Japan to India at the "neutrality, soft-policy" pole. And finally, the analysis of partisan differences intranationally and of partisan differences and similarities transnationally provides a demonstration of the extreme, not to say crucial, importance of the political party.

Despite these virtues, one must entertain certain reservations about the study. In the first place, the collection of interview data from parliamentarians in order to establish the existence of partisan and trans-national differences to which "[e]veryone who keeps abreast of international affairs has grown accustomed" (p. 197) does not seem an optimum use of research resources. Using their lore, area specialists could doubtless agree on descriptions of each country as idiographically rich as the present study's descriptions. Statistical precision in the ranking of the differences is available from the content analysis of parliamentary debates and the mass media (*vide, e.g.,* Henry Bush's unpublished doctoral dissertation, done at

Chicago) and from the analysis of legislative roll calls. A uniquely appropriate use of professional politicians as information sources would draw from them data for testing propositions not testable by "intuitional," content-analytic, or roll-call-analytic methods—*e.g.*, propositions that would explain the process by which professional partisans of different parties in the same country learn and maintain different "reality worlds," and those of similar parties in different countries learn and maintain similar "reality worlds."

In the second place, the study's remarks about theory raise expectations that the study does not fulfill. A jacket blurb asserts that the book "demonstrates the application of a highly systematic social psychology [Hadley Cantril's transactionist, neo-Deweyan theory] to the field of international relations in general." The study unquestionably "demonstrates" (as do "hyper-factual" content and roll call analyses) the existence of the differences whose existence it demonstrates. It is hard to see, however, that these differences *verify* any theoretical proposition derived in Cantril's introduction (pp. xi–xiii) or Free's terminal paragraphs (pp. 196–98). Rather, it seems (so far as *this* book is concerned), transactionist psychology merely calls some phenomena (*e.g.*, "reality worlds") by names different from those ("ideologies" or "mystiques") used in other theoretical systems or other scholarly disciplines.

Finally, the study unfortunately does not analyze, nor explain its failure to analyze, the responses to two fascinating questions in the interview schedule: would the Western bloc or the Soviet bloc prevail (end stronger) under peaceful competition over the next generation, and would the U. S. or Russia show the greater adaptability to changing conditions in the next decade. One hopes that these data are usable, and are not already buried in the files of some unavowed, official sponsor. Analysis of them would provide a significant study of the interactions, both conflicting and congruent, of policy objectives, preferred techniques of implementation, and expectations of "success" or "failure."—CHARLES D. FARRIS, *University of Florida.*

The Purge of Japanese Leaders Under the Occupation. BY HANS H. BAERWALD. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press. 1959. Pp. 111. $2.25.)

Paragraph 6 of the Potsdam Declaration set forth the terms of surrender and the over-all objectives which the victors wished to accomplish in Japan during the period of Occupation: "There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world." Concrete implementation of this high-level objective was provided by a series of measures, initiated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other United States agencies and in effect ratified by the eleven-member Far Eastern Commission, which included the arrest and trial of suspected war criminals and also, more generally, the putting down of "anti-democratic and militaristic activity" through a ban on "militaristic, ultranationalistic, and other anti-democratic institutions," the purge of Japanese leaders being one of the prime instruments of Allied Occupation officials in this regard.

As Dr. Baerwald points out, the purge, in numerical terms at least, was highly successful, for by mid-1948 more than 200,000 individual Japanese had either been removed or barred from public office. And yet, on any substantial tests, the purge programme must probably be counted as a failure, most of the purgees in fact remaining in their political outcast status for less than five years, in spite of the stated Potsdam objective that the removal be "for all time." Much of the responsibility for the failure undoubtedly stems from the "reverse course" of American Occupation policy, due to the onset of the Cold War: instead of removal of militarists and ultranationalists the prime objective of the purge now seemed to have become the ousting of Communists and their sympathizers. Yet even without such externally induced equivocations in Occupation policy, it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the purge programme was doomed to failure from the outset, because of its own inherent contradictions. First, we would have to note the Allied equation of "militarism" and "anti-democratic activities," which introduced a fatal confusion into the attempt at postulation of viable criteria for application of the purge, and so diverted attention from the most immediate task of removal of the erstwhile wartime leaders in Japan. Again, so far as the evidence for the carrying out of the purge had to consist *faute de mieux* in such facts as the holding of particular offices over particular time periods, or membership in particular groups or organizations, the purge was necessarily premised on the principle of guilt by association: a more unpromising legal tool for the inculcation of "democratic" attitudes in a defeated people is hard to envisage. And the sort of "label thinking" that inevitably led to the formulation of rigid black-and-white categories—the pro-war vs. anti-war, and the pro-democratic vs. anti-democratic, dichotomies—seems equally objectionable on jurisprudential grounds as inconsonant with the Western concept of the Rule of Law in its substantive aspects.

Baerwald's calmly dispassionate and objective study is a sobering warning of the immense practical difficulties involved in imposing a liberal democratic polity from above, and also of the need for a certain display of humility as much on the part of the Occupation powers as of the people whom they have defeated.—EDWARD McWHINNEY, *Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.*

The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947–1950. BY LEON GORDENKER. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1959. Pp. xii, 306. 18.75 Gilders)

This study, based primarily on official documents, is concerned with the workings of three United Nations' field commissions in Korea. It is "a close-up view of their work, an attempt to fill in the political details by closely examining important discussions, the atmosphere in which they were held, the results that were anticipated." The work is in method essentially descriptive, historical and diagnostic.

The author's skillful use of the UN documents is highly rewarding, bringing to light useful infortion on many critical events in the development of the Korean question. The chapters dealing with such crucial developments as the advice of the Interim Committee and the UNTCOK's decision to observe the 1948 election should be particularly illuminating to the general reader.

Domestic politics of Korea are treated primarily as responses to the commissions' work, and the author's references, made rather peripherally, are confined largely to the views of prominent Korean personalities. The work thus omits an important part of the situational data, namely, the identification and systematic inquiry into the ideologies and activities of the major Korean groups. Furthermore, it might have been well had the author kept in mind that each participant group sought to limit the transformation in the pattern of power to the attainment of a favorable position for itself. The proposition seems relevant to the study of group activities, Korean or non-Korean, in the Korean arena.

The author judiciously examines cleavages of opinion among commission members which accompanied the major decisions, pointing out a fairly consistent pattern of behavior among the members. However, no sustained effort has been made to explain the why's of their behavior. The author's views on the matter, sporadically placed, do not encompass the psychological data. If the instructions from the home governments cannot adequately explain the behavior of the members, the discussion of other situational elements alone would not suffice. The psychological determinants, *i.e.*, the effects of the motivations, personalities, attitudes of the participants on the situation must also be considered. Even if such data were not easily accessible or available, a more explicit awareness of the various factors affecting group cohesion as well as other determinants would have helped to free the work from its self-imposed limitation.

In the concluding chapter, the author discusses for the first time the possibilities and limitations of two other forms of UN field subsidiary: a single representative form and a commission of experts. The propriety of injecting unsubstantiated statements in the concluding chapter may be questioned. If the study was meant to throw light on the problem of which form of field subsidiaries is the best organ for the use of the UN, the problem, together with the author's theoretical assumptions, might more appropriately have been stated and investigated from the beginning.

In his preface, the author modestly suggests that a field commission would not be the best possible organ in "the delicate sort of situation found in Korea." With his intimate knowledge and experience with the United Nations, the author neither attempts to characterize "the delicate sort of situation" nor provides any criteria whereby a given situation could be so classified. The author could have justifiably suggested, among other things, that the effectiveness of the United Nations influence varies inversely with the degree to which their interests, as envisaged by the participants, are actually or are assumed to be conflicting.

Despite the author's modest claim, the work on historical grounds alone is a valuable contribution. The reviewer can only regret the absence of a deliberate attempt to make the findings of the study theoretically meaningful and significant.—YOUNG-CHIN KIM, *Hobart & William Smith Colleges.*

India and Anglo-Soviet Relations (1917–1947). BY CHATTAR SINGH SAMRA. (New York: Asia Publishing House. 1959. Pp. xi, 186. $3.15.)

Mr. Samra's book is a chronological and factual survey of Anglo-Soviet relations concerning India and Afghanistan. No new ground has been broken. Only the traditional English language sources have been used. The book is useful if one wants to get a quick general idea of the impact of Anglo-Soviet rivalries on the peoples and policies of India and Afghanistan. To the specialist, however, the book is likely to prove disappointing.

In the opinion of this reviewer the main body of the work is artificially narrow in scope. The author fails to establish his case for isolating India and Afghanistan from the over-all elements of British and Russian foreign policies. We are not told in what special and significant ways the problems of these two countries contributed to the shaping of British and Russian policies.

The author puts much too much emphasis on the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy. To say that under the Bolsheviks Russia's foreign policy underwent a "radical" change—because of ideology—seems rather misleading. The Russians used ideology as an instrument but were ready to discard it when it came in conflict with their national interests. From the days of the Baku Conference the Communists have been faced with the task of reconciling Russian national interests with genuine revolutionary fervor. The theses of Lenin and Roy were steps in this direction. And Mr. Samra would have better satisfied the specialists by dealing with the Baku Conference, the training of the revolutionaries in Central Asia, the role of people like Mahendra Pratap, Barkatullah, and Moulvi Obeidullah. We know so little about these matters.

In his epilogue Mr. Samra corrects some of his earlier observations. Here he recognizes the role of national interest not only in Soviet foreign policy but also in the policies of the Afghan government and Indian independence movement. He rightly points out that the leaders of Afghanistan and India leaned towards Soviet Union's international power position and not her communism. On the other hand, Russia sacrificed local Communists without a pang whenever the need arose. Mr. Samra might have made his analysis of the Afghan situation a little more penetrating by discussing the diversity of national minorities in Soviet Central Asia and Afghanistan. Afghanistan had more reasons to be friendly towards the Soviet Union than India.

Mr. Samra is correct in saying that in the inter-war period the Soviet Union's fears for her security were exaggerated. The same should be said of British India. Great Britain, primarily a maritime power, was unduly nervous in the inter-war period of Russian encroachments against India and Afghanistan.—Brijen K. Gupta, *Southern Illinois University.*

The Soviet Union and the Middle East. By Walter Z. Laqueur. (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1959. Pp. x, 366. $6.00.)

Although books on the Soviet Union relations with other parts of the world have been published in relatively considerable number, no serious studies on Soviet relations with the Middle East have been made available to Western readers before Spector's *Soviet Union and the Islamic World* and Laqueur's *Soviet Union and the Middle East.* The latter's work is by far the more elaborate and readable, and it deals specifically with Soviet policy and problems as they relate to recent developments in the Middle East. Mr. Laqueur's first work, entitled *Nationalism and Communism in the Middle East* (1956), dealt with the rise and development of the Communist ideology and parties in the Middle Eastern countries. The present study is intended to interpret Soviet policy and tactics from Russian sources. The book under review is divided into two parts. The first discusses the Soviet relations with the Middle East until Nasir's arms deal of 1955; and the second, entitled the "great breakthrough," discusses the Soviet's sudden successes since 1955. In the first part Mr. Laqueur makes it clear that, judged by Soviet writings on the Middle East, the Soviet rulers changed their attitude and tactics toward the Middle East no less than Westerners did. The Soviet supported the Arab countries in their struggle against the French and British domination in 1945 and 1946; but turned against them on the partition of Palestine in 1947. The Soviet attacked Nasir in 1954 as "reactionary" and supported Nagib and the Muslim Brotherhood only to discover that Nasir was prepared to deal with them against Western powers. Mr. Laqueur rightly argues that the Soviet Union did not quite grasp the reaction of the new rulers of the Arab countries against the West, whom they thought were not progressive enough. When, however, Nasir came out boldly to buy arms from a Soviet satellite and defied the West, Mr. Khrushchev immediately seized the opportunity. The chain of subsequent events—the Suez Crisis, trade agreements with Egypt and Syria, the Syrian crisis of 1957, and the Iraqi revolution of 1958—demonstrated the deep cleavage that had developed between the new rulers of the Arab world and the West which the Soviet fully exploited.

Mr. Laqueur's book was published before the events in Iraq demonstrated that the drift of Arab nationalism toward the Soviet was superficial rather than a genuine association of Arab nationalism with Soviet ideologies. One gets the impression from reading Mr. Laqueur's book that Arab friendship with the Soviet was more than receiving arms and political support in achieving national objectives. The exchange of terse statements between Nasir and Khrushchev in 1959 on their conflicting policies toward Iraq, and the subsequent conflict between Arab nationalism and communism, demonstrated that the Soviet could easily be disappointed in their attempt to exploit internal nationalist movements to their advantage. The Soviet's greatest asset was that it had kept aloof for a long while from involvement in internal Arab affairs when Arabs were struggling for their independence with Britain and France. When the Russians involved themselves in inter-Arab rivalries, despite their support of the Arabs against the West, they discovered how soon they could be disappointed.—Majid Khadduri, *The Johns Hopkins University.*

Britain and the Middle East. By C. M. Woodhouse, Publication de l'Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, No. 30. (Geneve: Librairie E. Draz, 1959, 59 pages.)

This monograph, consisting of three lectures given by the former Director-General of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, discusses in the main the objectives of British foreign policy in the Middle East in its historical perspective. The lectures reflect the mature ideas of a man who, for a long time, has been observing the events in the Middle East with a keen eye; his observations should be of greater significance since he later has become a member of the British Parliament and might have some influence in shaping future policy in the Middle East.

Mr. Woodhouse rightly observes that British policy in the Middle East has changed from one time to another. The original need to defend India has since shifted to other objectives. These are now principally strategic and the need for oil. He regrets that these latter interests were not so apparent when Britain was in control of the area; but now, after she has withdrawn, these interests have considerably grown in importance. He advises accommodation of British policy with Middle Eastern nationalism, and concludes that in spite of Western reverses in the Middle East, Britain can still adjust its relation with the present regimes in that area. In the absence of a general war, he believes, things might not turn out to be so bad.

This is a provocative piece of historical interpretation on which its author is to be congratulated. Majid Khadduri, *The Johns Hopkins University.*

The Cambridge History of the British Empire: Volume III, The Empire Commonwealth, 1870–1919. Edited by E. A. Benians, Sir James Butler, and C. E. Carrington. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1959. Pp. xxi, 948. $19.50.)

The third volume of the Cambridge History of the British Empire appears almost twenty years after the second—a delay caused first by the war and then by the death of its editor, E. A. Benians in 1952. It continues the history of the Empire as a political and legal institution, rather than of its separate parts. The period covered is that in which the "second" empire was carved out in the face of acute international rivalry; and in which public and politicians in Britain were confronted with the dual problem of extended dominion over primitive, non-European races, at a time when the established colonies were rapidly approaching that maturity which received formal recognition in the Statute of Westminster. The political discussion and changes in policy on the part of successive British governments in reaction to this problem are very fully discussed, and such contributors as A. F. Madden show an appropriate sense of subtlety and fine distinction in their description of the nuances of political views (even though one might wish for a fuller account of the debate about empire outside the strictly political framework).

Equally commendable is the composite description of the institutional apparatus of Empire, of the developments which took place during the period of renewed imperial consciousness at the end of the nineteenth century, and those which were proposed but never realized. As in so many other spheres it was the threat of war and war itself which promoted the most rapid political development. Proposals for consultation and common defence gave way to the actual participation of the dominions in the great campaigns of the war and the formation of the Imperial War Cabinet. Yet this concentration of effort implied independence of choice on the part of the self-governing members of the empire, and it was this that proved the decisive development, so that the period ended with their representation at the peace conference in a dual capacity as members of the Empire and as independent states (a status which, as K. C. Wheare shows, was more readily grasped by the printer of the Covenant than by legalists and statesmen).

As an account of these developments the volume forms a useful work of reference, and its value from this point of view is enhanced by an extensive and excellent bibliography. For all that, many scholars will regret the opportunities it misses and the gaps it leaves unfilled. It is essentially an account of the empire seen from the centre. Other volumes (already published) to some extent correct this impression for the old Dominions, India and South Africa. But the reader looks in vain for any adequate discussion, for example, of the other African colonies, as communities meeting the impact of imperialism, and for any examination of the structure of imperial rule in the territories themselves. In contrast, excessive space is given to accounts of international politics (Anglo-American relations, or the diplomacy of the last peace time decade) which would be more appropriate elsewhere. It is not quite clear whether the inadequacy of teatment from this point of view is a measure of the changed emphasis in colonial and commonwealth studies over the past twenty years, or whether it derives from the collapse of editorship after Benians's death; but whatever the reason it represents a severe defect in so important a work of reference. Wilfrid F. Knapp, *St. Catherine's Society, Oxford.*

Legal Effect of World War II on Treaties of the United States. By Stuart Hull McIntyre. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1958. Pp. ix, 392. 28.50 guilders.)

The author has made a valuable contribution to the study of the law of treaties. The work is primarily an empirical investigation of United States practice in regard to the effect of war on the force of contractual agreements. However, the treatment actually deals rather extensively with comparative aspects of the problem inasmuch as the co-signatories of the instruments under consideration compose such a large portion of the family of nations.

In accordance with the widely accepted view that the effect of war on conventions varies considerably with the subject matter treated therein, the writer has arranged his own classification, *i.e.*, political, humanitarian and economic treaties. Although this threefold division is useful, at times it becomes somewhat awkward and labored.

Dr. McIntyre's study confirms the generally accepted view that many treaties are not terminated by the outbreak of hostilities between the signatories. However, the author's examination of treaty actions since the early nineteenth century is truly revealing in indicating the degree to which treaties tend to survive wars. He finds that the overwhelming majority of the agreements to which the United States has been a party have not been terminated by war.

The writer states in regard to humanitarian conventions:

> Of all the multipartite treaties discussed above in the fields of the conduct of war, public health, narcotics, labor, the control of liquor in Africa, slavery, the trade in white women, the suppression of obscene publications, and the safety of life at sea, it appears that none were terminated by war. (p. 156)

He continues, "All of the bipartite humanitarian treaties which could be revived under the peace treaties were revived by the United States except the agreement with Italy regarding the smuggling of liquor into the United States." (p. 157) Of economic agreements, the author writes, ". . . it may be said that there was no case in which an economic treaty was definitely regarded by the United States as terminated by World War II." (p. 293) Dr. McIntyre notes that political treaties are less predictable; however, his findings refute the view of numerous writers that war has the effect of abrogating political treaties. He declares that the United States, ". . . does not appear to regard the termination of all political treaties as a necessary consequence of war." (p. 353) He states that ". . . multipartite (political) treaties appear to reflect a greater durability than the bipartite (political) agreements." (p. 85) Perhaps the most startling statement in this study is the author's finding that ". . . one cannot with certainty point to a single treaty which the United States may be said to have regarded as terminated by World War II." (p. 355)

The author's conclusions are somewhat perturbing. He concludes:

> It appears likely that states, the United States included, will continue for a long time to come to decide for themselves which treaties remain in force, are suspended, or are abrogated by war between the parties. One may conclude from this that the legal effect of war on treaties appears to be one of the areas in the law of treaties which is not susceptible to codification at this time in view of the lack of an agreed law. (p. 361)

The quotation above is reminiscent of Justice Cordozo's statement in *Techt* v. *Hughes* that, "The effect of war upon the existing treaties of belligerents is one of the unsettled problems of the law." This leads to the conclusion that the effect of war upon treaties is decided, not on the basis of predetermined principles of law, but by the whim of the victor. Robert E. Clute, *University of Nevada.*

Controls for Outer Space. By Philip C. Jessup and Howard J. Taubenfeld. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1959. Pp. xi, 379. $6.00.)

Controls for Outer Space rests upon the assumption that many aspects of international relations are important *per se* but are not inextricably enmeshed in politics and strategy. Professors Jessup and Taubenfeld believe that outer space and Antarctica may not become so enmeshed. The authors emphasize they are writing about possible contributions which the study of international organization can make to the controlling of man-made objects and men in space. They argue that although the danger of military rivalry in space cannot be ignored, they are entitled to discuss problems which will arise and the role which international organization can play, *on the assumption this danger can be averted.* By choosing to concentrate upon the potentialities of international organization, the authors excuse themselves from considering the negative aspects of international bodies' experience in situations where territories have been appropriated unilaterally or after a power struggle, and how they have been governed subsequently.

The most valuable sections of the book are the chapters surveying shared control of political administration, such as the condominium; international regimes, such as Tangier; functional international organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization; and national claims and international cooperation in Antarctica. These are concise and informative. Also valuable are the chapters on recent international cooperation in outer space (including the role of the

United Nations) and on the legal problems arising from activity in outer space.

Unfortunately, the authors do not always make clear why past experiences with international organization are relevant or how they can be made more relevant to controls for outer space. For example, they suggest that the international regime for Danzig is "interesting" in relation to the problem of controlling space—scarcely an analytical comparison. Again, the subtitle of this book (*And the Antarctic Analogy*) promises to tell how and why control of Antarctica has meaning for the control of space. So far as this reviewer is concerned, the reader is left with the whole burden of constructing the analogy himself from two distantly related chapters on Antarctica and outer space. When earlier experiences with international organization are said to be "pertinent" to the control of Antarctica, without reference being made to space, the reader can only wonder whether the problems are to be solved by assertion and analogy.

Value judgments and interpretations of the nature of man and of world politics are built into this book. The authors disregard their promise not to evaluate the military problems of space or historical evidence which supports the view that international organization cannot play an effective role in controlling outer space. Although Professors Jessup and Taubenfeld disclaim their military and strategic expertness, they do not hesitate to discuss the possibility of limited war in space. Without discussing the failures of international organization, the authors state: "If no previous type of organization is considered by governments to be helpful in meeting the problems confronted as man penetrates the frontier areas of the Anarctic and of outer space, new ones will be developed." Again they write: "If the scholar suggests that all national claims to the moon should be foresworn in favor of the United Nations, the military strategist is bound to ask what potential military advantage he is being asked to deny himself."

Are scholarship and military strategy incompatible? Must scholars support the "internationalization" of outer space?—Albert C. Stillson, *Montana State University.*

Soviet Conduct in World Affairs. Compiled By Alexander Dallin. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1960. Pp. 318. $4.50.)

This excellent collection of interpretative and analytical essays should help to unravel some of the riddles that are sometimes alleged to surround the subject with which it is concerned. All the selections were originally published elsewhere in widely scattered locations, and the editor has performed a service in bringing them together. As he himself observes, this is not the textbook on Soviet foreign policy that is so much needed, but it nevertheless will be a valuable supplement to existing materials for teaching purposes.

One of the best essays in the collection, alone worth the price of the book, is Daniel Bell's "Ten Theories in Search of Reality," a very fine analysis of the principal hypotheses that have been advanced in explanation of Soviet behavior. The debate among R. N. Carew Hunt, Samuel Sharp and Richard Lowenthal about the role of national interest in Soviet foreign policy is rewarding, as are the comments of Barrington Moore, Jr., on the significance of ideology, Nathan Leites' summary of the operational code of the Politburo, and the notable commentaries of Mr. X and *Historicus.* Also represented by worthy contributions are Philip Mosely, Robert C. Tucker, Michael M. Karpovich, Bertram D. Wolfe, Alex Inkeles, Henry L. Roberts, and Marshall D. Shulman. All in all, a distinguished company.

Although a great majority of the selections relate, of necessity, to the Stalin era, they nonetheless provide, as the editor suggests, perspective against which to evaluate subsequent developments. One minor criticism might be offered concerning the lack of more extensive editorial comment for the purpose of making more explicit the considerations which led to the particular choices and to the order in which they are presented.—John A. Houston, *Knox College.*

Science and Technology in Contemporary War. By Major General G. I. Pokrovsky. Translated and edited by R. L. Garthoff. (New York, N.Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1959. Pp. ix, 180. $4.50.)

Mr. Garthoff, a specialist in Soviet military and strategic thought, seems to offer this volume as a sample of the materials with which he has been working. It is, he says, "the first volume of Soviet military writings to be translated and published in English," and also "the most penetrating Soviet work ever to be written on the crucial question of the influence of science and technology on modern war." If the latter statement is correct, one has reason to shudder. General Pokrovsky develops his simple theme that "the role of science and technology in contemporary warfare is large and varied"—on what would be considered barely high-school level in this country. His "penetration" of the difficult problems of technology and war is perhaps no feebler than that of much Western military writing, but owing to the heavy doses of Marxism-Leninism included, it is considerably more confused. It is also out of date. The last of the three papers here presented was completed just before the launching of the Soviet satellites in October, 1957; and even if one could take the book seriously as a reflection of Soviet military thought at that time, with all that has happened since its present evidential value would be slight.

It is hard to know what an American reader is supposed to make of it. If it has in fact been "distributed widely," as the jacket says, "among the top echelons of the Soviet bureaucracy," it may indicate the depths of ignorance as to modern war and weaponry in which those echelons were kept. As a propagandist document, designed to urge the Russians to greater technical and scientific effort to ensure "victory" in war, without scaring them with any hint of possible Soviet aggressive intentions, the book is interesting. All the examples of the new weaponry are drawn from American or Western sources, with scarcely an intimation (this was the pre-sputnik era) that the U.S.S.R. had any part in the race toward mass-destruction. The only war explicitly contemplated is one which "the aggressors succeed in unleashing." This point of view vitiates the book as a contribution to serious military or strategic theory.

Thus, Pokrovsky dutifully repeats what was in 1957 the official position that strategic weapons must be regarded as only part of the armament, "entering into the general system . . . but *not* replacing or supplanting any other means of combat." His own unhappiness with this appears later on: military technology "must inevitably produce enormous changes" that require "of military theoreticians an entirely new manner of solving the problems facing them"; "contemporary military affairs are quite dissimilar" from those of the past, which now offers only "historical signposts"; the new world war "will be significantly different from past wars and, particularly, different from World War II." But a book which throughout basically reflects a Second War concept of warfare and "victory" fails to shed much light upon the difference, or upon the "entirely new manner" in which Russian military theoreticians are approaching their problems. WALTER MILLIS, *Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.*

The Arms Race: A Programme for World Disarmament. BY PHILIP NOEL-BAKER. (London: Atlantic Book Publishing Company; New York: Oceana Publications. 1958. Pp. xviii, 579. $6.00.)

This work is the product of at least thirty years' devotion to the cause of disarmament, and its character follows therefrom. It argues the case for disarmament—both as a means to the reduction of international tension and because of the dangers inherent in nuclear weapons; it surveys the most important aspects of disarmament negotiations since 1946; and it puts forward practical proposals for the continued pursuit of this objective. As a public figure the author commands respect both for his moral courage and his intellectual integrity; this inevitably extends to a book which, while pleading a case, shows an authoritative command of the facts, and is both informed and informative.

Die Saar Zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich: Politische Entwicklung von 1945-1959. BY PER FISCHER. (Alfred Metzner Verlag: Frankfurt a/M. Pp. 280.)

This study is a detailed chronicle of German-French negotiations on the Saar in the post-World War II period. It deals only incidentally with the equally significant and complex internal politics of this buffer area.

The author begins with a brief but comprehensive outline of the thousand year history of the Saar and a presentation of its contemporary economic status and significance. He then traces these post-World War II developments: (1) the initial French efforts to acquire the coal and iron of the Saar as a balance against German economic superiority, (2) the later series of attempts at "Europeanization" of the area, (3) the final reunification of the Saar with West Germany.

Fischer, an official of the secretariats of the Council of Europe and the Western European Union, was keenly disappointed in the failure of Europeanization. His book is written as a case study in a lost opportunity to do what he regarded as raising an object of national conflict above traditional rivalries through a supranational solution. In spite of his disappointment with the final results, he does present enough details of the negotiations leading to the reunification with Germany to indicate how constructive statesmanship in both Germany and France removed the Saar as an obstacle for future Franco-German cooperation.—WILDER CRANE, *Vanderbilt University.*

Algeria before the United Nations. BY MOHAMED ALWAN (New York: Robert Speller and Sons. 1959. Pp. xii, 121. $3.50.)

In this small volume the author, First Secretary of the Iraqi Embassy in Washington, reviews UN debates and decisions on the "question of Algeria" between 1955-58. With a concise chapter on historical background, he proceeds to report without prejudice the attitudes of both sides.

On the plane of legality the issue centers around the competence of the UN to intervene in a conflict regarded by France as "essentially" within her "domestic jurisdiction" and by the Afro-

Asian Bloc as a serious threat to world peace and a violation of human rights. Both sides base their arguments on the UN Charter and precedents in international law. France's claims that conquest constitutes a right and that the Algerians are French citizens with "equal" rights and privileges, are challenged on the grounds that unilateral action does not constitute legality, and that the discriminatory treatment of the native Algerians deprives the concept of "equality" of all content.

Although he analyzes the voting behavior of the different blocs, the author hesitates to explore further the political motives and power interests behind their voting record. This would undoubtedly have required a thorough study of the national and regional interests of the UN members but would have been highly rewarding.

Writing before the September 16th declaration in which de Gaulle offered the Algerians the choice of self-determination, and the 14th session of the General Assembly which failed to pass a resolution on Algeria, the author's predictions that "the new political front of de Gaulle has no solution to offer . . . (p. 73) and that the UN "will recognize the independence of Algeria in the forthcoming session in September 1959 (p. 75), may be excused.

While the UN has failed to provide a solution to the Algerian question as a result of the bloc-voting system and France's intransigence, no one would deny the moderating influence, on both sides, of the world's most eloquent forum. Recent developments in Algiers, however, make it safe to predict that so long as de Gaulle is in office, the solution of the Algerian problem will take place outside the UN. Had de Gaulle not survived the "insurrection," ensuing anarchy might have made UN intervention inevitable. Mr. Alwan has made a contribution in providing all interested persons with such a valuable handbook.—FAUZI M. NAJJAR, *Michigan State University.*

A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict. BY RONY E. GABBY. (Geneve: Librairie E. Droz. 1959. Pp. xvi, 611.)

In the conclusion of this study, the author writes " . . . throughout the Arab-Jewish dispute, for every justifiable reason which the Israelis or the Arabs advanced for their attitude towards disputable problems, the other side could always present a counter-reason—equally justifiable and equally founded in history and ethics." This observation aptly summarizes the tone and scope of the book. It was as objective an analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict as one could expect to find. It takes up in detail each argument and counter-argument and painstakingly reviews the intricate Arab-Israeli problems, while focusing on the tragic Arab refugee dilemma.

Written by a former Iraqi Jew who has lived for some time in Israel, this study was prepared as a thesis at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. It is essentially a straightforward chronological analysis of the refugee problem within the context of the over-all difficulties between Israel and her Arab neighbors and that of the wider world political area. Interspersed in this account are descriptive analyses of key issues and problems concerning refugees, such as "How The Refugees Are Living," "The Status of The Arab Refugee in The Host Countries," "The Repatriation Issue" and the problem of "The Abandoned Arab Property." Preceding this lengthy treatment of the subject is a succinct introduction concerning the Arab-Zionist controversy in Palestine prior to 1947. Without going over once again material concerning the rise of Zionism and the development of the Palestine problem that has already been dealt with more than adequately in numerous studies, the author in a brief fifty-three pages presents a cogent background to the sociological, economic and political roots of the refugee problem.

The body of the study takes up more than five hundred pages and is followed by a brief twelve-page conclusion. This is a noteworthy fact, for what more could be said in an objective analysis of the refugee problem than "it would be futile to try to give a just verdict between the conflicting claims of the two sides . . . it is quite evident that not one specific element but the combined effects of different factors such as: the Arab leaders' encouragement, the flight of local leaders, fear of the Jews and the human desire to escape war and damages, combined in bringing about the mass flight of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs in less than six months." With regard to the solving of this highly complicated and tragic problem the author tries to present encouraging indications, but he is forced to conclude that the probability of these being implemented is open to serious challenge. Actually, the author's conclusions with regard to the refugees takes up only half of his last chapter. The other six pages are devoted to "the Big Powers and the Middle East," which seems to be a misplaced addendum.

The book is marred by more than a fair number of typographical errors. To a certain extent this may be excused as the book was published in a non-English speaking country. On the other hand one of the strengths of the book comes from the background of the author which enabled him to use freely sources in Arabic and Hebrew as well as the standard western languages.—BENJAMIN RIVLIN, *Brooklyn College.*

Latin America and the Palestine Problem. By Edward B. Glick. (New York: Theodor Herzl Foundation. 1958. Pp. viii, 199. $4.50.)

This is an illuminating account of the rôle which the Latin American states played in the Palestine drama after the British government had decided to divest itself of its mandatory responsibilities and to refer the Palestine problem to the UN for whatever solution the world organization might devise. As the author indicates, the geographical remoteness and political non-involvement of the countries of Latin America enabled their representatives in the UN to base their policies in the Palestine situation on general principles of humanitarianism, the self-determination of peoples, the juridical equality of states and the universality of UN membership rather than considerations of a more immediate self-interest. In virtually every stage of the Palestine debate adherence to these principles caused most of the Latin American states to support the Zionist aspirations even if their votes brought them into opposition to the policies of the United States and the other great powers. Only in the deliberations of the status of Jerusalem did the majority of Latin American representatives, obviously mindful of the Catholicism of their populations, adopt the demand of the Holy See for the full territorial internationalization of the city as a means of safeguarding Catholic interests in all of Palestine while Israel, like Jordan, refused to relinquish its respective portion of Jerusalem and conceded but the internationalization of the religious shrines themselves. If the balance sheet demonstrates that Latin America has supported the Jewish side much more often than the Arab side, the main reason must be seen in the fact that prior to Israel's admission into the UN the Jewish side seemed to be more intimately associated with the moral and philosophical concepts embraced by Latin America. That it was not Zionist propaganda or some anti-Arab bias which prompted the Latin Americans in their decisions becomes clear when one observes how the same humanitarian impulses which led the Latin Americans to solve the problem of the European Jewish survivors of Hitlerism by the partition of Palestine, now express themselves in favor of the Arab refugees from the area which has become the state of Israel. In his concluding chapter, Dr. Glick, a non-governmental representative on the U.S. mission in the UN, uses his data on the Palestine issue to bring to light the considerable, if not decisive, influence of the Latin American states in the General Assembly, as well as the frequently overlooked fact that UN procedures redound to the advantage of its less powerful members. Joseph Dunner, *Grinnell College.*

The United States and Latin America. Edited by Herbert L. Matthews. (New York: The American Assembly, Columbia University. 1959. Pp. ix, 221. $2.00.)

This volume contains the background papers prepared for the participants in the American Assembly who discussed United States-Latin American relations and the Final Report of the Assembly containing the consensus of opinion of the delegates as to what the United States could do to improve its relations with Latin America.

The six papers prepared by Frank Tannenbaum (describing Latin America), K. H. Silvert (discussing the political forces of the area), Edward W. Barrett and Penn T. Kimball (analyzing the role of the United States news media in informing the public about Latin America), Reynold E. Carlson (presenting the economic picture), Herbert L. Matthews (reviewing the history of United States diplomatic relations with Latin America), and Charles G. Fenwick (analyzing United States recognition policy in the area), are all excellent summaries of the topics covered. The most valuable is probably Professor Tannenbaum's "Toward an appreciation of Latin America" which, in the opinion of this reviewer, is the best short description of Latin America available.

The final report of the Assembly recommends a policy for the United States Government similar to what most competent scholars have been advocating for decades and should be made required reading for all administrators in the State Department and all members of the United States Congress. This is a most useful book which teachers will want to call to the attention of their students. —Harry Kantor, *University of Florida.*

A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations: 1830–1871. By Henry Blumenthal. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1959. Pp. xiv, 254. $6.00.)

This scholarly monograph is the first detailed study of the relations of the United States and France during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. It is based on thorough research in published and unpublished sources. It deals with the maneuverings of the diplomats, but it also gives some attention to economic forces and to the mixed feelings with which French monarchists and republicans watched the growing power of the United States. Four chapters, constituting about half the book, cover the years from 1830 to 1861. The remaining three chapters are devoted to the tense decade of the American Civil War, the French interventon in Mexico, and the Franco-Prussian War.

The first four chapters deal with issues and events which usually receive only casual notice in standard histories of American diplomacy. Aside from brief discussions of minor incidents, the principal themes of these chapters are the unrealistic efforts of French diplomacy to check American expansion and the fluctuations of trade and investments which affected the relations of the two countries. By studying so carefully these little known aspects of Franco-American diplomacy, the author has provided a work of value for specialists. The events themselves, however, still seem relatively unimportant; and it is unlikely that the textbooks will be revised to give greater prominence to Franco-American relations between 1830 and 1861.—HAROLD WHITMAN BRADLEY, *Vanderbilt University.*

American Labor's Role in Less Developed Countries. Published by the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations. (Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. Pp. vi, 70, n.d.)

This is a brief report of the proceedings of a conference held at Cornell University in 1958, and sponsored jointly by the AFL-CIO Department of International Affairs and the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at the University. Of the papers printed—most probably in abbreviated form—the most interesting are "An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Programs in Less Developed Countries," by Dean Harlan Cleveland of Syracuse who develops with great skill the well-known thesis that international affairs are now mostly the internal affairs of other nations; "The Role of the Free Trade Union in a Less Developed Nation," by John Dunlop of Harvard who presents a resume of some of the ideas developed in his recent work on "Industrial Relations Systems"; careful reports on the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (William Kemsley of the ICFTU), the International Labor Organization (Bert Seidman of the AFL-CIO), the International Trade Secretariats (John Windmuller of Cornell), a brief paper on "Problems of Management in Less Developed Countries" by Charles A. Myers of M.I.T. In addition to more or less conventional phrases the conference produced a number of interesting ideas.—ADOLF STURMTHAL, *Roosevelt University.*

Trade and Economic Structure. BY RICHARD E. CAVES. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1960. Pp. viii, 317. $6.00.)

The subject of this book, the theory of international trade, will appeal to many political scientists, but the approach is perhaps too technical for those totally unacquainted with modern economic thought. The work is a scholarly catalogue of the major 19th century and the major and minor 20th century contributions to international trade theory. The author revives many writings temporarily ignored because they did not fall easily into the main stream of the developing theory. Certainly such a periodic revival is valuable, particularly in this area where the main stream frequently reaches a dead end; and when a new stream is developed, its origins may later be discovered many years back in partially forgotten articles. Professor Caves catalogues the divergent recent contributions side by side, without attempting to reduce them to one coherent theory and without demanding that all adopt identical restrictive assumptions. It is a valuable book, but not for the reader who wants only a summary of recent trends in trade theory.

International Affairs: Since 1939 to Present Day. BY DR. SUSHIL CHANDRA SINGH. (Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal. 1959. Pp. iii, 387. 10 rupees)

It is cheering to see scholars in other countries —particularly in free Asia—grappling with the intractable yet urgent field of international relations. Dr. Chandra Singh describes the settlements at the end of World Wars I and II. He devotes nearly one-third of his study to the institutions of the United Nations, "the most significant development of the post-war era." The balance of his book is devoted to a description of the foreign policies of the United States, Russia, Britain, France and India, a discussion of growing regional institutions, and changing political trends in the Middle East, South East Asia and the Far East. The author is kind to American policymakers, although there are clear contradictions in his reactions to military security pacts, their causes and consequences. He judges India's basic policy as sound, but thinks Mr. Nehru has not faced certain liabilities in its execution. He views with skepticism and vigilance the Soviet Union's policy of "peaceful co-existence," but a deeper analysis of Soviet doctrine, military investment, economic modernization and subterranean organization would have provided a more convincing basis for his argument. In the eyes of this reviewer Dr. Singh attaches too much importance to public statements by leading personalities and insufficient attention to such limiting circumstances as the location of possibly threatening neighbors, rapidly changing productive and military technology, and the capabilities of the political economy to release from minimum consumption and investment requirements a margin of resources expendable for foreign policy purposes. There does not seem to be a rigorous frame of reference by which the different elements of his discussion are related to one another. His style is discursive; the thought is neither tight nor free from inconsistencies.

But Dr. Chandra Singh is by no means alone in not having overcome the very real difficulties which still beset the international relations field. It is to be hoped that other Indian and Asian scholars will try their hand, too. Seeing the world from a fresh, more distant view, they may be able to penetrate further beneath the surface than Dr. Chandra Singh and many another student have succeeded in doing.—W. HOWARD WRIGGINS, *Library of Congress.*

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WILLIAM H. ROBERTS
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NEWS AND NOTES

1960 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1960–61

The 1960 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 8–10, at the Statler Hilton Hotel in New York City. Professor C. Herman Pritchett, of the University of Chicago, is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting the Nominating Committee (comprised of John W. Masland, Chairman; Ethan P. Allen; Hugh Elsbree; Thomas P. Jenkins; William W. Marvel; and Donald S. Strong) will propose the following officers for 1960–61: President-elect, Charles S. Hyneman (University of Indiana); Vice-Presidents, Merle Fainsod (Harvard University); Maure L. Goldschmidt (Reed College); and John A. Perkins (University of Delaware); Secretary, George A. Peek, Jr. (University of Michigan); Treasurer, Max M. Kampelman (Washington, D. C.); Members of the Council for two years, Lawrence Durisch (Tennessee Valley Authority), William O. Farber (University of South Dakota), Ivan H. Hinderaker (University of California, Los Angeles), John T. Holden (University of New Hampshire), Gladys M. Kammerer (University of Florida), Richard C. Snyder (Northwestern University), Kenneth W. Thompson (Rockefeller Foundation), and John D. Williams (University of Utah).

PROGRAM: 1961 MEETINGS

Early appointment of the Program Committee for the annual meetings of the Association to be held in St. Louis, Missouri, in September, 1961, makes it timely now to invite anyone having program suggestions for the occasion to convey them as soon as may be convenient, and prior to October, 1960, to the Chairman or an appropriate member of the Committee. Its members are: Wallace S. Sayre, Columbia University, Chairman; Ralph K. Huitt, University of Wisconsin, National Government; Charles R. Adrian, Michigan State University, State and Local Government; Allen Westin, Columbia University, Public Law; Dwight Waldo, University of California, Berkeley, Public Administration; Henry W. Ehrmann, University of Colorado, Comparative Government; Alexander Heard, University of North Carolina, Political Parties; Louis Hartz, Harvard University, Political Theory; Morton A. Kaplan, University of Chicago, International Relations.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The thirty-sixth annual session of the Institute of World Affairs, sponsored by the University of Southern California in co-operation with the colleges and universities of the Pacific area, was held at the Huntington-Sheraton Hotel, Pasadena, California, December 6–9, 1959. The Institute of World Affairs is the oldest organization of this kind in the United States. This year's session was under the directorship of James T. Watkins, IV, professor of political science, Stanford University. The overall theme of the conference was "This New Age of Discovery." Participants included: The Very Reverend Leonidas C. Contos, Dean, Saint Sophia Cathedral; General Lauris Norstad, USAF, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; Charles F. Horne, Vice President, Convair; T. Keith Glennan, The National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Colonel George A. Lincoln, USA, Head, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy; Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; Joseph Caplan, University of California at Los Angeles; Thomas E. Murray, Consultant to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The Institute's Executive Committee includes Charles E. Martin, University of Washington, J. William Robinson, Whittier College, and Graham H. Stuart, Emeritus, Stanford University. Paul E. Hadley, of the University of Southern California is executive secretary of the Institute and Chancellor Rufus B. von Kleinsmid, of the University of Southern California, is its chancellor.

A conference on the Research Function of University Bureaus and Institutes for Government-Related Research was held August 17–28 at the Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley. The Conference was sponsored by Gilbert Y. Steiner, director, the institute of government and public affairs, University of Illinois, York Willbern, director, bureau of government research, Indiana University, and Dwight Waldo, director, bureau of public administration, University of California, Berkeley; and was supported by a grant to the sponsors from the Ford Foundation. Participants, in addition to the sponsors, included the following: Charles R. Adrian, Ethan P. Allen, Franklin L. Burdette, Winston W. Crouch, Rowland Egger, George A. Graham, Morton Grodzins, Robert Highsaw, V. O. Key, John W. Lederle, Norton E. Long, Harvey C. Mansfield, Peter H. Odegard, Vicent Ostrom, Frank Pinner, Wallace S. Sayre.

Papers were presented on the following subjects: "Research in Politics"; "Bureau Research and Community Decisions: Some Points of Intercept"; "Public Policy Studies: An Approach to Government Research"; "Comparative Studies"; "Research in Public Administration"; "Research in Metropolitan Affairs"; and "Methods in Social and Political Research." These papers, plus comment thereon, and a summary statement by the conferees will be published in 1960 and will be available from the sponsoring committee.

A new organization, interdisciplinary in nature, called the International Studies Association, has been organized, dedicated to the better teaching, research, and understanding of international relations. The first annual conference was held at the University of California (Berkeley) in April. The program included papers on "A New International Studies Association: Purposes, Problems, and Proposed Organization"; "The Changing Nature of International Relations"; "Is There a Discipline of International Relations?" "The Foreign Policy of President DeGaulle." Speakers included Richard C. Snyder of Northwestern, Graham Stuart of Stanford and M. Robert Luc, Consul General of France. S. Grover Rich, Jr. of the University of Utah is the general chairman of the new organization.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

A fourth edition of the biographical *Directory* of members of The American Political Science Association will be under the editorial direction of Franklin L. Burdette, professor and director of the Bureau of Governmental Research, University of Maryland, College Park. A copy of the *Directory* will be mailed to each member of the Association upon publication in 1961. The editor asks prompt return of the biographical questionnaire recently sent to each member. Professional biographies of new members joining the Association by the summer of 1960 will be included.

The Maxwell Graduate School of Syracuse University in cooperation with the Danforth Foundation, will present the second faculty seminar dealing with problems of metropolitan areas during the period August 28th–September 7th. This ten-day seminar will focus on identification of substantive problems of urban regions and on the research methods available for the analysis of those problems. The 1959 seminar was considered very successful as an interdisciplinary approach to the complexity of the metropolis, and this year's plan is built upon that experience.

Section K—Social and Economic Sciences—of the American Association for The Advancement of Science will hold sessions for contributed papers at the annual meeting of the A.A.A.S. in New York, December 26–31, 1960. Association members interested in presenting a paper at these sessions should forward titles and abstracts not later than September 1 to Donald P. Ray, Secretary of A.A.A.S. Section K, National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, George Washington University, Washington 6, D. C. Papers should be based on research recently completed by the author. The A.P.S.A. is an affiliate member of the Section on Social and Economic Sciences of the A.A.A.S.

The American Council of Learned Societies announced in late February that in a national competition it had awarded grants to 61 scholars for research in the humanities and related social sciences. Of these, one went to a political scientist, William S. Livingston of the University of Texas, for a study of the British Liberal Party.

A bureau of government research has been established at the University of Rhode Island. John O. Stitely became the director of this new bureau in February, 1960. He will continue as associate professor of social science.

On March 28–30 the department of political science at Berkeley held a conference on the French Fifth Republic, organized around three central themes—the constitutional framework of the Fifth Republic, the Fifth Republic and Europe, and the Fifth Republic and Africa. Papers for the first theme were presented by Andre Mathiot and Henry Ehrmann; for the second by Jacques Rueff, Paul Reuter and Roy Macridis; for the third, by Thomas Hodgkin and Benjamin Rivlin. Public lectures were delivered by Paul-Marc Henry of the French Foreign Ministry, on "Future Relations Between French-speaking African States and English-speaking States in Africa"; by Thomas Hodgkin on "The States of French-speaking West Africa and Their Neighbors"; by Henry Ehrmann on "Constitutional Developments in the French Fifth Republic"; and by Milorad Drachkovitch, Berkeley, on "French-American Views on the Fifth Republic." Other participants in the conference, which was chaired by George Lenczowski, included, from France: Lucien Neuwirth, Deputy from the Loire; General Pierre M. Gallois (retired); and Michel Crozier, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto; from Mali: Gabriel d'Arboussier, Member of the Federal Assembly; from England: William Pickles, London School of Economics; from the United States: Robert Baum, U. S. State Department; James Coleman, University of California at Los Angeles; William Diebold, Council of Foreign Relations; Val Lorwin, University of Oregon; David McLellan, University of California, Riverside; Robert Neumann, University of California, Los Angeles; Calvin Nichols, World Affairs Council, San Francisco; Lowell Noonan, University of Southern California; Theodore Von Laue, University of California, Riverside; Nicholas Wahl, Harvard University; Gordon Wright, Stanford University; and faculty members at Berkeley in political science, history, law, economics and French.

A new survey of graduate programs in public administration, covering all colleges and universities in the United States which currently offer such programs, is presently under way. Launched in March 1960, the survey is being conducted at the request of the American Society for Public Administration by the Higher Education Division of the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The survey is being carried on by means of mail questionnaire and will cover such areas as objectives, admissions policy, organization of the curriculum, degree requirements, student financial assistance, internships, placement services, faculty, and current and cumulative information concerning enrollments and degrees granted.

Ward Stewart specialist in business and public administration in the Division of Higher Education, is director of the survey, and the project is under the general supervision of Harold A. Haswell, Director of the Programs and Homer D. Babbidge, Jr., Assistant Commissioner for Higher Education. Members of the advisory committee include John D. Millett, Miami University (Ohio); Lloyd M. Short, University of Minnesota; Harlan Cleveland, Maxwell School, Syracuse University; Don K. Price, Jr., Harvard University; Henry Reining, Jr., University of Southern California; Donald C. Stone, University of Pittsburgh; Stephen B. Sweeney, University of Pennsylvania; and Don L. Bowen, Associate Director, A.S.P.A. Publication of the report, including both narrative text and individual program descriptions, is planned for late 1960 or early 1961.

The tentative publication title is *Graduate Study in Public Administration.*

The department of political science at Emory University, in conjunction with the Communicable Disease Center, put on a Management Seminar for Public Administrators, March 14–18, in which Wallace Sayre, Schuyler D. Hoslett, and Rowland Egger participated.

The Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh conducted a new type of executive development program during the first two weeks of February. It focused on personal development for effective performance of the participants' executive role. Twenty-four senior officials took part, from federal agencies, the Port of New York Authority, two national research organizations, and one city managership. Nathan D. Grundstein, a member of the School's faculty, was the designer and director of the program. Problems, puzzles, visual aids, and other techniques were used at the start to demonstrate obsolescent and inadequate assumptions, patterns, principles, stereotypes, and emotional factors in executive practice.

The Herman Gerlach James Lecture Series in Municipal Government has been established at Ohio University. The lecture series has been named in honor of Dr. James, a former president of Ohio University; and is made possible by a gift of $10,000 from Mrs. George E. Frazer, sister of the late Dr. James. The first lecture will be presented during the academic year 1960–61.

Henry J. Abraham, associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, was granted one of twenty $1000 awards given by the University of Pennsylvania for excellence in teaching. The awards represent a new policy designed to emphasize and provide recognition for superior teaching accomplishments.

Paul C. Bartholomew, professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, was a visiting lecturer during the winter quarter at the University College, University of Chicago.

Howard Bavender, doctoral candidate at the University of Texas, was appointed assistant professor of political science at the College of Idaho for the spring semester 1959–60.

Leonard Binder of the University of California at Los Angeles has been granted a one semester sabbatical leave and a special leave of one semester to do research in Egypt on political ideologies. His work will be supported by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Robert Blum, president of the Asia Foundation, served as lecturer at the University of California, Berkeley, for the 1960 spring term.

Irene Blumenthal, formerly of the University of Oregon, has been appointed acting assistant professor in the department of political science and assistant to the overseas programs, at Stanford University.

Phillips Bradley, who was appointed to the United States Information Service on July 2, 1959, is now Attache of Embassy and Public Affairs Officer, USIS, at Kathmandu, Nepal.

R. Wallace Brewster is visiting lecturer at the Institute for American Universities, affiliated with the University of Aix-Marseille, France.

John H. Bunzel, of Stanford University, has been appointed to the advisory committee of the newly formed Constitutional Rights Section of the Attorney General's office in California.

Eugene L. Burdick, associate professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, was on leave during the 1959 fall semester.

Ben G. Burnett, associate professor of political science at Whittier College, has been appointed director for the school year 1960–61 of the Whittier College program in Copenhagen, Denmark.

Paul Camp, adjunct professor, in the school of government and public administration of The American University, on April 10, 1959, accepted a Superior Service Award from the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare "For meritorious contributions to personnel administration, particularly for vision in anticipating manpower needs and planning to meet them."

George A. Codding, assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, went to Switzerland between the fall and spring semesters of the current academic year for an intensive study of the recent election of the Swiss Federal Council. The trip was financed by a research grant from the University of Pennsylvania.

Jules Cohn, instructor in political science at Brooklyn College, has received a grant-in-aid for research in practical politics from the Eagleton Foundation.

Cornelius P. Cotter, Stanford University, is serving his second year as special consultant to the chairman of the Republican National Committee.

James C. Davies, associate professor of political science, California Institute of Technology, is visiting professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, this year.

Herbert A. Deane of Columbia University will be on sabbatical leave during 1960–61.

Robert DeVelbiss of the University of California is serving as lecturer in the department of political science, University of Washington, during the winter and spring quarters, 1960.

William E. Diez of the University of Rochester will be in Africa on sabbatical leave during the academic year 1960–61.

William Ebenstein, professor of politics, Princeton University, was Haynes Foundation lecturer at Occidental College during March.

Salo Engle returned to his post at the University of Tennessee after a tour of duty with Point Four as Codification Advisor to Panama and as Visiting Consultant on Comparative Law at the Harvard Law School. In recognition of his services, the President of Panama made Professor Engle a Knight of the order of "Vasco Nunez de Balboa."

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., assistant professor of political science at the University of Rochester has been awarded a grant under the program for research in American Governmental and Legal Processes of the Social Science Research Council.

George B. Galloway attended the biennial meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in Canberra, serving as secretary of the U. S. Senate delegation composed of Senators Frear, Engle, Keating and Scott.

Dante L. Germino, assistant professor of political science at Wellesley College, has been granted a leave for research in political theory in England next year, on a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Malbone W. Graham has been granted a one-semester sabbatical leave from the department of political science at U.C.L.A. to pursue research in Europe.

Morris Greene, professorial lecturer in the school of government and public administration, The American University, participated in sessions of the CCAQ (Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions) in Rome, Italy, April 13–17. This is the Inter-Secretariat body established to coordinate administrative matters among the major international organizations.

Bertram Gross will serve as a visiting professor of political science at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, for the academic year, 1960–61.

Nelson Guild, of the department of government, Hamilton College, is the recipient of an Eagleton Foundation grant, for a case study of the interaction of party and interest group organizations in migratory labor politics in upstate New York.

With the support of a grant by the Ford Foundation, Professor Jerome Hall of Indiana University will make a tour of Mexico and South America from June 4 to September 25 of this year. The principal purposes of the tour are: (1) to hold seminars and lecture in the fields of (a) theory of criminal law (b) philosophy and science of law and (c) comparative law; and (2) to participate in round-table discussions of the above fields of law, in which scholars in the various countries visited will be invited to present their views. Professor Hall will also exchange views with Mexican and South American scholars about current research and plans for developing programs of research in legal science and comparative law.

John H. Hallowell of Duke University will teach courses in political theory at Utah State University during the first session of the 1960 summer program.

William A. Hambley, Jr. has been appointed as instructor at Macalester College for the spring 1960 semester, substituting for Professor G. Theodore Mitau during his sabbatical leave. Mr. Hambley is currently with the University of Minnesota.

Lowell H. Hattery of the school of government and public administration of The American University, attended the 12th International Congress of Scientific Management in Sydney Australia on February 22–March 4, 1960. In addition to serving as discussant on panels, Professor Hattery presented one of the principal papers of the Conference upon the subject of "Management in Government."

Murray C. Havens of Duke University will be a visiting faculty member at The Johns Hopkins University for the summer session of 1960.

Robert A. Horn of Stanford University, has been appointed a senior research associate in American Government by the Social Science Research Council for 1960–61.

Charles D. Hounshell of Emory University has recently been appointed editor of the *Journal of Politics* to succeed Donald Strong.

Samuel P. Huntington will hold the Ford Rotating Research Professorship in Governmental Affairs, at Columbia University during the fall term.

Norman Jacobson, associate professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, is on sabbatical leave during the spring semester, 1960. He is conducting research in Florence, Italy.

Philip C. Jessup will be on leave from Columbia University for the academic year, 1960.

Victor Jones, professor of political science, is the University of California representative to the graduate school of administrative sciences, University of Bologna, during the current academic year.

Joseph Wood Krutch was visiting research professor of governmental affairs at the University of California, Berkeley, during the 1960 spring semester.

David W. Knepper of the University of Houston has been appointed a member of the Texas Commission on City and County Government.

Richard P. Longaker of Kenyon College will be on leave of absence 1960–61 as visiting professor at Cornell University.

Austin F. Macdonald, professor of political science, University of California, Berkeley, is on leave during the 1960 spring semester.

Theodore McNelly, of the far east division of the University of Maryland, gave a series of lectures on "The Growth of the American Nation" at the University of the Ryukyus, Naha, Okinawa, in Decemger, 1959.

Joseph M. Maloney of Fordham University has been appointed administrative assistant to Governor Foster Furcolo of Massachusetts under a special program of the Citizenship Clearing House sponsored by the Ford Foundation. Professor Maloney will serve with Governor Furcolo until the end of 1960.

Andre Mathiot, professor of law, University of Paris, is visiting professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, during the 1960 spring semester.

Herbert Maza is teaching international relations at the Faculte de Droit, University of Aix-Marseille, France.

Mrs. Keith Miller has been appointed an instructor in political science at Whittier College.

G. Theodore Mitau, chairman of the department of political science at Macalester College, St. Paul, will be on sabbatical leave during the Spring 1960 semester, During his absence, Dorothy Dodge will serve as acting department chairman.

Emmet V. Mittlebeeler, associate professor of government and public administration at the American University, has been named executive secretary of the National Academy of Economics and Political Science, effective November 1, 1959.

George Modelski of the Australian National University and during 1959–60 visiting assistant professor at the University of Chicago has been appointed visiting research associate in the center of international studies, Princeton University.

Daniel Ogden of Washington State University has been awarded the Citizenship Clearing House Democratic National Committee fellowship for 1960. His replacements for the two semesters will be Ronald Bevensee and Walfred H. Peterson.

Richard H. Leach of Duke University will serve during the summer of 1960 as visiting lecturer in political science at the University of Houston.

Howard C. Perkins, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, will be teaching summer session, second term, at the University of Colorado this year.

Pitman B. Potter will lecture on international relations during the spring semester at the Institute for American Universities at Aix-en-Provence, France.

James W. Pratt, assistant professor of government at Lafayette College, has received a Social Science Research Council Award to participate in a summer institute on the administration of Criminal Justice to be held in Madison, Wisconsin.

Robert S. Rankin, chairman of the department of political science at Duke University, has been appointed by President Eisenhower to the Commission on Civil Rights.

J. William Robinson, chairman of the department of political science and international relations at Whittier College, will do research at the United Nations during the summer 1960 under a grant received from the Danforth Foundation.

Harold H. Roth, professor of government and public administration at the American University, is on sabbatical leave for the spring semester, 1960.

Robert A. Scalapino, professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, is on sabbatical leave during the 1960 spring semester.

Richard F. Schier of Franklin and Marshall College has been granted leave to accept an appointment as deputy superintendent of public instruction for higher education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Lincoln Smith of New York University has been appointed a member of the Maine Quoddy Commission.

Loren E. Tesdell, assistant professor, has been granted a leave from Temple University during the spring semester, 1959–60 to undertake an exploratory mission in Jordan for the American Friends Service Committee's Social and Technical Assistance Program. Also, during his ten-week stay in the Near East and after returning home, he will continue his research and writing on the administration of the United States and United Nations technical assistance programs in Jordan and Iraq.

Eric Voegelin, director of the *Institut für Politische Wissenschaften*, University of Munich, will spend the fall semester at the University of Notre Dame, under its distinguished professor program.

George V. Wolfe, professor of political science and chairman of the division of economics, history and political science, the College of Idaho, will be spending his sabbatical leave during the spring and summer of 1960 in Europe and the Middle East.

Shao Chi Yuan, formerly assistant professor of public administration at the University of Southern California, has been appointed visiting assistant professor of political science at Kansas State University.

Harold Zink of Ohio State University is teaching at Victoria University in New Zealand in the spring and summer, 1960.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Donald Balmer has been named chairman of the political science department, Lewis and Clark College.

John C. Bollens has been promoted to professor at the University of California at Los Angeles.

Zbigniew Brzezinski has accepted a post as associate professor of government at Columbia University, effective July, 1960.

Fred G. Burke, Ohio Wesleyan University, has been appointed an associate professor of political science at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University.

The Rev. Joseph T. Cahill, C.M., has been appointed dean of the college of arts and sciences and also academic vice president of Niagara University.

Lawrence H. Fuchs has been appointed as dean of faculty at Brandeis University after serving as chairman of the department of politics.

Joseph P. Ganley, C. M., has been appointed assistant professor in the department of history and political science at Niagara University.

David T. Cattell has been named associate professor in the department of political science at U.C.L.A.

John Crampton has joined the faculty of Lewis and Clark College as assistant professor.

Joseph P. Farry has joined the political science faculty of Fordham University as an instructor.

William Fleming, chairman of the department of political science at Ripon College, Ripon, Wisconsin has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science.

Edward B. Glick, formerly director of the Commission on International Affairs of the American Jewish Congress is now a senior human factors specialist with System Development Corporation, which is connected with the Rand Corporation.

William M. Goldsmith has been appointed as assistant professor of politics at Brandeis.

Robert E. Goostree has been promoted to the rank of professor of government and public administration at the American University.

A. Clarke Hagensick has been appointed as assistant director of the bureau of government of the University of Wisconsin and will be in charge of activities of the bureau in the Milwaukee area. He is appointed as an assistant professor of political science.

Erwin C. Hargrove, candidate for the doctorate at Yale University, has accepted an instructorship in the department of political science at Brown University, beginning next September.

Richard Harvey has been appointed an instructor in political science at Whittier College.

Robert S. Jordan who recently completed his D. Phil. at Oxford University on a Fulbright fellowship, is executive assistant to the dean and assistant professor of public and international administration at the graduate school of public and international affairs, University of Pittsburgh.

Marc Karson has become assistant director of the labor institute at Southern Illinois University. He is also doing a half hour program over KMOX-TV St. Louis, a forty week series intended to arouse interest in American politics in this presidential election year.

Josef Korbel, professor of international relations and staff member of the Social Science Foundation, University of Denver, has been appointed director of the Social Science Foundation and Chairman of the department of international relations.

Walter Kurylo, lecturer in the school of government and public administration of the American University, has accepted an appointment on the staff of the United States Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which is making a comprehensive study of national transportation policies pursuant to Senate Resolution 29 of the 86th Congress.

Louis S. Loeb of The American University, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

Robert E. Lorish has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Ohio Wesleyan University for the four year term, June 1960–June 1964.

William R. Monat has resigned as administrative assistant to the governor of Michigan to accept an associate professorship with the institute of public administration at the Pennsylvania State University.

L. Vincent Padgett has been promoted to associate professor at San Diego State College.

Guy J. Pauker has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the University of California, Berkeley.

Ralph E. Purcell has joined the faculty of the University of Delaware as chairman of the department of political science. Professor Purcell formerly served with the U. S. Diplomatic Service in India.

Ralph H. Retzlaff has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley.

John P. Roche resumes the chairmanship of the department of politics (at Brandeis University) after serving as dean of the faculty for two years.

William H. Roberts has been appointed director of the institute of international law recently established at The Catholic University of America.

Edgar S. Robinson has been promoted to the rank of professor of government and public administration at The American University.

John R. Romani, formerly associate director of the Cleveland Metropolitan Services Commission, has joined the faculty of the graduate school of public and international affairs of the University of Pittsburgh as associate professor of metropolitan affairs.

Thomas A. Rusch, Donald P. Kommers, and Hal Fishman have accepted appointments in the department of government at Los Angeles State College. Rush is an assistant professor, Kommers and Fishman are instructors. All appointments became effective September 1, 1959.

I. Milton Sacks has been promoted to associate professor of politics at Brandeis University.

Wendell G. Schaeffer, until recently a senior consultant of Public Administration Service and their resident representative in Burma since 1955, has been appointed associate professor of public affairs at the graduate school of public and international affairs of the University of Pittsburgh.

Currin V. Shields of U.C.L.A. has accepted an appointment as professor and head of the department of government at the University of Arizona at Tucson, effective September 1, 1960.

Paul Shoup has been appointed in the fields of international and Russian studies at Kenyon College.

Robert Slusser has been appointed a research associate in the department of political science at Stanford University.

Dwight Waldo, professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, has been appointed director of the bureau of public administration at Berkeley. Eugene Lee, assistant professor, has been appointed assistant director of the bureau.

Eugene V. Walter has been promoted to associate professor of politics at Brandeis University.

David A. Wilson, formerly acting assistant professor, has been named assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Peter Woll has been promoted to assistant professor at the University of California (Los Angeles).

IN MEMORIAM

John Cotton Brown, associate professor of political science and public administration at Cornell College, Iowa, died suddenly on September 18, 1959, following a very brief attack of asthma. Only 39, Professor Brown's life was arrested in mid-career. He prepared at the University of Florida, where he received a B.A. in 1942. He then earned his doctorate at the University of Chicago in 1949 with a dissertation on *The 1948 Progressive Campaign: A Scientific Approach.*

Brown began his professional career as assistant professor of political science at Bard College in 1950–51, and served as assistant professor at Brandeis University from 1953–55. He came to Cornell College in 1955 where his signal talent was recognized by promotion to associate professor in 1958. During the second World War and from 1951 to 1953 he had served as an administrator in several federal agencies in Washington.

His teaching career at Cornell has been distinguished by his contagious love of people, by the excellence of his scholarship, by his devotion to his students, by the warmth of his friendship for them and for his colleagues, and by the energy and enthusiasm with which he faced the daily tasks.

John Cotton Brown was able to a remarkable extent to combine a life of political activity with theoretical speculation. Energetically interesting himself in the civic problems of the State of Iowa, he served with distinction as a member of the Advisory Council to the Iowa State Bar Association Committee on Judicial Reorganization. In the fall of 1958 he organized, and was chairman of, the first bipartisan conference on Civil Service for the state. Active in Iowa Democratic Party affairs, he was a frequent advisor to Governor Herschel Loveless, who attended the funeral.

Professor Brown served as president of the Iowa Conference of Political Scientists and Chairman of the Iowa Conference of University Professors. He was a member of ASPA, AAUP and APSA.—Eric C. Kollman and Charles R. Foster.

With this issue the Review makes a virtue of necessity, we hope, in changing its format and type size for articles and book reviews. The Executive Committee of the Association, at its last meeting, concluded that the change was imperative as an offset to the latest increase in printing rates, which took effect with the March issue. There is also said to be scientific evidence that a double-column page is easier on the eyesight.—Managing Editor

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By Douglas V. Verney, Lecturer in Government, University of Liverpool

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

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

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